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CHAM • IUIS o, 
- -~ttitch ~htics ~istrfrt @ourt 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
1100 COMMERCE STREET 
DALLAS . TEXAS 75242 
.JUDGE BAREFOOT SANDERS 
July 10, 1989 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
University of Georgia 
School of Law 
Athens, Georgia 30605 
Dear Al: 
I agree with many of Judge Hodges' suggestions, as set forth in his 
June 26 memo, and add the following comments, some of which may 
overlap with those of Judge Hodges. 
1. Section 2256. I am concerned that states may find the system 
proposed in (b) (4), (b) (5) and (c) so onerous and/or expensive 
that they will consider it unattractive. Could we strike these 
sections and provide in (b) (2) and/or (b) (3) for each state to 
appoint (and compensate) counsel who meet these standards, 
leaving to each state the method of appointment? I think it 
important that each state's standards be approved by the 
relevant federal circuit court, as Hew Pate has suggested, 
despite problems of comity. (Of course, the very existence of 
federal habeas creates comity problems.) 
"' - -
Judge Hodges' substitute proposal, see his paragraphs 7 and 8, 
would require oversight and policing, if I understand it 
correctly, but might be feasible; I just have some doubts about 
it. 
At some point we should obtain informal reactions from a few 
states regarding our approach; perhaps you have already looked 
into this. I recall the testimony before the ABA committee that 
in Arkansas the state pays a total of $1,000 to trial counsel in 
each capital case. I doubt that Arkansas will be willing to pay 
more to state habeas counsel. 
Should we require that state habeas counsel be different from 
trial counsel? The ABA committee has heard testimony 
recommending this approach. 
If we adopt your procedure, we should make clear that we are 
referring to the Chief Justice of the highest court of the state 
with criminal jurisdiction. As you know, in Texas that is the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. 
Of course, whatever system we agree upon, it quickly becomes 
apparent that no standards are required for state trial counsel 
(who handle the "main event"), despite there being standards for 





this anomaly will not long exist, and that states which opt for 
our system will very likely also set standards for trial counsel 
in capital cases. I have some unease that we may be spawning 
litigation re inadequacy of trial counsel by setting standards 
for habeas counsel versus no standards for trial counsel. 
However, I have no solution for this problem, if it is one, and 
I may be nit-picking. 
Section 2257. As to the expiration of stay in lb) (1). I agree 
with Judge Hodges that this needs to be more clearly tied to the 
tolling provisions of 2258. Like him, I have continuing 
difficulty in meshing 2257 and 2258. 
Section 2259. I agree with Hew Pate that it would be preferable 
for district courts to retain their present authority to 
adjudicate the merits, thus retaining current procedure and 
requiring one less change. 
Does 2259 nullify the present authority of the federal district 




I look forward to seeing you in Washington later this month. 
cc: Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Chief Judge Charles Clark 
Chief Judge Paul H. Roney 
Sincerely, 
/ ' ) 
~~ 
·~([;;;~DERS 









245 EAST CAPITOL STREET. ROOM 302 
JACKSON , MISSISSIPPI 39201 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL 
CHIEF JUDGE PA UL H. RONEY 
July 14, 1989 
CHIEF JUDGE WM. TERRELL HODGES 
JUDGE BAREFOOT SANDERS 
PROFESSOR ALBERT M. PEARSON 
Dear Judges and Professor: 
(801) 353·0911 
I enclose a proposed modification of Professor Pearson's draft statute which 
incorporates most of the comments of Judges Hodges and Sanders. I also suggest a 
pr~~port by our committee which includes an analysis of the statistical data we 
have on hand. Since these show the main delay occurs in federal habeas, I recommend 
that we not keep the elaborate requirements for appointment of counsel or for federal 
approval as Judge Sanders suggests. This step may be added later if experience shows it 
is needed. I have also suggest a preamble to the legislation. It will, of course, be 
discarded in any bill, but should serve as a worthwhile introduction to members of 
Congress who might look at it. 
My hope is that this proposal will benefit our effort to achieve a committee 




cc: William R. Burchill, Jr. 
. . ...... J'\ •• -...---., ... - · · ·-- ~ -- ------ -. - ...... . ... --- , .~-.--. -,· 
- C,/4_~J ~L~~-1-
0'~ ...... ~ t-</1 .... f/u· ...---/4..,.,...:,..:.-
Comnittee Report 
, /I ---I 7 ;I •C-L ( ~_,,,-- ~ ( / ,z 
When Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist formed this 
corrmittee, his charge to us was to inquire into "the necessity 
and desirability of legislation directed ~oward avoiding delay 
and the lack of finality" in capital cases in which the prisoner 
had or had been offered counsel. He specifically directed our 
attent i on to the following issues: (1) better coordination of 
state and federal collateral procedures, (2) exhaustion, (3) 
/ 
expediting federal habeas corpus review, (4) a statute of 
l i mi tations for collateral proceedings, and (5) lack of finality 
i n the collateral process. We have examined statistical 
information, studied case histories, considered many articles 
published in leading journals, solicited and considered the views 
of a broad spectrum of organizations and attorneys interested in 
the area, and conferred extensively. Our report to the 
Conference follows. 
I n 1 9 7 2 , F u r man 
k b1 v. ~(1c;1t,), ~ 
~f-~~~ cj~ 
v~ Georgia allowed states to impose the / 
lt/12 
death penalty based on guidrjury discretion.\ Since ~n, 1 there 
,,.,:/'/ ,,_._ oJ,-~ /l_fA,.,~ ~f-~ /.LI-~ 
(J'lA'-"'Y_ ~ _/_ ' 
~  µ ~ ~~ ~~ 4.c-<~  
~~ ~h-1--~~ ~~~ £:!.~. 
-.r,c,.-··--·--· . . ·- .·•· ......... --· --- ·- - . "'.·- · ·--· ·- .. _. -- - -.-·-· . - : . --·----•--~.--------- """- . ,· -:-·---.- - --
fa~•r:-----•-
- -
challenges in the state for~~- This results in delayed or 
ineffective federal collateral procedures. Other factors also 
contribute to the present process of difficult and unsatisfactory 
collateral adjudication. Prominent among them is the fact that 
the Supreme Court has handed down 71 decisions · affecting various 
phases of death penalty litigation since Furman. Until the 
recent decision in Teague limited the effect of new precedent on 
0--~ ~ 
long pending litigation, ffitrR-Y of these decisions created new 
A. 
rules that spawned relitigation of settled collateral issues and 
the pending of such cases delayed the process of adjudication. 
Capital litigation must be improved if the death penalty 
remains a constitutional form of punishment for ~~l E:.~FIIITI rra ' 
proceedings. The Comnittee's ~etdile;u analysis of cases from 
~ . 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas shows that 80% 
of the time spent in collateral litigation in death penalty cases 
occurs outside of state collateral proceedings. A table showing 
- 3 -
.... -~- .... ,_ ••·77 . -
- -
the average time periods and ratios in death penalty cases in 
these states is attached to this report. Underlying data is 
available from the reporter. 
No single reason for this disproportionately high federal 
\ 
percentage can be identified. The recorrmended legislation is 
~f-.. 
designed to achieve a single state proceeding~ exhausts all 
issues and, if necessary, is followed by a single federal habeas 
corpus action. To accomplish this goal, we are convinced that 
the petitioner must be represented in state post-conviction 
review by competent counsel who stays with the collateral 
proceedings through any federal court habeas corpus litigation. 
This goal can best be achieved with the initiative and 
cooperation of - the 37 states that authorize imposition of the 
death penalty. We would hope that those governments would also 
take steps to make their trial and direct review process in death 
nu_ /.l.. f-t:J-.~ 
penalty cases as error-free as possible.~ We bel-~ th~y mu.sJ: 
~petent counsel~~t petitioners for state 
I\ /\. • 
collateral review. 
It.~~,»~.> 




review p r o c e e d i n g s ~ s h o, ti ~Q., l;;l.e =+ill.a i m ,U e.d aAd-Al 0-H l d p o.s ~ i !) l y ~ 
ef" eli.11i1.ated. The single, well-counseled series of collateral 
proceedings we envision would best ensure that every proper issue 
L2A-
is raised and decided in t-.l;i~ i:i:ies.t orderly way. 
A 
The legislation we propose to effectuate the one prompt, 
--
counseled state/federal post-conviction process provides that 
~ 
 counsel 
~ Gp-ll4--p,_,,-~  
is appointed by a state, a statute of limitations 
" 
would begin to run as to all claims cognizable in federal 
habeas. At this time, an automatic stay of execution, if needed, 
could be obtained. This stay would remain in place until all 
collateral proceedings were completed. The prisoner would have 
~'i w.....,._ ~ a-/ ~/.-c,..k ~~ 
six months within which to file in federal court. This 
" ~J_ 
limitation assur~f that the presentation of issues will not be 
I\ 
de l a y e d • T i me w o u 1 d 3-t-e p -nrmrti'tg w h e-A__.___..,..,...-f)·~-i-s-·01H~ r £...U e d f Q F ~ 
~ 
s t &<~"e1:N-1--a--'t'E~Ll--r-~"N~:-.... . n At O 1 1 e d du r i n g s u Ch 
state proceedings. When state proceedings conclude/, th~ t:>--f' 
would reconrnence ~d and any federal petition would 
~ 
have to be filed within the time provided or be time-barred 
I\ 
- 5 -




unless petitioner could show a basis for relief that had not been 
presented, that a substantial question of guilt existed, that new 
~~yu-,--~-f-
facts had been found, or that new fundamental rights had been 
A 
developed. Since 28 U.S.C. §5 1657 and 2243 already require all 
federal habeas corpus proceedings to be expedited and decided 
"forthwith" and "sumnarily," no additional legislation requiring 
priorities for the handling of federal habeas corpus proceedings 
W-L- ~ ~<f 1~1- ~1- ,14. , ~ ~1-~ 
is needed .i · · . · · 
/'. ' 




51:P.~u\RY OF DEALTH PENALTY LITIGATION STATISTICS 
BASED ON 50 CASES FROM FLORIDA, TEXAS, 




End of state direct appeals 
Direct certiorari review by U.S. S. Ct. 
Execution 
Valid sentence to: 
End of state direct appeals 







Sentence to cert. on direct/sentence to execution 
Down time*/sentence to execution 
State collateral/sentence to execution 
Federal collateral/sentence to execution 
Total collateral/sentence to execution 
State collateral/total collateral 
Federal collateral/total collateral 























- k~lfa4t:r.L ~ ~ 
J~ 17, 
Representation by competent counsel in all post-conviction 
proceedings for prisoners in state custody subject to a capital 
sentence would best ensure justice and minimize delay. Such 
representation is now available in all federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. This bill is intended to encourage states to make 
such representation available to indigent prisoners in state 
post-conviction proceedings by eliminating unmeritorious, 
successive petitions and requiring prompt filing of habeas corpus 
-
claims in federal courts. Its goal is to achieve a more orderly 
post-conviction review process in both s t ate and federal court 
that will both assure constitutional rights of capital sentenced 
pr i soners and protect the interest of society in the meaningful 
enforcement of this constitutional punishment. 




Habeas Corpus in Capital Sentencing: Special 
Procedures 
[new] 
Habeas Corpus in capital sentences of prisoners 
in state custody; appointment of counsel 
(a) This subchapter shall apply to cases arising under 
section 2254 of Title 28 involving prisoners in state custody who 
are subject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if 
indigent pri 'soners have been offered the assistance of competent 
counsel at all stages of post-conviction proceedings authorized 
by the state. 
(b) For the provisions of this subchapter to apply to it, a 
state must establish and fund a resource center or equivalent to 
recruit, select, and compensate counsel in state post-conviction 





Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on 
stays of execution; successive petitions 
If, during the pendency of any state or federal post-
convicton proceeding claiming the violation of a right arising 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, a state 
issues a writ for the execution of a prisoner under a capital 
sentence who is represented by counsel, the writ shall be stayed 
by any district court in which habeas proceedings are pending or 
could be instituted. The stay shall expire automatically if 
counsel for the state prisoner fails to file a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the district court within ...!lQ_ days of 
the final judgment of the highest court of the state on direct 
appeal and through the t ime for filing a petition for certiorari 
in the Supreme Court of the United S t ates after direct appeal , 
and, if such a petition be filed, through the date of final 
disposition of the petition. If a petition for habeas corpus is 
so filed, then the stay shall expire automatically upon final 
determination of such habeas corpus proceedings. 
The 180-day period provided shall be tolled during any 
- 3 -
- -
period counsel has pending before a state court of competent 
jurisdiction a petition for post-conviction relief. 
No federal court thereafter shall have the authority to 
enter a stay of execution in the case unless: 
(1) the basis for the stay is a claim not previously 
presented in any state or federal court; 
(2) the facts underlying the claim are sufficient, if 
proven, to undermine substantially the court's confidence in the 
jury's determination of guilt on the underlying offense or 
offenses for which the death penalty was imposed; and 
(3) the failure to raise the claim is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States; (B) based on a federal right newly recognized by 
the Supreme Court that is retroactively applicable, or (C) based 
on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered 
.. - • : . ~,. : ~ : •• :.A : - ·· ·.'· 
through the 'exercise o·f - re·a~onabie ·d·1·1·igence ·in -; time ·to present 
.... -~ ' . .\ • 
the claim for state or federal ~post-conviction review. 
4 -
. ... -r·-- "· ,-.-.- . :;_:,._ 
Section 2258 
- -
Filing of habeas corpuus petitions 1 time 
requirements; tolling rules 
Counsel appointed under section 2256 to represent a state 
prisoner under capital sentence must file any petition for habeas 
corpus in the appropriate federal district court within 180 days 
from the effective date of appointment. The filing rule 
established by this section shall be tolled: 
(a) During the time period running from the date of the 
affirmance of the capital sentence on direct appeal by the 
highest court of the state through the time for filing of a 
petition for certiorari in the Snpreme Court; and, if counsel for 
the state priosoner files such a petition for certiorari, through 
the date of final disposition of the petition. 
(b) During any period in which a state prisoner under 
capital sentence has a properly filed request for post-conviction 
. review pending .before a ~state court of competent jurisdiciton; if 
all state filing rules are made in a timely manner, this period 
shall run continuously from the date that the state prisoner 
files a request for post-conviction review of his capital 
- 5 -
~ ~---·--· ... - . 
- -
sentence in the court of conviction or other proper trial court 
until final disposition of the post-conviction review proceedings 
by the highest court of the state. The filing rule is not tolled 
during the pendency of certiorari proceedings in the Supreme 
Court of the United States related to such state collateral 
proceedings. 
(b) During an additional period not to exceed 60 days, if 
counsel for the state prisoner: (A) moves for an extension of 
time in the federal district ~oirt that would have proper 
jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of :·a habeas corpus 
.. ::·. 
petition and (B) makes a showing of good cause for counsel's 
inability to file the habeas corpus petition within the 60-day 
period established by this subsection. The moton for extension -
of time may not be filed prior to the completion of all state 
post-conviction review of the validity of a capital sentence. 
-· - . ' · -· 
.. \.'.:·:.--.: ~:~-. 
. ·- . - ~ ....... - ..... 
... . .. "' " .. ,. . .. -.. .. ·_:p.,;, .;: : -'W_.J,,.. • 
-.. .: -~ ~ -·.· . 
, .... ,-. - - ... - _ ..... 1•.' .. . 
. .. -~ -~. ' . ,_ 
_:· .. . _.,, ·. •; ,_. , .:. :1.).".J •. f• . • ~ • • ~ .:.--:• ··· •:·~:----• -- ·· ... . ~ .;. •.. 
':. . ,. : ,,,.. ''1', ! • ---~; .: : •; -·~: • . • • .... :· ,. • . ... 
- 6 -
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Section ~25!3 Evidentiary hearings; scope of federal review; 
exhaustion by a state prisoner under capital 
sentence. 
In . any habeas corpus proceeding under this subchapter a 
district court shall consider and rule upon any request for an 
evidentiary hearing and conduct any evidentiary hearing necessary 
to complete the record for the purpose of habaas review. [Upon 
the development of a complete evidentiary record, the district 
court shall rule on the merits of all claims properly before 
it] [Upon the development of a complete evidentiary record, the 
district court shall certify · the record to the court of appeals 
as ripe for the adjudication of all claims properly before it]. 
[(c) Upon the receipt of a record from a district court in a 
case involving a state prisoner under capital sentence, the court 
of appeals shall proceed to consider and resolve all propoerly 
preserved and presented calims as if the case were on direct 
_appeal f_rom a r~li-ng -of _the :·.distr .ict ·- court advers·e-: to .. t .he ,. : J • ;,c ,:<. • • •~ •..., • 
_ .,, . 1. 
~--_,...., -~ : . . ::..:...:i ~: ~ .•: .. ··.' ':.• r ~. •- -~ 
· ·-;; ... ~ ~-t . ' ... •-• 
petitioner on all ·claims ·, · including any request · for an 




Unexhausted claims shall not be considered by the district 
court and shall be dismissed by a district court under § 2254(b) 
or (c), unless the prisoner can show that the failure to raise or 
develop the claims in the state courts is (A) the result of state 
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States; (B) based on a federal right newly recognized by the 
Supreme Court that is retroactively applicable; or (C) based on a 
factual predicate that could not have been discovered through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence in time to present the claim for 
state post-convction review. 
•: ... 
- 8 .) 
-- -
Section 2260 Certificate of probable cause inapplicable 
The requirement of a certificate of probable cause in order 
to appeal from a district court to a court of appeals does not 
apply to any habeas corpus proceeding subject to the provisions 
of this subchapter. 
...._,,, ·. . -. . . . . . .. ~~ .  






( ~k ,..,,.__ j. d~ L--41-: j 
Justice Powell July 18, 1989 
FROM: Hew 
RE: Habeas Committee 
I spoke with Al Pearson today, and he is working on a 
revised draft of the proposed statute. I gave him your 
Richmond address. He will send a copy of the proposal to 
you by Federal Express on Thursday. 
we received yesterday the enclosed letter and materials 
He has submitted his own proposed revi-
s i\on, as we.LJ,.-----"o S a proposed Report for the Committee. I 
~ 1-~s A_.-Jf 
have the following 2 comments: ,.,.,,....,~y 
(1) The draft statute omits any oversight or standards 
whatsoever for appointment of counsel, and instead simply 
requires provision of "competent" counsel. There . are two 
problems with this approach in my view. First, if the pro-
vision of counsel is to be meaningful, there should be some 
mechanism or standards to see to it that counsel are really 
qualified. Second, without some mechanism by which the ap-
pointed counsel may be approved as "qualified" -- say by the 
dct to which the habeas petn will come -- there will be in 
every case a round of subsequent litigation on whether coun-
sel was "effective." This would undermine finality. 
(2) While I agree with much of the proposed Committee 
report, I don't think it represents the wisest approach. It 
• - - 2 - -
focuses almost entirely on the need to eliminate delay. In 
my view, the proposal will stand a better chance of making 
it on the Hill (and in the Judicial Conference!) with a more 
balanced report accompanying it. 
I have enclosed your file from the last meeting so that 
you can review it before coming to Washington. I have elim-
--~ 
inated the duplicate materials from the file, and added a 
copy of Bill Burchill's minutes from the meeting. 






July 20, 1989 
Subject: Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear Chief, 
This Committee meets again on Thursday, July 27 at 9:30 
a.m. Of course you would be welcome to attend. 
I enclose Judge Clark's letter of July 14th, together 
with his suggested "draft 'st:.at'Ute" and a suggested report by our 
Committee. His draft includes generally the principal components 
of legislation that you suggested and that we have discussed. At 
the last meeting of the Committee, we reviewed a draft statute 
prepared by Professor Pearson and suggested a number of changes. 
Pearson promised to submit a revised draft by today, and it may 
)
have come to my Chambers at the Court. I have instructed my law 
clerk, Mike Levy to deliver a copy to you when it arrives. 
It is evident that Charles Clark has devoted a good deal 
of time and thought to our problem, and subject to clarification 
his draft has merit. His proposed report also is quite helpful. 
I am sure the Committee would welcome any comments or 
suggestions you may care to make, either formally or informally. 
Jo and I plan to return to Washington on the 26th. I can be reached 
here at the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals (804-771-2733) or at 
our residence (804-358-4647). 
I hope that you and Nan have had an opportunity to 
combine rest with being with children and grandchildren. 
The Chief Justice 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
LFP/djb 





July 20, 1989 
Dear Charles, 
Thank you for your letter of the 14th, enclosing a 
proposed report by our Committee, and a suggested modification of 
Al Pearson's draft statute. It is evident that you have devoted a 
substantial amount of time and thought to the work of our 
Committee. Your drafts will be quite helpful. I find your report 
particularly helpful. I have done some light editing, and enclose 
a draft reflecting these minor changes. 
I have not yet received Al Pearson's drafts. As always, 
my best to you and Emily. 
Honorable Charles Clark 
Chief Judge 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit 
P. o. Box 2219 










The University of Georgia 
School of Law 
July 20, 1989 
~ 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
Supreme Court of the United 
States 
1 First Street, NE 
Washington, DC 20543 
Honorable Charles Clark 
Chief Judge, United States 
Court of Appeals 
245 E. Capitol St., Rm. 302 
Jackson, MS 39201 
\ 
Honorable Wm. Terrell Hodges 
Chief Judge, United States 
District Court 
United States Courthouse 
Suite 108 
Tampa, FL 33602 
Hew Pate 
260 Stonewall Heights, NE 
Abingdon, VA 24210 
Gentlemen: 
Honorable Paul H. Roney 
Chief Judge, United States 
Court of Appeals 
601 Federal Bldg. 
144 1st Avenue, South 
St. Petersburg, FL 33701 
Honorable Barefoot Sanders 
Acting Chief Judge, 
United States District Court 
United States Courthouse 
Room 15D28A 
1100 Commerce St. 
Dallas, TX 75242 
William R. Burchill, Jr. 
General Counsel 
Administrative Office of 
the United States 
Washington, DC 20544 
Enclosed is a redraft of the legislative proposal considered at 
the June 23, 1989 meeting. New language is underlined; deletions 
from the June 23 draft are sticken out. 
Brief comments accompany each section to highlight the rationale 
behind the revisions. 
I look forward to seeing you on July 27. 
Sincerely, 
af p--
Albert M. Pearson 
Professor of Law 
Athens, Georgia 30602 
An Equal Opportunity/ Affirmative Action Institution 
- -
CHAPTER 153. HABEAS CORPUS 
Subchapter A. General Provisions [a proposed redesignation] 
[sections 2241-2255 would not be changed.) 
Subchapter B. · Review-e£ Capital Cases Senteneing: Special 
Procedures [new] 
Section 2256. Review-e£-eapital-senteneing-when Prisoners in 
state custody subject to capital sentence;-
appointment of counsel; requirement of rule of 
court or statute; procedures for appointment 
(a) This subchapter shall apply to cases arising under 
section 2254 of Title 28 involving prisoners in state custody who 
are subject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if the 
provisions of subsections (b) and (c) concerning the appointment 
of counsel are satisfied. Ne-stattlee-e~-~tlle-e£-eetl~t-±n 
een£l±et-w±th-eh±s-stlbehapte~-shall-be-en£e~eed-±n-a-p~eeeed±ng 
te-wh±eh-eh±s-stlbehapee~-±s-ap~l±eable7 
(b) To make the procedures asse~e-the-exped±eed-pest-
eenv±et±en-~ev±ew-p~eeedtl~es-±n-seet±ens-~~58-and-~~59 of this 
subchapter applicable, a state must establish by rule of its 
h±ghest court of last resort or by statute a mechanism for the 
1 
- -
appointment, compensation and payment of reasonable litigation 
expenses of competent counsel in state e£-eettnsel-te-serve 
eentinttettsly,-i£-£easible,-threttgh-state-and-£ederal post-
conviction proceedings in-eases involving state prisoners under 
capital sentence. The rule of court or statute must provide 
satis£y-the-£ellewing-additienal-eenditiens~ for representation 
of indigent prisoners whose capital sentences have been upheld on 
direct appeal to the court of last resort in the state or whose 
I 
























f:;;;~cl ... .-1_,v le-J , __ C.,,;fltl .. / /,(_,. -·.!...-c:...-<1... ct L ~1-- r I✓ j,_, 
S 
[(c) If the state \:fa.opts a mechanism for the appointment of 
..it-~ ~- /\ 
J • f _, .. i...:?..---1'1 ~ i'l. ~,-· __ .,, --
Ci.,,-<- 't .,-,, counsel as providediin subsection (b), it shall offer to appoint 
,J _,.-...l-f-',,.-
,._v'Y """" I ---
:~1 (__C) competent counsel to all indigent state prisoners under capital 
,_. {-~r----
(vt 
(Jf'f ~ 5 sentence. If the prisoner accepts the offer of appointment, an 
I. 
order appointing one or more counsel to represent the state 
pr i soner shall issue and be entered in the appropriate records of 
3 
- -
the court of conviction. After proper notice of the offer to 
appoint competent counsel, if the state prisoner refuses the 
offer or does not resEond to the offer within ? days from 
receiving it, the state shall take reasonable steps to ascertain 
whether the prisoners's refusal of the offer of counsel or 
failure to respond reflects an awareness and understanding of 
l 
the consequences. If the refusal of the offer of counsel or 
" 
failure to respond reflects an awareness and understanding of 
the consequences, an order to that effect, after a hearing and a 
factual showing by the state, shall issue and be entered in the 
appropriate records of the court of conviction. If the refusal 
of the offer of counsel or failure to respond is not based on an 
awareness or understanding of the consequences and the prisoner 
is incapable of such awareness and understanding, an order 
appointing one or more competent counsel to represent the state 
prisoner shall issue and be entered in the appropriate records of 
the court of conviction.] 
4 
- OJ~ -L f,,,~ -, -' .._l / .,-> W A .a,, , .- ._, 1/ <...:::= \ '-"'___,-r· y, ) 
((c) If the state adopts a mechanism for the appointment of 
counsel as provided in subsection (b), it shall offer to appoint 
competent counsel to all indigent state prisoners under capital 
sentence. The state shall further establish and promulgate 
procedures to formalize this process which shall include the 
requirement that the court of conviction or some other designated 
court enter: (lL~an order appointing one or more counsel to 
represent the prisoner and noting that the prisoner accepted the 
offer or was unable competently to decide whether to accept or 
reject the offer; or (2) an order, after any necessary hearing, 
noting that the prisoner rejected the offer of counsel and made 




ente r -an-erder-ef-appeintment-speeifying-an-ef£eetive-date 
therein-and-make-the-erder-a-par t -ef-the-ptlb±ie-reeerds-e£-the 


















(d) No person appointed pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) 




previously represented the prisoner at trial or on direct appeal~ 
~<--"~ 
in the case for which the appointment is made . hJ C,,,,"J-~.,.1.,; 
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~ t.,A .. ,A ... 41' ... 
\ e) The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during /~ 
4..J-
WCJ.,,,...., / t--
state or federal post-conviction review in a capital case shall 0 l,,(..y·,- "-)1-·~ 
0.- f?t;''t 
.c.....- I 
not be a ground for granting relief in a proceeding arising under 
28 USC §2254. 
COMMENT: ✓,;'his section establishes the scope of this 
legislative proposal. It is a scaled down version of the first 
draft. V AS in the first draft, it makes the subchapter 1 s 
applicability depend on the existence of a state mechanism for 
the appointment of counsel in state post-conviction review. 
However, . i1;1 this draft mo~t of the details concerning the system ~ -·cLH','-
forproviding representation are left up to the state. One point 
bears emphasis: the proposal attempts--fo·· en·cour ·age the 
appointment' of counsel for state post-conviction review. It does 
not obligate the states to fund certiorari petitions to the 
Supreme Court under any circumstances. This issue may become 
important if and when this proposal is debated down the line. 
Presently, the only time a state prisoner under capital sentence 
would be entitled to counsel before the Supreme Court appears to 
be after a fi nal order by one of the circuit courts of appeals. 
21 USC §848(g)(8). 
In subsection (c), I have proposed two a +.!~~.!:@!_ives. The 
procedures are"'-a~s:tgned to make clear-wnen the subchapter is 
triggered. I am not happy with the language in either ~/~ 
alternative. The wording of the second alternative is less 
cumbersome than the first. In any event, certainty in this 
regard is important to the integrity of this proposal. There 
~ needs to be a public record of (1) the appointment of counsel or 
t {2) a finding that the prisoner refused the offer of counsel and 
did so competently. If a prisoner can't grasp the significance 
of his refusal to accept the offer of appointment, then 
subsection {c) would require the state seeking to make this 
subchapter applicable to go ahead and appoint counsel anyway. 
Subsection {d) requires that state post-conviction counsel 
be different from a state prisoner 1 s trial and appellate counsel.~~ 
This insures a second look at the case and makes it possible for 0 
a legitimat e inqufry ~necoinpetency of trial and appellate 
counsel to be undertaken. ----------
Subsection (e), however, makes clear that the competency of 
counsel at the state and federal post-conviction phases is not a 
litigable issue at least when a petition is filed under section 
7 
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2254. If a problem arises, the remedy should be the appointment 
of new counsel when a case reaches federal district court. 21 
use §848 (q). Whether previously unlitigated issues can be 7 ~ 
injected into the case at that juncture will depend on whether f 
the requirements of section 2259 and/or Wainwright v. Sykes can 
be satisfied. 
Section 2257. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on 
stays of execution; successive petitions 
(a) Upon the filing in the court of conviction of an order 
issued Rtlflfliflg-£fem-ehe-e££eetive-date-e£-the ~r appointing 
~ 
,.) 
counsel pur'suant to section 2256 ( c), any order E-~~ a!.E_aE\. setting 
an execution date for a state prisoner under capital sentence 
shall be subject to automatic stay upon application to any 
federal court that would have jurisdiction over any proceeding 
filed pursuant to 28 use §2254. ~he-eetlft,-seate-ef-£ederal, 
that -has-jtlrisdietiefl-ever-the-s~bjeet-matter. The applicati on 
must recite only that the state has invoked the post-conviction 
review procedures established by this subchapter and tha t the 
scheduled execution is subject to a u tomatic stay. 
(b) Any stay of execution granted pursuant to subsection ( a) 








(1) Counsel for the state prisoner fails to file a 
habeas corpus petition in the proper federal district court 
\ 
within the time period provided in section 2258; 36S-days-e£-ehe 
e££eeeive-daee-e£-his-appeintmene-ttnder-seetien-~~S67 
(2) Upon completion of state and lower federal court 
post-conviction review: (AL the time for filing a petition for 
certiorari has expired and no petition was filed; (B) a timely 
petition for certiorari was filed and the Supreme Court denied 
the petition; or (C) a timely petition for certiorari was filed 
and upon consideration of the case, the Supreme Court disposed of 










(3) Before a court of competent jurisdiction, in the 
presence of counsel and after having been fully advised of the 
consequences of his decision, a state prisoner under capital 
sentence waives the right to pursue federal post-conviction 
review pursuant to 28 USC §2254. 
(c) No federal court thereafter shall have the authority to 
enter a stay of execution or grant relief in a capital in-the 
case unless: 
(1) the basis for the stay and request for relief is a 
claim not previously presented in the state or lower federal 
courts; 
(2) the facts underlying the claim are sufficient, if 
proven, to undermine substantially the court's confidence in the 
jury 1 s determination of guilt on the underlying offense or 
10 
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offenses for which the death penalty was imposed; and 
(3) the failure to raise the claim is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States; (B) based on a federal right newly recognized by 
the Supreme Court that is retroactively applicable or (C) based 
on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence in 'time to present 
the claim for state or federal post-conviction review. 
COMMENT: This redraf t incorporates clarifying changes based 
on comments and suggestions from Committee members. Subsection 
-~ ( a) ma~:=~ a_n __ ~~~~~~-c~ ~~¥- 9! ___ execut~~':~- a~pl_i _c ~e ~e __ y hen c?unsel 
''-.._.......--- is_ ~t:ea or trie of fer of couns·e-J.- is refused under section 
2256(c). The application for stay, if necessary, must be filed 
in the federal district court that would have jurisdiction over 
the section 2254 petition. Subsection (b) similarly tries to 
clarify the scope of the stay of execution provisions. In 
subsection (b)(3), it should be noted that I included a provision 
authorizing the lifting of an automatic stay when a state 
prisoner under capital sentence waives his right to pursue review 
under section 2254. I don't want to invite unnecessary 
~; controversy by incorporating this provision into the draft but 
its rationale seems obvious. 
Subsection (c) limits the authority of the federal courts to 
stay executions and grant relief after one trip through federal 
post-conviction review. The addition of the language referring 
to the granting of relief makes the authority of a federal court 
to stay executions upon the filing of a successive petition 
coextensive with the authority to grant substantive relief. 
11 
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section 2258. Filing of habeas corpus petitions; time require-
ments; tolling rules 
Counsel appointed under section 2256 to represent a state 
prisoner under capital sentence must shall-~t';;; petition for 
habeas corpus in the appropriate federal district court within 
365 days from the filing in the state court of conviction of an 
order issued pursuant to section 2256(c)~ e££eetive-da~e-e£-the 
appeifltffleflt~by-the-ehie£-attstiee-e£-the-highest-eettrt-iH-the 
state~ The time requirements £iliflg-rttle established by this 
section shall be tolled as-£ellews: 
(a) Bttriflg-the-time-peried-rttflfliflg From the date of the 
filing of a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court until 
the date of final disposition of the case, if counsel for the 
state prisoner files a petition for certiorari following the 
affirmance of his capital sentence on direct appeal by the court 
of last resort highest-eettrt of the state;~ 
(b) During any period in which a state prisoner under 




review pending before a state court of competent jurisdiction; if 
all state filing rules are met in a timely manner, this period 
shall run continuously from the date that the state prisoner 
initially files a request for post-conviction review of his 
capital sentence in the court of conviction or other proper trial 
court until final disposition of the case on appeal by the 
highest court of the state,~ The filing requirement established 
by this section is not tolled during the pendency of a petition 
for certiorari before the Supreme Court following state post-
conviction review. 
-
(c) During a period not to exceed 60 days, if counsel for 
the state prisoner: (1) moves for an extension of time in the 
federal district court that would have proper jurisdiction over 
the case upon the filing of a habeas corpus petition under 28 use 
§2254 and (2) makes a showing of good cause for counsel's 
inability to file the habeas corpus petition within the 365 day 





































Section 2259. Evidentiary hearings; scope of federal review; 
fdistrict court adjudication1 ft~ans£e~-te-eett~t 
e£-appeals-£e~-adjttdieatien1 
(a) Whenever a state prisoner under capital sentence files a 
petition for habeas corpus relief under this chapter, the 
14 
- -
district court shall: 
(1) determine the sufficiency of the evidentiary record 
for the purposes of federal habeas corpus review based on the 
claims actually presented and litigated in the state courts. 
Unexhausted claims shall not be considered except when the 
prisoner can show that the failure to raise or develop a claim in 
the state courts is (A) the result of state action in violation 
of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (B) based on a 
federal right newly recognized by the Supreme Court that is 
retroactively applicable; or (C~ based on a factual predicate 
that could not have been discovered through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence in time to present the claim for state post-
conviction review; and 
(2) consider and rule upon any request for an 
evidentiary hearing and conduct any evidentiary hearing 
necessary to complete the record for the purpose of federal 
habeas corpus review. 
15 
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(b) fUpon the development of a complete evidentiary record, 
the district court shall rule on the merits of all claims 



























Section 2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable 
The requirement of a certificate of probable cause in order 
to appeal from the district court to the court of appeals does 
not apply to habeas corpus cases subject to the provisions of 
this subchapter. 
COMMENT: No changes from first draft. Judge Hodges 
suggested that the certificate of probable cause requirement be 
revived when successive petitions are filed under this 
subchapter. Given the restrictions on successive petitions in 
section 2257, I don't think many_ prisoners will have a chance of 
getting the stay of execution that they will need to litigate any 
appeals on the merits. On the other hand, if the requirements 
for a stay in section 2257 are satisfied as far as a court of 
appeals is concerned, that is tantamount to saying that probable 
cause for the appeal exists. The certificate of probable cause 
requirement would appear to be redundant in that situation. 
- --·· ----· - · - -~--
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11. "hi ~,r•...:i .--~r1 \I~ ')) 'c"'l O .'-i'-'-·~t v .,1., !I .\. '- -; . -
Jul:; 21, 198 9 
Hon. Ler,ls F~ Po'.'1ell, Jr., 
u.s. Ct of Appeals for the 4th C5.r. 
Tenth & Main sts. 
Richmond, VA 23219 
R:S: Eew Dr2...f't Pabeas Stat1J.te 
Dear Justice Powell: 
Al Pearson!s revised. stc..tute reached ms this :r.10:rr..ing 
in Abingdon., My t:;eneral r e action is very positive. In 
view of Al• s changes , and the cc111li!ents from Judges Cl!J.rk, 
Hodges, and Sanders, I run hopeful that the Con.m:!.ttee cr.n 
.find enoueh common ground next Thursday to move to a fJna.1 
draft in tin-:.e for the J"J.dicial Conference. 
I have enclosed. a :::r1er-10 v:i tt. rr,y corrI-:ents on the n:~j or 
provisions o:: the ne•:v drs.ft. I have JTID.de little or no 
eo:rnment on the parts of' the statl~ te tJ.:.at e.re unchanged,. 
As to those I refer you to my earlier :rr:crw., 
r.:y Bo.~ Exrun study is going pretty ,'.re11, 
a 2.oss to .,__t:_1.derstand Necotiable Ins trument s. 
my best not to disgrace us. 
Yours sincer·ely, 
I I ,~~~----
Ro Rewi tt Pate 
but I F...m at 
I will do 
P. S lb Note that Al has mistakenly crossed out the cm:t:' .. ents 
to sections 2258 and 2259 of the draft,. These 
co:r.i:ne!!ts ~re new, and you should read them ev<~!l 




TO: Justice ,?ov:rell 
FROM: Hew 
July ,..,., C.-, ~ ,..,e;O 1.)"v / 
P2: .P:>o.:f • .Pecrso?J. f s 2d Draft Er.'"Jee.s Ste.tute 
I have reviewed t~e 2d draf~ statute sent by .Profo 
.Pearso::i on July 20. 'I~1.e draft loo1:s GOod, a._"Y}_d hopefu::.ly there 
-i•., l be '-'"'OU~,- c,..,.,.,.,.,,,, ,~n r,.,,..oun,.:, 1"'0,.-. -'-,~e Co...,,.,,,,~·'-+- op. .._c move +- C"Tard " J. v L... J Ll ........ u.:...:. ;..1. -..,,,_.,. 0 _ ~-\A. _ v_.... .iJLL, ..:.. t,"' ..... ...,, Li • v ,. 
a final draft at t:he next neetir.e~ I he.ve tbo follow:!.ng 
specific corrments: 
l. Sec. 22561s provisions -J:or appointmer:.t of counsel are 
much simplified, in line vri th Judse Clark's concerns c.bou t the 
intrusiveness of t}1e proced'.l:"es in the p-rior drs.ft. li.}:'choug_.'1 
it is ireportant t0 E.V'Jid unneces sa17 intrusion., there. may 
still be a need f()r so::ne stn.:idards as to i) q_:lalificu.t ions of 
counsel to be appointed, a:1.d. ii) anou.nt o~ compensationo 
.Perhaps tr:i s could be accomplished with a r.r!nimu . .1-n of complication 
a.Yl.d Vli thout disb .. ,:"."bing sta"t3 procedures by incorporat~.r ~ the 
standards n.ppllcable to federal ha'Jeo..s 2ppointments ureter the 
new federal sta~ute. 
2. The nev.r draft mal{es t7ro a.lternat:.\re proposals L:1. sec. 
2256 (cJ to deal with the s:: tuatio:n ·:rhere a prisoner ref'uses an 
, 
of'fer of appointed co1..mselo Both proposals e.::>e tied to the 
proposition that refusal of counsel must be made with ••awareness 
and understand.ing;j of the consequenceso Some provision 
probably must be ::nad.e for the situation, but the opt ions in 
the draft see::.: likely to produce colla.te:='al litisation if 
p:::-isoners later t:."y to e.vc-:.d -:he r,::·0ce d.ur·::.:.l t ::irs or t i r 13 
-2--
lirr·:!--1::s of the str,t :; t e., Litieatj02 ::;::.cht .~enter ;:,.n 2 t1oints: 
i) ~:hether the priso~er had t~e ~s:._~acity to underste.r..d the 
co~sequences., and ii) if 1:e did, ;vb.eth er e.dequa.te pro~edures 
.ere followed to o.nsure that the 17ai vcr was actually rm.de with 
"awareness and un1erstandirrg. ·1 ~ss1.:minc a provision of this 
type is needed, should i:. at leas';:; incorpor2.te a waiver sto.ndo.rd 
that is alree.dy farn.iliar {eog•, "knowing a~d intelli8e:cc" as 
f'or ~!'.ira.ndg_ waivers}? Th::.s vmuld avoid developr.1ent of a 
whole r:eu jurisp~.dence of ;'awareness a.vid understandi:ne;." 
We may also need to give some thought to the relationship 
between this provision and situations where prisoners ·•oppose 
efforts" t:, stay their eJ-:ecutior_s. The Court :".las granted e. case 
involving this situation for next te:-:~. 
3. Sec. 225C (i) proviees that the state collateral ccunsel 
shall not b3 t:1.e ~ an e counsel nho represented the prisoner at 
tr:.2.l a..Yld 0:1 direct ap::,eal. This was disct:s:rnd at the last 
r.r.eeting ar...d the rationale in Prof" Pet.rson' s co:rm::ents seens 
so"J.nd. As a p:>ac ~ical m~tter, is new coi.:;..nsel on collo..teral 
re"'rier. not already standard practice? Should the sts.ti)te 
preclude co,msel staying \tlth the case, or is there any situation 
~here this would be appropriate? 
4. Sec. 2256teJ provides that the perfor~n~ce of collateral 
counsel ca,~iot bs t ::ie basis of a nerr roun 1 of litigation. This 
is a key provisic~ if the s:rs-tem ,l"".'I ..\-f"'"\ ....,. :.,) Li v provide finality. 
5. Sec. 2257 now provides that the federel dct that ~ill 
have jurisc i ct::_on of the hc>.beas petn is to issue the e_,· t o:rw.tic 
sts.y 0 Prof. l'ea_-r,, 3 0:1. h D.s c:i. .':, l"'~:.:'i :: r:. Lhe ~ :>cJi:J ·::m co:::~--::;-·:: .:. ::1g 
expi ::--•.:1t i or: c.,·~ tl':.2 ~-;-;:, r . ·~;r V -·.:: ::,,:; ( ,- .- 3 J~ ... 1, -- ., ~. ~ ' .J\,.,c. !J 
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6. Sec. 2257 (b) (3) would cauee the stay to expire if 
the p:>isone:!'.' ':7a:i7es his ~-::.e;ht to seek federal habeas. This 
r..ei.7 p:rovi sion seems UrL"'lece ss r.try e._Yl.d could ce1.1 se problems in 
the event the prisoner cha::1:es his nind o~ce a 1-rn.rra!'1t issues. 
L:;ain, ttb.ere is the prospect of l:: t~ zatio:,:i o~.;2r t~e adequacy 
of the waiver. Of cou~se, tJ:1a prisoner's right to seek habeas 
relief in federal ct will expi:::."e v1~en the l:L-:-,"' t~tior..s period 
r-cms in any even~:~ There Tiould te little ::.arm in allowing tr:e 
~~11 limitatior..s period even ~here a pr1soner does not intend 
to seek relief, although the:::>e would be a ~trong appe::i.rance of 
po:.r,..tless del~y. J..ga.in, t:-.e rights of rri soners who "oppose 
efi'orts" and the standing of 11next frienc.n petitioners who 
seek to halt e.xec,Jtions may be rel sv2.nt here .. 
7. Seo 22.58 incluc.es cl2rifyir:0 c:-,anses but leaves the 
time requi:>er::.ents essentially unchs.n:;ed,. ':'he period ro:::1'.:1.ins a 
ge:-iercu.s 365 days 9 i.7i th tolling f or cert petns follov.1in~ direct 
review and f c~:'.' sts.te collo.teral :review, but _pot for ce:-t petns 
following ~t~te collateral review. The provision for telling 
d.-o.rin0 state coll ste r2.l re.,.~·ieV: req_ui!'es tr..2-.t n all stc.::.e fil:.ng 
ru.les 11 be met. ';'his see:r.1s un,_"J.ecessary -- the state cts can 
er..force their ov;n fil:.:".1.g rules. The corriJ:r.ent to this sect:!.o:r-1 
:;.-1otes that a ::_:irisoner 1nir-;::-1t t:ry to s::.:7.ult8neousl-v fil ~ a cert 
~ V 
petn folloTin; st2te review :3.nd - a :cderQl habe&s petn. If 
has ever ha:r:pened in t:-ie p2.st, we shoul d fine out wh&t the 







Ad Hoc Committee 
(My summary) 
-
Professor Pearson, with his letter of July 20, suggests 
a new Subchapter B. It's caption would simply be "Capital Cases: 
Special Procedures". 
Section 2256. Prisoners in state custody subject to 
capital sentence; appointment of counsel; requirement of rule or 
statute; procedures for appointment. 
There are three subsections. This subchapter applies only 
if a state complies with subsections (b) and (c) below. 
(a) and (b). A state must provide, with respect to state 
collateral proceedings, for the appointment, compensation and 
payment of expenses of competent counsel. Query: Do we need a 
standard, like the new federal standard for the qualifications of 
counsel? 
(c) Professor Pearson's draft suggests alternative language 
with respect to the appointment and acceptance by the prisoner of 
counsel. Both alternatives seem complicated to me, particularly the 
provisions as to what happens if there is doubt whether the 
prisoner accepts the state's offer of counsel. The second 
alternative would require the state to "establish and promulgate 
procedures to formalize [the appointment]. These would provide (i) 
that the order appointing counsel note that the prisoner had 
accepted the offer of counsel or was incompetent to accept or 
- -
2 • 
reject it; or (ii) in an order after hearing, note that the 
prisoner rejected the offer of counsel "with an awareness and 
understanding" of what he was doing. Hew Pate suggests that the 
"awareness and understanding" language could cause litigation. The 
familiar language: "knowingly and intelligently" (Miranda waivers) 
would be better. 
Subsection (d) puzzles me. It would require - if I understand 
it - that the counsel appointed pursuant to the new statute could 
not be the lawyer who represented the prisoner at trial or on 
direct appeal. I suppose the idea is that the counsel on collateral 
appeal would be free to argue that trial counsel had been 
ineffective. 
(e) As the new counsel could raise the effectiveness issue, 
this subsection would provide that the ineffectiveness of counsel 
could not thereafter "be a ground for granting relief is a 
proceeding under Section 2254 11 • 
There is no provision for the state to provide counsel 
for appeals to the Supreme Court where the capital defendant loses 
his collateral appeal in state court. At present, the appointment 
of counsel in this situation is done by a court of appeals. 
New Section 2257 Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on 
stay of execution; successive petitions. 
( a) When counsel has been appointed as above provided a 
federal court, upon application , will issue an automatic stay. 
- -
3. 
(b) Any stay of execution shall expire if: 
(i) counsel fails to file a federal habeas corpus petition 
within "the time period provided in [new] section 
2258 11 ; 
(ii) The stay shall expire when (A) no petition has been 
filed for certiorari; (B) a cert petition was filed 
and the Supreme Court denied it; or (C) a cert 
petition was due to be filed, and the Supreme Court 
disposed of it in a way that left the capital sentence 
fully in effect. 
(iii) The stay shall expire if the prisoner waives the right 
to pursue federal post-conviction review under Section 
2254. 
(c) No federal court [after exhaustion of the foregoing 
remedies or waiver thereof] shall have authority to enter a stay 
of execution or grant relief in a capital case unless: 
(i) the alleged basis for the stay of execution had not 
previously been presented in the state or lower federal courts; 
(ii) the facts in the application create doubt as to the 
guilt of the defendant; and 
(iii) the failure to raise the claim is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or federal law; (B) 
a federal right newly recognized by the Supreme Court; (C) or new 




My Comment: Although the foregoing seems unduly complicated, 
Al notes that these clarifying changes [that seem too detailed] 
were based on questions raised by committee members when we last 
met. He emphasizes in his comment the important point that an 
automatic stay takes effect when counsel is appointed. The purpose 
of the provisions of Section 2257 is to limit the authority of the 
federal courts to stay execution and grant relief after one fair 
trip through federal post-conviction review. 
Section 2258. Filing of habeas corpus petition; time requirements; 
tolling rules. 
This provides for a one-year statute of limitations 
within which a petition for federal habeas may be filed. The 365 
days run from the filing in state court of the order prescribed in 
Section 2256(c). This is the order in which the state offers to 
provide counsel for an indigent state prisoner sentenced to die. 
But the one-year period of limitation will be tolled: 
(a) from the date of the filing of a petition for cert with 
the Supreme Court and until final disposition of the case when 
counsel for the prisoner has filed a petition for cert from the 




(b) The one-year limitation also will be tolled during any 
period in which the state prisoner has filed for post-conviction 
review. But the filing requirement shall not be tolled during the 
pendency of a petition for certiorari for the Supreme Court 
following state post-conviction review. 
(c) This provides for a further tolling of sixty days when 
good cause is shown for additional delay. 
Section 2259. Evidentiary Hearing: scope of federal review; 
district court adjudication. 
(a) When the state prisoner files for federal habeas corpus 
relief, the district court shall: 
(i) shall determine the sufficiency of the evidentiary 
record to consider the claims presented. Where there are 
"unexhausted claims", these shall not be considered unless the 
prisoner can show good cause and prejudice. See Wainwright v. 
Skyes. 
(ii) When a state prisoner files for federal habeas, the 
district court also must consider any requests for a evidentiary 
hearing and conduct such a hearing when necessary to complete the 
record. 
(b) When the record is satisfactory, the district court shall 
rule on the merits. 
- -
6. 
Section 2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable. 
This is simply a provision to the effect that no longer is a 
certificate of probable cause required before a court of appeals 
may review a habeas corpus case. 
* * * 
My Comment: The foregoing changes, at least on their face, seem 
unduly complicated. Some also seem fairly obvious, and perhaps 
could be omitted. There is some merit to Chief Judge Clark's view 
that we should leave more decisions to the discretion of the state 
and federal courts. I nevertheless am inclined to agree with Hew 
that this may be a draft we could approve. 
Our accompanying statement is quite important. It could 
well incorporate much of Judge Clark's draft, but should place 
greater emphasis on the overall fairness of the proposed changes 
in the law. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
- -~iteh jhrles ~isirid ainud 
CHAMBEl'IS OF 
JUDGE BAREFOOT SANDERS 
August 1, 1989 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
1100 COMMERCE STREET 
DALLAS, TEXAS 7!5242 
To: Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Honorable Charles Clark 
Honorable Paul H. Roney 
Honorable William Terrell Hodges 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
, 4 AUG 1989 
r--
Since I will be at the American Bar Convention most of the week 
of August 7, the period in which I understood Al Pearson will be 
sending, or perhaps calling about, another draft of our habeas 
proposal, I wr~ e at this time to s ~ st for your consideration a tl)few c~ ges ~~he draft ~ tute a ~ e Committee Report. -- The Statute 
Add the following sentence at the end of Section 2256(b) (following 
the word "purposes"): 
Such mechanism must provide standards of competency for OJ( 
such appointed counsel. 
As you know, the draft sets no standards of competency for counsel ~ 
appointed pursuant to§ 2256(a). Yet the competence of such counsel 
cannot be questioned. § 2256(e). I raised this problem at our July 
27 meeting but did not offer language to cure it. The problem is 
exacerbated by the requirement of§ 2259(a) that unexhausted claims>· 
will not be considered -- a provision I agree with if counsel is 4 
competent and has time to prepare. ef1/t.----
Al Pearson's first draft provided an intricate scheme for compet- ) 
ency standards. We have now moved to the opposite extreme -- no \ 
standards. Surely, the absence of standards will generate 
litigation. At least one of the purposes of our effort is to reduce 
unnecessary litigation in habeas. Granted, competency standards may 




Apparently, state habeas now is usually a futile exercise even where 
counsel is appointed. We propose to elevate the importance of state 
habeas. It should follow that we emphasize the importance of state 
habeas counsel by requiring more than sime.ly "competent counsel". 
~ 
As a less preferable alternative to the language which I have 
suggested, you may wish to consider language requiring the appointing 
court to put of record its reasons why appointed counsel is deemed 
competent. 
Another alternative, less desirable, would be to put language in the 
Committee Report to the effect that it is expected that states 
utilizing our procedure will set competency standards. 
The Committee Report 
1. I am enclosing proposed language to be used as an opening 
summary or as a conclusion to the Report. .. ~ . A~ . ~/'ii./.;:--
- --- - ' .-- ~,,,,. s ~· '.:rt 
2. I suggest changes in the draft as reflected on the 
enclosure. (I made the changes on the plane returning from 
Washington so they are not neatly done; I hope they are 
decipherable). 
I take out certain language on pages 2, 3 and 4 which seems 
to place blame on federal courts for delay in capital collateral 
proceedings. It should not be surprisin that most of the time spent 
in collateral proceedin s .is7:l'f'tne e era cour~s. resuma , 
fe era c rs re a ing time to ma ea more complete and meaningful 
inquiry than was done in state habeas. The draft Report disclaims 
(at p. 6) any need for additional statutory priority for federal 
habeas; the language (and the chart) taken out are inconsistent with 
that disclaimer, and could be construed to be inviting legislation 
requiring more priority. 
I recall my conversation, after the Dallas ABA hearing, 
with the Texas Assistant Attorney General in charge of collateral 
proceedings in capital cases. He had no complaint about delay in 
federal habeas proceedings in capital cases; he stated that his 
office has had only one case in which he thinks that the federal 
district court has unreasonably delayed a decision. This is / 
anecdotal but valuable; Texas is a major player in capital 4..,G,t_,, 
litigation. 6 
The changes on pages 6 and 7 are for purposes of clarity. 
2 
- -
Finally, I think it important that we look at the draft which we 
submit to the Judicial Conference as the draft of a bill which we 
would be happy to see enacted in the form recommended. There is 
always a prospect, which I can't evaluate, that our recommendation, 
if approved by the Conference, can be attached as an amendment to one 
of Congress' perennial drug bills and thus enacted without benefit 
(or hindrance, depending upon the point of view) of committee 
hearings, markup, etc. 
Thank you for your consideration of these suggestions. It has been 
an honor to serve on the Committee. 
Sincerely yours, 
Enclosure 
cc: Mr. William R. Burchill, Jr. 
Mr. Hew Pate 
3 
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The Honorable Lewis P. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 






The Honorable Wm. Terrell 
Hodges 
0 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, NE 
Chief Judge, United States 
District Court 
Washington, DC 20543 
The Honorable Charles Clark 
Chief Judge, United States 
Court of Appeals 
245 E. Capitol St. , Rm. 302 
Jackson, MS 39201 
The Honorable Paul H. Roney 
Chief Judge, United States 
Court of Appeals 
601 Federal Building 
144 1st Avenue, South 
St. Petersburg, FL 33701 
Gentlemen: 
United States Courthouse, 
Suite 108 
Tampa, FL 33602 
The Honorable Barefoot Sanders 
United States District Court 
United States Courthouse, 
Room 15D28A 
1100 Commerce St. 
Dallas, TX 75242 
Mr. William R. Burchill, Jr. 
General Counsel 
Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts 
Washington, DC 20544 
Attached is a redraft of the proposed new subchapter of the 
federal habeas corpus statute. Please reflect on what we have 
done to determine whether we have failed to consider any material 
issues or factual scenarios. In the meantime, I intend to sketch 
out some of the comment to each section so that our work product 





4 ~ ~ . ~_p~ _, I !u.h 
Albert M. Pearson 
Professor of Law 
Athens, Georgia 30602 
An Equal Opportunity/ Affirmative Action Institution 
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CHAPTER 153 . HABEAS CORPUS 
Subchapter A. General Provisions [a proposed redesignation] 
[sections 2241-2255 would not be changed.] 
Subchapter B. Capital Cases: Special Procedures [new] 
Sect ion 2256. Prisone rs in state custody subject to capital 
s entence; appointment of counsel; requirement of 
rule of cour t or statute; procedures for 
appointment 
(a) This subch apter shall apply to cases arising u nder 
section 2254 brought by prisoners in state custody who are 
subject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if the 
provisions of subsections (b) and (c) are satisfied. 
(b) This subchapter is applicable if a state establishes by 
rule of its court of last resort or by statute a mechanism for 
the appointment, compensation and payment of reasonable 
litigation expenses o f competent counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings brought by indigent prisoners whose 
capital sentences have been upheld on direct appeal to the court 
of last resort i n the state or whose convictions have otherwise 
become final for state law purposes. 
1 
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(c) Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation and 
reimbursement of counsel as provided in subsection (b) must offer 
counsel to all state prisoners under c apital sentence and must 
provide for an order by a court of record either: (1) appointing 
one or more counsel to repre sent the prisoner upon a find ing that 
~0---S--
the prisoner is indigent a nd a ccepted the offer or is unable 
compet ently to decide whether to accept or reject the offer; 
(2) finding, after a hearing i f necessary, that the prisoner 
rejected the offer of counsel and made the decision with an 
understanding of its legal consequences; or (3) denying the 
appointment of counsel upon a finding that the prisoner is not 
indigent. 
(d) No counsel appointed p ursuant to subsections (b) and (c) 
to represent a state prisoner under capital sentence shall have 
previously represented the prisoner at trial or on direct appeal 
in the case for which the appointment is made unless the prisoner 
and counsel expressly request continued representation. 
2 
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(e) The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during 
state or federal collateral post-conviction proceedings in a 
capital case shall not be a ground for granting relief in a 
proceeding arising under section 2254 or this subchapter. This 
limitation shall not preclude the appointment of different 
counsel at any phase of state or federal post-conv iction 
proceedings. 
Section 2257. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on 
stays of execution; successive petitions 
(a) Upon the filing in the appropriate state court of record 
of an order pursuant to section 2256(c), an order or warrant 
setting an execution date for a state prisoner under capital 
sentence shall be stayed upon application to any court that would 
~-
have jurisdiction over any proceeding filed pursuant to Section 
2254. The application must recite that the state has invoked the 
p ost-conviction review procedures established by this subchapter 
and that the scheduled execution is subject to stay. 
3 
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{b) Any stay of execution granted pursuant to subsection (a) 
shall expire if: 
(1) Counsel for the state prisoner fails to file a 
habeas corpus petition under Section 2254 within the time 
provid ed in Section 2258; or 
(2) Upon complet i on of district court and court of 
appeals review under Section 2254 relief is denied and (A) the 
time for filing a petition f or certiorari h as expired and no 
petition was filed; (B) a timely petition for certiorari was 
filed and the Supreme Court denied the peti tion; or ( C) a timely 
petition for certiorari was filed and upon consideration of the 
case, the Supreme Court disposed of it in a manner that left the 
capital sentence undisturbed; or 
(3) Before a court of competent jurisdiction, in the 
presence of counsel and after having been fully advised of the 
consequences of his decision, a state prisoner under capital 




(c) No federal court thereafter shall have the authority to 
enter a stay of execution or grant relief in a capital case 
unless: 
(1) the b a sis for the stay and request for relief is a 
c laim not previously present ed in t he state or lower federal 
courts; 
(2) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient, 
if proven, to undermine the court's c onfidence in the jury's 
determination of guilt on the underlying offense or offenses for 
which the death penalty was imposed; and 
(3) the failure to raise the claim is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States; (B) bas ed on a federal right newly recognized by 
the Supreme Court that is retroactively applicable or (C) based 
on a fac tual predicate that could not have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence in time to present 
the claim for state or federal post-.conviction review. 
5 
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Section 2258. Filing of habeas c orpus petitions; time require-
ments; tolling rules 
Any petition for habeas corpus relief under Section 2254 
must be filed in t he appropriate dis t rict court within 180 days 
f rom the filing in the appropriate s t a t e court of record of an 
order iss ued in c ompliance with Sec t i on 2256(c). The time 
requi rements established by this section shall be tolled: 
(a) From the date of the filing of any petition for 
certiorari in the Supreme Court unti l the date of final 
disposition of the petition if a state prisoner seeks review of a 
capital sentence that has been affirmed on direct appeal by t he 
court of last resort of the state or has otherwise become final 
for state law purposes. 
(b) During any period in whi ch a state prisoner under 
capital sentence has a properly filed request for post-conviction 
review pending before a state court of c ompetent jurisdiction; if 
all state filing rules are met in a t imely manner, this period 
shall run continuously from the date that the state prisoner 
6 
- -
initially files for post-conviction review until final 
disposition of the case by the highest court of the state; 
provided, however, the tolling rule established by this sub-
section does not apply during the pendency of a petition for 
c ertiorari before the Supreme Court following such state post-
conviction review. 
(c) During an additional period not to exceed 60 days, if 
counsel for the state prisoner: (1) moves for an extension of 
time in the federal district cour t that would have proper 
jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of a habeas corpus 
petition under Section 2254 and (2) makes a showing of good cause 
for counsel's inability to file the habeas corpus petition within 
the 180 day period established by this section. 
Section 2259. Evidentiary hear ings; scope of federal revie w; 
district court adjudication 
(a) Whenever a state prisoner under a capital sentence files 
a petition for habeas corpus relief to which this subchapter 
applies, the district court shall: 
7 
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{1) determine the sufficiency of the evidentiary record 
for habeas corpus review based on the claims actually presented 
and litigated in the state courts except when the prisoner can 
show that the failure to raise or deve lop a claim in the state 
courts is (A) the result of state action in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States; (B) based on a 
federal right newly recognized by the Supreme Court that is 
retroactively applicable; or (C) based on a factual predicate 
that could not have been discovered through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence in time to present the claim for state post-
conviction review; and 
(2) conduct any requested evidentiary hearing necessary 
to complete the record for habeas corpus review. 
(b) Upon the development of a complete evidentiary record, 
the district court shall rule on the merits of the claims 




Section 2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable 
The requirement of a certificate o f probable cause in order 
to appeal from the distr i ct court to the court of appeal s does 
not apply to habeas corpus case s subject to the provisions of 






August 8, 1989 
Subject: Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear Barefoot, 
Your letter of August 1 with enclosures was forwarded to 
me here in Richmond. I appreciate your continuing to give thought 
to the work of our Committee even when you are on an airplane. 
The Statute 
I agree with your suggested addition of a sentence at the 
end of§ 2656(b). 
The Committee Report 
I like your proposed language to be used as an opening 
summary or as a conclusion to the report. I had hoped to have the 
opportunity to do some work on the report. It may be helpful to 
identify the factual background of the problem: there are, as I 
recall, about 2,100 defendants on death row, and only about 112 -
115 have been executed since Furman was decided. In a typical case 
a capital defendant has been making three trips through the federal 
courts. See my article in the Harvard Law Review March 1989 issue. 
In view of the concentration of capital case convictions in six 
southern states and California, a substantial majority of the 
Judicial Conference members may have only a limited knowledge of 
the problem. A brief statement of why the Committee was appointed 
will be helpful. 
I will talk to Al Pearson next Monday when he returns 
from vacation. If you have suggestions as to the report, please 
send them to Al. 
1 
-
Honorable Barefoot Sanders 
August 8, 1989 
Page Two 
-
It has been helpful to have specific suggestions from 
Charles and Barefoot. I hope we can deliver a draft statute and 
report to The Chief Justice before the end of this month. 
Honorable Barefoot Sanders 
Judge, U.S. District Court 
u. s. Courthouse 
1100 Commerce Street 
Room 15D28A 
Dallas, Texas 75242 
Sincerely, 
cc: Honorable Paul H. Roney 
Honorable Charles Clark 
Honorable William T. Hodges 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 
General Counsel, Administrative Office 
R. Hewlitt Pate, Esquire 
LFP/djb 
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August 9, 1989 
Subject: Ad Hoc Committee 
Dear Al, 
-
Your letter of August 7 reached me here in my Richmond 
Chambers today. I commend you on doing the redraft so quickly, 
particularly when you have been on vacation. 
I have not had an opportunity to read the redraft, but 
will do so promptly. Hew Pate will be back at the Court on next 
Tuesday, and I am making sure that he has a draft. At my request, 
I have asked Hew to give me at that time a draft of a statement to 
accompany the statute. 
Of course, the comments that you will add to each section 
will be particularly helpful to members of the Judicial Conference. 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
The University of Georgia 
School of Law 
Athens, Georgia 30602 
LFP/djb 
cc: R. Hewlitt Pate, Esquire 
c/o Sally Smith 
Justice Powell's Chambers 
u. s. Supreme Court 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Sincerely, 
- • 
August 11, 1989 
Subject: Ad Hoc Committee 
Dear Hew, 
In view of your excellent draft of a Committee Report, 
I am afraid your vacation was a working one. Lindsey, like my wife 
Jo, must be more tolerant than perhaps she should be. 
I enclose a revised draft of the report. A temptation is 
to expand the report to include much of what we said in my H.L.R. 
Commentary on Capital Punishment. But given our audience, and the 
importance of a report that is likely to be read by members of the 
Judicial Conference, I think we have the length about right. The 
major change is the addition of a conclusion based primarily on a 
suggestion by Barefoot Sanders. 
I have suggested a few footnotes. I do not expect the 
citations to be read by the judges, but they may have their law 
clerks take a look at these. Do you think we should include 
additional notes? It may be helpful, either in the text or 
footnote, to add the information in the Harvard Law Review as to 
the number of murders committed in the United States each year. A 
footnote describing the unitary system in the District of Columbia 
also may be helpful. (seep. 1042 H. L. R.). 
I am concerned about my failure to use Judge Clark's 
draft. Take a look at it and try to find a few paragraphs that can 
be incorporated, at least in substance. 
I enclose a copy of my letter to Justice Kennedy. Of 
course, you will now have an office with him. I cannot begin to 
tell you how much I will miss having you by my side. I add that 
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August 11, 1989 
(Hew's draft as revised 
by L. F . P. , Jr. ) 




studies of public opinion establish that an overwhelming 
majority of our citizens favors the death penalty for certain 
murders. And the Supreme Court has made clear that the evolving 
standards of decency embodied in the Eighth Amendment permit 
imposition of this punishment for some offenders. Of course, both 
the Court and society have recognized that, because it is 
irreversible, death is a unique punishment. This realization 
demands safeguards to ensure that capital punishment is 
administered with the utmost reliability and fairness. 
But our present system of multi-layered state and federal 
appeal and collateral review has led to repetitious litigation and 
years of delay between sentencing and execution. The resulting lack 
/ 
r . , 
✓ 
- -
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of finality >f:r1e1:sti:ates the laws of thir:t!:'9 seve11 ~ 
undermines public confidence in our criminal justice system.~ 
the delay inherent in the present system brings little benefit in 
terms of reliability in sentencing or fair and orderly review of 
constitutional claims. Prisoners often cannot obtain qualified 
counsel until execution is imminent. The resulting last-minute 
rushed litigation disserves inmates, and saps the resources of our 
judiciary. 
To address these problems, Chief Justice William H. 
~ 
Rehnquist formed this committee -e~ ---------1, 
c!vllA_ 1988. His charge 
to us was to inquire into "the necessity and desirability of 
legislation directed toward avoiding delay and the lack of 
finality" in capital cases in which the prisoner had or had been 
offered counsel. The Chief Justice appointed as members of this 
Committee Chief Judge Clark of the Fifth Circuit, Chief Judge Roney 
of the Eleventh Circuit, District Court Judge Hodges of Florida and 
1Federal criminal statutes also authorize capital punishment. 
See, e. g , 4g UCCA § 14 7(i) (B) (airoraft ~iraoy) J 
~ a-.t "' \r/4,t r, e\l< \-J 
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3. 
Judge Barefoot Sanders of Texas. The states in the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits have by far the greatest numbers of prisoners 
subject to capital sentences, and each of these judges has had 
extensive experience with federal review of capital cases. The 
chairman of the committee, retired Associate Justice Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr., served as Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit 
while sitting on the Supreme Court. Professor Albert M. Pearson of 
u\, ~~S. 
the University of Georgia,~ experience in capital cases, was 
the Reporter for the Committee. William R. Burchill, Jr., General 
Counsel of the Administrative Office, served as Secretary. 
The committee met six times and considered with care the 
problems associated with collateral review of capital sentences. 
We invited written comments from a broad spectrum of interested 
parties and organizations, and received a number of helpful 
presentations. These included the views of state and federal 
prosecutors, groups urging abolition of the death penalty, state 
executives and legislators, and criminal defense and public 
- -
4. 
defender organizations. The responses contributed to our findings, 
/ which follo0 nd to the formulation of the legislation we propose. 
II. Findings 
A. Delay and Repetition 
The committee identified serious problems with the 
present system of collateral review. The most general of these is 
that the dual system of state and federal collateral review 
engenders repetitious litigation and excessive delay. Few would 
argue that the current state of death penalty administration is 
af¥l51(1"~k,s ;Jy}oo 
satisfactory. There are now« ,16G(?) convicted murderers on death 
row awaiting execution. Yet since the Supreme Court's 1972 Furman 
1\5 
decision only~ executions have taken place. The shortest of 
these judicial proceedings required two years and nine months to 
complete. The longest covered a period of 14 years and six months. 




The committee's analysis of cases from Alabama, Florida, 
Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas shows that 80% of the time spent 
in collateral litigation in death penalty cases occurs outside of 
state collateral proceedings. A table showing the average time 
periods and ratios in death penalty cases in these states is 
attached to this report. 
The relatively small number of executions, as well as the 
delay in cases where an execution has occurred, makes clear that 
the present system of collateral review operates to frustrate the 
0 
law of 37 states. The collateral review process tends to be erratic 
and frequently is repetitious. The long separation of sentence and 
execution hampers justice without improving the quality of 
adjudication. 2 Because res judicata is inapplicable to federal 
habeas proceedings, many capital litigants return to federal court 
w #cfu~ I~ 7-/'x, fflJv1.~ ~ CcJfl-W p~~ -,.._ C91t~ ~~. ~ 
J_<g (),S,C. § __ (r'>wvtltts IAI ~ ~+t. ~oos ofi:u~s). 
2contrary to what may be assumed, the Constitution does not 
provide for federal habeas corpus review of state court decisions. 
'l?h fr~re s e Bt s ys: tem h iil. s e¥&l~el-t..~om-:&h e-st:a,,t-tt-t -e- en a ~t ,ed- b-~ e e Rg.Fess 
-in :t8 6 7. New 2 9 r U. ~ . C . § 22-s • ~ 1h.- we~\ i ~ok"~ f<NPII~ avr,;,1,J).t fo ~flih 
f "c,~ ,~ f$ ftJ'Vlhll1'l{ It\ fRi ((MSh~hrM I k.+ ~cu &10/vel_ \<'()YT\- -q ~t~Me ~ Ii~ 
C<Ji\f>'tC½ ,11 li(r/lJ qo>J <4.d ~ Jt O,~. l, S iat;q, 
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with second - or even third and fourth - petitions for relief. 
Current rules governing abuse of the writ and successive petitions 
have not served to prevent this repetitive and ~ ritless~ 
litigation. This committee believes that any serious reform 
proposal must address the problems of delay and repetitive 
litigation. 
B. The Need for Counsel 
A second serious problem with the current system is the 
pressing need for qualified counsel to represent inmates in 
collateral review. As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in 
Murray v. Giarrantano, provision of counsel for criminal defendants 
is constitutionally required only for trial and direct appellate 
111f:. 7' pr~ccJ. M~ 
review. BecauseAthe focus of review in capital cases often shifts 




Capital inmates almost uniformly are indigent, and often 
illiterate or uneducated. Capital habeas litigation may be 
difficult and complex. Prisoners acting pro se rarely present 
promptly or properly exhaust their constitutional challenges in the 
state forum. This results in delayed or ineffective federal 
collateral procedures. The end result is often appointment of 
qualified counsel only when an execution is imminent. But at this 
stage, serious constitutional claims may have been waived. The 
belated entry of a lawyer, under severe time pressure, does little 
to ensure fairness. In sum, the committee believes that provision 
of competent counsel for prisoners under cap i t a l sentence 
throughout both state and federal collateral review is crucial to 




c. Last Minute Litigation 
Another disturbing aspect of the current system is that 
litigation of constitutional claims often comes only when prompted 
by the setting of an execution date. Judicial resources are 
expended as the prisoner must seek a stay of execution in order to 
present his claims. Justice may be ill-served by conducting 
judicial proceedings in capital cases under the pressure of an 
impending execution. In some cases last minute habeas corpus 
petitions have resulted from the unavailability of counsel at any 
~ 
earlier time. But in some- cases attorneys appear to have 
intentionally delayed filing until time pressures were severe. In 
most cases, successive petitions are meritless, and we believe many 
are filed at the eleventh hour seeking nothing more than delay. 
The foregoing types of abuses have no place in a rational 
system of justice. In the committee• e ·-1iew. eem:ectcnae eeuH• cl5- ~P • 
)4;hgula se ~eq~i~ed. o~ eou}.QoBc ~ the merits of capital cases should 
:::;. -





pressure. This should be true both during state and federal 
collateral review. But once this review has occurred, absent 
extraordinary circumstances there should be no further last minute 
litigation. 
III. The Committee Proposal 
In response to the problems described above, the 
committee proposes new statutory procedures for federal habeas 
corpus review of capital sentences where competent counsel has been 
provided. Separate procedures for capital cases are appropriate in 
light of the problems of capital litigation. The incentives facing 
the capital litigant are unique. Prisoners serving an ordinary term 
of years have every incentive to bring their claims to resolution 
Anet 
as soon as possible in order to gain relief. Mee they are serving 
wWL l1~ ~ f(c.,.(.t... 
their sentence~ . In contrast, the inmate under capital sentence, 
whose guilt frequently is never in question, has every incentive 
to delay the proceedings that must take place before that sentence 
is carried out. Such an inmate is avoiding the punishment 
prescribed by the law of the state. 
- -
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The committee's proposal is aimed at achieving this goal: 
Capital cases should be subject to one complete and fair course of 
collateral review in the state and federal system, free from the 
time pressure of impending execution, and with the assistance of 
competent counsel for the defendant. When this review has 
concluded, litigation should end. 
The specific operation of our proposed legislation3 is 
described in notes following each statutory section. Some general 
comments are appropriate here. The proposal allows a state to bring 
capital litigation by its prisoners within the new statute that 
provides competent counsel for inmates on state collateral review. 
Participation in the proposal is thus optional with the states. 
Because it is optional, the proposal should cause minimal intrusion 
on state prerogatives. But for states that are concerned with delay 
3our proposal would add a new Subchapter B dealing with 
Capital Cases. Sections 2241-2255 of Subchapter A will not be 
changed. We refer to these changes simply as a proposed "statute" 
or as a "proposal". 
- -
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in capital litigation, it is hoped that the procedural mechanisms 
we recommend will provide an incentive to provide the counsel that 
are needed for fairness. 
~ )~ MtSY\,t-l 
The statute provides for a ~88 day limitations period 
within which the federal habeas petition must be filed. Tp e 
limitations period begins to run only on the appointment of counsel 
for the prisoner, or a refusal of the offer of counsel. The 
limitations period also is tolled during the pendency of all state 
court proceedings. In view of the provision for counsel, the 
tolling provisions, and the fact that the exhaustion requirement 
mandates that the prisoner's federal petition present the same 
claims contained in the state petition, the six-month period 
provides adequate time for the development and presentation of 
~ 
claims ~fmportantly, the statute provides for an automatic stay of 
execution which is to remain in place until federal habeas 
proceedings are completed, or until the prisoner has failed to file 
a petition within the allotted time. ~ av~~ st-~ ./W\Svfe..S. ~-a.t-' 
cl~ t\ull fl%' k (/,/alv~ Lil\~ +t..t 1lw\(, rre.sGYre 1 i ~c~J.,~J f1.twh7M. 
Mt~uval -rfu f,~ pu,iJ ~ ~ s"1r<t-- ,~ v1u,,> f ~ -M 1i?Ji" ~ -n~ liMAA: wAano~ 
QJf;•rts °'t pres~J ff 5'1.oJJ b,_ l\,,()~tl ,t~ ~ix MUVlrJe.s ,s hf'_ l<»iCJ-1 ~ ~ ~ prMd.ed f,r 
04) ~flt i z_tl)eJ ~ ~ 9~ rx ko&,<AJ rytle-,.,1 t< W S,et,ttn5 c•e,,(l,d'('4,tf ~;,,... ~ 
C ,H>lb.M.lfJ /' - ... ~ 
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Federal habeas proceedings under the proposal will 
encompass only claims that have been exhausted in state court. With 
the counsel provided by the statute, there should be no excuse for 
failure to raise claims in state court. The statute allows for 
exceptions in extraordinary cases on the basis of new law or newly 
discovered facts. In the event the entire counseled state and 
federal collateral process concludes without relief being granted, 
the statute includes new mechanisms to promote finality. Subsequent 
and successive federal habeas petitions can no longer be the basis 
of a stay of execution absent a colorable showing of factual 
innocence. Relief will still be available in extraordinary cases 
on the basis of new law or newly discovered facts. 
IV. Conclusion 
The fundamental requirement of a criminal justice system 
is fairness. In habeas corpus proceedings fairness requires that 
a defendant be provided a searching and impartial examination of 
his claims. Fairness also requires thatt if a defendant's claim~ 
.' - -
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,afh"' s"eh exancinatimo are found to be devoid of meri~ society 
is rightfully entitled to have the penalty prescribed by law 
carried out without unreasonable delay. 
Every capital defendant is now entitled to competent 
counsel at state trial and in federal habeas corpus proceedings.@ 
The Committee's proposal will fill a gap which now exists by 
providing competent counsel also in state habeas or collateral 
proceedings. The proposal also assures that, upon completion of 
state proceedings, a defendant will have one opportunity to have 
his claims reviewed carefully by the federal courts. Thereafter, 
if no infirmity in the conviction has been found, judicial 
proceedings will be at an end, absent exceptional new developments. 
The Committee believes that its proposal will go far to 
rectify the current chaos in capital litigation--periodic 
inactivity and last minute frenzied activity, scheduling and 
rescheduling of execution dates--which diminishes public confidence 
in the criminal justice system. 
Jr\ ~zJ_ h?:\~ztS Ccxfvr ~ ..,;., ffi.q__ ® CIY"~~ pt1MdJ. w C<J\M\~ 




In sum, adoption of this proposal will significantly 
improve fairness in death penalty litigation. 
C - -
August 14, 1989 
Dear Al, 
Sally is sending you today a copy of a draft of our 
Report prepared by Hew and revised by me. 
Copies of this have not been sent to Committee members. 
I wanted you to take a look at it first, and make such changes and 
additions as you think appropriate. Of course, send copies to us 
by overnight mail. I think the draft is close to being 
satisfactory. 
I would not make changes in the Conclusion (p. 12-14). 
It embodies some of Judge Sanders' suggestions, as well as my own 
views. 
I would like to get a copy of the Report in the hands of 
Committee members this week if possible, with the view to having 
the Report and the Statute printed at the Court the week of August 
21st. Keep in touch with me by telephone. 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
University of Georgia 
Law School - Room 242 
Athens, Georgia 30602 
LFP/djb 
Sincerely, 
- ,', ~ ~4,_, ;;}:;!t-2... . ) .Lv...d-~  1--v-~ 
,, ....e,.~ c....-i..-~ ~ 
~A,~ MEMORANDUM 
TO: Justice Powell August 16, 1989 
FROM: Hew // __,,, 
a_e:4- •~£.. 
~ abeas Committee 
3.~/-~ 
/4_/-k+-z_ - ~tr-Ii~ 
RE: Report /\ 
Lf-,, &we. a-~ {__,, ~ 
/'tA,..4...-/-~ ~ 
Here are my few minor suggestions for change to the 
committee report. 
~-1.>f-~ 
Your editing and the addition of Judge 
~~-k 
Sanders' material were improvements. I suggest that you 
~~-
look these changes over and then let me know what you think · 
11 . dd. . . dS-. ltJ' //-:~, t~h t 1 -- as we as give me any a 1t1on 1 eas .--· over e e e-
phone. I have kept a copy of these, and I think it would be 
most efficient to have Sally go ahead and type the draft 
report into the ATEX system here. There is no point in hav-
ing Dot type another version. 
I have reviewed the draft for inclusion of material 
from Judge Clark's proposed report. I did not find much 
opportunity to include more of his language. But in review-
ing our draft I noted that we do use a good deal of his lan-
guage, and certainly incorporate all of his ideas. You 
could fairly emphasize this in a letter when you circulate 
the proposed draft. Since Al Pearson seemed generally in 





now preparing, perhaps the draft should be circulated to \ r-other committee members soon. 
I will await your instructions. 
ber at the Court is 479-3072. 
R.H.P. 
My new telephone num-
t:5 bf-
• -
August 18, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Gentlemen: 
I enclose a proposed draft committee report to accompa-
ny our statutory proposal. I am indebted to other members 
of the committee for their work on the report. I felt that 
the ultimate compilation of the report was a duty that, as 
chairman, I could not shirk. You will note that the enclose 
draft incorporates much of the language, and all of the sub-
stance, of Judge Clark's draft. Also, the conclusion in-
cludes material suggested by Judge Sanders. Of course, I 
invite further comments and suggestions. 
Al Pearson is now working on comments to follow each 
section of the proposed statute, and they will be ready 
within the next few days. Once the statute and committee 
report are in final form, I propose to have them typeset by 










cc: The Chief Justice 
Sincerely, 
- - AUG 2 3 1989 
MEMORANDUM yll"-<.-~ 




Habeas Cammi ttee Report / Pearson Comments 4,~ · 
Hew (479-3072) 
ti_,+ .(f 
He re are my handwritten remarks on the Pearson comments g/-z.,3 
to the statute. Sally and I are working on getting a final 
version of the whole report, statute, and comments ready. 
Al is planning to call me Wednesday a.m. with comments about 
the draft report, and to ask me for any ideas about the com-
ments to the statute. After I talk with you about the com-
ments, I can tell Al of any needed changes, which we can 





CHAPTER 153. HABEAS CORPUS 
Subchapter A. General Provi-sions [a proposed redesignation] 
[sections 2241-2255 would not be changed.] 
Subchapter B. Capital Cases: Special Procedures [new] 
Section 2256. Prisoners in state custody subject to capital 
sentence; appointment of counsel; requirement of 
rule of court or statute; procedures for 
appointment 
(a) This subchapter shall apply to cases arising under 
section 2254 brought by prisoners in state custody-Xi.ho are 
subject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if the 
provisions of subsections (b) and (c) are satisfied~ 
(b) This subchapter is applic~ble ·if a state establishes by · 
rule of -its court of last resort · or by statute· a mechanism for 
the appointment, compensation and payment of reasonable 
litigation expenses of competent counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings brought by indigent prisoners whose 
capital convictions and sentences have been upheld on direct 
appeal to the court of last resort in the state or have otherwise 
~ e rule of court or 
~ 
become final for state law purposes. 




statute must provide standards of competency for the appointment 
of such counsel. -
(c) Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation and 
reimbursement of counsel as provided in subsection (b) must offer 
counsel to all state prisoners under capital sentence and must 
provide for the entry of an order by a court of record: (1) 
appointing one or more counsel to represent the prisoner upon a 
finding that the prisoner is indigent and..:-accepted the offer or 
is unable competently to decide whether to accept or reject the 
offer; ( 2) finding, after a hearing if necessary, that the . 
prisoner rejected the· offer of counsel and _made the decision -with 
an understanding · of its · legal conse·quences; or ( 3) denying the 
appointment of counsel upon a finding that ~he prisoner is not 
indigent. 
(d) No counsel appointed pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) 
to represent a state prisoner under capital sentence shall have 
previously represented the prisoner at trial or on direct appeal 




~nd counsel expressly request continued representation. 
(e)- The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during 
state or federal collateral post-conviction proceedings in a 
capital case shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding 
arising under section 2254 or this subchapter. This limitation 
shall not preclude the appointment of different counsel at any 
phase of state or federal post-conviction proceedings. 
~ 
COMMENT: Subsection (a) defines the scope of what would be 
new subchapter B which establishes rules and procedures that 
apply solely to section 2254 cases involving prisoners under 
capital sentence. The aim of this subchapter is to provide a 
mechanism for the post-conviction litigation of capital cases 
that has enhanced procedural- safeguards for the pr1soner and yet 
is less time consuming -and less cumbersome -from the vantage point 
of the jurisdiction _seeking to eJ'!force its death penalty. -There 
is no intent to alter the- substantive scope of federal habeas 
corpus . review under section 2254. 
Subchapter B offers an alternative to the present process of 
post-conviction review in capital cases. If it is applicable, it 
would in all but the most unusual- of capital cases limit each 
prisoner to a single opportunity for federal habeas corpus review 
under section 2254. This limitation would advance the state 
interest in the finality of criminal convictions and capital 
sentences. But to avail itself of subchapter B's more structured 
habeas corpus review procedures, a state would have to establish 
a system for the appointment and compensation of competent 
counsel throughout all stages of state post conviction review. 
~ The purpose of this mechanism is to assure that ii• eemb• 
_ _,JV~~ pri ssna• a22a:c!! • api••ilz ee11tss11 • a ••• • nil.:'] a •••!•• apportunj ii'l i•• 
1\/J\fAC,. o review under section 2254a eMIL 1co1:coo will be fair, thorough and 
~ lilo. the product of capable an committed advocacy. While subchapter 
JL:~1 B attempts to craft a realistic balance between the values of 
11\Q.,'vvv,1\ j udicial efficiency and procedural fairness in the context of a 
~A~ TT\t.£11 federal system, it does not impose a solution on the states. 
~ ~ Each state must assess the utility of subchapter B for itself. 
o::lr ½ ~lb~~- 3 
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~ Unless a state takes the affirmative steps required in sections 
2256(b) and (c), its litigation of capital cases under section 
2254 will be governed by the statutory and court rules that 
- presently apply to all federal habeas corpus cases. 
NoH.· --
lfMec.-esi;,"Zl(I . 
section ( a) , 
7-2260 apply i 
ent, compensat 
expenses of co 
especial rules 
a state establi 
on and payment 
etent counsel 
( • under cap,i _______ _____ _ _ _ . 
w 
A 
~i. ogee~ gs ./ Cent ral to efficacy of this scheme is the 
ifevelopment of standards governing the competency of counsel 
chosen to serve in this specialized and demanding area of 
litigation. This mechanism is to be established by state statute 
or by rule of the state court of last resort. The Committee 
believes that it is more consistent with the federal-state 
balance to give the states '5\.de latitude to establish a mechanism 
that complies with subsect~ (b) 
The final judgment as to the adequacy of any system for the 
appointment of counsel under subsection (b), however, rests 
ultimately with the federal judiciary. If prisoners under 
capital sentence in a p articular state doubt that a state's 
mechanism for appointing counsel complies with subsection (b), 
the adequacy of the system -- as opposed to the competency of 
~t~ particular couns~l -- can be raised in a section 2265 proceeding 
or perhaps might be challenged in d ¢£as§ &QCXQJ> brought under 
~ h> se~tion 1?83. Qpe Jdi cT •! • •a stlte!! • . o~a#ia and ~•• pz i scha• s 
i> ./ _ WP sz oap±tal sc:.'l anoa u 1.ll get a eicf11a t l oc zai±H!J • • 'l i&e 
~~ \IMP - •l1P ihi!o ail• ia.i:1e3 . o:i • ;bs bapt as ii . . ·. 
C(<,\-~~1 If the requirements of subsectlon (b) are satisfied·, the V~~ece~-(f"sta~e mechanism must offe7 ?ouns71 to all st~te prisoners ~nder . capital sentence; In addition, it must provide for the entry of 
an appropriate judicial order based on the state prisoner's 
response to the offer of counsel. Judicial control of this 
process is necessary to _establish a clear point in time to 
determine the applicability of sections 2257 and 2258. It is 
also necessary to assure that a full record exists showing which 
state prisoners have appointed counsel and which do not. 
Under subsection (c), all indigent state prisoners under 
capital sentence would be entitled to counsel in state post 
conviction proceedings as a matter of right. If an indigent __ 
prisoner is not competent to decide whether to accept or decline 
the state's offer, the state must appoint counsel in any event. 
If a prisoner is not indigent, which would be the rare case, he 
would not be entitled to the appointment of counsel even if he 
accepted the state's offer. Finally, in some instances, a 
prisoner might reject the offer of counsel. This rejection would 
become effective and binding only after a judicial inquiry into 




Subsection {d) establishes a rule requiring the appointment 
of new counsel at the state post-conviction phase of capital 
litigation. The primary reason for the rule is that during the 
post-conviction review, ineffective assistance of trial and 
appellate counsel is frequently a major issue. It would be 
unrealistic to expect a capital defendant•s trial or appellate 
counsel to raise a vigorous challenge to his own effectiveness. 
A secondary reason is that trial and appellate counsel in death 
penalty cases serve under great pressure and often work 
themselves to the point of emotional and physical exhaustion. 
They are understandably less able to undertake a fresh and 
dispassionate consideration of the issues raised or possibly 
overlooked at trial and on direct appeal. The appointment of new 
counsel at the state habeas phase will do as much as can be done 
to overcome these difficulties. The Committee, however, did not 
believe the rule should be absolute. In some cases, the prisoner 
under capital sentence may have such trust and confidence in his 
trial or appellate counsel that he would desire the attorney-
client relationship to continue during state post-conviction 
review. Subsection (d) would permit, though not require, 
continued representation if the prisoner and his counsel 
expressly make a request to the appointing authority established 
by the state. 
Subsection (e) provides that the ineffectiveness or 
incompetence of counsel during state or federal post-cqnviction 
review in a capital case is not a ground for reli~f in section 
2254 proceedings. This . rule reflects settled ·· constitutional 
_ doctrine which limits ineffectiye assistance of counsel , 
challenges to .those criminal proceedings to which the Sixth 
Amendment right _to counsel attaches. Murray v. Giarrantano, . __ 
U.S._._ (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 US 551 (1987). · 
The Committee recognizes that the competence of counsel 
during all stages of state and federal post-conviction review is 
of the utmost importance in capital cases. However, as far as 
federal review in a proceeding under section 2254 is concerned, 
it believes that the focus • sn s t~•--•anaii¥ should be on the 
performance of a capital defendant• s trial and appellate counsel.,· 
The effectiveness of state and federal post-conviction counsel is 
a matter that can and must be dealt with in the appointment 
process-. Only one who has the clear ability and willingness to 
handle a capital case should be appointed under subsections (b) 
and (c). If at any time during state or federal post-conviction 
review it appears that appointed counsel is unable to discharge 
his obligations in a timely and competent manner, the remedy 
for the court to appoint a replacement and to permit post-
conviction review to go forwara_ wiatba:at r•• jl'el•i •• •• the 
11•i:ae:22• s 
~:A..~~~ w~~. fk c~ 
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rmt11,M c~ Crt* f\t.w (cM~t'( 
lQ\1M~. ~~ c~~s -a~ ~t\+-
) ciar'i~. 
,wo : 
~~ prov•s1M J ~l v+\Ja.c Jt ~ st1<1vk ~te~ 
5 Jo"<. ftt>t IAv'ol~ ~ Cft~h~ ~ ~ ~ 
sh,Jv~ '',n.e&~~ :us,st~'' cl-a,~s ~ 
col\"' k.l-id ~vi~-
- -
Section 2257. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on 
stays of execution; successive petitions 
(a) Upon the entry in the appropriate state court of record 
of an order pursuant to section 2256(c), a warrant or order 
setting an execution date for a state prisoner shall be stayed 
upon application to any court that would have jurisdiction over 
any proceeding filed pursuant to Section 2254. The application 
must recite that the state has invoked the post-conviction review 
procedures of this subchapter and that the scheduled execution is 
subject to stay. 
(b) A stay of execution granted pursuant to subsection (a) 
shall expire if: 
(1) A state prisoner fails to file a habeas corpus 
petition under Section 2254 within the time required in Section 
2258; or 
(2) Upon completion of district cqµrt and court of 
appeals review under Section 2254 the petition for relief is 
denied and (A) the time for filing a petition for certiorari has 
6 
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expired and no petition has been filed; (B) a timely petition for 
certiorari was filed and the Supreme Court denied the petition; 
or (C) a timely petition for certiorari was filed and upon 
consideration of the case, the Supreme Court disposed of it in a 
manner that left the capital sentence undisturbed; or 
(3) Before a court of competent jurisdiction, in the 
presence of counsel and after having been fully advised of the 
consequences of his decision, a state prisoner under capital 
sentence waives the right to pursue habeas corpus review under 
Section 2254. 
(c) If one of the conditions •in , subsection (b) has occurred, 
. no federal - court .-thereafter shall have the authority ·to enter a 
stay of execution or grant relief in a capital case unless: 
(1) the basis for the stay and request for relief is a 
claim not previously presented in the state or federal courts; 
(2) the failure to raise the claim is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States; (B) the result of the Supreme Court recognition of 
7 
- -
a new federal right that is retroactively applicable or (C) based 
on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence in time to present 
the claim for state or federal post-conviction review; and 
(3) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient, 
if proven, to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's 
determination of guilt on the offense or offenses for which the 
death penalty was imposed. 
COMMENT: This subchapter rests on the assumption that every 
state prisoner under capital sentence should have one opportunity 
for full state and federal post-conviction review before being 
subject to execution·. Although this appears to have been the 
practice in capital cases since Furman v. Georgia, 408 US 238 
( 1972), it · has ne-veI_' been f_ormal.ly recognized- as such. Many 
state prisoners under capital sentence have struggled to secure a 
stay of execution - .- often against the vigorous opposition of ·the 
state-~ before availing themselves of even· one chance to pursue J), 
state and federal post-conviction review. Stay of execution ~ -
litigation has been subject to extraordinarily tight deadlines,A~ 
laces unrealistic demands on judges, lawyers and the prisoner• 
• i rjght T • 
If applicable, section 2257 would eliminate stay of 
execution litigation during a state prisoner's first request for 
post-conviction relief. It provides for a mandatory stay of 
execution in capital case~ at any time following the appointment 
of counsel pursuant to section 2256(c). If an execution date 
has been set, the prisoner can get a stay as a matter of right 
simply by making application to any federal court that would have 
jurisdiction over the case in a proceeding brought under section 
2254. In practice, however, even this step is not likely to be 
necessary. If a state takes the steps required in section 2256 
to bring its capital litigation under this subchapter, there will 
be no reason to set an execution date until the completion of 
~t 7-.~ 2' proch~-J M~ "~ 8 
4tip t'G\J~'" is rer''~, n..o+✓- MJ\jcM-e.. 
?,~ o.i?J- if- lo~~~ k C<lf,..culJ.. 
~~a~~ ,fe fl~-
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state and federal post-conviction review. At that juncture, the 
federal courts would have no authority to stay executions except 
under the very limited circumstances identified in section 
2257(c). -
Subsection (b) establishes the duration of a stay of 
execution issued under this subchapter. In effect, it provides 
that a stay of execution issued under subsection (a) will remain 
in effect as long as state and federal post-conviction review in 
a capital case is being actively pursued by the state prisoner. 
The relationship between subsection (b)(l) and section 2258 
is particularly important. Under subsection (b)(l), a stay of 
execution remains in force as long as the state prisoner files a 
section 2254 petition in federal court within the 180 day period 
set forth in section 2258. It is important to emphasize here 
that the object of the 180 day period established in section 2258 
-- which includes the right to apply for a 60 day extension -- is 
not to produce default. Rather it is one of a series of 
provisions in this subchapter designed to stimulate the orderly 
and expeditious consideration on the merits of all federal issues 
arising in capital cases. 
If a state prisoner files a petition under section 2254 
within the time period set forth in section 2258, subsection 
(b)(2) extends the right to a stay of execution to include the 
entire period that the case is pending before the district court, 
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court if a petition for 
certiorari is filed. The right to a stay 'would expire after the 
opportunity for Supreme Court review has passed or after · the 
-Supreme Court .has considered a petition for certiorari and has .-
denied the petition or disposed of the case without overturning 
the capital sentence. The Committee assumes that in capital 
cases the , state prisoner will want to pursue -every opportunity 
for federal post-conviction review open to him including Supreme 
Court review. But once this review process comes to its 
conclusion without a reversal of the capital sentence, it is the 
Committee's belief that federal review should be over. 
In subsection (b)(3), the authority of a federal court to 
stay the execution of a state prisoner expires if there is a 
waiver of the right to pursue habeas corpus review under section 
2254. To eliminate doubt about the validity of the 
waiver, subsection (b)(3) requires that the prisoner announce 
the decision before a court of competent jurisdiction and in the 
presence of his counsel. It also requires the court -- which can 
be state or federal -- to advise the prisoner of the 
consequences of the waiver decision. 
After the occurrence of one of the conditions resulting in 
the expiration of the right to a mandatory stay of execution 




to section 2254 is extremely limited. Subsection (c) would 
thereafter permit a stay of execution and the grant of relief in 
a capital case only if: (1) the claim has never been raised in 
state or federal court previously; (2) there is a valid excuse 
for not discovering and raising the claim during the prisoner's 
initial opportunity for state and federal post-conviction review; 
and (3) the facts underlying the claim raise a serious doubt 
about the prisoner's guilt on the offense or offenses for which 
the death penalty was imposed. 
The third of these conditions is clearly the most important. 
In the Committee's view, if there is any doubt about the 
sentencing phase of a capital case, it should be raised during a 
state prisoner's initial attempt to obtain post-conviction 
review. Often factual guilt is not seriously in dispute. Both 
the prisoner and his counsel have every incentive to ask whether 
all relevant information in mitigation of punishment was 
presented and whether the sentencing phase of the trial was 
otherwise conducted in a constitutionally fair manner. Given the 
clear incentive to do this, the Committee does not believe that 
the federal courts should have to consider a second petition 
under section 2254 which challenges only the sentencing phase 
in a capital case. As subsection (c) reflects, the only 
appropriate exception is when the new claim goes to the 
underlying guilt or innocence of the state prisoner under capital 
! entenee . ~ Murray v. Carrier, 477 us 47 ~ ( (1986); Smith v. Murray, 
477 us 52 1 (1986)(- APD'. .llf16-Lf't'7 . 
s.; 1- L( nmA'.\ €-'(Qp{'t~ hi 1'cr,w~ ~ f(e,<fAA' st~?UJ o1 l,J-r,..,~ wof:10: v. -~) 
. 433 0,S. r~ (1~11-) 11\ Cu~$ ii>JJ.w.... -u. ~shtvh~~ vrola.+?~ h2.ts · 
Section 2258~ · Filing of h~as corpus petition; time require- ''p-,t,hati?~ ·rtw!M 
ments; tolling rules _ ,'-,, th_ (tmVich 
·of (f'f,q__ ~ IS 
Any petition for habeas corpus relief under Section 2254 ~tfu~(~ ~ 
l~ifO~. j 
must be filed in the appropriate district court within 180 days 
from the filing in the appropriate state court of record of an 
order issued in compliance with Section 2256(c). The time 
requirements established by this section shall be tolled: 
10 
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(a) From the date that a petition for certiorari is filed in 
the Supreme Court until the date of final disposition of the 
petition if a state prisoner seeks review of a capital sentence 
that has been affirmed on direct appeal by the court of last 
resort of the state or has otherwise become final for state law 
purposes. 
(b) During any period in which a state prisoner under 
capital sentence has a properly filed request for post-conviction 
review pending before a state court of competent jurisdiction; if 
all state filing rules are met- in a timely manner, this period 
shall run conti~uously from the date that the state prisoner 
initially files for post-conviction review until final 
disposition of the case by the highest court of the state; -
provided, however, the tolling rule established by this sub-
section does not apply during the pendency of a petition for 
certiorari before the Supreme Court following such state post-
conviction review. 
(c) During an additional period not to exceed 60 days, if 
11 
- -
counsel for the state prisoner: (1) moves for an extension of 
time in the federal district court that would have proper 
jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of a habeas corpus 
petition under Section 2254 and (2) makes a showing of good cause 
for counsel's inability to file the habeas corpus petition within 
the 180 day period established by this section. 
COMMENT: Section 2258 requires a state prisoner under 
capital sentence to file a section 2254 petition within 180 days 
from the entry of an order under section 2256 ( c.l·. In almost all 
cases, this will be an order appointing counsel to initiate state 
post-conviction review. But even if a state prisoner is not 
entitled to the appointment of counsel or simply rejects the 
state's offerof appointment, the 180 day period applies to all 
c it ases if the state is sub·ect to this subcha ter rf1/--
At ought e ay i ing rue rese e o 
, ~im~ta~ion, it does not functi,.on like a limitation no1 {"t? is it intended to do so. * 
~ In death penalty jurisdictions, the sole incentive for a 
pris9ner to initiate post-conviction review is either the 
scheduling of an execution date or the threat to schedule one. 
The disadvantages of this method of administering capital 
litigation persuaded the Committee to recommend the mandatory 
stay of execution provisions in section 2257. But it is clear 
that there must be some substitute mechanism to cause 
understandably reluctant state prisoners to seek post-conviction 
review when such action may remove the only obstacle preventing 
the state from carrying out the death sentence. 
The entry of an order under section 2256(c) is such a 
substitute. It starts the state post-conv1ction litigation clock 
in capital litigation. Unless the state prisoner actively 
litigates his case after his conviction and capital sentence have 
become final on direct appeal, he risks losing the right to file 
a section 2254 petition in federal court. Thus, the 180 day 
filing requirement serves the state interest in promoting 
finality in capital cases. At the same time, this subchapter 
serves to advance that interest only if the state provides 
state prisoners under capital sentence with the means --
~01£ ; ,,:1 12 WU(/c.. /;/u_ .,._ sta-luk 'D Ii~. 
111 s~ respul's, ~ st~ ~ / v~ CIAMM--1 I D ,_, • ~ ~L. 
I.$ ~ ~ -r-,~k " -ap~a-r,~, olt$i,,~Utnu ? W-,l\ ~~t>~ k 'ftolt(}- lrl llj 
~ irht 1. h~hLWJ ptA'Ot{ ? 
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competent counsel at state expense -- to assert their legal 
rights in state post-conviction proceedings. As stressed 
earlier, the interaction of sections 2256, 2257 and 2258 is 
designed not to produce finality through procedural default but 
rather through a structured process of post-conviction litigation 
that brings all potentially meritorious claims to the attention 
of the state and federal courts before the imposition of the 
,~: death penalty becomes legally permissible. 
~ ""t ~i-,\'-i<.X There are several · · ng rules in section 2258. 
-,~ i-te. krfl'l With one exception the · ti ation cloc does not run after the 
[h OUY\ filing of a section 2256 c or er as ong as a capital case is 
1 ~"l. v I pending for consideration before a court of competent e,I~, 11/r jurisdiction. The policy underlying section 2258 is to encourage 
~ it'r, ~ litigants to initiate the post-conviction review process and to 
r ~ keep it moving from stage to stage. If delay in the litigation 
~s tt<... (J,Vf.. ·process is due to slow judicial consideration of death penalty 
~- M~(~l itigation, that time obviously should not be and is not counted ~"°V in computing the 180 day period under section 2258. 
f, \""l--. Under section 2258(a), the 180 day period is tolled when a 
state prisoner files a petition for c~tiorari in the Supreme 
Court after affirmance of his capital sentence on direct appeal 
to the state court of last resort. It is extremely important to 
recognize, as section 2258(b) makes clear, that there is no 
comparable tolling rule to permit the filing of certiorari 
petitions after state post-conviction review. The Committee 
believes that multiple . opportunities fpr Supreme Court r~view are 
not 'essential to fairness in the consideration of capital cases. 
In this vein, it would point out that the Supreme· Court since 
1972 has granted certiorari in only 2 of 99 capital . cases- after 
state post-conviction review. ta <loes not r;sul t in 
di~advai:itage t.o the state. pr~soner,. however, since. aiT issues , Aoo : 
• raised in state post-conviction ·review can be carried forward i n,...,-..=--=--=--
a section 2254 petition and ultimately presented to the Supreme EI.M1"'a--hOV'\ 
Court. l"rhe Committee believes that once post-conviction of- ~ slef 
proceedfflgs have begun, it would be a better use of the Supreme ----
k ? .,,, Court's limited resources to defer certiorari review in capital 
...:: • 1 LI cases until after all lower_ ~ urt consideration -- state and 
~ rt--w.. f)<butAt\federal -- has been complet~ 
,~t 5.Ct. The tf'_ft£g:at1op ctcktp:t lso stops under section 2258(b) during 
~~~ any peri&i £Hat a capital case is pending for post-conviction 
i-,:c.e..ft- ~ review before a state court of competent jurisdiction. After all 
·r~ · _, state post-conviction review has been complete~ cluding review 
, f'>'I\ vo V~by the court of last resort, the 180 day time c o begins to run 
~ ~ ((.,(f'" poo( again if the capital sentence is undisturbed. T e next step for 
;,\tA') 11-i the state prisoner is to file a section 2254 petition in federal 
_1 · district court. If counsel for the state prisoner properly 1




In the event that counsel experiences some difficulty in 
filing a section 2254 petition on time, subsection (c) authorizes 
a 60 day extension upon a showing of good cause in the federal 
district that would have jurisdiction over the section 2254 
petition when ultimately filed. 
Section 2259. Evidentiary hearings; scope of federal review; 
district court adjudication 
(a) Whenever a state prisoner under a capital sentence files 
a petition for habeas corpus relief to which this subchapter 
applies, the district court shall: 
(1) determine the~sufficiency of the evidentiary record 
for habeas corpus review based on the claims actually presented 
and litigated in the state courts except when the prisoner can 
show that the failure to raise or develop a claim in the state 
courts is (A) the result of state action in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States; (B) the result of the 
Supreme Court recognition of a new federal right that is 
retroactively applicable; or (C) based on a factual predicate 
that could not have been discovered through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence in time to present the claim for state post-
conviction review; and 
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(2) conduct any requested evidentiary hearing necessary 
to complete the record for habeas corpus review. 
(b) Upon the development of a complete evidentiary record, 
the district court shall rule on the merits of the claims 
properly before it. 
COMMENT: Subsection (a) defines the scope of federal review 
in capital cases to which this subchapter applies. It authorizes 
t he district court to consider only those federal claims actually 
raised and litigated in the state courts. If the section 2254 
petition presents no new claims, the district court will proceed 
t o rule on the merits of the claims properly before it as long as 
the state evidentTary record and findings of fact are adequate. 
If they are deficient in any respect recognized under section 
2254(d), the district court must complete the evidentiary record 
before addressing the issues on the merits. To this extent, 
subsection (a) does not depart from existing law and practice. 
If a petitioner asserts a claim. not previously presented to 
the state. courts, the district court can consider ~he claim only 
if one of the three exceptions .to the general rule listed in , · 
subsection {a)(l) fs applicable. In that case, the district 
court must conduct an evidentiary hearing necessary to _a full 
and fair consideration of the claim · and in.- accordance with 
subsection (b) adjudicate it on the merits along with all other 
issues presented in the section 2254 petition. 
As far as new or "unexhausted" claims are concerned, section 
2259 represents a change in the exhaustion doctrine as 
articulated in Rose v. Lundy, 455 US 509 (1982). Section 2259 
bars such claims from consideration unless one of the subsection 
(a)(l) exceptions is applicable. The prisoner cannot return to 
state court to exhaust even if he would like to do so. On the 
other hand, -i-f a subsection (a) ( 1) exception is applicable, -the 
district court is directed to conduct an evidentiary hearing and 
to rule on the new claim without first exhausting state remedies 
as Rose v. Lundy now requires. Because of the existence of state 
procedural default rules, exhaustion is futile in the great 
majority of cases. It serves the state interest of comity in 
theory but in practice it results in delay and undermines the 
state interest in the finality of its criminal convictions. The 
Committee believes that the states would prefer to see post-
15 
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conviction litigation go forward in capital cases even if that 
entails a minor subordination of their interest in comity as it 
is expressed in the exhaustion doctrine. 
Section 2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable 
The requirement of a certificate of probable cause in order 
to appeal from the district court to the court of appeals does 
not apply to habeas corpus cases subject to the provisions of 
this subchapter except when a second or successive petition is 
filed. 
COMMENT: The premise of this subchapter is that a state 
prisoner under capital sentence is entitled to one opportunity 
for state and federal post-conviction review before being subject 
to execution. Consistent with this premise, the Committee · 
believes that in a . section 2254 proceeding, a state prisoner · 
should be allowed to appeal from the district court to the court 
of appears as a matter of rlght. With one exception, section · 
2260 eliminates the certificate of probable -cause requirement in 
c·ases to which this .subchapter is applicable. The exception 
arises when a second or successive petition is filed. Even if 
such a petition is authorized under the provisions of section 
2257(c), the right to appeal in that instance will be governed by 
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AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
IN CAPITAL CASES 
Committee Report 
I. Introduction 
Studies of public opinion establish that an overwhelming 
majority of our citizens favors the death penalty for certain 
murders. The Supreme Court has made clear that the 
evolving standards of decency embodied in the Eighth 
Amendment permit imposition of this punishment for some 
offenders. Of course, both the Court and society have rec-
ognized that, because it is irreversible, death is a unique pun-
ishment. This realization demands safeguards to ensure 
that capital punishment is administered with the utmost reli-
ability and fairness. 
But our present system of multi-layered state and federal 
appeal and collateral review has led to piecemeal and repe-
titious litigation, and years of delay between sentencing and 
a judicial resolution as to whether the sentence was permissi-
ble under the law. The resulting lack of finality undermines 
public confidence in our criminal justice system. Of course, 
any system of review entails some delay. It is not suggested 
that the delay needed for review of constitutional claims is 
inappropriate. But much of the delay inherent in the pres-
ent system is not needed for fairness. Adding to the prob-
lem is the fact that prisoners of ten cannot obtain qualified 
counsel until execution is imminent. The resulting last-
minute rushed litigation disserves inmates, and saps the re-
sources of our judiciary. 
To address these problems, Chief Justice William H. Rehn-
quist formed this Committee in June 1988. His charge to us 
was to inquire into "the necessity and desirability of legisla-
tion directed toward avoiding delay and the lack of finality" in 
capital cases in which the prisoner had or had been offered 
counsel. The Chief Justice appointed as members of this 
Committee Chief Judge Clark of the Fifth Circuit, Chief 
Judge Roney of the Eleventh Circuit, District Judge Hodges 







additional litigation over a request for a stay of execution is 
inevitable. 
The existing system also fosters piecemeal and repetitive 
litigation of claims. Because res judicata is inapplicable to 
federal habeas proceedings, many capital litigants return to 
federal court with second-or even third and fourth-peti-
tions for relief. Current rules governing abuse of the writ 
and successive petitions have not served to prevent these 
endless filings . Another example of piecemeal litigation is 
the fact that current rules allow at least three petitions for 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court-after direct 
review, after state collateral proceedings, and after federal 
collateral proceedings. 
Few would argue that the current state of death penalty 
administration is satisfactory. There are now approxi-
mately 2,200 convicted murderers on death row awaiting 
execution. Yet since the Supreme Court's 1972 Furman de-
cision only 116 executions have taken place. The shortest 
of these judicial proceedings required two years and nine 
months to complete. The longest covered a period of 14 
years and six months. The Jength of the average proceeding 
was eight years and two months. The Committee does not 
believe eight years are required for the appropriate habeas 
review of state criminal proceedings. 
The Committee's analysis of cases from Alabama, Florida, 
Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas shows that 80% of the time 
spent in collateral litigation in death penalty cases occurs out-
side of state collateral proceedings. A table showing the av-
erage time periods and ratios in death penalty cases in these 
States is attached to this report. 
The relatively small number of executions, as well as the 
delay in cases where an execution has occurred, makes clear 
that the present system of collateral review operates to frus-
trate the law of 37 States. 1 The collateral review process 
tends to be erratic and frequently is repetitious. The long 
1 Federal law also provides for capital punishment in certain cases. See 
P. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4387 (Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988) (murders com-







C. Last-Minute Litigation 
Another disturbing aspect of the current system is that 
litigation of constitutional claims often comes only when 
prompted by the setting of an execution date. Judicial 
resources are expended as the prisoner must seek a stay of 
execution in order to present his claims. Justice may be 
ill-served by conducting judicial proceedings in capital cases 
under the pressure of an impending execution. In some 
cases last-minute habeas corpus petitions have resulted from 
the unavailability of counsel at any earlier time. But in 
other cases attorneys appear to have intentionally delayed fil-
ing until time pressures were severe. In most cases, succes-
sive petitions are meritless, and we believe many are filed at 
the eleventh hour seeking nothing more than delay. 
The foregoing types of abuses have no place in a rational 
system of justice. The merits of capital cases should be re-
viewed carefully and deliberately, and not under time pres-
sure. This should be true both during state and federal col-
lateral review. But once this review has occurred, absent 
extraordinary circumstances there should be no further last-
minute litigation. 
III. The Committee Proposal 
In response to the problems described above, the Commit-
tee proposes new statutory procedures for federal habeas 
corpus review of capital sentences where counsel has been 
provided. Separate procedures for capital cases are appro-
priate in light of the special problems of capital litigation. 
The incentives facing the capital litigant are unique. The in-
mate under capital sentence, whose guilt frequently is never 
in question, has every incentive to delay the proceedings that 
must take place before that sentence is carried out. Such an 
inmate is avoiding the punishment prescribed by the law of 
the State. In contrast, prisoners serving an ordinary term 
of years have every incentive to bring their claims to resolu-
tion as soon as possible in order to gain relief. And they are 







Importantly, the statute provides for an automatic stay of 
execution, which is to remain in place until federal habeas 
proceedings are completed, or until the prisoner has failed to 
file a petition within the allotted time. This automatic stay 
ensures that claims need not be evaluated under the time 
pressure of a scheduled execution. It should substantially 
eliminate the rushed litigation over stay motions that is trou-
bling for both litigants and the judiciary. 
Federal habeas proceedings under the proposal will encom-
pass only claims that have been exhausted in state court. 
With the counsel provided by the statute, there should be no 
excuse for failure to raise claims in state court. The statute 
departs from current exhaustion practice by allowing for im-
mediate presentation of new claims in federal court in ex-
traordinary circumstances. In the event the entire coun-
seled state and federal collateral process concludes without 
relief being granted, the statute includes new mechanisms to 
promote finality. Subsequent and successive federal habeas 
petitions can no longer be the basis of a stay of execution 
or grant of relief absent extraordinary circumstances and a 
colorable showing of factual innocence. 
IV. Conclusion 
The fundamental requirement of a criminal justice system 
is fairness. In habeas corpus proceedings fairness requires 
that a defendant be provided a searching and impartial 
examination of his claims. Fairness also requires that if a 
defendant's claims are found to be devoid of merit after such 
examination, society is rightfully entitled to have the penalty 
prescribed by law carried out without unreasonable delay. 
Every capital defendant is now entitled to competent coun-
sel at state trial and appeal and, under recent congressional 
enactment, in federal habeas corpus proceedings. The Com-
mittee's proposal seeks to fill a gap that now exists by en-
couraging the appointment of competent counsel also in state 
habeas or collateral proceedings. The proposal further as-
sures that, upon completion of state proceedings, a defendant 








CHAPTER 153. HABEAS CORPUS 
Subchapter A. General Provisions 
[a proposed redesignation] 
[sections 2241-2255 would not be changed.] 
Subchapter B. Capital Cases: Special Procedures 
[new] 
Section 2256. Prisoners in state custody subject to cap-
ital sentence; appointment of counsel; 
requirement of rule of court or statute; 
procedures for appointment. 
(a) This subchapter shall apply to cases arising under sec-
tion 2254 brought by prisoners in state custody who are sub-
ject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if the provi-
sions of subsections (b) and (c) are satisfied. 
(b) This subchapter is applicable if a State establishes by 
rule of its court of last resort or by statute a mechanism for 
the appointment, compensation and payment of reasonable 
litigation expenses of competent counsel in state post-convic-
tion proceedings brought by indigent prisoners whose capital 
convictions and sentences have been upheld on direct appeal 
to the court of last resort in the State or have otherwise be-
come final for state law purposes. The rule of court or stat-
ute must provide standards of competency for the appoint-
ment of such counsel. 
(c) Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation 
and reimbursement of counsel as provided in subsection (b) 
must offer counsel to all state prisoners under capital sen-
tence and must provide for the entry of an order by a court of 







prisoner to a single opportunity for federal habeas corpus re-
view under section 2254. This limitation would advance the 
state interest in the finality of criminal convictions and capi-
tal sentences. But to avail itself of subchapter B's more 
structured habeas corpus review procedures, a State would 
have to establish a system for the appointment and com-
pensation of competent counsel throughout all stages of state 
post conviction review. The purpose of this mechanism is 
to assure that collateral review will be fair, thorough, and 
the product of capable and committed advocacy. While 
subchapter B attempts to strike a realistic balance between 
the values of judicial efficiency and procedural fairness in the 
context of a federal system, it does not impose a solution on 
the States. Each State must assess the utility of subchapter 
B for itself. Unless a State takes the affirmative steps re-
quired in sections 2256(b) and (c), its litigation of capital cases 
under section 2254 will be governed by the statutory and 
court rules that presently apply to all federal habeas corpus 
cases. 
Central to efficacy of this scheme is the development of 
standards governing the competency of counsel chosen to 
serve in this specialized and demanding area of litigation. 
This mechanism is to be established by state statute or by 
rule of the state court of last resort. The Committee be-
lieves that it is more consistent with the federal-state balance 
to give the States wide latitude to establish a mechanism that 
complies with subsection (b). The final judgment as to the 
adequacy of any system for the appointment of counsel under 
subsection (b), however, rests ultimately with the federal 
judiciary. If prisoners under capital sentence in a particular 
State doubt that a State's mechanism for appointing counsel 
comports with subsection (b), the adequacy of the system-as 
opposed to the competency of particular counsel-can be set-
tled through litigation. 
If the requirements of subsection (b) are satisfied, the 
state mechanism must offer counsel to all state prisoners 
under capital sentence. In addition, it must provide for the 







(d) would permit, though not require, continued representa-
tion if the prisoner and his counsel expressly make a request 
to the appointing authority established by the State. 
Subsection (e) provides that the ineffectiveness or incom-
petence of counsel during state or federal post-conviction re-
view in a capital case is not a ground for relief in section 2254 
proceedings. This rule reflects settled constitutional doc-
trine which limits ineffective assistance of counsel challenges 
to those criminal proceedings to which the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attaches. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 
2765 (1989), Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551 (1987). 
The Committee recognizes that the competence of counsel 
during all stages of state and federal post-conviction review 
is of the utmost importance in capital cases. However, as 
far as federal review in a proceeding under section 2254 is 
concerned, it believes that the focus should be on the per-
formance of a capital defendant's trial and appellate counsel. 
The provision of counsel under the new statute therefore 
does not involve the creation of any potential claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel in collateral review. The effective-
ness of state and federal post-conviction counsel is a matter 
that can and must be dealt with in the appointment process. 
Only one who has the clear ability and willingness to handle 
capital cases should be appointed under subsections (b) and 
(c). If at any any time during state or federal post-convic-
tion review it appears that appointed counsel is unable to dis-
charge his obligations in a timely and competent manner, the 
remedy is for the court to appoint a replacement, and to per-
mit post-conviction review to go forward. 
Section 2257. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; 
limits on stays of execution; successive 
petitions. 
(a) Upon the entry in the appropriate state court of 
record of an order pursuant to section 2256(c), a warrant or 
order setting an execution date for a state prisoner shall be 







(2) the failure to raise the claim is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States; (B) the result of the Supreme Court rec-
ognition of a new federal right that is retroactively appli-
cable; or (C) based on a factual predicate that could not 
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence in time to present the claim for state or federal 
post-conviction review; and 
(3) The facts underlying the claim would be suffi-
cient, if proven, to undermine the court's confidence in 
the jury's determination of guilt on the offense or of-
fenses for which the death penalty was imposed. 
COMMENT: This subchapter rests on the assumption that 
every state prisoner under capital sentence should have one 
opportunity for full state and federal post-conviction review 
before being subject to execution. Although this appears to 
have been the practice in capital cases since Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), it has never been formally recog-
nized as such. Many state prisoners under capital sentence 
have struggled to secure a stay of execution-often against 
the vigorous opposition of the State-before availing them-
selves of even one chance to pursue state and federal post-
conviction review. Stay of execution litigation often has 
been subject to tight deadlines, and places unrealistic de-
mands on judges, lawyers, and the prisoner. 
If applicable, section 2257 would eliminate stay of execu-
tion litigation during a state prisoner's first request for post-
conviction relief. It provides for a mandatory stay of execu-
tion in capital cases at any time following the appointment of 
counsel pursuant to section 2256(c). If an execution date has 
been set, the prisoner can obtain a stay as a matter of right 
simply by making application to any federal court that would 
have jurisdiction over the case in a proceeding brought under 







tal sentence, it is the Committee's belief that federal review 
should end. 
In subsection (b)(3), the authority of a federal court to stay 
the execution of a state prisoner expires if there is a waiver 
of the right to pursue habeas corpus review under section 
2254. To eliminate doubt about the validity of the waiver, 
subsection (b)(3) requires that the prisoner announce the de-
cision before a court of competent jurisdiction and in the 
presence of his counsel. It also requires the court -which 
can be state or federal-to advise the prisoner of the conse-
quences of the waiver decision. 
After the occurrence of one of the conditions resulting in 
the expiration of the right to a mandatory stay of execution 
under subsection (b)(2), federal review in capital cases pur-
suant to section 2254 is extremely limited. Subsection (c) 
would thereafter permit a stay of execution and the grant of 
relief in a capital case only if: (1) the claim has never been 
raised in state or federal court previously; (2) there is a valid 
excuse for not discovering and raising the claim during the 
prisoner's initial opportunity for state and federal post-
conviction review; and (3) the facts underlying the claim raise 
a serious doubt about the prisoner's guilt of the offense or 
offenses for which the death penalty was imposed. 
The third of these conditions is clearly the most important. 
In the Committee's view, if there is any doubt about the sen-
tencing phase of a capital case, it should be raised during a 
state prisoner's initial attempt to obtain post-conviction re-
view. Often factual guilt is not seriously in dispute. Both 
the prisoner and his counsel have every incentive to ask 
whether all relevant information in mitigation of punishment 
was presented and whether the sentencing phase of the trial 
was otherwise conducted in a constitutionally fair manner. 
Given the clear incentive to do this, the Committee does not 
believe that the federal courts should have to consider a sec-
ond petition under section 2254 which challenges only the 
sentencing phase in a capital case. As subsection (c) re-







jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of a habeas corpus 
petition under section 2254 and (2) makes a showing of good 
cause for counsel's inability to file the habeas corpus petition 
within the 180 day period established by this section. 
COMMENT: Section 2258 requires a state prisoner under 
capital sentence to file a section 2254 petition within 180 days 
from the entry of an order under section 2256(c). In almost 
all cases, this will be an order appointing counsel to initiate 
state post-conviction review. But even if a state prisoner is 
not entitled to the appointment of counsel or simply rejects 
the State's offer of appointment, the 180 day period applies to 
all capital cases if the State is subject to this subchapter. 
In death penalty jurisdictions, the sole incentive for a pris-
oner to initiate post-conviction review is either the schedul-
ing of an execution date or the threat to schedule one. The 
disadvantages of this method of administering capital litiga-
tion persuaded the Committee to recommend the mandatory 
stay of execution provisions in section 2257. But it is clear 
that there must be some substitute mechanism to cause 
understandably reluctant state prisoners to seek post-
conviction review when such action may remove the only 
obstacle preventing the State from carrying out the death 
sentence. 
The entry of an order under section 2256(c) is such a substi-
tute. It begins the running of the filing period in capital liti-
gation. Unless the state prisoner actively litigates his case 
after his conviction and capital sentence have become final on 
direct appeal, he risks losing the right to file a section 2254 
petition in federal court. Thus, the 180 day filing require-
ment serves the state interest in promoting finality in capital 
cases. At the same time, this subchapter serves to advance 
that interest only if the State provides prisoners under capi-
tal sentence with the means-competent counsel at state ex-
pense-to assert their legal rights in state post-conviction 







ing review by the court of last resort, the 180 day period be-
gins to run again if the capital sentence is undisturbed. The 
next step for the state prisoner is to file a section 2254 peti-
tion in federal district court. If counsel for the state pris-
oner properly discharges his responsibilities, default under 
the 180 day rule will not occur. 
In the event that counsel experiences some difficulty in fil-
ing a section 2254 petition on time, subsection (c) authorizes a 
60 day extension upon a showing of good cause in the federal 
district that would have jurisdiction over the section 2254 
petition when ultimately filed. 
Section 2259. Evidentiary hearings; scope of federal 
review; district court adjudication. 
(a) Whenever a state prisoner under a capital sentence 
files a petition for habeas corpus relief to which this sub-
chapter applies, the district court shall: 
(1) determine the sufficiency of the evidentiary 
record for habeas corpus review based on the claims ac-
tually presented and litigated in the state courts except 
when the prisoner can show that the failure to raise or 
develop a claim in the state courts is (A) the result of 
state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
Untied States; (B) the result of the Supreme Court rec-
ognition of a new federal right that is retroactively ap-
plicable; or (C) based on a factual predicate that could 
not have been discovered through the exercise of reason-
able diligence in time to present the claim for state post-
conviction review; and 
(2) conduct any requested evidentiary hearing neces-







sults in delay and undermines the state interest in the finality 
of its criminal convictions. The Committee believes that the 
States would prefer to see post-conviction litigation go for-
ward in capital cases, even if that entails a minor subordina-
tion of their interest in comity as it is expressed in the ex-
haustion doctrine. 
Section 2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable. 
The requirement of a certificate of probable cause in order 
to appeal from the district court to the court of appeals does 
not apply to habeas corpus cases subject to the provisions of 
this subchapter except when a second or successive petition 
is filed. 
COMMENT: The premise of this subchapter is that a state 
prisoner under capital sentence is entitled to one opportunity 
for state and federal post-conviction review before being sub-
ject to execution. Consistent with this premise, the Com-
mittee believes that in a section 2254 proceeding, a state pris-
oner should be allowed to appeal from the d.istrict court to the 
court of appeals as a matter of right. With one exception, 
section 2260 eliminates the certificate of probable cause re-
quirement in cases to which this subchapter is applicable. 
The exception arises when a second or successive petition is 
filed. Even if such a petition is authorized under the provi-
sions of section 2257(c), the right to appeal in that instance 
will be governed by section 2253 rather than section 2260. 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS 
CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES 
Justice Powell has asked me to distribute the attached minutes of 
our last meeting on July 27. 
Inasmuch as we have no further meetings scheduled and thus there 
may be no such opportunity to record formal approval of the minutes, I 
know that Justice Powell would be pleased to receive from you any written 
suggestions for correction, addition, or clarification. In the absence of any 





JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON 
HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF CAPITAL SENTENCES 
Minutes of the Meeting of July 27, 1989 
The Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Capital Sentences 
held its sixth meeting at the Supreme Court Building, Washington, on July 27, 1989. 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., presided, and all other members of the committee were 
present. The Chief Justice visited with the committee briefly at the commencement of 
the meeting and expressed optimism at the prospect that the committee would shortly be 
ready to submit its report to the Judicial Conference. Also in attendance were Professor 
Albert Pearson of the University of Georgia Law School, reporter for the committee, 
Hewitt Pate, law clerk to Justice Powell, and William R. Burchill, Jr., General Counsel, 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 
Justice Powell began by asking for the committee's approval of the minutes of its 
last meeting, held on June 23, 1989. These minutes were unanimously approved without 
revision or further comment. 
Next Justice Powell asked Judge Sanders to relate any new developments 
regarding the ABA Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus since the committee's 
last meeting. Judge Sanders stated that no further meetings of the Task Force had 
occurred. He also referred to correspondence of the Task Force's reporter, speculating 
that its present consensus is there should be no priority for Federal habeas proceedings. 
Judge Sanders further related that other developments have been occurring through 
correspondence within the Task Force. In summary, the committee and Task Force are 
on largely parallel tracks with the recognition that the Task Force's charter is a broader 
one. The Task Force has expedited its time schedule with its next meeting to take place 
- -
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in Atlanta in late August, at which time there will be public hearings with a long witness 
list. 
At this time Judge Clark distributed for the consideration of the committee his 
suggested draft of its final report. Justice Powell then called upon Professor Pearson to 
review the changes to his draft of proposed legislation that were agreed upon at the last 
meeting. Professor Pearson stated that the major change is to frame the obligations of 
the states so as to give them more latitude in invoking the procedures of new section 
2256 of title 28. Another change which he enumerated had occurred in the definition of 
persons eligible for appointment as counsel: this reflected the expressed view that there 
is no need to mandate a change of counsel on appeal where all parties are satisfied to 
retain petitioner's original lawyer. 
Judge Hodges inquired whether this draft legislation would apply only to indigent 
petitioners and questioned the desirability of erecting a possible double standard between 
indigents and others. Professor Pearson responded that states would wish to be able to 
invoke this subchapter by making the requisite offer of counsel to all defendants under 
capital sentence, although there would be no need to appoint counsel for those 
defendants who have funds. As a practical matter, he noted, virtually all capital 
defendants have been indigent, but some of them have volunteer counsel. In summary, 
the offer of counsel is envisioned as a mechanism to trigger the procedures of the new 
subchapter, although it is recognized that some defendants may not qualify to avail 
themselves of this off er. 
Judge Hodges then asked if the proposed statute should explicitly declare whether 
non-indigent defendants will come within its time limitations. Professor Pearson thought 
that this was an open question, while Judge Clark suggested that the present draft 
already provides the answer. After further discussion Professor Pearson recommended 
- -
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requiring the states to off er counsel to all state capital prisoners, subject to their 
meeting the qualification of indigency. Judge Sanders voiced his preference to handle 
this problem through a change to proposed section 2258. Additional discussion then 
occurred on the question whether the mere offer of counsel by the state would constitute 
a sufficient triggering mechanism. Ultimately Judge Clark suggested a change of 
language as shown on page five of the edited statutory draft that had been distributed. 
This proposal received general agreement. 
Further discussion then took place on proposed section 2256(d) and its provision to 
permit counsel to continue on appeal where all parties so desire. An agreed change was 
made to section 2256(e) to ref er to state or federal collateral post-conviction 
proceedings. Judge Hodges noted that section 2256(c) nowhere places a time frame on 
the appointment of counsel and raised the question whether this should be done. 
Professor Pearson responded that a clear incentive for the states is being created and 
that it should then be left to them. Judge Clark predicted that the mechanism would 
work equitably and uniformly in its present form. Justice Powell agreed, but 
Judge Roney expressed concern that there will be no contribution to the process unless 
states voluntarily see fit to take advantage of this device. 
Judge Sanders observed that under this draft the state would decide the issue of 
counsel's competence and that this question would then be forever foreclosed. Professor 
Pearson agreed that this is a fair interpretation of the draft. Then Judge Hodges pointed 
out that the statute as proposed would not permit federal litigation of unexhausted state 
claims. He added that this principle would apply if the 'issue of trial counsel's 
competence were not raised at the state level. Judge Hodges expressed the view that 
this does not present a problem because the statute would require the appointment of 
competent counsel, although admittedly this is a subjective determination. 
- -
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Professor Pearson then summarized the proposed changes to be made to section 
2256 of the draft legislation: 
add a third option to paragraph (c) where there is an 
adjudication of non-indigency; 
in paragraph (d) authorize the continuation of 
representation by trial or appellate counsel if the 
defendant so requests, counsel agrees, and this 
arrangement is approved by the court after hearing; 
the clarification suggested by Judge Hodges to 
paragraph (e), adding "collateral" and substituting 
"proceedings." 
Discussion then continued on the issue of competency of counsel. Several 
members observed as to the difficulty or impossibility of defining "competency" with 
Judge Sanders expressing concern that the statutory draft before the committee would 
implicitly define it by lessening the ability to raise it as an issue. Judge Roney raised the 
question whether the standard for legal competence in the post-conviction context is 
properly a federal or state issue, and Judge Sanders questioned whether the discrepancy 
among federal judicial districts as to what constitutes competent representation can be 
alleviated. 
At this point Justice Powell posed the question whether the committee should add 
to subsection (e) a federal standard of competence. Judge Roney responded that the 
issue is not truly competence but effectiveness in a given case. Judge Sanders 
speculated as to the effect of removing subsection (e); Judge Clark responded that its 
retention will not pose a problem if defendants have the right to litigate whether this 
system applies to them or not. Judge Hodges then suggested removing the "competent" 
modifier from subsection (c), and the committee agreed to this approach. Professor 
Pearson noted that this change is consistent with the purpose to eliminate case-by-case 
- -
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adjudication of attorney competence and define this standard instead on a statewide 
basis. 
Justice Powell then moved the discussion to proposed section 2257. Professor 
Pearson summarized the changes incorporated as a result of discussion at the last 
meeting. At the suggestion of Judge Hodges it was agreed to add to section 2257(b)(2) 
explicit language requiring the petition to have been denied, on the basis that it would be 
desirable to state this clear assumption. Other minor changes as shown in the revised 
text were agreed to. Judge Roney noted in summary that in the situation of successive 
petitions the approach of this draft would be to remove as an issue the correctness of the 
death penalty and focus solely on the issue of the defendant's guilt. There was general 
agreement with this analysis. 
The discussion then shifted to proposed section 2258. Judge Sanders expressed 
satisfaction that the new version is more understandable, but he raised the question of 
the tacking. of time periods. After discussion there was general agreement that the use 
of the word "toll" is sufficient to evidence the intent for tacking. It was observed that a 
change had been made in the lead-in to this section to clarify that its requirements apply 
to all capital defendants, including those who do not qualify financially for appointed 
counsel. 
Justice Powell raised the fundamental question whether the proposed stay of 
execution pending the filing of a habeas corpus petition should remain 365 days, as 
proposed. Judge Hodges responded that he would support a revision to 180 days, but 
Judge Sanders questioned whether such a reduction would create political difficulties for 
the committee's recommendations and misperceptions thereof by Congress. After 
additional discussion the committee agreed to recommend only a 180-day period but with 
- -
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the recognition that this will be a pivotal issue before the Judicial Conference in its 
review of the committee's report. 
Discussion then occurred on proposed section 2259 with particular reference to 
the question whether the court must rule on all habeas claims if relief is granted as to 
one of them. There was the general consensus that courts should rule comprehensively 
on all claims. It was agreed that the proposed language on page 16 of the draft required 
no change but that this statement of the committee's philosophical view would be made 
explicit in the commentary. 
Next the committee considered proposed section 2260 with respect to the 
inapplicability of the certificate of probable cause requirement for capital habeas 
petitions. Judge Clark recommended omitting this section on the premise that 
maintaining the requirement could save a small amount of time. Judge Roney suggested 
that there is an inconsistency in applying the certificate requirement only to some 
categories of habeas cases. Justice Powell then proposed omitting section 2260 from the 
committee's recommended statutory draft. Judge Clark agreed, but after further 
discussion it was decided to retain this section with the addition of language qualifying it 
so as not to cover second or successive petitions. 
Justice Powell directed Professor Pearson to effect the added changes to the 
statutory language agreed upon by the committee today and then to consider 
Judge Clark's suggested language for a committee report. He expressed the intention to 
meet the required time schedule to bring the report before the Judicial Conference on 
September 20. Judge Clark noted that this goal could be met if the report reaches the 
Executive Committee of the Conference in time for its scheduled meeting on August 24 
to finalize the Conference agenda. It was agreed that Professor Pearson would distribute 
- -
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the amended statutory language by mail on August 7 and then proceed to finalize the 
report. It was further agreed that no additional meeting of the committee appeared 
necessary. 
In conclusion Judge Roney inquired whether the committee had now concluded all 
of the business that the Chief Justice had assigned it. Judge Hodges raised the question 
whether conforming changes would be necessary in the rules under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but 
Professor Pearson responded that he had considered this need and found no changes 
required. Judge Sanders asked whether any further comment should now be invited on 
the committee's proposed work product. Justice Powell answered that scrutiny by the 
Judicial Conference would be sufficient, and this became the consensus of the 
committee. The committee then adjourned with no further meeting plans. 
Respectfully submitted, 
d~ f?/ //,., / (. 
William R. Burch1i~
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Justice Lewis Powell 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
0 5 SEP 1989 
August 29, 1989 
Re: Special Committee on Habeas Corpus Review of Capital Sentences 
Dear Justice Powell: 
Enclosed is a paper that our Foundation has prepared on the habeas corpus 
question. I hope that your committee will find it useful. Our specific proposals 
are in part III, on pages 43 to 49. This paper has also been submitted to the ABA 
committee. 
If your committee intends to hold public hearings, I would be pleased to 
attend and answer any questions the committee may have on this proposal. 
KSS:iha 
Enclosure 
cc: Hon. Charles Clark 
Hon. Paul H. Roney 
Hon. William Terrell Hodges 
Hon. Barefoot Sanders 
Very truly yours, 
~~52, 
Kent S. Scheidegger 
2131 L Street, Sacramento, CA 95816 • P.O. Box 1199, Sacramento, CA 95812 • (916) 446-0345 
., - -
Conference of Chief Justices 
0 ~ SE? ,1389 
_;--
PRESIDENT 
Harry L. Carrico 
Chief Justice August 31, 1989 
Secretariat 
National Center for State Courts 
300 Newport Avenue 
Williamsburg, Virginia 23187-8798 
(804) 253-2000 
Supreme Court of Virginia 
Post Office Box 1315 
Richmond, Virginia 2321 
(804) 786-2023 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Retired 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D.C . 20543 
Dear Lewis: 
I thought you might be interested in the attached 
resolution adopted by the Conference of Chief Justices at 
its recent annual meeting in Lake Tahoe, calling for studies 
that could: (1) help identify those factors in state~ 
criminal proceedings which increase or reduce habeas 
activity, and (2) provide a hTstorical analysis of the rate 
atwnich habeas writs have been granted, analyze the 
evolution of the grounds for granting them, and determine 




f e f h. -f . e . Con erence o C 1e Justices 
RESOLUTION XI 
Research on Haoeas Corpus 
WHEREAS, the Conference of Chief Justices has repeatedly expressed the 
view that duplicative and overlapping reviews of state criminal 
convictions by federal courts unduly prolong and conflict with state 
criminal proceedings without furthering the historic purposes of the 
writ of habeas corpus; and 
WHEREAS, the Conference has repeatedly endorsed legislation which would 
modify federal habeas corpus procedures on petitions by state 
prisoners so as to lessen the heavy burden these writs place on state 
as well as federal courts; and 
WHEREAS, the Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, whose members include four state 
judges, three of whom are chief justices, is studying problems 
involved in administration of the writ in the federal courts and 
be l ieves well designed studies could suggest solutions that could 
help ease tensions between state and federal courts resu l t i ng from 
the writ; and 
WHEREAS, the Judicial Conference Committee has asked the Conference of 
Chief Justices to initiate studies that could: (1) help identify 
those factors in state criminal proceedings which increase or reduce 
habeas activity, and (2) provide a historical analysis of the rate at 
which habeas writs have been granted, analyze the evolution of the 
grounds for granting them, and determine whether the need for the 
writ is declining; 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Conference of Chief Justices 
requests the . Nat ional Center for State Courts to conduct such studies 
of the writ of habeas corpus and to apply to the State Justice 
Institute for a grant for that purpose; and urges that the State 
Justice Institute favorably consider such application. 
Adopted as proposed by the State-Federal Relations Committee of the 
Conference of Chief Justices at the 41st Annual Meeting in Lake Tahoe, 
Nevada, on August 3, 1989. 
- -
September 5, 1989 
Dear Harry: 
Thank you for your letter of August 31, with ita 
enclosure. 
I agree fully that the ~buse of fc<leral habeas cor-
pus has reflectea discredit on our criminal justice system, 
and has made it almost imposnible to enforce the laws of 37 
states that authorize capital punishment. 
Chief Ju~tice Rehnquist appointeo an Ad Hoc Commit-
tee to consider possible revisions in the habeas corpus 
statutes. I chaired the Committee, and we have submitted a 
report to the Chief Justice to be considered by the Judicial 
Conference which meets later t~is month. 
I hope to be in Williamsburg on Sunday, and to see 
you then. 
Hon. Harry L. Carrico 
Chief Justic 
Supreme Court of Virginia 
P.O. Box 1315 
Richmond, Virginia 23210 
lfp/ss 
Sincerely, 
cc: Hon. William H. Rehnquist 
I enclose a copy of Chief Justice Carrico's letter of August 
31 with a copy of the resolution adopted by the Conference of 




September 5, 1989 
Dear Mr. Scheidegger: 
Thank you for your letter of August 29 enclosing a 
paper prepared by the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation on 
Federal Habeas Corpus. 
Our Committee has completed its report, and submit-
ted it to Chief Justice Rehnquist. I nevertheless am glad 
to have a copy of your report. 
Sincerely, 
Kent S. Scheidegger, Esquire 
Legal Director 
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation 
P. O.Box 1199 
Sacramento, CA 95812 
lfp/ ss 
-
September 11, 1989 
Dear Terry: 
A brief note to say again that it 
was a special pleasure to have you serve 
with me on the Chief's Ad Hoc Committee on 
Federal Habeas Corpus. In view of your 
experience as a key District Court Judge in 
Florida you were particularly helpful to 
the Committee. 
It also was a pleasure to have the 
opportunity to know you personally. 
Sincerely, 
Hon. William Terrell Hodges 
United States District Court 
Middle District of Florida 
United States Courthouse 
Suite 108 




September 11, 1989 
Dear Barefoot: 
A brief. note to say again that it 
was a special pleasure to have you serve 
with me on the Chi~f•s A0 Hoc Committee on 
Federal Habeas Corpus. As a District Court 
Judge, and former member of Congress you 
were particularly helpful to the Committee. 
It also was a pleasure to have the 
opportunity to know you personally. 
Sincerely, 
Hon. Barefoot Sanders 
United States District Court 
Northern District of Texas 
1100 Commerce Street 
Room 15D28A 




September 11, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear Bill: 
This is a belated reply to your 
letter of August 25 in which you enclosed 
the minutes of our last meeting on July 27. 
I have no suggestions. 
I also take this opportunity to 
say that you were an excellent Secretary of 
our Committee, made contributions at our 
meetings, and prepared excellent minutes. 
In my view, the Administrative Office is 
fortunate to have you as General Counsel. 
Sincerely, 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 
Genera) Counsel 
Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts 




DONALD P. LAY 
CH I E P' JUDGE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
P . O . BOX 7!1908 
ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA !1!117!1 
September 12, 1989 
The Honorable Charles Clark 
Chief Judge 
United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit 
245 Capitol Street, Room 302 
Jackson, Mississippi 39201 
Dear Charles: 
i 5 SEP i989 
I have just received the committee's report on habeas 
corpus. Unfortunately, I am in St. Louis this week with a 
full schedule of court, and I have not been able to do an 
indepth analysis. 
I know the committee has worked very diligently. There 
are certainly some meritorious suggestions made, but at the 
same time I find areas in which I feel I would disagree. I 
hope you will understand that I do not have the time during 
court week to outline these. I look forward to a good discussion, 
but I do hope that we can postpone final action on this matter 
until March. It is such an important area and I am sure you 
would agree that we should not act hastily without due consider-
ation of all concerns. I am also troubled by the fact that 
some of the report, particularly that which pertains to the 
statute of limitations, can be attacked on a constitutional 
basis. I am concerned that the Judicial Conference could be 
placing its imprimatur on something that could be challenged 
on a constitutional basis. 
In any event, I hope that you will understand my reasons 
for not writing in detail. I look forward to our discussions 
at the time of the conference. 
Sincerely yours, 
r '" .. ,,/ - £f) 
~----'·'.(_.(,t_ (_ . } .. ·1 
DONALD P. LAY _ 
DPL/ja 
cc: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
cc: Paul H. Roney 
cc: Barefoot Sanders 
cc: All Chief Circuit Judges 
-
CHAM B ERS OF 
JUST I CE AN TH ONY M. K E NN EDY 
Dear Lewis, 
-
j;np::rtntt <ircnrt .itf flrt ~h j;tatt,g 




I h ~ve just ~ opportunity to peruse quickly the report 
of th~ d Hoc Commit t ee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital 
Cases. , Congratul _a-t-i'ons for producing such a fine piece of work. 
. ..----
I am back here in chambers and look forward to seeing you 
soon. Bes/7 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
- -
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Justice Powell September 14, 1989 
FROM: Hew 
RE: Habeas Commitee -- Press Conference/Interview 
I have spoken with Bob Feedler of the legislative af-
fairs section of the Administrative Office. Here is the 
proposed schedule for your participation in the announcement 
of the Habeas Committee's Report and Proposal: 
1. Judicial Conference Meeting: 
20. The meeting begins at 10:00 a.m. 
Wednesday, September 
The Attorney General 
and several congressmen and senators will attend the public 
session of the Conference from 10:00 to 11:00. You are wel-
come to attend if you like, and might have an opportunity to 
meet with congressmen who will be important to the propos-
al's success on the Hill. At about 11:00, the Conference 
will go into closed session, and you will be called on to 
present the Commit tee report. Al Pearson to answer ques-
tions on specifics after you speak(?). 
2. Press Conference: Thursday, September 21, 10: 00 
a.m., Lawyer's Lounge. Feedler or Toni House will open the 
press conference and then introduce you to speak on the sub-
ject of the habeas committee. You may give brief introduc-
tory remarks and then take questions for approximately 15 
minutes. Bill Burchill and I can be present if you wish to 
- - 2 - -
refer to us on any technical questions, statistics, etc. 
After you finish, Feedler of the AO will continue the press 
conference on other topics. 
3. Interview: Thursday, September 21, around 10:30 
a.m., proceed to C-Span studio on N. Capital Street (about 
300 yards from Court). Approximately 20 min. interview on 
habeas committee. Feedler will tell us the name of the in-
terviewer in advance. We can submit proposed question sub-
jects to the interviewer. 
R.H.P. 
- -
lfp/ss 09/14/89 ADC SALLY-POW 
Ad Hoc Committee Report 
MEMO TO HEW: 
using your helpful draft, I have made some factual 
additions and editing, and enclose a draft of September 14. 
I would appreciate your taking a close look at it. 
I estimate that the draft has about 1000 words. 
This would take about 12 minutes to deliver. Could we re-
duce it a bit without losing essential substance? 
we say that because incentives are different, the 
use and abuse of federal habeas corpus occurs in capital 
cases. I may be asked by a member of the Judicial Confer-
ence, or by a reporter later, whether habeas corpus also is 
used repetitively in noncapital cases. I think the answer 
is yes, but far less frequently. 
I suggest that you take a look at the Annual Report 
of the Administrative Office. I believe it has a table 
showing the number of federal habeas corpus cases in each of 
the last five years. Take a look. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
SEP . 15 '89 10: 10 HOL.Y, CHI EF JU[ iGE, 10TH CIRC -UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
WII.L IAM J , HOLLOWAY, .JI,. 
c",u Ju De• 
TINTH C I IIC UI T 
Pou 0,,1c1 Box 1787 
OKLAHOMA C I TY, OKLAH0h\ A 73101 
September 15, 1989 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
Honorble Charles Clark 
Honorable Paul H. Roney 
Honorable William Terrell Hodges 
Honorable Barefoot Sanders 
Dear Justice Powell and Judges: 
P.02 
T t L!" l-< 0 111!'. 
406 / lt:1 1·4118 
,TII 731 · 117. 
I have this week studied the very thorough and thoughtful 
Report of your Committee on the habeas statutes with respect to 
death penalty cases after return from our Circuit Conference. It 
is immediately apparent that you gave intense study to the problems 
and have proposed innovative solutions, particularly addressing the 
problem of adequacy of representation. 
With full deference to each of you and your studious efforts, 
I am compelled to state reservations concerning the statutory 
proposal. First, it is a far-reaching proposal which has evolved 
from your many months of hard work and extensive research. The 
Conference is requested to consider and act upon it, however, in a 
comparatively brief period of study of it along with substantial 
other Conference materials. Second, I must express concern that 
even in instances where factual circumstances could not have been 
earlier discovered, and where the death sentence, but not the 
conviction, can be challenged by a showing that would undermine 
confidence in the penalty, th i s statute would not afford relief 
under proposed Section 2257(c)(3). Third, the 180 day time bar 
proposed (with a possible extension not to exceed 60 days), which 
interrelates with the last point, presents a troublesome prospect 
to me, particularly where grounds for a habeas proceeding could not 
be developed earlier. 
I submit these thoughts because of the invitation of Chief 
Judge Clark to do so and in orde r that you be advised of these 





cc: Professor Albert M. Pearson 
Mr. William R. Burchill, Jr, 
- -
September 15, 1989 
Dear Chief: 
I enclose copies of letters received this morning 
from Judges Lay and Holloway, 
I have made sure that Al Pearson also has copies. 




Ya ff Ho Ho Ho HoH0 
.. 
CHAMBERS OP' 
JUDGE BAREFOOT SANDERS 
September 15, 1989 
~iteh jbttes ~fotrid Qiourt 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF T EXAS 
1100 COMMERCE STREET 
DALLAS, TEXAS 7!5242 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
U.S. Supreme Court 
1 First St., NE 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
-4 8 SEP 1989 
Today I received a fax letter from Chief Judge Holloway expressing 
reservations about our Task Force Report to the Judicial Conference. 
This letter refers to those reservations. 
His first reservation i ~ the effect that Conference action is 
being requested withou~ ficient time for consideration. In this 
he agrees with Chief Ju~ ge Lay. My reaction is that if a substantial 
minority of the Conference believe that further study is needed, then 
we should defer; however, if only a few are of that mind, I think we 
should press ahead. This will be a judgment call. Perhaps we can 
ascertain the feeling of Conference members prior to any vote. 
Judge Holloway's second reservation has to do with Section 
2257(c) (3). Would it be appropriate to substitute "the jury's 
assessment of the death penalty" or words of similar import , for the 
words "the jury's determination of guilt on the offense or offenses 
for which the death penalty was imposed"? I have a dim recollection 
that we may have already discussed this possibility during our last 
Tdsk Force session. 
Judge Holloway's third reservation is to the 180-day time bar. As 
with the first reservation, this is basically a judgment call as to 
whether (1) others share his concern and (2) a longer period would 
satisfy those concerns. 
'~ 
I have not myself responded to Judge Holloway's communication. If 
there is anything you want me to do, please let me know. 
Best wishes to you. 
cc: Honorable Charles Clark 
Honorable Paul H. Roney 
Honorable William Terrell Hodges 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
Mr. William R. Burchill, Jr. 
;• . 
FROM :LAW SCHOOL - UGA rn: SEP 18 , 1989 10: 11 AM P.02 
MEMORJ\NDUM 
~o: Justice Lewis F. Powell 
FROM: Al Pearson 
DATE: September 18, 1989 
RE: Possible Issues Before Judicial Conference 
Report of the ~d Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus 
in Capital cases 
ln this memorandum, I have identified some potentially 
difficult issues that might come up for discussion when the 
Judicial Conference meets on Wednesday, September 20, 1989. 
1. What reason does the Committee have to believe that its 
proposal will reduce the total time necessary to litigate capital 
cas~s? 
A: We can't be certain that the total time necessary to 
litigate capital cases will be reduced. This is because the 
nwnber of capital convictions continues to be around 300 
~nnually , Even if the Committee's proposal is adopted, the sheer 
volume of capital cases may mean t ha t capital cases on average 
will still take a long time to resolve. However, under this 
proposal the capital litigation process will be more structured 
and tha states should have the assurance that after one chance 
for federal review, the death penalty can be carried out. At 
this juncture, all that the Committee can say is that its 
proposal makes the prospect of finality more concrete than is 
presently the case and it creates the possibility of some 
reduction in total litigation time. 
2. Even if one can justify treating capital and non-capital 
cases differently, how does the Committee justify having 
potentially two different sets of habeas corpus rules in capital 
cases? 
A: This proposal responds to stat e concerns about the 
disruptive effects of federal habeas cor pus review on their 
ability t o carry out the death penalty. It offers those states 
which feel these concerns most intensely a way to achieve 
finality in death penal t y cases. The presenca of counsel in 
state and f ederal post-conviction r eview proceedings promotes 
f a i rness and at the same time makes it easier for courts to 
require that all issues in capital cases must be presented in a 
timely and orderly manner or else lose the chance to litigate 
them. If a state elects not to take advantage of the subchapter 
B procedures, its standing to complain about federal habeas 
review in capital cases ought to be diminished. 
FROM :LAW SCHOOL - UGA rn: SEP 18 , 1989 10:11 AM P.03 
The alternative would be to make the subchapter B scheme 
mandatory. This probably would not be feasible politically. 
States with small death row populations might resist particularly 
if they believe their death row inmates already receive adequate 
representation. States with large death row populations might 
balk because of the potential financial impact of a mandatory 
proposal. The present proposal allows some experimentation on a 
state-by-state basis. If the expected advantages are there, 
other statos will get on the bandwagon. 
3. Why not make the scheme for representation more detailed 
instead of leaving the initial proposal up to the respective . 
states? 
A: The flexibility of the Committee's proposal is designed 
to make it more attractive to the states. Financing, selection 
of counsel and training all can be done in a variety of ways. If 
a scheme is good enough to provide competent counsel in state 
habeas proceedings, why not evaluate the scheme on its own terms 
rather than imposing a detailed federal framework? 
4. Why exempt the competency of habeas counsel from review? 
A: OnQ raason is that the right to counsel does not apply 
in post conviction proceedings and the ineffective assistance 
issue does not arise. But apart from that, does it make sense to 
address the competency of counsel by fashioning a remedy that 
requires more litigation? The object of this proposal, in part, 
is to find a way to bring capital litigation to a fair and just 
end. The premise of subchapter Bis that a before-the-fact 
solution to the problem of competent counsel is better than the 
present system of after-the-fact litigation in which new counsel 
challenges the effectiveness of prior counsel. If a state 
develops a scheme which results in the appointment of capable 
counsel in capital cases, doesn't reliance on that system make 
sense as an alternative? Can't the states and the federal 
government make the judgment that reliance on the efforts and 
acumen of such counsel is enough to make the system of post 
conviction review in capital cases fundamentally fair? The 
containment of ineffective assistance of counsel claims is one of 
the keys to finality in death penalty litigation. 
5. Is the limitation on successive petitions in section 
2257(c) fair to the extent that it links such petitions to a 
showing of probable innocence on the underlying charges? 
A: At a minimum, mos t would ag r e e that if there is evidence 
strongly suggesting a capital defendant's innocence, the validity 
of the ·conviction -- and hence the sentence -- should be subject 
to a second look. Should section 2257(c) go farther? Is a 
FROM :LAW SCHOOL -UGA rn : SEP 18, 1989 10 :1 2AM P.04 
second look appropriate when the only argument goes to penalty? 
The guilt-innocence decision turns on an inquiry into historical 
fact which means what the defendant did or didn't do and what his 
mental state was at the time. At the sentencing stage of a 
capital case, the jury has decided in favor of guilt. The 
question then becomes whether there is anything more about the 
defendant as an individual that the jury should know before it 
imposes sentence. Under current law, the defendant can present 
almost anything to argue against the death penalty. The 
sentencing decision, however, turns far less on questions of 
historical fact and for that reason a second look at it during 
post conviction review may not be necessary to insure fairness. 
Subchapter B places an obligation on habeas counsel to take 
a searching look at the sentencing phase of a capital case. Once 
this is done, a federal court should not be asked to speculate 
pursuant to a successive petition whether new information about a 
defendant -- which is potentially hard to limit and easy to 
manufacture -- might cause another jury to view the imposition of 
the death penalty differently. Section 2257(c) is probably as 
important as any provision in terms of promoting finality in 
capital cases. 
6. Docs the 180 day filing requirement of section 2258 
violate the suspension clause? 
A: The argument against a constitutional violation has two 
parts. The first is that federal review of state habeas 
convictions is purely statutory. Arguably, the restriction on 
the suspension of the writ applies only to federal convictions. 
The second is that section 2258 does not in fact entail a 
suspens i on of the writ. It is part of the scheme that is 
designed to stimulate full and fair review of all claims in 
capital cases. Functionally, section 2258 is a substitute for 
the scheduling of execution dates as a means of moving capital 
litigation along. It is far different in conception from the 
statute of limitation provisions that have appeared in habeas 
corpus reform proposals in the eighties including HR 1333 that 
was discussed by the Judicial Conference in March of 1988. Those 
statutes of limitations have applied across the board to all 
habeas cases without regard to a prisoner's access to counsel and 
a nwnber of other factors which are relevant under subchapter B. 
Finally, section 2258 has tolling rules which apply after counsel 
has been appointed and remain in force as long as a capital case 
is being actively litigated in the state system. 
- -
September 20, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee 
Dear Chief: 
I was disappointed that the recommendations of the 
Ad Hoc Committee were not approved today. As our report had 
been available to members of the Conference for only about 
3-1/ 2 weeks, the delay until March is understandable. Mem-
bers of the Committee are grateful that we were discharged. 
We had a strong Committee, and every member of it 
did his homework and attended all six of our meetings. Al 
Pearson was an able and conscientious Reporter, and Bill 
Burchill also was quite helpful as our Secretary. 
If I can be of any assistance to you as the report 
is considered further, do not hesitate to call on me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ ss 
cc: Members of the Committee 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 
--{ 
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AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
September 20, 1989 
Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary 
United States Senate 
Washington, DC 20510 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
PLEASE: REPLY TO. 
1800 M $TAE:E:T. NW 
WASHINGTON, 0 .C . 20036 
.. 
The United States Judicial Conference today released the 
report of its Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital 
Cases, chaired by retired Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr. The report makes an important contribution to the public debate 
on this complex issue. However, it leaves a number of questions 
unanswered and issues unresolved. We are concerned that fairness 
not be sacrificed for the sake of expediency. We urge your 
committee to carefully examine all critical issues in this area, 
including proposed limitations on successive petitions and proposed 
statutes of limitations. Foremost in our view, however, is the 
issue of ensuring adequ~te\:ounsel. 
The Committee's report identifies the need for qualified 
counsel as one of the most pressing problems in the current death 
penalty system. This critical problem has . been addressed in .recent 
years by initiatives launched by the _federal courts and the Judicial 
Conference which mandated the appointment of counsel in federal 
capital habeas proceedings, established stringent standards and . 
pro~ided reasonable compensation for counsel., ~nd supported the 
creation ot death penalty resource cente~s. 
t 
Hon. Joseph R. Biden 
September 20, 1989 
Page Two 
While the report does address the problem of providing counsel 
in state post-conviction cases, the solutions to this problem must 
not be limited to this stage of the proceedings. These are very 
complex cases which are literally matters of life and death. Yet in 
many states, counsel provided at trial and on direct appeal are ill 
equipped and inadequately compensated. These problems manifest 
themselves most clearly at the post-conviction stage, where relief 
is granted to the defendant in more than 40 percent of the cases. 
As the Committee's report indicates, each stage of the death 
penalty system has a significant impact on the next. The disturbing 
def iciences of the system at the. trial and direct appeal levels tie 
the hands of post-conviction counsel -- regardless of how effective 
that counsel may be -- and exacerbate the heavy workload of the 
appellate courts. Efforts at habeas reform must assure the adequacy 
of counsel at every stage, both to safeguard constitutional 
protections and to ensure the efficient administration of justice. 
The Committee's reliance on the judgment of individual states 
with respect to standards for counsel will maintain the existing 
patchwork of often-inadequate systems and likely will lead to 
protracted litigation around the issue of adequacy of counsel.. The 1 
American Bar Association supports adoption of detailed, uniform 
guidelines for the appointment and compensation of counsel, which we 
believe to be critical to effective reform. 
Recognizing the need to improve the system, the ABA's Criminal 
Justice Section, with support from the State Justice Institute, has 
established a broad-based task force whose report is expected to be 
completed by the end of October. While the Ad Hoc Committee was 
composed exclusively of federal judges, our task force members 
include state and federal trial and appellate judges, prosecutors, 
defense counsel, and legal scholars. The task force neld hearings. 
around the nation and received testimony from more than 80 
witnesses. The findings of the task force should prove a valuable 
reso·urce as you co.nsider this difficult issue. 
The complexity of this issue has required both the Ad Hoc 
Committee and the ABA task force .to focus narrowly on habeas · corpus 
review of death penalty cases. It is hoped that your Committee will 
be mindful that the recommendations in both these reports are 
limited to and should be considered only with respect to habeas 
corpus procedures as they apply to death penalty cases, which 
· present unique problems and require special solutions. 
\ 
Hon. Joseph R. Biden 
September 20, 1989 
Page Three 
We realize your Committee is under time constraints. However, 
given the enormous complexity and importance of the issues involved 
and the need to ensure a comprehensive solution, we urge you to hold 
full and complete hearings on the proposed reforms and that the 
hearings not be concluded before the ABA task force report has been 
issued and can be considered during the hearings. We would welcome 
the opportunity to testify at the hearings. 
Sincerely, 
L. Stanley Chauvin, Jr. 
cc: Hon. William H. Rehnquist 
Members of the Committee on the Judiciary 
L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Administrative 







JEROME D. GORMAN, M.D. 
3900 CHAMBERLAYNE AVENUE 
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23227-4202 
Telephone 804/ 262-3900 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell Jr. 
Retired Justice of the U . . S. Supreme Court 
Care of HUNTON & WILLIAMS Law Firm 
707 East Main Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23219 
Dear Justice Powell: 
WI~~ 
2 ? SEP 1989 V-/ 
Friday 
September 22, 1989 
I write to say "Thank you" for your statement r e ported in 
yesterday's Richmond News Leader in which you foresee abolition 
of the death penalty; and that if you were now a legislator you 
would oppose the death penalty. It is - to use a medical analogy -
an "abscess'' which poisons and corrupts the lifeblood of our 
criminal justice system. 
Thomas Jefferson wrote that Cesare Beccaria had "satisfied the 
reasonable world of the unrightfulness and inefficiency of the 
punishment of crimes by death". Yet, Virginia has conducted more 
executions than any state or former colony in U. S. history. 
I hope to see - and work for - the day when Jefferson's and 
Beccaria's vision shall become a reality in the criminal justice 
systems of Virginia and the United States. 
Thanks again for speaking out. Please continue to do so. Your 
words are hastening the arrival of abolition of the death penalty . 
It would be a blessing and a grace if Virginia and Federal legislators 
would act upon your seasoned view. 
Yours truly, 
~f)-~ 
Jerome D. Gorman 
Enclosures 
....... 
THE RICHMOND NEWS LEADER, Thursday, September 21, 1989 15 
Ex-justice pred[cts death penalty abolition 
By Peter Hardin 
News Leader Washington correspondent 
WASHINGTON - Retired Su-
preme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell 
Jr. predicted today that capital pun-
ishment eventually will be abolished 
in the United States, and he said he 
would vote against it if he were a 
state legislator. 
Powell does not have questions 
about the constitutionality of the 
death penalty, but he believes the 
death penalty system is not currently 
working, he told reporters at a news 
conference about a study he led on 
streamlining the system. 
A committee of federal judges that 
Powell headed recommended today a 
voluntary system for states that per-
mit capital punishment to limit the 
"chaos" in the death penalty system. 
The Judicial Conference of the 
United States, the policymaking body 
of the federal judiciary, met this 
week but deferred until its meeting 
next March any decision on endorsing 
the Powell committee's report. 
Powell, generally considered a 
moderate when he sat on the Supreme 
Court, made his personal observa-
tions about capital punishment in re-
sponse to reporters' questions. 
Pressed on his views about the 
\. death penalty, he said, "My opinion is 
.. that capital punishment will be abol-
'-~ , .-
.... 
Lewis F. Powell Jr. was ap-
pointed to the Supreme Court in 
1971. 
ished in the United States." 
To have major laws that are not 
being enforced will bring discredit to 
the whole legal system, he said. 
The jurist, a successful lawyer in 
Richmond, Va., before his appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court in 1971, 
had pointed out in prepared remarks 
that about 20,000 murders are com-
mitted in the United States a year, but 
"only a fraction of the worst murder-
ers ... are sentenced to die." 
About 2,200 convicted murderers 
are on death rows awaiting execu-
tion, and the average time lapse be-
tween conviction and execution is 
more than eight years, he said. 
In the question-and-answer period, 
Powell was asked how he would vote 
on capital punishment if he were a 
state . legislator. 
"I'd vote against it," he replied. He 
referred to multitudes of "collateral 
problems" raised in the court system 
and said capital punishment does not 
appear to have deterred murderers in 
the United States. 
In the entire Vietnam War, 58,000 
Americans were killed, he said. Ev- · 
ery three years, about 60,000 people 
are murdered in the United States, he 
said. 
"I personally do not think the an-
swer is capital punishment," he said. 
Powell had expressed public reser-
vations about the death penalty be-
fore, but he went further with today's 
remarks, suggested a Richmond 
criminal defense lawyer who did not 
want to be named. 
On the Supreme Court, Powell con-
sistently voted to uphold death sen-
tences. 
Powell's committee, convened at 
the request of Chief Justice William 
H. Rehnquist, recommended an op-
tional system for states to curb de-
lays in imposition of the death penal-
ty. 
The panel recommended encourag-
ing states to provide attorneys for 
convicted killers beyond their initial 
round of appeals in state courts, set-
ting a deadline for filing "habeas cor-
pus" applications in federal courts, 
and sharply restricting any subse-
quent federal appeals. 
Prisoners contend in "habeas cor-
pus" applications that they are being 
held illegally. In death penalty cases, 
they appeal to federal courts for help. 
Some groups involved in defending 
convicted killers were expected to 
criticize the committee report. 
Among their concerns is a failure of 
the study to propose funding for 
states to provide attorneys to convict-
ed killers beyond their initial round of 
appeals. 
Earlier this year, the Supreme 
Court said in a Virginia case that 
states are not required under the Con-
stitution to provide lawyers for 
death-row inmates after the initial 
round of appeals. 
Powell retired from the high court 
in 1987. 
- -
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CHAM B E R S O F 
TH E CHI E F JUSTIC E 
Dear Lewis, 
September 22, 1989 
I take this opportunity to extend to you, as Chairman 
of the Committee on Habeas Corpus Review, and to Charles 
Clark, Paul Roney, Terry Hodges, and Barefoot Sanders, as 
members of that Committee, my profound thanks for your 
diligent and productive labors at this task. I was 
disappointed that the Judicial Conference did not act on the 
merits of the report at its September meeting , but one 
cannot say that the argument about lack of time to consider 
the question was unreasonable . 
Pursuant to the provisions of an Act passed by Congress 
last fall, I am transmitting copies of your report to the 
Speaker of the House and President Pro Tern of the Senate. 
You have done a fine job, and I am confident that the 
Conference will adopt your report next March, and that 
Congress may even before then enact large parts of it into 
1~. 
~ 
P.S . - I have asked the Administrative Office to send copies 
of your report to every active district and circuit 
judge. 
cc: The Honorable Charles Clark 
The Honorable Paul H. Roney 
The Honorable William T. Hodges 
The Honorable Barefoot Sanders 
• 
September 22, 1989 
Dear Linda: 
As usual, your story in the Times 
on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee was 
fair and accurate. 
You perceptively identified the 
problem and the essence of our proposal. 
You made clear that it would not binrl 
states, but give them the option to provide 
competent counsel throughout state review. 
No one has ever covered the Court better 
than you do. 
Sincerely, 
Ms. Linda Greenhouse 
5410 Spangler Avenue 






1627 I STREET, N.W. 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 
(202) 862-0300 
• / 
September 24, 1989 
Dear Justice Powell: 
Thanks so much for your very kind note. I had 
not read the Harvard Law Review piece, but I did 
see the text of your ABA talk last year. 
All this has made me consider the evolution of my 
own thinking about the death penalty. Before I 
came to Washington, I covered the New York State 
Legislature. Tee death penalty debate was an 
annual ritual, because the Legislature always passed 
it and the Governor always vetoed it. I wasn't 
particularly engaged one way or the other, but 
probably would have voted yes if I had been in the 
Legislature. 
But the issue became much less of an abstraction 
to me after a few years of watching it unfold 
from the Court's perspective. I decided that the 
death penalty should be abolished much for the 
reasons that you suggest. In addition, I'm 
persuaded that arbitrariness, with the possible 
infection of racial prejudice, will always be 
a problem, given the extent of prosecutorial 
discretion. But basically, how much better our 
system of justice would be if all the resources 
and intelligence expended over the executions of 
a few people a year could be put to better use. 
It's too bad that our political leaders are more 
drawn to being demagagues on this xissue than on 
leading the country to make a better choice. 
Sorry for this long screed -- as you know, once 




Franklin & Marshall College 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, DC 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
-
September 25, 1989 
2 8 SEP 1989 
.2 s s_ 
Last Thursday evening, C-SPAN telecast an interview in which you 
expained some of the details of a report you and others had written on 
reforms in review of capital sentences. Friday's edition of The New York 
Times distributed here contained an article by Linda Greenhouse on the 
report. 
Could I obtain a copy of the report? It would be of great benefit in my 
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September 29, 1989 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
U.S. Supreme Court 
1 First St., NE 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
I greatly appreciated your recent note. 
n ru,,,," ..., 
1989 
Like y ou I can unders tand why the Ccnference postpone d 
action on our Report, although I regret the delay. 
Perhaps the Report will introduced in Congress as 
legislation prior to the March 1990 Conference meeting. 
I was honored to serve on your Ad Hoc Committee. I was 
particularly glad to have the opportunity to work with 
you. The association strengthened my longstanding 
admiration for you. 
I look forward to seeing you at the March meeting and 
send my best and warmest regards. 
Sincerely, 
- ' "' 
OLIVER W. HILL 
S. W. TUCKER 
HENRY L. MARSH, III 
HAROLD M. MARSH 
JOHN W. SCOTT, JR . 
MARGARET P. SPENCER 
RICHARD D. TAYLOR,JR. 
DA YID EUGENE CHEEK 
JULIAN W. JOHNSON 
Dear Lewis: 
- LAW OFFICES 
HILL, TUCKER & MARSH 
509 NORTH THIRD STREET 
P. 0 . Box 27363 
RICHMOND , VIRGINIA 23261-7363 
Telephone (804) 648-9073 
-
29 September 1989 
~ 
OCT 
FREDERJCKSBURG, VA. OFFICE 
JOHN W . SCOTT, JR . 
510 Princess Anne Street Suite 200 (22401) 
Telephone (703) 371-3700 
Although I do not respond as promptly as I should, I do 
enjoy hearing from you. 
I, too, was disappointed that we did not have an 
opportunity for a chat. The fact is, I had a terrible summer. 
Since I saw you at the Homestead, my principal activities have 
been consulting doctors and taking tests. I p ~ d ou! again in 
July so the doctors know that I have some prol5lemother than 
mature age, but so far, they have been unable to determine the 
cause. The situation is complicated by the fact that, other than 
some dizziness from time to time and general lack of energy, my 
health report is very good. 
a/' When I read the report pertaining to procedures in 
capitol punishment cases, I suspect that I will be a memb~ of 
the loyal opposition. As you know, I am opposed to capitol 
punishment. In my opinion there are two things that the 
Government must take the leadership in to reduce violence from 
our way of life. 
Firstly, the general public has to be made aware of the 
pervasiveness of the evolutionary process. Change is inevitable 
and the evolutionary process applies to all institutions and 
material objects created by man as well as the animal, mineral, 
and plant life created by natural sources. 
Secondly, society operating through its governmental 
structure must exercise leadership in removing official approval 
of the taking of human life and in creating among the general 
public greater respect for human life, human dignity and human 
welfare. 
- -
Honorable Lewis F. PowellL Jr. -2- 29 SeRtember 1989 
Thus, we need to reverse customary thinking on many of 
our cultural concepts and start to promoting ideas and practices 
designed to remove public approval of the taking of human life. 
My purpose for writing was not to get on my soap box, 
but to send you an excerpt from a speech made by a mutual friend 
that appeared in last winter's issue of The Boule Journal. The 
program at the judicial conference brought it to my mind. I 
think you will enjoy it. 
Best wishes. Tell Thurgood I say "hello". 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Supreme court of the United States 
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THE WASHINCTON POST 
Edwin M. Yoder Jr. 
The Right 
Track f Qr .. - ~-1 
Execuiiolls 
The Washington Poet ("Fast Trade 
fot ·Executions," editorial, Sept. 25) 
has asked an interesting but loaded 
question about capital punishment: 
"Why should there be a rush to judg-
mcmt in the shadow of the electric 
chair?" 
The Post was condemning a set ex 
proposals by a panel of distinguished 
feq_eral judges, chaired by retired Jua-
ti~ Lewis Powell Jr. The proposals 
would shorten an appeals process that I 
in ~th ·pena1ty cases ~ drajS out J 
endlessly (in one notorious instance 14 1 
years and six months) and that Chief 
Jusfice Rehnquist has called "disjoint-
ed~d chaotic." 
Where's the hann? The P06t asks. 
What is the danger to the community, 
after all, if a convicted killer "sits on 
death row for 20 years petitioning a 
court to review his case''? There is, ex · 
course. no physical ~er. What wor-
ries the judges who administer this 
baroque and largely empty process is 
whjlt it does to the quality of justjce. 
No "rush to judgment in the ·shad-
ow of the electric chair" ~ in fact at 
issue. The unseemly urgency imposed 
by . execution dates ia. deplored by 
Powell's study panel. Its· proposals 
would institute an orderly'"collatera1"· 
cotlrse of habeas corpus appeals, as- · 
sisted by -~ IIJ.)POintment of counsel . 
fori the 1ndigent. ;There ii no such · · 
en~tgdayinadi~~-
as 'there iis'in triaf and direct appeal. -
Under the ~•s plan.appeals -would 
be exhausted before aii'execuoon date · • 
/ ~ _§et. ~ ,.~~~;;'..4(:~ .... ;·:~ .'"'--;~~ 
But back .to . the Jrey. que:Sti(n,' , 
What's so bad aboufdelay, everdf it · 
stretches to 20 years? For _prjncipled ·· · 
· opponerits~,capifal,.,.~ the 
' answer ,~ ~ , .. AD ,~~ _are
1 
-
abhorrent,~ any_:cleJay·of any-length 
on any pretextis 'desirable. .ft is possi-' 
,: hie, thni,:,h . vastly irnprol>able, that : 
while "~1'~nmecf 1ot1ers· 1111utt1e mter-· 
minably through th6 appellate courts, 
all 37 states - that renewed ·'their · 
death-~ty statutes after 1972 will · altheilt ~ -- "' ·.~~' -~ '"" . 
re~nfo~fe~/ti~s· is 'a tuxu-!· :1
1 
ry oo..-ution. Under the nhiLwnnhy that •· • ; 
ll 
'I·_;:_,_ ' • , ,,~~ if,r;'"\"-.,:r~ 
·a -ys are Ji""" f°'1 •~• -to -
fin~ the nuftlo!.,.._f clistastefui VU'~IU~~• ' .. , pro-
cedural safeguards in aD aiminal Pl'lr 
ceedings soon· would ·be undermined -·-
by deliberate exploitation, and justice 
itself would be hopelessly clogged and 
stalled. 
Broadly speakin&_ there are Jwo 
justifications for any criminal penalty, 
including death. ~ -it dete~, for ,. 
which tlie evidence ranges from shaky · 
to slight. But if valid, the theory ex 
deterrence assuredly relies on some ". 
visible connectiort betweesn:iime and • 
punishment-justice~ only done but 
seen to be done. Delays 'that attenuate · 
lhat.~'W (be~)1Dishing point t 
tend-to def~ it,,_~'~~~ l~-t:' • _,, t~ 
;{{ ' .{Jt i ,;.• u . . . . =~ 
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The, same is ~ ex the only other 
rnticinaleforpunishmentretribution. 
Retrl!Sution reflects the coninnmity'a 
will to vindicate its moral seme. But 
when- punishment is. endlessly evaded, . 
the -=cense of appropriateness and . 
seemline&S fades-so much so that · 
ofte~-9nly the bereaved family ex the 
long:forgotten victim remains inter-
este<(»l the ultimate outcome • . 
Today, the average interval be-
tween murder and execution (if it 
comes at all) is upward of eight years. 
A case in which, after trial, no claim of I 
factual innocence is ever asserted may 
nonetheless be appealed and reviewed I 
seven or eight times.Jt may reach the . I 
Supreme Court up to three times- , 
once p{ter direct ~ through _state I 
courts and once dunng both state and . I 
federal habeas corpus proceedings. · .. ' , 
Of't'purse, it is the dread finality of 
the death penalty that makes a full and 
unhurried appeals process essential, 
and anything Jess unacceptable. The I 
Powell_ Conunissi91l'a recornmenda- 11 
tions . .fiou!d not ~ -~ risk ex 
error. indeed, some of the reforms it .1. propoees would. ensure .tfiat real and"'' ' 
subst~tive ~ ex errot_ as to tast·. . 
or. procedure would be_ more carefully '; 
examined, ' than -~ _<XllDJJlOllJy jre :" 
tcxfay; ~ ·!.:._ ":li ... ·; ~· ·•~ . . , . f ·:,I 
So why -~ fuss?. ~ .of it ~ . : ! 
from the usual fqes ex capital punish-' • . ' 
ment, relying on de(ects in its~- ... 
istratioo to disaedit it, .and hostile.to , 
reforms, however .fair oi- useful, thaf' · 
would eliminate those defects. But 
some criticism of the Powell Commis-
sion'u_eport sprinp from. misconcep- , . 
tion. - :. .. "' ~ ~- ~ .. ~~\-~~ ., ·~ ' '· ~ . -
So-called collateral reviews ex nmr-
der convictions tmder habeas corpus 
are oot . ..a constitutiooal.right.. They 
have ~- evolved through · custom and 
practice, and the preposterous dupli-
catiorf is adventitious and serves no 
useful purpose. There is nothing con-
stitutionally unsound or threatening 
about correcting the · defects throogb 
statute. 
foeE~~~~t~ ,•-
is te . ted these days to give up'·dn it for r?sons (i practjcality apcJ seemli-
ness-a feeling that. pn,mpted Powel 
himself to say ~-~ ·w ~.i( ~ 
can't make . this defective · prot:eS1J 
work, "We' ""ought to ·af>o1ish ~ 
punishfuedt:I" 'PoweD nhvinh.lv" favon-
refortt\iitcfwith gooc1;~ A pun-....., 
ishment still overwhelmingly favored 
by Ame~ should be abandoned, if 
aban49ned,_ 'because we .:decide· it is 
moratty W1clesirable, . not because the· 
admirilstration ~-chaotic. , · · 
>; :,.. --- ,.. 
The capital-punishment ~ -today .. 
is merely one exanJ>le, more visible 
than most, of the· procedural failures 
-of our-system of justice. This system 
is chqjµng-µ9t on due pfQCeSS, but 
often, and certainly in this instance, oo· 
a~ody<iit. , , 
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UNITED STATES COURTS 
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WASHING1DN, D .C. 20544 
October 3, 1989 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice Retired 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, NE 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
9 ocr 19a9 
WILLIAM R. BURCHILL. JR. 
GENERAL COUNSEL 
Perhaps you have already seen the enclosed letter to Senator Biden 
from the President of the American Bar Association in regard to your 
Committee's report. In view of the source and importance of this 
correspondence, nevertheless, I am enclosing a copy in case it has not 
otherwise reached you. With kindest personal regards, 
Sincerely, 
Enclosure 
cc: Honorable Charles Clark 
Honorable Paul Roney 
Honorable Wm. Terrell Hodges 
Honorable Barefoot Sanders 
FIFTY YEARS OF SERVICE 
1939 - 1989 
TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
f ; I ~ - .  - -
LEAD-IN •...• Rehnquist chairs the Conference, which sets policy for the entire 
judiciary. A recent action by Rehnquist, aimed at speeding up implementation 
of the death penalty, has upset some of the 26 federal judges who are members 
of the Conference; more from NPR legal affairs correspondent Nina Totenberg. 
Report by lina Totenberg, Legal Correspondent, National Public Radio (NPR) 
October 4, 1989 
The subject of the judge's anger is the way Rehnquist handled the so-called 
Powell Co1111tission report.,for years Chief Justice Rehnquist has been an ardent 
advocate of faster execution. for years his views did not prevail. But last 
year he appointed a commission of the Judicial Conference to study execution 
delays. Retired Justice Powell was put in charge of the commission and in · 
September the commission finished a report that recommended procedures to put 
the nations 2,200 death row inmates on a faster track to execution. But when 
the Judicial Conference balked at immediate approval of the report, the Chief 
Justice took steps that have infuriated some of the Conference members. "I 
don't know that I'd called his actions duplicitous 11 said one judge, but they 
were not straight forward. According to sources, when the report was 
presented to the Judicial Conference on Sep. 20, many judges, noting that the 
report was still secret, ~aid they wanted to wait to vote on it until they 
could discuss the commission's recommendations with fellow judges and death 
penalty eiperts. Each of the 26 members of the Judicial Conference represents 
an appeals or district court. The conference, after some discussion, agreed 
to make the report public and to postpone any further action until its next 
meeting in March. According to those present, the Chief Justice never 
indicated that he intended to take any other action. The next day, however, 
he efficiently forwarded the report to the House and Senate Judiciary 
. ~ ..... - -
2 
Committees, an action that set in motion an obscure provision of a new federal 
law. Rehnquist's action in fact guarantees that a bill mandating a speed-up 
in death penalty procedures will move forward in the Senatt before the 
Judicial Conference meets in March to discuss the matter. You see hurried in 
the 1988 Drug Bill is a provision that says once the Chief Justice transmits 
the report from the Judicial Conference to Congress, legi~lation must be 
introduced within 15 days in the Senate and that the legislation must be put 
on a fast track for Senate consideration within 60 legislative days. That 
means the changes in appeals rights of death row inmates are certain to come 
before Congress before th~ Judicial Conference considers the Powell report 
before its next meeting in March; in short that any action the Conference 
takes then will be irrelevant-too late to effect the Senate. And so a number 
of judges who make up the Conference are upset. Said one "nobody wants to 
pick a fight with the Chief Justice, but this leaves a bad taste in your 
mouth", said another "he never sa;d one word about the statute or the fact 
that he was planning to transmit the report, 11 said a third judge, "most of us 
did not know anything about the statute and the ones that did figured he would 
consult us before taking any formal action. Justice Powell, the chairman of 
Death Penalty Commission, said the Chief Justice did not consult him e;ther 
before officially transmitting the report. Said one judiciary aide "in plain 
English, they were had". On Monday NPR submitted to the Chief Justice a 
series of questions about his failure to notify the Judicial Conference. The 
Chief did not respond but did supply a copy of a memorandum also dated Monday 
that informs the Judicial Conference Members of his action and its legislative 
consequences. 














lJCf 5 191 
Octo,Jefer 4, 1989 
I enclose several articles on the Habeas Committee pro-
posal, in the event you have not seen them in Richmond. I 
hope that you have not been beseiged by reporters. 
I still think that it would be worthwhile for you to 
set forth the facts about the Committee proposal in a brief 
article. I will have a draft for you on your return. I 
look forward to seeing you then. 
R.H.P. 
-~ :t11 ,,,,,, v,e.J, ~~k1MAAIJ 
1k.il,"' c;/cvia:tJ 




' . -·· _, .. ~'i,iillll',. • • ····~- - •• --·- - • - - - -
Quick Snap: Rehnquist Punts Habeas RefornitOJliU '·" 
BY ANNE KORNHAUSER 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist's uni-
lateral m<fve formally sending to Congress 
sweeping proposals to reform the nation's 
death-penalty appellate processes has 
touched off a skirmish over the timing of 
Rehnquist's action and its legislative 
impact. 
On Sept. 22, Rehnquist sent to the 
Senate a report prepared by a committee of 
federal judges, whom he had appointed, 
that recommended streamlining habeas 
corpus appeals. The report was just the 
latest proposal in a decade-long controver-
sy over the ·morass of litigation stemming 
from the 37 state death-penalt)' statutes. 
The judges' report was written by an ad 
hoc committee of the Judicial Conference 
of the United States and was mandated by 
Congress in the 1988 drug bill. That leg-
islation provided that any proposals com-
ing out of the judges' panel would be put 
on a fast track for congressional action. 
But Rehnquist may have speeded up 
even that accelerated schedule . On Sept. 
20, the full Judicial Conference voted only 
to study the package until next March, 
rather than send it to the Hill immediately . 
The chief justice's abrupt forwarding of 
the report to the Hill may have pre-empted 
his colleagues, and it caught.off guard the 
panel's chairman, former Justice Lewis 
Powell Jr. 
"I had heard rumors !of Rehnquist' s 
move] around here," says Powell . "The 
chief didn' t consult me. I would have left 
it to him anyway .'' 
Rehnquist's action sparked confusion 
oq the Hill and alarm among critics of 
habeas reform . By moving before the 
Judicial Conference had acted, Rehnquist 
n 
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Chief Justice William Rehnquist surprised his fellow jurists by uni-
.laterally choosing to send death-penalty appellate plan to Congress. 
. 'IT 'r J. ; ·- (' A l,_J ,-. .. ,l ~ 
threw the package into a procedural limbo 
and prompted charges that he was trying to 
avoid a debate within the judiciary over 
death-penalty appeals . 
Rehnquist's decision " would essen-
tially render the Judicial Conference im-
potent, " asserts Leslie Harris, legislative 
counsel for the Washington office of the 
American Civil Liberties Union . 
· ·could it possibly have been their in-
tent to have the law enacted before they 
acted?'' Harris asks rhetorically . 
Toni House , the Supreme Court 
spokeswoman, says Rehnquist did not do 
anything inappropriate . 
• 'There is no requirement that it be ap-
proved by the conference, " says House. 
•· He felt it was appropriate to send it 
uv11r." 
Other opponents of habeas reform , 
· however, said they thought Rehnquist's 
move discredited the report. 
"What the failure [ of the conference] to 
act does is raise the .cloud . Judges are not 
sure what they want to do about habeas 
reform," charges H. Scott Wallace, leg-
islative director for the National Associ-
ation of Criminal Defense Lawyers . 
At the Senate Judiciary Committee , 
where the package was referred, Rehn-
quist ' s move created some confusion 
about whether the fast-track approval 
mechanism bad actually been triggered. 
The unexpe~ted arrival of the proposal 
caught many of the panel's members and 
staff completely off-guard . 
· ·Most people thought that the chief 
justice wouldn 't send the report until the . 
Judicial Conference passed on it ," ex-
plains a Democratic committee aide. 
Under the 1988 fast-track law, once the 
SEE HABEAS REFORM, PAGE 7 
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HABEAS REFORM FROM PAGE 6 
report is formally sent to Congress by 
Rehnquist. Senate Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Joseph Biden Jr. (D-Del.) has 
15 legislative days to introduce a habeas-
refonn bill . The bill does not have to be 
the legislation proposed by the Powell 
comminee. 
When Judiciary Committee members 
first learned that they had received the re-
port, several liberal Democrats urged 
Biden to examine whether the trigger , . 
mechanism had indeed been set off, ac- t. 
cording to staffers involved in the dis- I · · 
cussions. Opponents of death-penalty re- • 
form also urged the comminee to wait. 
But after aides to Sen. Strom Thurmond 
(R-S .C.) clearly indicated in several dis-
cussions last week that the Senator felt the 
15-day period had begun, Democrats ap-
peared to be conceding the point, accord-
ing to staffers in both parties. 
ln addition to the 15-day requirement, 
the 1988 law requires that the bill be re- I }! ;.:; ~: 
ported out of committee 60 legislative .1~;.)~ :-
days after the report arrives at the Capitol. ·<:!.: 
In any event, in a compromise reached 1 . 
last week over this year's drug bill, the 
Senate had agreed to raise habeas corpus 
reform on the floor before the end of the 
session. 
How _heavily Biden will rely on the 
Powell proposal is still unclear. But sev-
eral Democratic aides say the report will 
likely act as a starting point for any new 
legislation. 
Biden had no comment on the report 
last week. 
' . • ~• _-. ~ : ·~• • • • •.- • • •.._ . I -. •.' ,. • • • ·, .... ·---~:;if~~-~~: -~e~~~l~;i·~~-·-_.-_ :;>-: ·.- j° ). :·.\, 
The judges' report calls for new· legis-
1 at ion that could restrict the post-
conviction death-penalty appeals available 
to defendants . Post-conviction appeals 
come in the form of writs of habeas corpus 
that challenge the constitutionality of the 
conviction or the sentence. 
Using a novel formulation, the Powell 
plan would allow only those states that 
supply lawyers for indigent death-row de-
fendants to pare down the habeas process. 
Except under extraordinary circum-
stances, these states could limit each de-
fendant to one habeas petition in state 
court and then one in federal court to be 
filed within six months of losing the state 
appeal. The law would also provide for an 
automatic stay of execution while habeas 
petitions are pending. 
At the Sept. 20 meeting of the full 27-
member Judicial Conference, the five-
member judges' panel presented these 
recommendations. The conference then 
voted to release the report to the public, 
discharge Powell ' s panel, and defer action 
on its recommendations until next March. 
Some members of the conference are 
interested in reviewing an American Bar 
Association report on the same subject that 
is scheduled to be completed next month, 
according to lawyers close to the confer-
ence. At about the same time they re-
ceived the Powell report, the conference 
members had received a habeas-reform 
resolution adopted by an ABA section 
emphasizing new standards for competent 
counsel rather than a streamlining of the 
appeals process. 
The action taken by the conference on · 
the habeas report seems to have opened a 
broad debate on the panel's recommen-
dations. No one at the conference meeting 
formally mentioned whether the report 
. should go to Congress, according to Al-
bert Pearson, the comminee's reporter and 
a professor of law at the University of 
. Georgia School of Law. 
By forwarding the report, Rehnquist has 
shifted the focus of the habeas-reform de-
bate to the Senate Judiciary Commincc. 
There, the fast-track mechanism has 
thrown critics of the Powell panel's pro-
posals on the defensive. Biden and the 
Democrats must now scramble to come up 
with an alternative or face the prospect 
that either Powell's plan or Republican 
modifications will move to the Senate 
floor with a full head of steam. 0 
,, 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
----~ o oc, ,9s'l 
JOSEPH F. WEIS. JR. 513 U.S . COURTHOUSE 
PITTSBURGH. PA 152111 
,12 -e,, .3552 
CIRCUIT JUDGE October 5, 1989 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Retired Associate Justice 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Supreme Court Building 
Washington, o.c. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
I am enclosing a letter that I received from a member of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court commenting on the report of your 
Capital Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus Rules. I do 
not know whether your Committee considered the point that Justice 
Zappala raises, but perhaps you might want to communicate with 
him. 
Best personal regards. 
Sincerely, 




• ,, ;• ) ~.> 
- COMMONWEALTH OF Pe:NNSYLVAN. 
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SUPREME COURT 
2800 GRANT BUILDING 
PITTSBURGH , PENNSYLVANIA 15219 
STEPHEN A . ZAPPALA 
.JUSTICE 
October 5, 1989 
Honorable Joseph F. Weis., Jr., 
U.S. Court of Appeals - Third Circuit 
Room 513 
U.S. court 





s Chairman of the Rules of Practice and Procedure 
Committee I would like to bring to your attention the recent 
publication of "The Criminal Law Reporter" text No. 16, Vol 45, 
No. 25, dated September 27, 1989, wherein the report of the 
Capital Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus rules relating 
to Capital Punishment Cases was published. 
The proposals as submitted appear direct, concise, and I 
think quite beneficial in attempting to resolve the issue of both 
fairness and an expedited disposition of capital cases. 
J 
I would however, like to bring to the Committees 
attention a matter not addressed and if not addressed, I think 
would undermine the entire purpose of the intended rules. 
-I would suggest that as there is alr~ady a mandatory 
time requirement for filing, · there should be likewise an absolute 
mandatory requirement for . the disposition , of the · matter both 
on the Federal District level and also on the Circuit level. 
There· have been cases where from the date of filing to the date of 
disposition a Federal Co"Urt · took in excess . of twenty-two · ( 22) 
months to dispose of a death related matter. I think that is 
unfortunate. The rule can be drawn so that where the Court, being 
unable to meet a specific time constraint, can state on the record 
the specific reasons why and the approximate time in which the 
matter can reasonably be disposed. This at least will keep the 









Fully cognizant of the heavy loads that 
incur, I still believe that these particular 
absolute priority and should be disposed of in as 
fashion as possible. 
Very truly yours, 
. Zappala 
SAZ/jam 
all the courts 
cases deserve 
fair and rapid 
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L. RALPH MECHAM 
DIRECTOR 
, ('I 
ADMINISiRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ·n ,-- ....... ·-..:.;, ,,, 
JAMES E. MACKLIN. JR. 
DEPUTY DIREClDR 
UNITED STATES COURTS 
·..-yOt,, • S~v 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20544 
October 6, 1989 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
WILLIAM R. BURCHILL, JR. 
GENERAL COUNSEL 
In case you have not already seen it, I wanted to bring to your 
attention the enclosed excerpt from the Congressional Record of 
September 26, which describes a unanimous-consent agreement to bring to 
the Senate floor on an expedited basis as early as October 20 a package of 
drug-related provisions including habeas corpus reforms. 
I shall keep you informed on further significant legislative 
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&ptember 26," 1989 CONGRESSIONAVRECORD ~ SENATE S 11869 
-The'' PRESIDING ' OFFIC He of firearms for purchase; that this ve-. 
- · . -~•H , clerk.will call the roll. · · · · · · • : hlcle or motion to proceed to such ve;;.. 
. The ~ legislative clerk oceeded to hlcle shall be sent before the Senate, 
call the ron: 1 10 earner than October 20. 1969 aod 
-·Mr. · MITCH Mr. President, · I 110 later than sine we adjournment, 
· ask unan consent that the order - Mr: DO'td!l adchessed the Chair. 
for the rum call be rescinded. . . The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
· T RESIDING OFFICER. With~ Republican leader is recognized. 
objection, It Is so o_rdered. · Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, reserving 
·. UlfAND1ous-coNsENT ACREEMENT-u.a. 3015 · the right to object, and I shall not 
•Mr. · Mi'l'CllELC Mr. President, · I object, I want to commend the majorl-
ask unanimous consent that when the ty leader and chairman of the Appro-
Senate resumes conslderatl~m of t~e priatlons Committee, Senator HAT-
Transportation appropriations bill, FIELD, and others. I think we have an 
H.R. 3015, that It be considered under agreement here that I hope will be ap-
the following limitations: Tha~ Sena- proved. I make just one comment with 
tor BYRD be recognized to modify the reference to sine die adjournment, and 
pending amendment to reflect the bi- we have had this conversation. I think 
partisan negotiators agreement; that the RECORD might reflect that there 
immediately u~on ·. th_e dispasition of will be a reasonable time before sme 
the Byrd-Hatfield · amendment, the ., . 
Senate proceed without any lnterven- - die _aaJoumment to take up the crime 
Ing action or debate to vote on the un- bill, is £fiat correct? · · . . 
derlylng committee amendment; that Mr. !'J~Tc'i~ELL. Yes. M~. President, 
upon the disposition of the committee the distmgm.shed Republican leader 
amendment the . following ·1egislative and I and several of the Senators who 
language ~endments be · the only participat1:d In these negotiations ~s-
first-degree amendments In order; and cussed thIS ~t some length earl~er 
that they ·not be subject to paints of today. The original agreement provid-
order · when offered, or if amended; ed no later than November 15, 1989~ I 
amendments to be· offered by the mi- objected to that on the grounds that I 
nority· leader or his designee: One re~:· do not know when sine die adjoum-
garding drug treatment plans, one re-: ment is going to. occur and did not 
garding drug-free school plans, one re: want to tie_ up the Senate for -such a 
garding waivers for International ·oar.: period after November 15, were that 
cotlcs assistance, one regarding' trans.: necessary. · . ·· · · 
fer to special forfeiture fund for the I also Indicated to the distinguished-
drug czar. Amendments to · be· offered Republican leader that, in · my- Judg-
public auction/- Whe such auctions · by the majority leader of his designee: ment, tv.:o factors will . contr~l-my:'ac:_ 
it Is unlike! that One regarding pregnant women, one tlons with resp~ct · to thIS ·· ~atter.-. 
• h with Y ~ . regarding abused.children, one _regard- matter. The first is that this agree-
gtotnstano · . 
1 
ghte g Ing training professionals; that ger- ment does not preclude the raising of es s au r- · · · th h • d th mane amendments to these·· amend- these issues prior to the time when 
~ 0 i . ~ inhey nients will be In order.and not subject such vehicle will be presented to the 
tab!~~ on · ~- to point of order: That further amend: Senate. u they are 1n fact presented to 
lnp the . men ts to th~ bill relative-to the alloca~ the Senate, ·all or some .of them, and 
~ riatlo~ b tlon of_ the Increased $800 milUpn In discussed at some length prior .. to · 
Y :ith a bet 
O 
tion. _ .: : budget authority shall be in order onl~ them, obviously, . wha~ ·is_ or is _not a 
·i · P if agreed to by_the chairman and rank reasonable time for their consider-
' on would a,II w the Sec- Ing . _member , of • ·.the- Appropriations - atlon under this agreement will be less · 
e Army to . fer any Committee;. such, amendments· shall • · • · ' 
removed fr m ' White not be subject to further amendments than if there is no . ralsmg -?f the~ 
e Range to th Secretary or Points of order; that no motions to • issues prior to them, and thIS is the 
for their lnclus n 1n the recommit the transpartation appro- first time between . now. and then. 
· Land Ma.nagemen •8 Adopt- pr!atlons bill shall be In order. . . , When I say this, I . mean the time set 
a-Horse ogram. The Dep · ment of . I further ask . unanimous consent forth In this agreement, that. would be 
the Inte or's cost of process g these that immediately roiiowirig .. the . pas- the first time that those issues would 
animals ould be reimburse by the sage of the final rejnuar approptil- be raised. · . .; · · . 
Army, rovjded ' these costs do not . tlons bill and the. anticipated contlnU:- In any event I told the Republlcan 
exceed 200,000. · ... . , . . , , : •. -iiig· resolution. . the Senate . shall pro- leader that I .. thought _something In 
Thia rovlsion is a humane ponse ceed to the immediate consideration ot the ~rder • of 3 days Is· a reasonable 
to the roblem caused by thee traor- · a, bill to be -introduced 0y.: $enator - time for . consideratlon of this without 
dlnary wth of the wild· horse pu- Dox.z' that·totally .fncorporates -the .re- - attempting to define it precisely, just 
latlon n White Sanda Missile ge. malnlng : legislative. •Initiatives .-urnii so there Is no misunderstanding on 
It , allow us to · maintain a able ~ es1c,ent·s <kiii strategr; tfiat this 6ltl anyone's part as to what my Intention 
herd f wild horses .on the .range and ill e. opened ·solely to drug-related is and what we had In discussion 
will nnit the Army and the B to amendmen~ ,Slfiendmenta . ,~dealing today. 
find Ing · Individuals to· - take the With the .ma ters to be Included In the Mr. DOLE. There ls no agreement to 
1 horses. It avoids the un pt- · following· bill will-not be In order to limit it, , if there Is a ' filibuster or 
ption of allowing these creat es this bill; that -~the .,majority leader, motion to-proceed. We understand .. I 
auctioned off and destroyed. , . acting In consultation with the minor!- thought , for someone · reading the 
President; ram-pleased that · he ty leader, shall ttetemiliie the method RECORD it would be helpful to them to 
ttee has· Included this, provls n for consideration of:,a;:J>ill!or:a motion·.- have an explanation: • ,,. • ·. :. _:. 
ie fiscal year 1990 Defense app to ;proceed to< suchl< tiOJ.,deallng ·with . ·:, Mr.-.·WILSON. Mr. President, reserv-
pri; uons bill, and I :. urge~~ --~p9:~ the· de11.th peIULltY~.habeasl corpus -re\- . Ing. the right. to .object,. and ,I .shall not 
upport it. _ ... •';;- , .. 1. :' ~f.i fotJiri-exclusion~t,fule:,'J ustlee,~.Dg:"_. object; · I- would: be· grateful: if the-ma-
r. - MITCHELL. Mr.: ~e.:-;lden~ . par ent reorgan!zatfo~,mtemational jorih ·· leader would ·clarify the polnL 
est the absence of a quorum;,:_, '. :•. ·· money laundering, and thp,avallabillty here.- •· '..!,.'. ' ·:· .. . _. ·· :· . ..-: ... -.. ,_ , . 
S 11870 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September .26, 1989 
Mr. President, it is my .understand-
ing, if I heard the majority ·leader-cor-
recUy, that . _- certalnly -.,-11.rst-degree 
amendments, and he recited those, will 
be in order ol!ered by both the minori-
ty leader and the maJority leader and 
that second-degree amendments to 
those first-degree amendments will be 
in order Jf .they are germane . . Is that 
correct? · ·· · · 
Mr. MITCHELL. That'is correct. , 
Mr. WIISON. .They shall not then 
be subject to points of .order them-
selves? . . . . .. 
·Mr. MITCHELL. That .is correct. 
The agreement expllcltly · states that 
hnmediately-and I am ·reading now 
from the agreement-tminediately fol-
lowing the listing of the seven amend-
ments, the sentence that I read reads, 
therefore, I repeat, ·"that · ·germane 
amendments to these amendments will 
be in order and not subject ·to points 
of order." · 
Mr. WILSON. I thank the majority 
leader. · 
I wish as a matter of courtesy to let 
him know that I will he ol!erlng .an 
amendment, a germane amendment In 
the second-degree, and I appreciate his 
comments. . 
Mr. Di:CONCINL Will -the maJority 
leader yield for a question? 
Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. 
Mr. DECONCINI. I would like a clar-
ification. In the next-to-last para.graph 
the majority leader refers to the "Ma-
jority leader and minority leader 
acting in consultation' shall determine 
a method of floor consideration of a 
bill. or a motion to proceed to a .bill.'.' 
He is talking about one. legislative ve-
hicle here that will permit the attach-
ment or inclusion of all of these items 
spelled out in that paragraph? ls that 
what the Senator is talking about? 
.Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, ·but .precisely 
because that matter has not ·been de-
fined or resolved it was phrased in this 
manner. We discussed that specifically 
today and it may be that it will simply 
be a motion to proceed to'"·• specific 
legislative vehicle which .has not yet 
been identified or developed. 
Mr. DECONCINI. If the majority 
leader will yield, I do not want to pro-
long this, but it is my understanding 
that if the majority leader and the mi-
nority leader find the death penalty 
bill to be the vehicle that comes to the 
floor, does this mean that -all of these 
other bills could be offered as amend-
ments, no prohibition against that but 
also no guarantee there will be a vote 
on them or any action on them? It 
would just be a vehicle to throw the 
. stuff on if you wanted to try to amend 
it. . ·1_. 1_ -· 
-Mr. MITCHELL. That 1s exactly cor-
rect. Neither I nor the distinguished 
Republican leader, nor any !Other .Sen-
ator, .I believe can .at ·this time assure a 
vote on any one of ·these matters. -. ·.-. ·-:I 
What .may -occur from what' ,we -dis-
cussed as.at least.a posslbillcyJa :devel-
oping :a vehicle, •maldng· • .motion ,to 
proceed, .and if .that encounters·-wbat 
might be opposition then fIµng a,clo-
ture motion -and having a ·.vote on--clo-
ture on the motion to :proceed. . That. 
may ,occur; I · do .not mean ,to -suggest 
either that will occur or that exhausts 
the possibilities of what might be 1oc-
curring. . , - ·. , " · · · -. · . 
Mr. DECONCINL I thank -the major-
ity leader. ·· -. _; -: ·' - ;. · · . :. ·. ,: - .' ;· 
What he Js saying, he is .going to put 
forth bis best effort to .get .a Yehicle 
that could be .amended, ,including all 
of these under normal _procedures of 
legislation brought to the floor. __ , . 
Mr. DOLE. U the Senator will yield, 
it means the bill reported might have 
more than one of these .provlaions .or 
all of these provisions and .they .could 
be stricken out. But we .are going to 
try to make -~ that everybody 
gets an .opportunity .to · discuss it. 
Someone ·may have a particular inter-
est in it. I am not certain· where it fi-
nally_ ends up, but it may be a lengthy 
debate. :. 
. . Mr. DECONCINI. I thank .the maJor-
ity leader and minority leader., : 
Mr. MITCHELL. I ,thank the Sena-
tor from Arizona !or .raising the Ques-
tion. It does clarify the ,point. . . · 
. So no Senator is under .any .misun~ 
derstanding, I am· not -committing to 
or even undertaking to .assure .ultimate 
disposition or . even·.a .vote on any one 
of these matters. As you can Just tell 
from the reading .of them .they · .are 
very controversial. -.and we -will . do our 
best to ~resent a vehicle and take _Jt 
from there. . . . , 
Mr. KERRY~ Mr. President, I .would 
like to Just clarify; . also, if I .can, .one 
Quick point which I ,-think ts ,under-
stood among the parties, but I want .to 
make sure the record reflects Jt. There 
Is . in . the unanimous-consent agree-
ment a prohibition regarding the rais-
ing of five matters, ,death penalty, 
habeas corpus reform, exclusionary 
rule,'-Justice Department reorganiza-
tion, .and international money .launder-
ing except .in the form mentioned by 
the majority leader at a separate time, 
and in discussion ·today it was agreed 
among the parties, and I would simply 
like the recprd to reflect it, hopefully 
with the assent of the minority leader, 
that International •money . laundering 
within that. context refers to the wire 
transfer .amendments and to the 
actual overseas ·aspects of Internation-
al money laundering;- but that domes-
tic actions; actions that can be taken 
within_ the confines ,of the United 
States by our authorities here with re-
spect to U.S. currency or with respect 
to enforcement are permissible under 
the terms of the agreement. 
• Mr. MITCHELL. If I may interrupt 
the Senator; there ·Is no prohibition in 
this ,agreement on any of these matr 
ters being ._(brought ·up at any time 
.prior .to this. . . 
; :Mr. :KERRY. The prohibition Ls that 
,futernational . . money laundering , Is 
cited as one .of the items that would be 
:brought .up .separately,as a -matter-,of 
-floor-consideration at the .last ,moment 
aa ·per :the majority leader's last :com-
ments._· -- .. ::: :· - . .-.--:: _._ .. 
Mr. MITCHELL. That Is correct . . 
. _Mr. KERRY. But :that are within 
the iegislation that will follow immedi-
ately . after the _appropriations :bill. 
There . Is an agreement . that therein 
there ... can . be consideration · ,of :aome 
International . money ,,laundering but 
domestic concerns, and .I -Just wanted 
the record to reflect that. · ·.. : · 
- Mr. DOLE. That is correct because -I 
think it says matters .included in the 
following bill will not · be Jn order .to 
this bfil which · means .International 
money laundering will not be In -order 
to the bill I Intend to Introduce. : - , , •. 
.. Mr_ MITCHELL. 1s the ·Senator ,re-
lating to the opportunity to present 
domestic matters to the bill? ,· -· 
Mr. KERRY. Yes.· They are idomes-
tic matters but they pertain to money 
laundering. All I . am; trying . . to ·do Is 
avoid confusion so someone does not 
raise points suggesting they are ,out of 
· order as a consequence ·that they 
relate to money laundering. 
Mr. MITCHELL. AB I :understand it, 
what the Senator is saying 1s that 
when ·we . take up the -bill that .is :re-
ferred to here to be Introduced by Sen-
ator DOLE to which drug-related 
amendments may be . offered, he ·. is 
saying that he wants it clear that be 
will be able to offer ·an amendment to 
that bill that deals with the subject he 
ts just describing? 
Mr. KERRY. That is correct. When 
we proceed to the consideration of .the 
bill Incorporating the remaining goals 
and strategy, ·that ts accurate. • 
· :Mr. DOLE. My understanding Is if 
there are sanctions on .foreign banks 
or .1nternational: . agreemenk they 
would not be In order? 
Mr. KERRY. That·1s correct. That ill 
accurate. 
Mr. MITCHELL. But as described .In 
more ,detail by the Senator earlier, he 
wants to make clear he does intend to 
offer-an amendment. 
· Mr. KERRY. ·within the context ·of 
domestic, right: · , 
Mr: DOLE. Marcos on currency and 
things of that kind? 
Mr. BIDEN. Reserving the. right. to 
object. -, , 
Mr. KERRY. I thank the distinguish 
leader and the minority Jeader. 
Mr. BIDEN. Reserving the right to 
object, I know we are all in agreement. 
It would be nice to have in the RECORD 
so all the colleagues do not ask us all -
these questions tomorrow when the 
staffs can read the RECORD. In the fur-
ther unanimous-consent . agreement 
immediately following the passage of 
the regular appropriations bill, •the 
continuing resolution. where Senator 
DoLE ts going to introduce a bill relat-
:ing to legislative Initiatives .. of .. the 
President, .! want to make it clear .to 
make sure we understand at that .Point 
the Senator from Delaware and ,others 
.will Introduce what Is referred to as 
the Democratic strategy,: -goals, ,and 
initiatives. . :. . i.: , 
The reason I : raise -that WI that a / "· 
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that question, . and they should know 
that that will be available and will 
take place at that time. I have no ob-
jection. -
Mr. MITCHELL. Presumably, that 
will be offered as an amendment to 
the bill, as a ·substitute, but that will 
be offered as an amendment to the 
Dole proposal · or not necessarily 
a.mending a particular provision, but 
adding a provision to the Dole propos-
al at that point. · 
I have no objection. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is 
there objection? Hearing none, the 
unanimous-consent agreement 'pro= 
~ pounded by the majority leader ls 
a gteed to. . 
. The tex t of the agreement is as fol-
lows: _ -
--rYrc1ered, That when the Senate resumes 
consideration of H.R. 3015, the Transporta--
tlon appropriations blll, Senator Byrd be 
recognized to modify his pending amend-
ment. to reflect the bipartisan negotiators 
agreement and that Immediately following 
the disposition of the Byrd amendment. the 
Senate proceed, without Intervening action 
or debate, to vote on the underlying com-
mittee amendment. 
Onlered. /urlllu, That upon the disposi-
tion of the committee amendment. the fol-
lowing legislative language amendments be 
the only first degree amendments In order, 
and that they not be subject to points of 
order when offered, or I! amended: • ; . · 
.. Amendments to be offered by the minori-
ty leader, or his deslgnee: . 
One on drug treatment plans; . 
One on drue-free school plans; . 
, One on waivers for International narcotics 
assistance; and . . 
· One on transfer to special forfeiture fund 
for drug czar. : . . 
. Amendments to .be offered by the majori-
ty leader, or his deslgnee: 
Oneonpre,nantwomen; 
One on abused children; and 
One on tralning professionals. _ 
Onlced /urlllu, That eermane 11.mend-
ments to these amendments.be In order and 
not subject to points of order. 
Onlere4 /urtha, That amendments to the 
bill relative to · the allocation of the ln-
creued $800 million In budeet authority be 
In order only If agreed to by the chairman 
and rank1ns member of the Appropriations 
Comm.It.tee, with such amendments not sub-
ject to further amendments or points of 
.order. 
·- ·Onlned /urtha, That no motions to re-
commit the Transportation appropriations 
bill be In order. <Sept. 28, 1989.> 
-onteml Jurtha, That Immediately follow-
lDJ' ·the puaaae of the final re,ular appro-
priations bill and the antlcipated contlnutn, 
resolution. the Senate proceed to the Imme-
. ,........,.dlate conaldetaUon of a bill by Senator Dole 
that aolely lncorporatea the remalnlnl lelda-
latlve lnltlaUvea . of the President's drug 
strategy. . 
That thls bill be _ Q~n 
IOlely to druJ related amendmenta; amenu-
ffii!HU deilloi with the matters to be Includ-
ed In the tollowtn, bill will not be In order 
to this bill. . . . 
OnkttdJurlllu, That. the majority leader, 
acttn, In . consult.at.Ion with the minority 
leader; ahaU determine a method tor floor 
consideration of· a. bill. or-a motion to pro-
ceed to au~ ·.blll.;_~eaµos· ,with. the death 
penalty, habeas corpua .reform. exclusionary 
rule, . Justice , Deparmtent ,reorpnlzatlon. 
International . moo,:,. : laundertn,, and the 
availability of flrearma for purchase. 
Ordered further, . That this · vehicle, or this year's amendment raises none of 
motion to proceed to such vehicle, be set th · • · 
before the Senate no earlier than Octobe . e constitutional issues in today s de-
20, 1989 no later than sine die adJour:.. CISion. ~en this year's ver5ion is e 
ment. Sept. 6 1989> -. . 7 . acted, therefore, Congress itselfi w· 
Mr. ._,_._~......,_ Mt President I have amended the_laws of the Dist ct 
wish to thank all those ~ho have b;en of Columbia to_ protect religious. · er-
instrumental in bringing us to this ty. · 
point-the distinguished Republican · _,The court .proceedings ·have 
leader; the chairman and ranking to- delay-enactment of the R 
member of the Appropriations Com- · Liberty Act. and dt:lay simpl . means 
mittee, who led the negotiations on that the D.C. Council has co mue~_to 
both sides; the Senator from Dela- sit as a .board of 13 moral t~or1t!es 
ware, who is here; the Senator from who ~ave pow~r to compel ellg10~ m-
Massachusetts; and others who partici- stitut1~ns to violate their oral p~mcl-
pated, as well. _ _ pals w1th ,)'espect ~o ho osexuallty. _I 
Mr. President I suggest the absence hope Congress will s n enact thIS 
of a quorum. · • · year's version of the eligious Liberty 
The PRESIDING OFFlCER. The Act so that religious hools in the Na-
clerk will call the roll. tion's Capital can . claim a portion of 
The bill clerk proceeded to call the their autonomy d moral authority. 
roll. I might add hat, since the first 
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President I amendment r ads, "Congress shall 
ask unanimous consent that the order make I_lo law especting an establish-
for the quorum call be rescinded. ment of rel' · on • • ... and since the 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- Constitutio clearly establishes that 
out objection, it is so ordered. Congress the legislature for the Dis-
MORNING BUSINESS -
MITCHELL. Mr. President, I 
animous consent that there be a 
perio or morning business with Sen-
ators pe tted to speak therein. 
The PR IDINO OFFICER. With-




trict of olumbia, one wouldn't have 
though that the Nation's Capital Re-
llgous 'berty and Academic Freedom 
Act ould be necessary. Unfortunate-
ly, e D.C. Council, sustained by the 
D ' trict's highest court, made congres-
nal action necessary. 
The court of appeals did not seem to 
understand the need for the Religious 
Li~rty Act. Writing for the court, 
Judge Harry T. Edwards said: _ 
Rather than seek review of the declsloo·1n 
the United States Supreme Court. George-
·. · • : town (University>. agreed to a settlement 
Mr. ARMSTRONG. based on the District of Columbia Court of 
this morning the U.S. Co Appeals' decision, Indicating publicly 
peals for the District of Col Ia Cir- through Its President that It regarded the 
cuit issued its opinion in Cl ke ersus outcome of the case as an essentially fair 
United ·states, ·the religi us li rty one. ~onetheless, certain members of Con-
case. - gresa disagreed. • • ... · Clarke v. United 
. As Members of the statu, slip op. at 7-8 m.c. Cir.· No. 88-M39, 
member, 2 years ago th decided Sept. 26, 1989? (cltaUon_om.ltted). 
Appeals ordered a reli Mr. President, the Religious Liberty 
university to give A did not come about because any 
homosexual studen Me r of Congress believed George-
though the universl town' settlement with the student 
religious objectio to homosexual groups as not a fair one. Indeed, 
practices_ One year ago, Congress and .· under t . Religious · IJberty Act, 
the · President en ted the Nation's Oeorgeto University or any other 
Capital Religious berty and Academ- religiousy af fated school in the Dis-
le Freedom Act which ordered the trict will be a e to make an arrang-
D.C. Council to hange D.C.'.s Human ment it deems ppropriate with re-
Rights Act sot at a religiously affW- spect to _homose als. . The Court did 
ated school uld decide · for · .itself not seem to realize hat the Religious 
whether it w d extend recognition · IJberty Act came a ut-and remains 
or benefits homosexual individuals necessary-because ess refuses 
or groups. ·. ' Federal district court to allow the D.C. Co ell to sit in 
found that he Religious Liberty Act judgment of religious ools . and 
unconstitu onally abridged · the free their policies with respect homosex-
speech ri ts of members of the city uals. I regret that the court appeals 
council, d today the cout of appeals did not understand that C gress's 
affirme the lower court. · · · motivation for the .Religious rty 
As ators will also remember, Just Act was nothing more than reli ous 
a few ays ago, on September 14, the liberty. 
Senat adopted this year's version of . In addition to. the religious Ube 
the atlon's Capital Religious IJberty aspects of_ this case,. there . is also th 
Academic · Freedom · Act as an . question of . congressional power. Of 
ndment . to the · D.C~- Appropria- course, . the Constitution gives .Con-
t ~ ns -bill, H.R. 3026. This year's ver- gress "exclusive" Jegislative authority 
on amends the D.C. Code directly; "in all cases whatsoever" that involve 
ast year's version ordered the council the District of Columbia. The court 
to make the amendment. • Therefore, held that Congress · couldn't compel 
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October 6, 1989 
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
United states Supreme Court 
One First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
I write to thank you for taking time out of your 
busy schedule promptly to write a letter of recommendation on 
my behalf. There is no doubt in my mind that your letter is 
far more complimentary than is warranted by my talents (such 
as they are), but I will do my best to live up to your 
opinion of me. 
I nave followed with great . interest the .media's 
reaction to the release of your report on habeas corpus-
reform. In this connection, I have15'een struck by the 
widespread assumption among media people that the present 
"system" is somehow desirable because, .though perhaps 
arbitrary, it results in fewer exequtions than any intel-
ligent alternative. I have yet to see any recognition of _the 
damage to the rule of law that results from the States' utter 
inability to carry out a punishment that the Court has 
repeatedly found constitutional. 
As you know from our prior conversations, my own 
view is that the Court has perhaps, in some cases, gone too 
far in devising extraordinary procedural requirements for the 
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-
imposition of capital punishment. Despite my general prefer-
ence not to impose additional burdens on the States in this 
connection, I found your proposal to provide these defendants 
with counsel eminently sensible in the context of the habeas 
framework you have proposed. I was also pleased to see the 
proposal incorporate, for successive and repetitive peti-
tions, the "actual innocence" standard that you had previ-
ously advocated in your opinion in Kulhmann v. Wilson. I am 
looking forward to the legislative adoption of these improve-
ments now that the Chief Justice has forwarded your 
committee's report to Congress. 






October 9, 1989 
Dear Oliver: 
Your letter of September 29 was forwarded to me in 
Richmond where I sat on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
last week. 
It is good to know that your general health is ex-
cellent. I also have had attacks of "dizziness", and was 
hospitalized for it on one occasion. After all, we are ap-
proaching what many people think of as "ancient age". Hap-
pily, your mind is crystal clear. I hope mine is equally 
clear. 
You and I are not far apart on capital punishment. 
I do think it is constitutional, and as long as states - as 
well as Congress - provide by statute for capital sentences, 
I think the law should be enforced. I have said publicly, 
however, that if I were a member of a legislative body, I 
would vote against capital punishment. 
You may be interested in the enclosed article in 
the Harvard Law Review of last March, and in a more recent 
article written by Stuart Taylor for "Legal Times" based on 
an interview with me. 
With warm best wishes, as always. 
Hon. Oliver W. Hill 
Hill, Tucker & Marsh 
P. 0. Box 27363 
Sincerely, 




Oct~~er 10 , 1039 
Dear Joe: 
It was t~ouqhtful of you to 
send me~ coov of the letter from Justice 
~appala ahout the Report of the An Hoc 
Committee. 
I will consi~er carefully his suq-
gestion. It is good to know that ~e ap-
proves generally of our Report . 
I send best wishes. 
Sincere)y, 
Hon . Joseph F. Weis, Jr . 
Unite0 States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
513 U.S. Courthouse 
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R ETI R E D October 10, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear Chief: 
In the event you may not have seen it, I enclose a 
copy of the letter from Stanley Chauvin, President of the 
ABA, to Senator Biden. Copies went to all member of the 
Judiciary Committee. I would not characterize the letter 
as entirely friendly. It is dated September 20, the day 
before the report of our Committee was made public. Nor do 
I think the letter is an accurate summary of the Committee's 
report. 
I can understand how the ABA Committee would want 
the Senate Judiciary Committee to await its report. Yet it 
is curious that Chauvin should think it necessary - or even 
appropriate - to criticize our report, implying that we may 
have "sacrificed [fairness] for the sake of expediency". 
I am sending a copy of this letter to the members 
of the Ad Hoc Committee, including Barefoot Sanders who also 
is on the ABA Committee. I had understood, perhaps mistak-
enly, that the ABA Committee - while differing in some re-
spects - perceived the problem as we did, and is considering 
recommendations not substantially different from ours. 
Do you think any further action on behalf of our 
Committee should be considered? 




cc: Members of the Committee 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 
' . -
-~ - -
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 
L. STANLEY CHAUVIN, JR. 
AMERICAN BAR CENTER 
750 N . LAKE S H ORE DRIVE 
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60611 
TE L. EPHONE : 3 12 / 988· 5 109 
ASA/ NET: ABA005 
September 20, 1989 
Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary 
United States Senate 
Washington, DC 20510 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
PL.EASE REPL.Y TO: 
1800 M STREET. NW. 
WASHINGTON, 0.C. 20036 
.. 
The United States Judicial Conference today released the 
report of its Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital 
Cases, chaired by retired Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr. The report makes an important contribution to the public debate 
on this complex issue. However, it leaves a number of questions 
unanswered and issues unresolved. We are concerned that fairness 
not be sacrificed for the sake of expediency. We urge your 
committee to carefully examine all critical issues in this area, 
including proposed limitations on successive petitions and proposed 
statutes of limitations. Foremost in our view, however, is the 
issue of ensuring adequ~te\_:ounsel. 
The Committee's report identifies the need for qualified 
counsel as one of the most pressing problems in the current death 
penalty ~ystem. This critical p~oblem ~as bien addtessed in recent 
years by initiatives launched ·by the federal courts and the Judicial 
Conference which mandated the appointment of counsel in federal 
capita1 habeas proc~edin~s, ·established stringent standards and 
provided reasonable compensation for counsel, and supported the 
creation of death penalty resource centers~ 
-
Hon. Joseph R. Biden 
September 20, 1989 
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While the report does address the problem of providing counsel 
in state post-conviction cases, the solutions to this problem must 
not be limited to this stage of the proceedings. These are very 
complex cases which are literally matters of life and death. Yet in 
many states, counsel provided at trial and on direct appeal are ill 
equipped and inadequately compensated. These problems manifest 
themselves most clearly at the post-conviction stage, where relief 
is granted to the defendant in more than 40 percent of the cases. 
As the Committee's report indicates, each stage of the death 
penalty system has a significant impact on the next. The disturbing 
deficiences of the system at the trial and direct appeal levels tie 
the hands of post-conviction counsel -- regardless of how effective 
that counsel may be -- and exacerbate the heavy workload of the 
appellate courts. Efforts at habeas reform must assure the adequacy 
of counsel at every stage, both to safeguard constitutional 
protections and to ensure the efficient administration of justice. 
The Committee's reliance on the judgment of individual states 
with respect to standards for counsel will maintain the existing 
patchwork of often-inadequate systems and likely will lead to 
protracted litigation around the issue of adequacy of counsel. T~e 1 
American Bar Association supports adoption of detailed, uniform 
guidelines for the appointment and compensation of counsel, which we 
believe to be critical to effective reform. 
Recognizing the need to improve the system, the ABA's Criminal 
Justice Section, with support from the State Justice Institute, has 
established a broad-based task force whose report is expected to be 
completed by the end of October. While the Ad Hoc Committee was 
composed exclusively of federal judges, our task force members 
include state and federal trial and _  appellate judges, _prosecutors, . 
defense counsel, and H~gal scholars. The ·task force held hearings 
around the nation and received testimony from more than 80 
witnesses. The flnding~ of the task force should prove a valuable 
resou~ce as y~u consider ~his difficult issue. 
The complexity of this issue has required both the Ad Hoc 
Committee and the ABA task force to focus narrowly on habeas corpus 
review of death penalty cases. It is hoped that your Committee will 
be mindful that the recommendations in both these reports are 
limited to and should be considered only with respect to habeas 
corpus procedures as they apply to death penalty cases, which 
· present unique problems and require special solutions. ~ 
' · 
t', • 
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We realize your Committee is under time constraints. However, 
given the enormous complexity and importance of the issues involved 
and the need to ensure a comprehensive solution, we urge you to hold 
full and complete hearings on the proposed reforms and that the 
hearings not be concluded before the ABA task force report has been 
issued and can be considered during the hearings. We would welcome 
the opportunity to testify at the hearings. 
Sincerely, 
L. Stanley Chauvin, Jr. 
cc: Hon. William H. Rehnquist 
Members of the Committee on the Judiciary 
L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Administrative 




October 10, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear Chief: 
In the event you may not have seen it, I enclose a 
copy of the letter from Stanley Chauvin, President of the 
ABA, to Senator Biden. Copies went to all member of the 
Judiciary Committee. I would not characterize the letter 
as entirely friendly. It is dated September 20, the day 
before the report of our Committee was made public. Nor do 
I think the letter is an accurate summary of the Committee's 
report. 
I can understand how the ABA Committee would want 
the Senate Judiciary Committee to await its report. Yet it 
is curious that Chauvin should think it necessary - or even 
appropriate - to criticize our report, implying that we may 
have "sacrificed [fairness] for the sake of expediency". 
I am sending a copy of this letter to the members 
of the Ad Hoc Committee, including Barefoot Sanders who also 
is on the ABA Committee. I had understood, perhaps mistak-
enly, that the ABA Committee - while differing in some re-
spects - perceived the problem as we did, and is considering 
recommendations not substantially different from ours. 
Do you think any further action on behalf of our 
Committee should be considered? 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ ss 
cc: Members of the Committee 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 
- -
¥t}t: American [oUegc of QC rial itaru~ers 
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October 10, 1989 
Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
United States Supreme Court 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Judge Powell: 
RegJOt for the 
S_¢e/ Province of LA, MS & p:'X 
ubert W. Green / 
111 Soledad, Suite 2poo 
San Antonio, TX 7B i 05 
As you know, the American College of Trial Lawyers has 
frequently taken a stand on important legal questions involving 
the trial profession and on which it may have unique e x perience or 
influence. 
The subject of death penalty appeals and the lengthy time 
required to dispose of these appeals has attracted my interest in 
recent years. While I am a civil lawyer, I served as a prosecutor 
during my youth and I now share the frustration the public feels 
at the interminable delays in the justice system where capital 
punishment has been assessed. 
As a Regent of the College it occured to me that the College 
might play a constructive role in improving this needless 
procedure which both victimizes the defendant and discredits the 
judiciary as a whole. I first thought that a special committee of 
the College might research the problem, hold hearings and report 
recommendations. This, however, was before I read that your own 
committee, operating by appointment of the Chief Justice, had made 
a report and recommendations on this subject for the use of 
Congress. 
I 
Without appearing presumptious, therefore, I wanted to 
contact you and see whether you thought the College might be 
useful in supporting y~ committee's propo~ s before Congress or 
in whatever forum. If so, and assumi ng n approach has not 
already been made, I would be happy to discuss the matter at your 
convenience and to help plan a program for securing the approval 
-
Page 2 
Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
October 10, 1989 
-
of the Board of Regents. You have, as you should know, immense 
credibility as a former President of the College and the Regents 
and Officers would likely have a great interest in assisting in 
this most worthy undertaking. 
If a copy of your committee's report is available, I would 
like to have it for my files. In any e vent , I of f er my services 
with respect to the College, in the hope that this institution 






October 11, 1989 
Dear Judge Zappala: 
Judge Weiss forwarded to me your thoughtful letter 
of October 5, 1989, concerning the Report of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Federal Habeas corpus. I appreciate your kind 
words of support for the Report. 
Our Committee considered the possibility of time 
limits or priority rules to prevent unnecessary delay in the 
consideration of capital cases in the district courts and 
courts of appeal. The delays in many cases have been sub-
stantial. 
The experience of Committee members, however, was 
that priority rules for handling capital cases that were 
attempted in the past were difficult to enforce, and caused 
dissatisfaction among judges. Possibly a rule with a spe-
cific time limit, as you propose, would prove more success-
ful. 
I have forwarded a copy of your letter to Professor 
Al Pearson, who was the Reporter of our Committee. Although 
our Committee has been discharged, it is my understanding 
that the hearings in Congress on the subject of habeas cor-
pus will take place in the near future. 
Hon. Stephen A. Zappala 
Supreme Court 
Sincerely, 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
2800 Grant Building 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 
lfp/ ss 
-THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 
Sally: 
DOLLEY MADISON HOUSE 
1520 H STREET, N .W . 
WASHINGTON, D . C . 20005 
10/11/89 
1 lOCT 1989 
This has been reviewed here, and by the 
Director of the Administrative Office, Ralph 
Mecham, as well as Bill Burchill, the General 
Counsel at the A.O. 
Messrs. Mecham and Burchill suggested 
I clear it with the Chief Justice and Justice 
Powell. 
__,---
Many, many thanks to you and the Justice, 
cz~ ..,. 
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/ Habeas Corpus Committee Recommends Singl~ FJC Girds for the 1990s 
Course of Collateral Review in Capital Cases One of the first items of business 
for the Federal Judicial Center as it 
One course of state and federal 
collateral review, with competent 
counsel provided to indigent defen-
dants under capital sentences, free of 
the time pressures of impending exe-
cutions, has been recommended to 
resolve problems in the present ha-
beas corpus procedure. 
At the Supreme Court 
on Sept. 21, retired As-
sociate Justice Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr., chairman of 
the Judicial Conference 
Ad Hoc Committee on 
Federal Habeas Corpus 
in Capital Cases, re-
leased the committee's 
report. The previous 
day it had been submitted to the 
Judicial Conference, which received 
the report and authorized its release, 
discharged Justice Powell's commit-
tee, and scheduled further considera-
tion of the report for its next meeting 
in March 1990. 
The report concerns procedures al-
lowing post-conviction challenges to 
state criminal convictions in federal 
court. These federal challenges, 
known as collateral re-
view, follow direct ap-
peal of the conviction to 
the highest criminal 
court in the state (and 
sometimes to the Su-
preme Court on a peti-
tion for certiorari), and 
exhaustion of state ha-
beas procedures. 
H) Powell, Jr. In the report, the com-
mittee said, "Capital cases should be 
subject to one complete and fair 
See Habeas Report, page 2 
AO Announces Internship Program for Court 
and AO Mid-Level Management 
The AO has created a manage-
ment intern program for court and 
AO mid-level managers. The 
program will provide for rotational 
assignments of mid-level managers 
within the AO to broaden their ex-
perience. It will also involve an 
exchange of mid-level managers be-
tween the courts and the AO for pe-
riods of up to 12 months. Court em-
ployees participating in the program 
will gain a system-wide perspective 
on issues, policies, and procedures af-
fecting the federal court system. AO 
employees serving in the field will 
gain an enhanced understanding of 
the operational aspects of court pro-
grams in the field. 
The goals of the program are: 
(1) to strengthen leadership 
throughout the federal court system; 
(2) to increase awareness and under-
standing among the participants of 
the functions and mission of the 
courts and the AO and to show how 
these interrelate within the agency, 
the courts, and Congress; (3) to facili-
tate a planned program of individual 
development for career employees; 
(4) to stimulate the growth of 
promising employees in the courts 
and the AO by exposing them to a 
range of activities designed to 
broaden perspectives and expand 
management skills; and (5) to provide 
an opportunity for these individuals 
to apply locally developed 
perspectives and expertise in the 
administration of national programs. 
Court employee interns. Court 
employees will be brought to divi-
sions within the AO; at the initial 
stages of the program, they will be as-
signed to the Court Administration 
Division. As the program develops 
and is evaluated, other divisions will 
See Management Interns, page 4 
enters the 1990s will be the selection 
of a new director to assume office 
after the current director, Judge John 
C. Godbold, reaches the statutory 
mandatory retirement age for service 
as director in March 1990. 
The Center is the research, devel-
opment, and training arm of the fed-
eral judicial system. It was created by 
Congress in 1967 (28 U.S.C. §§ 620-
629), on the recommendation of the 
Judicial Conference. Its statutory 
purpose is "to further the develop-
ment and adoption of improved judi-
cial administration" in the courts of 
the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 620(a). 
Among its functions, it provides 
educational and training programs 
and services for federal judicial 
branch personnel; produces educa-
tional audio and video media and 
publications; undertakes empirical 
and exploratory research on federal 
judicial processes and court manage-
ment and develops recommendations 
to present for the consideration of the 
Judicial Conference and its commit-
tees; designs and tests new technolo-
gies, especially computer systems, 
that are useful for case management 
and court administration; and pro-
vides staff, research, and planning as-
sistance to the Judicial Conference 
and its committees. 
Thus, the Center's primary con-
stituency consists of the Judicial 
See FJC Prepares, page 5 
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Habeas Report, from page 1 
~ rse of collateral review in the state 
and federal system, free from the 
time pressure of impending execu-
tion, and with the assistance of com-
petent counsel for the defendant. 
When this review has concluded, liti-
gation should end." 
The committee found that there is 
nearly unanimous agreement among 
the many groups and individuals it 
consulted that the present system is 
unacceptable, although there is little 
agreement on how to remedy the 
situation. The committee said, "Our 
present system of multi-layered state 
and federal appeal and collateral 
review has led to piecemeal and repe-
titious litigation, and years of delay 
between sentencing and a judicial 
resolution as to whether the sentence 
was permissible under the law." The 
"resulting lack of finality undermines 
public confidence in our criminal jus-
tice system." 
Justice Powell gave his own view, 
saying, "The present system of un-
limited and multiple appeals just isn't 
working. If we can't make it work, 
then we ought to abolish capital 
punishment." He added, "The United 
States has the highest murder rate in 
the world by far. My opinion is that 
capital punishment will be abolished 
in the United States because it is not 
being enforced. It produces so many 
collateral problems." 
The committee found that 37 states 
have capital sentence laws, that over 
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2,200 convicted murderers are await-
ing execution, and that the average 
time between conviction and execu-
tion is over eight years. "Delay of this 
magnitude is hardly necessary for 
fairness or for thorough review," the 
committee stated. 
A major problem has been the need 
for qualified counsel to represent 
indigent prisoners at all stages. While 
federal law mandates appointment of 
counsel in federal habeas litigation in 
capital cases and some states supply 
such counsel for post-conviction col-
lateral review, in many states counsel 
is not appointed. 
The present system provides no 
incentive for prisoners to pursue col-
lateral relief until an execution date is 
set, at which time litigation and re-
view commence under pressure. 
The committee proposes new fed-
eral statutory procedures for federal 
habeas corpus review of capital cases: 
• Each state could bring its capital 
case collateral review within the 
committee-proposed legislation by 
providing competent counsel for 
inmates on state collateral review, 
thus making participation optional 
with each state. 
• An automatic stay of execution 
would remain in place during the 
federal habeas proceedings, or until 
the prisoner has failed to file a peti-
tion within the allotted time of six 
months, within which federal habeas 
review must be pursued, commenc-
ing with the appointment of counsel 
for the prisoner or a prisoner's refusal 
of appointed counsel. That six-month 
limitation would be tolled during 
state court proceedings and upon fil-
ing a federal habeas petition. Thus 
II 
Pictured left to right are 
Chief Judge Charles 
Clark (5th Cir.), L. Ralph 
Mecham, AO Director, 
and Judge Richard S. 
Arnold (8th Cir.) dis-
cussing the judiciary's 
1990 budget on Sept. 20 
at the meeting of the 
Judicial Conference of 
the United States. 
the proposal should substantially re-
lieve both litigants and the judiciary 
by essentially eliminating stay-mo-
tion litigation, the committee deter-
mined. (Six months is a longer period 
than the time allowed for appeals in 
state and federal systems or for seek-
ing certiorari review in the Supreme 
Court, noted the committee.) 
• Upon completion of the entire 
state and federal collateral process 
with the assistance of competent 
counsel, absent a colorable showing 
of factual innocence and extraordi-
nary circumstances, subsequent and 
successive federal habeas petitions 
would not be the basis for further 
stays of execution or grants of relief. 
• Immediate presentation of new 
claims in federal court would be per-
mitted in extraordinary circum-
stances. 
The committee was formed in June 
1988 to study the operation of habeas 
corpus review in cases involving the 
death penalty. The Chief Justice 
charged the committee to inquire into 
"the necessity and desirability of leg-
islation directed toward avoiding 
delay and the lack of finality" in 
capital cases in which the prisoner 
had counsel or had been offered 
counsel. Committee members were 
Justice Powell (chairman), Chief 
Judge Charles Clark (5th Cir.), Judge 
Paul H. Roney (11th Cir.), Chief 
Judge William Terrell Hodges (M.D. 
Fla.), and Judge Barefoot Sanders 
(N.D. Tex.). Professor Albert M. 
Pearson (University of Georgia Law 
School) was the reporter, and William 
R. Burchill, Jr. (AO General Counsel) 
was the secretary£ ,1 J_, ~ 
,1 - -
October 12, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus 
Dear Friends and Colleagues: 
In the event you may not have seen it, I enclose a 
copy of the editorial in the Wall Street Journal of October 
11. 
I will miss seeing each of you. I am not unhappy, 
however, that our Committee was discharged. I am surprised 
that 14 members of the Judicial Conference would have criti-
cized the Chief Justice. 
In a conversation today with Sam Ervin he stated 
his concern was that members of the Conference needed fur-
ther time to consider our report. He indicated, based on a 
preliminary look, that he is inclined to agree with it. 




cc: Professor Albert M. Pearson 





✓ ~ .5'/t-i'd" h~/K '1 
The Judges' Coup Attempt 
If your friends on Capitol Hill can 
block the nomination of the most qual-
ified nominee to the Supreme Court 
this century because he is a conserva-
tive, why not go all the way and try to 
undermine the Chief Justice of the Su-
preme Court? A group of mostly lib-
eral federal judges has just launched 
an unprecedented assault on Supreme 
Court Chief Justice William Rehn-
quist, who apparently has committed 
the political crime of proposing that 
appeals of death penalties be stream-
lined. 
Last year's anti-drug law author-
ized the Chief Justice to submit a plan 
to end the current endless appeals by 
prisoners on death row. The law also 
provided that a reform bill would get 
quick consideration in the Senate. The 
Rehnquist proposal has now set off a 
mini-revolution in the lower courts 
among judges who don't believe in ex-
ecuting convicted murderers. A letter 
distributed by 14 senior judges last 
week effectively asks the Senate to Ig-
nore the law and the Chief Justice. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist last year 
appointed a group of judges, led by re-
tired Justice Lewis Powell Jr., to look 
int<;> the problem of _  death-penalty ap-
peals. It noted that ·while 2,200 people 
have bee_n sentenced -to death, 
there 've been . only· 116 ·executions 
.since 1972. The average length of a~ 
peals is more . than eight years; the 
shortest appeal nearly three years; 
the longest so far more than 14 years. 
As the report noted, "The inmate un- · 
der capital sentence, whose guilt fre-
quently is never in question, has every 
incentive to delay the proceedings." 
Some judges and "pro bono" lawyers 
are only too happy to oblige. 
The Powell report has moderate 
proposals. It urges a law limiting ap-
peals to two rounds-still more gener-
ous than any other kind of case-for 
states that agree to pay lawyers to 
handle the appeals. This would ensure 
adequate legal representation while 
ending delays. 
Still, a group of judges on the 28-
member Judicial Conference, the fed-
eral courts' policy-making group, ob-
jected last month when Chief Justice 
Rehnquist passed the Powell report to 
Congress. The judges sent a letter 
urging the Senate to "request that ,_ 
hearings be held" to take the Judicial 
Conference's presumably contrary po-
sition into account. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist was not 
amused by this challenge to his au-
thority. He responded by issuing a 
statement that cited the anti-drug-law . 
provision seeking reform of death-pen-
alty appeals. • 'My obligation to trans-
mit the report was not dependent on 
approval of the Judicial Conference,'' 
he salq, noting that he had informed 
the Senate that the judges' group 
hadn't yet taken a position. 
The benign view of this action is 
that liberal_ judges· fear losing the tac~ 
tic of delay to effectively repeal the 
very popular death penalty. But these 
judges have raised the ·ante -by chal-
. lenging the authority of Chief Justice · 
.-· Rehnquist, whose_·position makes him 
the top judicial spokesman on changes 
in federal court procedures. The less 
ben_ign-view is that" next we can ex-
pect liberal judges to announce that 
because of tlle newly conservative Su-
preme Court they will no longer be 
bound by the precedent system of 
stare decisis. 
.. ~ -
CHAMB E RS OF 
-
jlllltttm:t QIOltft 1lf tlrt 1,tttittb jltau• -.u~ J. QI. 2.llffe'l, 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
RETI RED 
October 13, 1989 
MEMO TO MEMBERS OF AD HOC COMMITTEE 
FROM L.F.P., Jr. 
The enclosed article from the Washington Post of 
this date will be of interest. The Chief Justice had no 
reason to consult me as he acted pursuant to §7323. See 102 
Stat. 4467. I regret that a substantial number of the 
judges on the Judicial Conference joined in a letter criti-
cal of the Chief's action. 
I was requested this morning by a lawyer for the 
Senate Judicial Committee to testify on November 8 or 9 in 
support of our Report. I suppose I should do this, and am 
requesting Al Pearson to join me. I hope the time is not 
far away when our "discharge" will in fact end our partici-
pation. I continue to think that we made a sound recommen-
dation. The CJ told me today that he agrees with it one 
hundred percent. 




cc: Professor Albert M. Pearson 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 
~ - -
THE WASHINGTON PosT FRIDAY, Ocronm 13, _1989 A ff _- -I 
Rehnquist Pr~ for Quicker Executions 
Delay in Hearings on Limiting Death Row Appeals Is Opposed 
By Al Kamen 
Wuhinston POil Slaff Writer 
Chief Justice William H. Rehn-
quist yesterday rebuffed an effort 
by Senate Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-
'Del.) to delay action on a proposal 
to speed -execution of inmates on 
death row. 
A majority of the 27 judges on 
the Judicial Conference of the Unit-
ed States-the federal judiciary's 
top policy arm-bad written Biden 
asking him to delay bearings on the 
proposal, which would restrict the 
rights Df death row inmates to ap-
peal sentences. The proposal was 
drafted by a Rehnquist-picked, five-
judge committee chaired by retired 
justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. 
On Wednesday, Biden wrote the 
chief justice indicating that he could 
accommodate the judges' request 
for a delay so that the Judicial Con-
f ere nee could review the issue next 
year. 
Rehnquist, however, indicated 
:that was not of -paramount concern. 
-"From my perspective as chief jus-
tice,• Rehnquist said in a letter to 
.Biden yesterday, "I regard the 
problem of delay an~ confusion in 
federal habeas corpus review _ of 
state [death) sentences an urgent 
one, and hope that Congress will 
see fit to address the matter this 
fan.· 
The dispute over Rehnquist's 
decision to put the matter in Senate 
hands began last month. At a meet-
ing Sept. 21, the conference-
which includes the chief judges of 
the 12 federal appeals courts and a 
district judge from each circuit-
voted 17 to 7 to def er consideration 
of the proposal until its next meet-
ing in March. · 
But the next day, Rehnquist, who 
strongly favors limiting death row 
appeals, sent the Powell committee 
proposal and report to the Senate 
and House Judiciary committees. 
That move apparently triggered 
language in a 1988 law that obliged 
the Senate to act on the proposal on 
an expedited schedule and vote on it 
by late December. The House bas 
no specified timetable. 
Fourteen judges, several furious 
at what they felt was an end-run by 
Rehnquist, staged a mini-revolt 
against the chief justice, who chairs 
·· the conference, and sent their let-
ter to Biden urging him to defer 
action until after the March meet-
ing. 
Biden, in a response that one Ju-
diciary Committee aide said was an 
effort to ease tensions, wrote Rehn-
quist Wednesday asking him if be 
intended to trigger the timetable. 
If Rehnquist did not intend to do 
so and if Rehnquist wanted to ~th-
hold fmal transmittal• of the propos-
al until March to give the other 
judges a chance to express views, 
Biden · wrote, "I am confident that 
the committee could accommodate 
this request. Moreover, I see noth-
1
(. 
ing in the (1988 law) that forecloses 
this approach.• 
Rehnquist, in the letter released 
to reporters yesterday, said as far 
as he is concerned Biden could de-
cide whether the timetable was 
triggered or not. The judicial con-
ference is not mentioned in the 
1988 law, Rehnquist said, and "im-
plicit in the statute was that I would 
transmit the Powell Committee re-
port when it became final rather 
than at some future time to be de-
termined at my discretion: 
Congressional sources said it a~ 
pears that Biden, if he wants the 
judges' views, may have to request 
them to testify at a hearing. 
A Judiciary Committee aide, who 
asked not to be identified, said he is 
surprised that Rehnquist •seemed 
to go out of his way to make pubtic• 
the letter and insert a •gratuitous 
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infraction with the consent of the parties.". 
SEC. 7SU. CONSIDERATION OF HABEAS CORPUS REFORM LEGISLATION. 
(a) INTRODUCl'ION 01' LEGISLATION BY nm CHAIR.MAN 01' nm 
O>IIMl'ITD ON nm JUDICLUY 01' TID SENAft.-Beginning on the 
date the Chief Justice of the United States forwards to the C.Ommit-
tees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives the report and recommendation of the Special C.Ommittee on 
Habeas C.Orpus Review of Capital Sentences, appointed by the Chief 
Justice of the United States and chaired by Justice Lewis Powell 
(hereafter in this section ref erred to as the "Special C.Ommittee"), 
the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate shall 
have 15 days of session thereafter to introduce a bill to modify 
Federal habeas corpus procedure after having faithfully considered 
the report and recommendations of the Special Committee. If no 
such bill is introduced by the chairman within the 15-day period, 
such bill may be introduced by the ranking minority Member of the 
committee within an additional 10 days of session. 
(b) REP6RTING 01' LEGISLATION BY THB 0>MMITl'EB ON THE JU-
DICIARY OF THE SENATB.-{1) The bill introduced pursuant to subsec-
tion (a) shall be reported with or without recommendation by the 
C.Ommittee on the Judiciary of the Senate by the end of the 60th day 
of session after the submission of the report by the Chief Justice or 
the bill shall be discharged automatically from such committee and 
such bill shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the Senate . 
(2) It is in order at any time after the 30th day of session after the 
bill has been placed on the calendar pursuant to J>81:8i.l:8Ph (1,, 
notwithstanding any rule or precedent of the Senate, mcluding Rule 
22, for any Member of the Senate to move to proceed to the 
consideration of the bill. The motion is not debatable. The motion is 
not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote 
by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in 
order. Only one motion in the Senate shall be in order pursuant to 
this paragraph and such motion shall be decided by a roll call vote. 
(3) This subsection is enacted by Co=-
(A) as an exercise of the rule~ power of the Senate and 
as such it is deemed a part of the rules of the Senate, but 
applicable only with respect to the procedure to 6e followed in 
the Senate in the case of a bill descnbed in paragraph (1), and it 
supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent 
with such rules; and 
(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of the 
Senate to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of 
the Senate) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same 
extent as in the case of any other rule of the Senate. 
.:r 











ofticialf . . t 
(c) REPoRT or THE SPECIAL CoMMITl'U.-The s~ C.Ommittee is 
urged to expedite the filing of its report and to include options for 
legi!Jlative action among its findings. The House of Representatives 
shall give fair, appropriate, and expeditious consideration to the 
report of the Special Committee. 
Subtitle I-Provisions Relating to the Federal 
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infraction with the consent of the parties.". 
SEC. 73%3. CONSIDERATION OF HABEAS CORPUS REFORM LEGISLATION. 
(a) INTRODUCl'ION OF LEGISLATION BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE 
CoMMITl'EE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE SENATE.-Beginning on the 
date the Chief Justice of the United States forwards to the Commit-
tees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives the report and recommendation of the Special Committee on 
Habeas Corpus Review of Capital Sentences, appointed by the Chief 
Justice of the United States and chaired by Justice Lewis Powell 
(hereafter in this section referred to as the "Special Committee"), 
the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate shall 
have 15 days of session thereafter to introduce a bill to modify 
Federal habeas corpus procedure after having faithfully considered 
the report and recommendations of the Special Committee. If no 
such bill is introduced by the chairman within the 15-day period, 
such bill may be introduced by the ranking minority Member of the 
committee within an additional 10 days of session. 
(b) REJ>6RTING OF LEGISLATION BY THE CoMMI'M'EE ON THE JU-
DICIARY OF THE SENATE.-{1) The bill introduced pursuant to subsec-
tion (a) shall be reported with or without recommendation by the 
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate by the end of the 60th day 
of session after the submission of the report by the Chief Justice or 
the bill shall be discharged automatically from such committee and 
such bill shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the Senate. 
(2) It is in order at any time after the 30th day of session after the 
bill has been placed on the calendar pursuant to paragraph (1,, 
notwithstanding any rule or precedent of the Senate, including Rule 
22, for any Member of the Senate to move to proceed to the 
consideration of the bill. The motion is not debatable. The motion is 
not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote 
by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in 
order. Only one motion in the Senate shall be in order pursuant to 
this paragraph and such motion shall be decided by a roll call vote. 
(3) 'This subsection is enacted by Congress-
(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and 
as such it is deemed a part of the rules of the Senate, but 
applicable only with respect to the procedure to 6e followed in 
the Senate in the case of a bill described in paragraph (1), and it 
supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent 
with such rules; and 
(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of the 
Senate to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of 
the Senate) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same 
extent as in the case of any other rule of the Senate. 
102 STAT. 4468 
PUBLIC LAW 100-690-NOV. 18, 1988 
(c) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CoMMITl'EE.-The Special Committee is 
urged to expedite the filing of its report and to include options for 
legislative action among its findings. The House of Representatives 
shall give fair, appropriate, and expeditious consideration to the 
report of the Special Committee. 
Subtitle I-Provisions Relating to the Federal 
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October 13, 1989 
MEMO TO MEMBERS OF AD HOC COMMITTEE 
FROM L.F.P., Jr. 
-
The enclosed article from the Washington Post of 
this date will be of interest. The Chief Justice had no 
reason to consult me as he acted pursuant to §7323. See 102 
Stat. 4467. I regret that a substantial number of the 
judges on the Judicial Conference joined in a letter criti-
cal of the Chief's action. 
I was requested this morning by a lawyer for the 
Senate Judicial Committee to testify on November 8 or 9 in 
support of our Report. I suppose I should do this, and am 
requesting Al Pearson to join me. I hope the time is not 
far away when our "discharge" will in fact end our partici-
pation. I continue to think that we made a sound recommen-
dation. The CJ told me today that he agrees with it one 
hundred percent. 
My best to each of you. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
cc: Professor Albert M. Pearson 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 
- -
October 13, 1989 
Dear Hubert: 
It was most thoughtful of you to write, and I par-
ticularly appreciate your willingness to be helpful with 
respect to the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal 
Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases. I enclose a copy of our 
Report. 
I also enclose copy of an article from the Washing-
ton Post. It indicates that the Chief Justice is taking an 
active role in supporting the Committee's recommendation. I 
have thought it best for me to leave this to the Chief Jus-
tice. I have been requested, however, by the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee to testify, and I will do this. 
Although my plans remain somewhat uncertain I hope 
to see you when the College meets in New Orleans. 
I send warm best wishes. 
Hon. Hubert Green 
111 Soledad, Suite 20000 




October 16, 1989 
Testimony Before Senate Judicial Committee 
MEMO TO HEW: 
Senator Biden, by one of his staff, has invited me 
to testify before the Senate Judicial Committee in support 
of the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee. 
I have agreed to do this at 10:00 a.m.L November 8. 
If convenient for Justice Kennedy, I would like for you as 
well as Al Pearson to accompany me. Also, please take a 
look at the statement I made to the Judicial Conference. In 
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l one member appointed from among SEC.'- ACADIAN CULTIJRAL CENTER. 
mmendatlons submitted by the Speaker <al IN O1:MERAL.-The Secretary Is author-
e House of Representatives of the lzed, .after consultation with the Co 
of Maine; slon, to establish a center for the preser,a-
ne member appointed from among tfon, perpetuation, and tnterpretatlolil' of 
reco endatlons submitted by the Pres!- Acadian culture within the State of 
dent of e Senate of the State of Maine; <bl ACQUISinOH or Luro.-The I 
<4> on member appointed from among 1a authorized to acquire lands and 
recommen tlona submitted by the Chan- therein, not to exceed 20 acres In 
cellor of th Unlverslty of Ma.lne System; purchase, donation, or exchange, 
· <5> three embers appointed from among velop, operate, and maintain 
recommenda ns submitted by State and and preservation facllltles and grams at 
local historic, tural or historic preserva- -the center In furtherance of th purposes of 
tfon organlzatl ; and ~l~oN.-The Beere 1 may con-
(6) one additi~ember appointed by tract with public and prlva entitles for the 
the Secretary. operation of the center in rdance with 
(bl Tnxs.-<1> embers of the Comm.is- program standards appro by the Secre-
alon shall be ap ted for terms not to tary. 
exceed 3 years. <d> IlffDnrrivl: PROG -In connection 
(2) The Secretary ay stagger the terms with center operatlo the Secretary shall 
of initial appointmen~ to the Commislons develop and lmpleme a comprehensive In-
in order to assure cont~y In operation. terpretlve program the Acadl&n culture 
<c> VOTDfG.-The Co Ion shall act in the State of , inclu~ preparation 
and advise by affirmative ote of a majority of interpretive an ormational materials, 
of Its members. exhibits, films, l ures. and other educa-
(d) COKPDSATI01'.-Mem~of the Com- tlonal materials. 
mission shall receive no pay on account of (el STATUTORY ~UTHORITY.-The Secretary 
their service on the Commlss n. but while shall adm1n1s properties acquired and co-
away from their homes or re~' ar places of operative agr ments entered into pursuant 
business In the performance of rvlces for to this Act accordance with the Act entl-
the Commission, members of th Com.mis- tied "An A to establish a National Park 
sion shall be allowed travel expenses, includ- Service, for other purposes", approved 
Ing per diem In lleu of subsistence_, in the August ·2 , 1916 (16 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) and 
same manner as persons employed lntermit- other s utory authority for the conserva-
tent}y in Government service are allowed tlon an management of natural, historical, 
expenses under section 5703 of title 5, and c resources. 
United States Code. \ SEC. 1. ln'HORlZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 
(e) EXEMPTION FROM CHARTER R~AL (a AUTHORIZATIONS or .APl'ROPJUATION'S TO 
REQUIRDCENTS.-Sectlon 14(b) of the FedE\r- COlfXISSlON.-There are authorized to 
al Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App~ be appropriated to the Commission such 
shall not apply to the Commission. \ of money as may be necessary for the 
<fl TERMINATIOlf.-The Commission shall \ rformance of Its duties under this Act. 
terminate 20 years from the date of enact- (b) LIMIT ON ExnlmITURES BY THE SECU-
ment of this Act. ~AilY.-The Secretary is authorized to 
(g) SUPPORT.-The Director of the Nation eJQ>end annually, in the performance of the 
al Park Service shall provide such staff su . Secretary's functions under tectlons 5 and 6, 
port and technlcal services as may be ne - ami)unts equal to 50 percent of the aggre-
sary to carry out the functions of the C m- gate\eost of perfornilng those functions, the 
mission. remainder of such cost to be paid with non-
SEC. ,. DlTIES OF THE COMMISSION. Federal funds. 
The Commission shall a.dvise \ --
ta.ry "II.1th respect to- SECTION.·BY-SECTION ANALYSIS or THE BILL 
(1) the selection of sites for POR Mum ACADIAN Ctn.TURAL CENTER 
tion, preservation, and develo Section i.: titles the b~l as the "Malne 
means of cooperative agreemen Acadlan Culture Preservation Act. 
t.o section 5· and Section 2: expresses the legislation's pur-
<2> the d~velopment and lementation poses: to recognize the contributions of Aca-
of a comprehensive interpret e program of dian lmmlgrants to this country and assist 
the Acadlan culture tn the tate of Maine efforts at preserving, perpetuating and In-
pursuant t.o section 6<d>. terpretlng that culture in Maine. 
SEC. 6. COOPERAffl"E ACRE 
<al IN GENERAL.-In f rtherance of the 
purposes of this Act, e Secretary Is au-
thorized, after consul tion with the Com-
mission. to enter · cooperative agree-
ments with the own of properties of nat-
ural, historical, or c tural significance asso-
ciated with the A . people iD the State 
of Maine, p\ll'!!u to which agreements the 
Secretary may p 0\1de management services 
and program · lement•tlon. 
. <bl RIGHT Accas.-Each cooperative 
agreements 11 pro,ide that the Secretary, 
through th National Park Service, shall 
have the ght of access at all reasonable 
times to public portions of the property 
covered the agreement for the purpose of 
conduct g visitors through such properties 
and in rpreting them to the public. 
(C) TERATION' 01" PROPERTIES.-Each CO-
Ive agreement shall provide that no 
ges or alterations shall be made in the 
rty covered by the agreement except 
mutual agreement between the Secretary 
d the other party to the agreement. 
Section 3: establlshes a "Maine Acadian 
Culture Preservation Commission" for 20 
years. The Commlsslon will have eight 
members appointed b,Y the Secretary <from 
. nominations submitte4 by specified groups 
or Individuals>. Commlsslon members shall 
serve three-year terms. !}leY will receive no 
compensation, but will ~ paid a per diem. 
The National Park Servl:;will provide the 
Commission staff suppo and technical 
services. 
Sectfon 4: proscribes th!_ "111_tlea of the 
Commission: to advise the oecreta.ry of the 
Interior In siting, esta.blishini, &nd imple-
menting the cooperative ~ments and 
the Maine Acadlan Cultural Ceniauthor-
ized In the legislation. 
Section 5: authorizes the Sec tary to 
enter Into cooperative agreemen with 
owners of properties associated the 
Acadlan people in Maine. Under the 
ments, the Secretary may provide m5ge-
ment services, program Implementation d 
financial assistance. The only restrict! ns 
on the property owners will be the req 
ments for the National Park Service to ha 
access to the public portions of the prope 
in order to conduct visitors through 
properties. In ~ditlon, no ch&nges or ter-
atlons could be made to the propert with-
out the agreement of the Secretar . 
Section 6: authorizes the P Service to 
acquire up to 20 acres of Ian . by purchase, 
donation or exchange for Center for the 
interpretation and prese atlon of Acadlan 
culture within the Sta of Maine. The Park 
Service Is autho to develop, operate, 
and m&lntain tnte. retlve facllltles and pro-
m.ms at the C " ter, although public and 
private entltl could be contracted to oper-
ate the ce r in accordance with program 
atandar pproved by the Secretary. 
Sect! 7: authorizes such aums u may be 
·"""'~u:¥ to carry out aectlons 5 and 6. Fed-
support ls limited to 50% of the total 
~
S. ~ .:.i~ amend title 28, 
United States Code, to provide special 
habeas corpus procedures in capital 
cases; to the Committee on the Judici-
ary. 
HABEAS CORPUS llEJl'ORl( ACT 
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, for some 
time now the Senate, on both sides of 
the a.isle, has expressed it-5 displea.5ure 
over the way our Federal courts review 
death penalty sentences imposed in 
State criminal trials. Some Senators 
have complained about the delays in-
volved in these Federal habeas corpus 
actions, as they are known, and others 
have complained about the lack of 
adequate counsel available to capital 
prisoners who are seeking full and fair 
review of their claims; that ls, people 
who have been convicted of a capital 
offense. 
Last year's drug bill, the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988, set out a procedure 
to consider legislation or for consider-
ing legislation to refonn the habeas 
corpus actions in capital cases. The act 
provided that, following the report of 
the special committee on habeas 
corpus reform, chaired by now retired 
Justice of the Supreme Court Lewis F. 
Powell, I was instructed, as chairman 
of the Judiciary Committee, to "intro-
duce a bill to modify Federal habeas 
corpus procedures after having faith-
fully considered the rePort and recom-
mendations of the· special committee." 
As required by law, I have studied 
the report of the Powell committee 
and today, within the provisions pro-
vided by the act, I am introducing a 
habeas corpus reform bill. 
Before I explain some of the particu-
lars of my bill, let me examine the 
basic principle of the Powell Commis-
sion's report on habeas corpus. 
The Powell Committee studies the 
issue that we have debated for many, 
many years here 1n the Senate. It has 
been the issue of debate, I know the 
Presiding Officer knows, at least for 
the 17 years that I have been a Sena-
tor and I suspect for the many more 
years that the Presiding Officer has 
been in the U.S. Senate. We found 
that much of the delay in capital cases 
was attributable to repetitive applica-
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tions for habeas corpus review in Feel- to help the prisoner with legitimate There fs no one-bite-out-of-the-
er,J courts. che.llenges to their sentences brought apple. You can take, 3, 2, 10, 9,000, if 
1'.n response, the Powell committee before the Supretne Court through possible, bites out of the apple. That 1s 
. r.eoomm.ended that a special procedure habeas corpus. the reason for the reform. 
be created for capital cases that would The Powell quid pro quo, which I The bill I am proposing and what 
provide each State prisoner with a support, recognizes this. With some the Powell commission proposed fs 
single opportunity to litigate all avail- simple, but ~ntial, changes, . it only one shot in Federal court. And 
able ' claims available to him or her In should result in a system that is an tm- my view, Mr. President, fs that we 
Federal court. In other words, the provement over the present system in should, in fact, not limJt that one bite 
committee recommended that the all respects. out of the apple to only issues raised 
State prisoner get Just one bite out of ___ My bill adopts the structure and in State courts if there fs good reason 
the apple. - text of the legislation recommended for there to be additional issues raised. 
The committee recogn.ized, however, by the Powell committee in many re- Therefore, my bill would allow a 
that review of death senten~ is an spects, but there are a number of prisoner to present in Federal court 
enormously serious and important un- areas in which I have made changes . any claim that bears on the legality of 
dertaking and that if there were to be n~. in my vtew, to ensure that his death sentence, as long as the rea-
only • single opportunlty for Federal this streamlined procedure fs as fair as sons that this claim was not presented 
review of the State death cases, the possible. in state court was due to tgnora.nce or 
procedure would have to provide the First, it 1s essential to the succes.5 of neglect of his attorney, or, again, 1f 
prisoner in question new weguards, the Powell committee's approach that the court's failure to consider such 
safeguards that do not no_w exist. the COWlSel appointed to represent the claim would result in the miscarriage 
Nothing less would be, ~~fflcient ~ defendant in State proceedings be of justice. 
guard against .the poss,bi~ty of mlS· qualified counsel. The Powell report So, notwithstanding the fact, Mr. 
take or prejudice in carrymg out the included no standards governing the President, I propose a claim may be 
death sentence, accordlng to the qualifications of attorneys appointed brought that was not raised in State Powell committee. . 
Therefore, the Powell committee in capital cas~. but yet spake t? the court in this one chance in Federal 
proposed that the one-bite-at-the- need for qualified counsel. My bill in- co1;1rl! even under those circumstances 
apple rule would apply but only 1f the ct1;1des such standards, adopting the I_ lurut it, as does the Powell c~m.mls-
prisoner had been afforded court-ap- mmi.'llums e?acted by Congress in the s10n. It 1s limJted only to cLrCum-
pointed counsel at every step of the 1988 drug bill as part of the appoint- st.ances where there was ignorance _on 
proceedings for them to be able to ~ent of counsel requirement made ap- the part of t_he attorney representing 
make this habeas corpus· one-bite-at- plicable by that law. the person sitting on death row, and 
the-apple procedure. If the state pro- In other words, we have already set therefore it_ did not get raised_. or,_ the 
vides such counsel-that is court-ap- the standards in the 1988 drug bill second provision I put in my bill, tnere 
pointed counsel-to capital' prisoners where we call for the appointment of would be a miscarriage of Justice re-
the Powell committee proposed they counsel in specific circumstances and sulting. Obviously, that 1s a Judgment 
could limit those prisoners to a single we set out criteria for that counsel for the court to make, if there would 
round of litigation in Federal court. that that counsel must meet. Essen- be a miscarriage of Justice. 
This quid pro quo 1s the essence of tially what I do, Mr. President, 1s take Fourth, the Powell committee rec-
the Powell plan. The bill I am intro- that standard and apply it to the ommended that the time period for 
ducing today adopts this quid pro QUO habeas corpus cases, as well filing habeas corpus petitions should 
approach. It provides that State pris- Second, the Powell repart provides be limited to 6 monLhs. Currently 
oners who are afforded qualified coun- for a second Federal habeas corpus ap- there is no time limit whatsoever. I 
sel at trial and throughout State plication In only the most narrow cir- agree that there should be some time 
death penalty proceedings sh.all have cumsta.nces, when the claim of factual limit on filing such petitions for other-
only a single opportunity to litigate innocence was not previously present- '\l:ise a prisoner with no incentive to 
their habeas corpus claim in Federal ed due to State action or facts not speed the arrival his State execution 
court. ' available at the time. I believe that might delay the filing of his claim in-
Mr. President, some may think this t!lis safety valve provision should be definitely. Six months, however, is too 
odd for the Senator from Delaware, broader than that recommended by short a time for a qualified and pre-
who opposed the changes in this rule the Powell Committee. sumably very busy attorney to drop 
on past occasions, largely due to the For example, 1n my bill, a prisoner what other work he or she might be 
risk of error in the applications to be can bring a second habeas corpus ap- doing. conduct a thorough investiga-
proposing legislation that will, to use plication in Federal court if-and I say tion of the case, and prepare an appro-
the common description given by if-it ts necessary to avoid a miscar- priate filing for this one bite out of 
some, speed up execution. But I see no riage of Justice, an established legal the apple. 
irony in this proposal. Delay for standard currently in place that en- For that reason, Mr. President, my 
delay's sake serves no one in the cap- sures that in extraordinary cases jus- bill would require the State habeas 
ital punishment system-a system that tice will be done. The Powell plan re- corpus petition to be filed within 1 
I do not oppose on moral groundc;, peals this miscarriage of justice excep- year. 
have occasionally supported for specif- tion. I believe it 1s necessary to provide . Finally, Mr. President, the Powell 
le death penalty cases, and generally the Federal court with the power to committee made no provision for cap-
have argued more safeguards should prevent unjust executions. ital prisoners who have the benefit of 
be built into the system when there is Third, the Powell report limits favorable Supreme Court rulings de-
going to be a capital offense available claims prisoners can raise in Federal clded after their trial and direct ap-
to the prosecution. court to those clalins raised. earlier in peals. My bill remedies this and In-
It ts, obviously, harmful · to the State court proceedings. Whfle I un- structs the court to apply the most 
system itself and to the famD.Jes of derstand the principles motivating this recent Supreme Court ruling to the 
crime victims and to all if, in fact, the proposal, I believe that. if we a.re going claims brought by capital prisoners 
system ls allowed to be, shall we say, to adopt the one-bite-out-of-the-apple 11•here appropriate. Again, if we are 
prostituted; allowed to be used and approach, the single review provided going to speed the process under 
manipulated in a way that wa.s never in Federal court must be as thorough which the death sentences are re-
intended. But, less obviously, tt does as possible. Keep in mind, Mr. Prest- viewed, then it seems to me we must 
nothing for the capital prisoner, dent, what I am proposing here and do all we ca.n to ensure the review pro-
either. what the Powell commission fs propos- ceed.ings are complete. 
The current system . does much .to ing 1s a significant change in what 1s Again, we are making a slgnificant 
delay the lnevit:.ble and does too little presently available. tradeoff here. Right now there are no 
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llmlt.s on the number of times a pris-
oner can seek habeas corpus in a Fed-
eral court. We are limiting that to one 
t ime. 
In sum. I believe the proposal I a.m 
mtroducing today is a reasonable com-
promise among the competing con-
cerns In this area, balancing a prison-
er's right to have full review of his 
claims with the State's interest In 
ending delay In capital sentences. 
Hopefully it will give us a system that 
is both faster and fairer for all con-
emed. 
Mr. President, In closing I commend 
the Ppwell committee for its thorough 
work and thoughtful recommenda-
tions. I am pleased to announce today 
our first hearing on habeas corpus 
reform will be held on November 8, 
and our first witness at that hearing 
will be the distinguished Justice 
Powell himself. 
I look forward to having his insights 
on his proposal and the bill that I am 
Introducing today. The President's 
plan, and any other alternatives that 
may be proposed in the coming weeks, 
will also be considered at that time. 
Mr. President, I ask una."limous con-
sent that the text of the bill and a 
side-by-side comparison of my bill and 
the Powell committee's recommenda-
tions be printed in the RECORD. 
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the 
RECORD, as follows: 
s. 1757 
& U nuu:ted bJ,I the Senate and Hou.se of 
ReJn-uentative, of L'i.e United State:; of 
AffleTiea in Congress Cl.lSembled. 
RCTION I . SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the "Habeas 
Corpus Reform Act of 1989". 
SF.C. 2. SPECIAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES IN · 
CAPITAL CASi::S. 
Title 28, United States Code, is a.mended 
by inserting the following new chapter im• 
mediately following chaptir 153: 
/"CHAPI'ER 154-BPECIAL HABEAS 
~ CORPUS ~ O~URES ~ CAPITAL 
r CASES (/)~3' I'>~ 
"Sec. 
··2256. Prisoners In St.ate custody subject to 
capital sentence; appointment 
of counsel; requirement of rule 
of court or statute; procedures 
for appointment. 
.. 2257. Mandator)I stay of execution; dura-
tion; limJts on stays of execu-
tion; successive petitions. 
.. 2258. Flllng of habeas corpus petition; time 
requirements: tolling rules. 
'"2259. E'videntlary hearings; scope of F'E'der-
al review; district court adjudi-
cation. 
.. 2260. Certificate of probable cause inappli-
cable. 
.. 2261. Counsel tn capital cases; trial and 
post ~ nvictlon; standards. 
.. 2262. Law controlling in Federal habeas 
corpus proceedings; retroactlv-
lty. 
.. , %256. Prieonen In State cu~tody 1ubjttt lo cap-
ital aentence; appointment or coun,el; requin-
1Mnt or rule of court or statute; procNluret1 for 
appointment 
.. Ca> This chapter shall apply to cases aris-
lnt: under section 2254 of this title brought 
by prisoners in State custody who are sub-
' Ject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only 
if subsections <b> and Cc> are satisfied. 
"Cb) This chapter ls applicable if a State 
establishes by rule of Its court of last resort 
or by statute a mechanism for the appoint• 
ment, compensation, and payment of rea-
sonable fees and litigation expenses of com-
petent counsel consistent with section 2261 
of this title. 
"(c><l> Upon receipt of notice that counsel 
has been appointed to represent a prisoner 
under sentence of death after the prisoner's 
conviction and sentence have been upheld 
on direct review tn a State court of last 
resort and In the Supreme Court of the 
United States if application ls made to that 
court, the State court of last resort shall 
enter an order confirming the appointment 
and shall direct lts clerk to forward the 
record of the case to the attorney appoint-
ed. 
"(2 ) Upon receipt of notice that counsel 
has been offered to, but declined by, such a 
prisoner, the State court of last resort shall 
direct an appropriate court or Judge to hold 
a hearing, at which the prisoner and the at-
torney offered to the prisoner shall be 
present, to determine whether the prisoner 
Is competent to decide whether to accept or 
reject the appointment of counsel and 
whether, if competent, the prisoner know-
ingly and Intelligently waives the appoint-
ment of counsel. The court or judge shall 
report its deterrnin&tlons to the State court 
of last resort, which shall review the deter-
mlnti.tions for error. If the State court of 
last resort concludes that the prisoner ls in-
competent and does not waive counsel, the 
court shall enter an order confirming the 
appointment of the attorney assigned to the 
prisoner by the appointing authority and 
shall direct the clerk to forward the record 
to the attorney appointed. If the court con-
cludes that the prisoner is competent and 
waives counsel, the court shall enter an 
order that counsel need not be appointed 
and shall direct the clerk to forward the 
record to the prisoner; provided that noth-
ing In this section requires the appointment 
of counsel to a prisoner who Is not indigent. 
"Cd) No counsel appointed pursuant to 
subsections <b> and <c> to represent a State 
prisoner in State collateral proceedings 
shall have previously represented the pris-
oner &t trial or on direct &ppeal in the case 
for which the &ppolntment ls ma.de unless 
the prisoner and counsel expreMly request 
continued representation. 
"Ce> The Ineffectiveness or Incompetence 
of counsel appointed under this chapter 
during Stat~ or Federal collateral post-con-
victlon proceedings shall not be a ground 
for relief in a proceeding arising under this 
chapter or section 2254 of this title. This 
limitation shall not preclude the appoint-
ment of different counsel at any phase of 
State or Federal post-con\'iction proceed-
ings. 
.. , %257. lltandat.>ry 1tay of exec:ution; duration; 
lbnite on 1ta11 of execution; 1111cceuive peti• 
tiona 
"<a> Upon the entry In the State court of 
last resort of an order pursuant to section 
2256<c> of this title, a warrant or order set-
ting an execution date for a State prisoner 
shall be stayed upon applicatJon to any 
court that would have Jw1sdiction over any 
proceedings filed pursuant to section 2254 of 
this title. The application must recite that 
the State has Invoked the post-conviction 
review procedures of this chapter and that 
the scheduled execution Is subject to stay. 
"<b> A stay of execution granted pursuant 
to subsection <a> shall explre lf-
"<l> a State prisoner fails to file a habeas 
corpus petition under section 2254 of this 
title within the time required In section 
2258 of this title; or 
'"(2) upon completion of district court and 
court of appeals review under section 2254 
of this title the petition for relief ls denied 
and-
"(A> the time for filing a petition for certi-
orari has expired and no petition has been 
filed; 
"CB> a timely petition for certiorari was 
filed and the Supreme Court denied the pe-
tition; or 
"CC> a timely petition for certiorari was 
filed and upon consideration of the case, the 
Supreme Court disposed of it In a manner 
that left the capital sentence undisturbed; 
or 
"(3) before a court of competent Jurisdic-
tion, in the presence of counsel and after 
having been advised of the consequences of 
hls decision, a State prisoner under capital 
aentence waives the ri&ht to pursue habeas 
corpus review under aectlon 2254 of this 
title. 
.. <c> If one of the conditions in subsection 
<b> has occurred, no Federal court thereaf-
ter shall have the authority to ente,r a stay 
of execution or grant relief In a capital case 
unless-
"(l) the basis for the stay and request for 
relief ls a claim not previously presented by 
the prisoner In the State or Federal courts, 
and the failure to raise the claim is-
"CA> the result of State action In violation 
of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States; "CB) the result of the Supreme 
Court recognition of a new Federal right 
that ls retroactively applicable; or "CC> 
based on a factual predicate that could not 
have been discovered ~ ugh the exercise4 
of reasonable diligence or •~~-• 
"<2> the facts underl the claim would 
be sufficient, if proven, to under.nine the 
court's confidence in the Jury's determina-
tion of guilt on the offense or offenses for 
which the death penalty was imposed; or 
"(3) a stay and consideration of the re-
quested relief are necessary to prevent a 
miscarriage of Justice. 
"I %258. Filing of habeu corpua petition; time re-
quirement.a; tolling rules 
"Any petition for habeas corpus relief 
under section 2254 of this title must be filed 
In the appropriate district court not later 
than 365 days after the date of filing In the 
St.ate court of last resort of an order Issued 
in compliance with section 2256<c) of this 
title. The time requirements established by 
this section sh&ll be tolled-
"<l > from the date that a petition for .cer-
tiorari Is filed in the Supreme Court until 
the date of final disposition of the petition 
if a State prisoner seeks review of a capital 
sent.t>nce that has been affirmed on direct 
appeal by the court of last resort of the 
St.ate or has otherwise become final for 
State law purposes; 
" (2) during any period in which a State 
prisoner under capital sentence has a prop-
erly filed request for post-conviction review 
pending before a State court of competent 
Jurisdiction; lf all State filing rules are met 
in a timely manner, this period shall nm 
continuously from the date that the State 
prisoner lnitl&lly files for post-conviction 
review until final disposition of the case by 
the State court of last resort, and further 
unto final disposition of the matter by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, if a 
timely petition for review is flied; and . 
"<3> during an additional period not to 
exceed 90 days, if counsel for the State pris-
oner-
"(A) mo\'es for an extension of time In the 
United States district court that would have 
proper Jurisdiction over the cnse upon the 
filing of a habeas corpus petition under sec-
tion 2254 of this title; and 
"CB> makes a showing of food cause for 
counsel's inability to file the habeas corpus 
October 1 G, 1989 
petition witbJn the 365-day 
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period esW trlct court to the court of appeals does not "<c> Upon a finding In ex parte Proceed-
lished by thla eectlon. 
•• %259. E-ridmtiary llearlnp; acope or Federal 
nTiew; di.trict court adjudication 
apply to habeas corpus cases subject to this ings that investigative, expert or other aerv-
chapter except when a aecond or successive tees are reasonably necessary for the repre-
petltion 1s filed. aentation of the defendant, whether In con-
· .. <al Whenever a State prisoner under a "'I %%61. Counael In capital cun; trial and post-
capital eentence rues a petition for habeas comiction; wtandarda 
corpus relief to which this chapter applies, .. <a> A mechantsm for the provision of 
the district court ah&ll- counsel services to Indigents sufficient to 
"<1> determine the sufficiency of the evi- Invoke the provfalona of thla chapter under 
dentiary record for habeas corpus review; acct.Ion 2256<b> of tb1a title shall provide for 
and counael to lndlgenta cha.reed with offenses 
"(2) conduct any _requested ev1dentiary -11:>r which capital puntabment ta aought, to 
hearfna' necessary to complete the record tndlgenta who have been aenteneed to death 
for habeaa corpua review. · and who eeek appella.u or collateral review 
"<b> Upan the development of a complete ln State court, and to india'ents who have 
evldentJary record. the d1str1ct court ah&ll been aentenced to death and who seek certi-
rule on the mertt.t of the c1aima properly orart review tn the United Stat.ea Supreme 
~fore tt. Court. · 
.. (c)(l) Except u provided In J;JU8.Daph .. (b~ case of an appointment 
<2>, a district court may refuse to consider a made re at least one attorney ap-
claim under thJa aectlon lf- painted un er chapter must have been 
"<A> the prisoner previously failed to raise admitted to practice tn the court In which 
the clalm tn State court at the time and 1n the prosecution ts to be tried for not less 
the manner prellCribed by State law; than 5 years, and must hav not l 
"<B> the State courts. for th&t reason. re- t years' e tn e of 
fused or would refuse to entert&ln the claim; fe O y r 1n a cou . -
nection with Issues relatlni to rullt or issues 
relating to sentence, the court sh&ll author--
tze the defendant·• attorney to obtain such 
aervtces on behalf of the defendant and 
ahall order the payment of fee.a and ex-
penses therefor, under subsection <d>. Upon 
flmllng that timelY procurement of such 
eervices could not practicably await prior 
authorir.atton, the court may authorize the 
provision of and payment of auch services 
DUDC pro tune. 
"<d> Notwithstanding the rates and maxi-
mum llmtta renerally applicable to criminal 
cues and any other provtalon of law to the 
contn.ry, the court ah&ll fix the compensa-
tion to be paid to an attorney appointed 
under thla subaectton and the fees and ex-
penses to be paid for tnvesttgatlYe, expert, 
and other reuonab}y necessary aervtces au-
thorlz.ed under subsection <c>, at such rat.es 
or amounts as the court determines to be 
reasonably necessary to carry out the re-
and . e case of an appalntment made 
"<C> such refusal would constitute an ade- ter at least one attorney appointed .. 1 %26%. Law controllinr In Federal habeu corpus quate and Independent State law around un e chtQ>t. must have been admitted . 
quirements of this subsection. 
that would forecl01e dlr.ect review of the to practice In the court of last resort of the proceedi.np; rmoacthit, 
State court Judgment In the United States State for not leas than 5 yea.rs, and must "In cases subject to this chapter, all 
Supreme Court. have had zit't Jess Efian ~ears• ~rience claims shall be rovemed by the law as It was 
"(2) A district court shall consider a claim In the handling of  m t State,, when the petitioner's sentence became final, 
under thJa aection If the prisoner shows that courts In felony cases. C !f_"""" ~ -~/ supplemented by any Interim change In the 
the failure to raise the claim In a State "<3> Notwithstanding this subsection. a law, lf the court determines, tn light of the 
court wu due to the ignorance or neglect of court, for good cause may appoint another purpose to be served by the change, the 
the prisoner or counsel or If the failure to attorney whose background. knowledge, or extent of reliance on previous law by law en-
consider auch a claim would result In a m.L-i- experience would otherwise enable the at- forcement authorities, and the ef!ect on the 
e&rriage of Justlce. torney to properly represent the defendant, administration of Justice, that It would be 
•1 %%60. Certificate of probable cauae inapplicable with due consideration of the seriousness of Just to give the prisoner the benefit of the 
''The requirement of a certlfica.te of prob- the PoSSible penalty and the unique and interim change In the law.". 
able cause In order to appeal from the dis- complex nature of the litigation. 
5'clilll 
~ Y-SIOECX>MP~ OF ~ ~ 
'B!il llill -llill 
2756(,l- 1llis Slllidllla" ISlillfi3iles .. ..,cicx1II prinlalt 1ar f«!l:al 11a1as cases illlol'lilg Stal! capital offfflde!s___ s-. 
2256(b - 1lis Pl~ OIOly I lit Sl.aa II ~ the dilfl1llalll is onicled _. qaaiflld CDaali ii Sane, 11111 tllt 1111q.oilemellt II~ counSl!f lllllfies • trial 1111 far crinri !'MW• Ml. 111d Ille smlsds 
Sim ~ Ill qiiatifatioo n ~ npiicit in Ste. 2261. 
2756!3_ '1111ft alSI II! a P1tmn lo-~ CXlnl « ~ 1llr. h ll!lelldalll Im wlMd c:oumif __ S-. ace;,! Ille padre f« dettnninina ~er.ey tll cive aul1II n lllde c,iplicit. ?256 - O:vl3li ~ * Pl)5KDIMC1JOn - sllal A0t bf tlle samr IS !rial Clllllsel---,-,.,-,--- S-. 2256 f --~ Ii C... it Sla1f « ftdlfal ~ ~ sla!! aot be I arlU1d IQ.' racf ill flds1I hllJus Snf. 
pnaetjr,as. . 
t257(a! -- £Mc.'!iln nil sllll be st3)'!d i Ille Slat? llas cflose, ID follow !lie pmadi.m it ll!i.l ~---- Sane. 
22S7(b _ n. Ila, II alCltiall eqlira~-: I) 111! dellAdaRt flil! Ill CIIITiply with Ille lime requnllltlltS; (2) Ille ftdlral s.iit. . · 
laasll!'Jticllisil!ni!d:«(3 llledelesmlrtwaimfederJ!lra!ltll pllX,l!8dilp. · 
22S1(c)_ ID ,aesliot ftllnl ll3las ·.· tlllless: (I) Ille claim - -,t ~ ill!Selll!d: (2) flil:.w ID raise Thft 111 !Int a11naM lll'tl:1ds fir 1:1ooirins 1 SCZSM pr.tiolt (I) I 111d 2 M 1111 ,-_Id; • (2) 3 
lit dliri lit Im! Ill e Jt1DI, - IN. « - 11!:ts lllit CN! 1111111M Im! IDlMl'ld prM0USly; flam 1111 l"MII ti;Ji; « (3) tlat review is llolCess.y tll Mid I nisQmap al jlsta. 
aid (3)tlf caiR ~fx1ual-
125! __ ~ lldilm • ail'ial!r1i reww ID be filla! ii 6 ffllllltl!s---,---------- Rlqiirt pelllions tar C111a1r11 !MW ID Ill fiW willill 12 m6s.. 
2258(1!- JIit time pnd is ~ mHi18 Cll1ini rMW ol I linld ~ - - - - - -,---,- -.,,-- $llrlt. 
22S8(b - 1lil lime ,nd is lllkl GR& Sta CIIIIJla 1MW.. ~ nat iad..1iac crilrai l'IWilw II ad Clllllld tlll 1iM periad is IDhd lbq $1Jle CD5MII l'MW. il::Mq crinri MW ti MIi ~ reww. -· ffll(c)_ lllr cm1 is~ ID aflM! Ille !ifflr 1lr lilac ftda3I baws t,,, go dlys far pld CMI- ---- 1llf 11111rt Is penni!l8I ID ll1end Ille n tar 1ii11i federal 11abeas 11r 90 days t.- a,l0d Q\Jlt. 2259(1) - TIie FtdlrJi lllllt2s a,,,rt may rtflllf 'If. CIIIISider I daim IIOI rm ill State CIWr1 Ullle::: Ille dmlll - dllt 11> n.. ~ --- aiurt ~ consm ,ny dailll. as hl«f~ Z259(c) ...,__ 
(I ) stall 1CUJ11; (2) - law;« (3) - fa:ts llla1 axAd 110C ilM beea dilaMfld prwiously .• ·---.·-- ·· S-
ffl9(bl- lllr cm1_ .. ,.. Ille Nits ft CIXllpldiaa ". ~ ran! . s.. U59(t - lill .. ..,,.... ______________________ llle Federal flalas CIJllt Ny 1M ID CllllSder a daiffl 110! rad in Sia 1111111. 11111 iuy not !'!!ft reww 
wl8' Ille default - M ID ip,rancz « -,tad. • l Ill failurt ID _. a dlll would IIMI ill a 
mo __ 01rt."tales t1 p1111a111t cam n • .-i • ~ r1 r.1!!11 a,t.s _ ________ s-flli7a:rilct • jllStica. 
ffi) __ 11D . ~ fir ~ rJ CIIIIIIS!f: TIie st3adatds II! Ille 1111W IS tllOlf eNdld ii tllt 1988 chg bil fur 
du" peuJty Cl3e$ (21 u.s.c. W (ql(4)), pap lllal CIIIIISII a Clll3leAI - would Ill ciffeent fivrn 
.262-- IID . . n.till:lllbm C11i11 tllllll ddenni:I!, • Ille basis II a b11anc:i1e lat, widller e!1J111!5 II Ille law MIUld 
- mrlllCIMlt ID iDes raised llalS cases. 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I 
commend the distinguished Senator 
from Delaware for h1s interest 1n 
habeas corpus matters. We had a hear-
ing a couple of '111eek.s ago in which the 
distinguished chairman presided. We 
had a lady there whose face had been 
disfigured. A defendant killed three 
people and he tried to kill her and 
thought he killed her and he left her 
for dead. Anyway. she was able to 
come to testify. 
This defendant was tried and con-
victed 10 years ago, and he was sen-
tenced to the electric chair. And he 
has had his fourth a~ &.l to th!LSu-
preme Court o1 lne O d States. His 
foU'ftfi appeal is pending now. 
This is utterly ridiculous. It brings 
the crtminal justice system in disre-
pute and we must take steps to pass a 
habeas corpus bill that remedies this 
situation. 
I am glad the distinguished Senator 
has introduced a bill on this subject 
and I shall introduce the recommenda-
tion of the Powell committee. We will 
have those two bills before the com-
mittee. I have already introduced a bill 
now before the committee, which I 
think is a good bilL But we wlll have 
all three there as we consider the 
.·, ... 
• • .J. •: ·.-: !/ 
------------------·-
SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF POWELL AND BIDEN SILLS 
Sdll Powell biK 8icellbill 
Z256(1) ___ TJl!s llbcllailllr ~ • optbw proeain flt ftdenl halleas ases lnvcMng Sule capil3t ottenden. ............. Sm.e. . . . . . . . . ......... ,. 
2256(b) - Tlis ir~able GIiiy ti lbt SUit Ill whldl the 11,Jfmnt is COt'Mcioo ~nu qcuifled counsel in Slme but the 1'q)\/tment of q~lifi~ coon!;tl apph~ at trill ml 101 Ctrtior1n rt...ew is wta. ffil thc .... ...,,.,, 
Stale · paeaaes, of ·qualific.atior, are made explici1 in SE(. 2261. . Z2S6i~- ll8' !Ml Ill I Jllmft for ~llni toon$II ct ntali:llloa thit lhe ~e~t has w1i't\'d COIJ~--·· ........ Same. ~t the pc~ures IOI determining comp;!ler.c)' to w.ir..e O)i.lr,sel m rnade c:pficit. m~ - ~ .aql0ila\l"' ~ l!\'leW w1 oo1 be the ~mt u trial a>UltSel.-....... _ .. _ ___ . Same. 
.....,,. t - lleHdtleim J COiia ii sin. or ftdltal baas ~ SNJI oot be 1 &rOIJlld 101 rifiel In federal hibeu Saine. 
Z257 (1) - ~ WI be ~ If tllt SUie has cll0Sell ID follow the proc\'dures m this ~!tr·- ·-··· .. ··· ... Same . 
2Z51(b) _ n, JU/ d DOalti0I ~~: I) the del«ldali fails lo aim~ with the time requ~emtnU; (Z) the federal SJme. 
llaas Pllitlaa II denied; er (3 lllt deltn:lalrt w.iiva Federal halJeas trocmngi. 
ZZS7(cl--. 11o S1C:C1SSiwe F«lnl lllbm · · UAlm: (I) them -w not pceviouslv presented: (2) f1ilure to raise Theft'" lhree altlsmlivqround3 for 3!low'on& 1 succm,-.-e petition: (I) I ,id 2 from the rowen bl; 0/ iZl 3 
111t c1M 1111 rm! Ill actioll1 new law, or 11N Ir.ls that toold oot 'hive been disc:ovtred imious!Y; from the ~ell bill; or (3) that review is ~sary lo ;ivoid I miscarriait " justx:i. 
n1 ,~ aa111 suuem 1actuat IDOO::l!IU . ill:-.- . . ter aillafir3I !MW lo be filled 111 & montlls ......... .... - ... ·····--·· ···-.. - ·.-·.-·- ReQUltt petitions for coUateul review to be IM Ylithin 12 mooths. 
mam = ~; =•.'tLt~ =: ~:,r~f°'lnd~& .. ~¥i"rri~ .. i ·Rdl--aiitjieiii .. rhemetime ~iod is toVed durin& State co!l.rterlf rr.-.ew. lncfud'IO& certklrtri ~ ol sud! ccr.atcril rt,-iew. ...... 
22Sl(c). __ Tlw cNt Is pnitll4 ID IIMI Ille tine fer fiiA& ftdera 11abu$ 17r' 60 daY$ 101 &000 cause ........... _ __ The too1 Is permitted lo ex1end lhe time for mini ~ral habels l1f 90 aiys ~ e,xxl cause. 
2259(1) - Tbe Ftdlral llabas ®1 INY retus, to caisider a cwa nol 11ised ill Slalt C0(.l!1 unles3 tie dehult was ckJl lc,; n .. s:..\><N ilabw coo,t 11111 consider 1ny ellim. ll 1iln.1t.'d t,y 2259(t) betoo#. 
(1) state~ (2) • w. or (3) - facb thit c:ou1d nol hM betft disw,oered f)IM)USly . ................. .. Same. 
Irn\bj ·-- t ~. ll!al ,. 111 1111 111erits atw CIXlll)ltooa o/ 111 Mlentwy reco.-d .... -... - ..... _ ... _ ....... _ ....... : ... _ ... Same. 
c •- llltMSPI-----------·- ···· ... - ........................................................................ The Feder.ii hat.us court NY rmise lo C011 r.der I daim no! rJised In Stile a,urt. bu1 may not rtfo.<:e. r!'lit# 
. Ywtiere the default wi.i due to i&nor,ra a ncaloct. a if Ille b~un lo COASl<lel' 1 cblm -.iuld f!SU!t in 1 
Z260 Clr1ifala cl -w.i. CIIISI . , misc.arriage ol )U$tice. , 
nil-. - No . . ..- n ilol NQllired lor ~ o/ federal ~i:ea.1.. .. . - .................................................... Same. . . . . 
• ·-- pror,,a _______ ...... . . _ ......... - - ...... _ ...... _ ............... .............. ·- ···-·· .. •·• .. •·•··· .. Standards fa aP()llntment of coon~: The stanoard$ ,re the 31m, n !t(l(,t tNcit:I In !hi 1988 CJl!g bill for 
dealb penalty casu (21 U.S.C. 848(q)(•)), IXU'!ll tNt c:wu.l for colbte111 review wMl be ~fe1en1 horn 
2262 No · · · . trial toons-.1. . . . 
- - -·- · ~ 1-----·--····· · · ······ · .. ••• • ..... . ............... ... . ............ .. ......... . ....... - •• - •••••••• _ .... The Fede,11 habeas axlrt could detcimme. 011 the bask ol , bl\aocr,1 1tsl. whether dlan&es III I/It ~• -..wld 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I 
commend the distinguished Senator 
from Delaware for his interest in 
habeas corpus matters. We had a hear-
ing a couple of weeks a.go in which the 
distinguished chairman presided. · We 
had a lady there whose !ace had been · 
disfigured. A · def end&nt k.llled three 
people and he tried to kill her and 
thought he killed her and he left her 
apply retroactil'ely lo &ues rii$ed ~bcu CJscs. 
!or dead. Anyway, she was able to habeas corpus bill that remedies this 
come to testify. · ·• situation. 
This def end ant was tried and con- I run glad the distinguished Senator 
victed 10 years ago, and he was sen• has introduced a bill on this subject 
tenced to the electric chair. And he and I shall lntroduce the recommenda• 
has had his fourth appeal to the Su• tion of the Powell committee. We will 
preme Court o! the United States. His have those two bills before the com• 
fourth appeal is pending now. mittee. I have already introduced a bill 
This is utterly ridiculous. It brings now be! ore the committee, which I 
the criminal justice system in disre• think is a good bill. But we will have 
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1natter and try to ret the best out of stifle creative community pro- ordinators wW meet on an interagen 
all three. · and dlscourare enthusiastic committee to share information. 
. I do think this ls Important. I hope volunteers-in short, endanrer The Office for Small Gove nt 
the .Members of the Senate wW act an undercut the very policies devised AdvOC2Cy wW also have the bene t of 
promptly on this measure and not and romoted at the Federal level advice from a council created b the 
delay it. It needs to be passed. Some of In 980, Congress passed the Regul~ bill that wW be comprised of tside 
these defendants have rone to the Su• tory exlbWty Act-RFA-to ensure experts; many of these expe wW be 
preme Court over and over again; al· that t aort of uneven re£U}atory acting local officials. 
though the St&te courts have settled burden...,,,,uc,n,. would not occur. The Another component of 
the matters many years ago. RFA app ·ea to virtually every Federal Governments Regulatory 
I look forward to working with the regulation Briefly, the RFA mandates Act consists of amendm 
distinguished chaJ.rman on this lmpor- that when Federal agency wuea a RFA itself. For example, 
tant subject. reau}atfon, t must certify whether the fies that the Regulato FlexlbWty 
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I say to regulation affect "small entl- Act applies to small vernment& u 
the Senator that be has been call1nc tles"-amall b messes and small cov- well u to small bus.lll(!ssea. Also, the. 
for this reform for some years now. I ernmenta. And, the agency must pro- bfil makes It more ficult for a.gen. 
hope lie will have an opportunity to pose altematlv regulations which cfea to exercise ao e of the RFA's 
look closely at the proposal I have would achieve tti"e -same purpose but waiver provisions; f instance the leg-
made. Nonetheles.,, however It works place less burden on small entitles. lslatlon requires t t agencies back up, 
out, I look forward to working with Last Congress trl· a hearing before with some evide ce and citation of 
him and I am sure we will be able to the Governmental fairs Committee, data sources, c that a proposed 
resolve It. witnesses testlfled tha the Regulatory regulatlon will ve no m effects on 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, 1 FlexibWty Act ls not w rk.lng for small small entltles. 
feel sure we will be able to bring 1n a governments. Nine ye ago, the Na- Finally, t Small Governments 
sood blll. We have the one my col• tlonal Science Found& on reported Regulatory nership Act addresses 
leagues Introduced and the one I Intro- that local governments\ dealt with the proble of Inadequate data on 
duced and, for the record, the recom- more than 1000 Fede~\ and State small gov ents. It requires agen-
mendatlons of the Powell committee. mandates ann'ua11y; our wit:r told ctes to standard measures when 
We will try to take them all and get us that during the •1980.s t number -6~"""'- the effect of regulations on 
the best of all three and bring it to the has lnci-eased dramatically vernmenta. It also mandates 
Senate. The committee found three artlcu- encies collect these data using 
I thank the cha1rman again for his · 1&r weaknesses in the act. Firaf., the unifo procedures. These provisions 
Interest in this matter. It 1s very Im- RFA assigns responsibWty for 1~ en- sbo d make It easier for different of-
portant to the welfare of this country forcement to the Small Business A1vo- fl within one agency to share such and to promote the cr1mlnal Justice cate who Is part of the Small Bus~ and for the Federal Government 
system. -- Adntlnistratlon. The Advocate ls Ull· a whole to track Its regulatory 
By Mr. GLENN (for himself, Mr. derstandably more interested in co~ curate\;n small governments more ac-
LEvnl, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. HEINZ. vlnclng Federal agencies to apply th In brlef the Small Government.,; 
Mr. Kom.. Mr. SASSER. and Mr. RFA to small businesses than ~els •gulatory Partnership Act can make 
RUDKAK): convincing them to apply it to e RFA work for local governments. 
. 1'158. A bill to provide for the es- governments. Second, the RF s It will force those of us in Washington 
:hment of an Office for Small waiver provisions allow Federal • n• to \face the fact that we do indeed op-
=ent Advocacy, and for other cies to bypass some of the act re- er&t.e in a federal system. And, It will p , to the Committee on Gov- qu!rements without adequate e force_ us to be cognizant of the effects emm tal Affairs. tlon. And third, in attempt that \>ur legislation and regulations comply with the RFA, many eral have ~ur Nation's small communi• PAHJrDSHIP •er agencies do not have access reliable ties. 
• Mr. ~- Mr. President, I rise or complete data to analyze t e effects Local vernments have always been 
today ~-tx,>.f.r?duce the Small Govern- of th~lr proposed regulatlo on small our partners-but too often our silent 
ments Re~tory Partnership Act. governments. partners. ~d as silent partners, they 
Small gove"?Inents are at the core of The bill I am now intr uclng, the have often tuffered. It la my sincere 
the Amert~ federalist system-yet Small Government& Re tory Part- hope that \he Small Governments 
we 1n the ~era! Government often nership Act, addresses h of these Regulatory nership Act will pro-
forget them, ~d them, or under- Issues. To Improve enf cement of the vtde local gov nta with the clear 
estimate the role and effect of them. RFA for small gove ent&. the bill convinctnc vol they deserve-and 
Small govertUll~nts provide most of establishes an Offi for Small Gov- that all of us wh care about effective 
our citizens with ~elr first and most ernment Advocacy the Office of Federal Gove nt want them to 
consistent contact with participatory Management and Budget. The bill have. 
democracy. Many ericans live In vests this Office h powers slmllar to Mr President, 1 . 
towns, townships. an vlllages primart- those of the Off of the Small Busl- sent · that the bill 
ly administered by v lunteers. These ness Advocate. e Office for Small · RzcollD 
are the communities where everyone Government dvocacy will monitor The~ being no obj 
pitches 1n to rovern, and the quality of Federal a.gen compliance with the was ordered to be p 
rovemment serTlce pro:!ed Is made Regulatory cxlbtllty Act, and track Rzcou as follows: 
better because of It. the regula burden Imposed by the ' 8. 1751 Local governments fo the base Federal emment on small commu- Be u ta ~ the s t.e 
upon which the success ot, our most nltlea. ~wa of the ~n« Stata of 
vital national programs res . We 1n The O flee for Small Government .tmerica 111 Congre.u cu.tembled. That this 
Washington entrust local fflcials Adv will be aided by Small Oov- Act may be cited u the " Govern• 
throughout the country "'1th e Im- emme t Coordinators, which the bill menta Reculatocy Partnerahlp Act f 1989". 
plementatlon of Federal plans safe- estab hes In each of the maJor rule- Tn'LE 1-ESTABLISIDIENT OF mE FnCE 
guard our citizens• environment, heir m agencies. These Coordinators FOR SMALL GOVERNMENT ADV CY 
health, and their livelihood. will atch their own agencies' actions All,'D SMALL GOVERNMENT coo 
It ls P<>Mible, however, that the · un er the Regulatory Flexiblllty Act TORS 
eral Government can ask too much f d provide support and data to the &EC 101. 0EnN1noNs. 
local government.a. Placing large re • mce for Small Government Advoca- For purposes of this Act-
Iatory burdens on small govemmen y. At least two times a year, these Co- <1> the term "small rovemment" means 
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Mrs. Hatzlpetrou Is a 50 year o 
Greet national. She has a U!e-t.hr 
en.Inc cue of cervical cancer an<Y 1n 
· · need of U.S. medical treatment. 
She first came to the United a.tes 
for medica.1 treatment tn 19 . She 
then returned to Greece w re her 
treatment results were less an aatfs-
factory. CwTenUy, she ~etvtng 
medJ.cal treatment at the ersfty of 
Pennsylvania Medical nter where 
lier doctors feel ahe stay for opti-
mal medical care. Haw r, the lmml-
sratlon and Na.t tion Service has 
atven her until Octo 25 to return to 
Greece. This Is her extension. 
1lan7 on Capt l Hill have tnown 
Mrs. Hatzf •• sister, Ms. Ltr1a 
Vouzlku u owner of the Senate 
Hair Salon 1 number of years. She, 
alone with e rest of Mrs. Hatzfpe-
trou•• slb now reside 1n the 
United S Only her parents. a.ged 
19 and 7 sWl reside 1n Greece. Her 
f:u:nlly suffered one tragedy a.ft.er 
anoth , with a serfously ill brother 
and e recent loss of a niece. Now, as 
the y strunles with Amalia Hat--
zl u'a health problems, they are 
f ~ to permit her to stay with 
em 1n the United States to receive 
he treatment she n - -
s. \J.'180 A hi]L te amend tftle 28, 
United States Code. to provide special 
habeas corpus procedures in capital 
eases; to the O>mmittee on the JucUci-
ary. 
ft0\'I$10ll OP SPtlClAL HABEAS COKJ"tJS 
ftOCZDUU:S DI CAPITAL CADS 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I 
rise today to Introduce the legislative 
recommendations of the Ad Hoc Com• 
mittee on Federal Habeas Corpus 1n 
Capital Cases chaired by former Asso-
c:fa.te Supreme Court .Justice Lewis 
Powell This committee, commonly re-
ferred to as the Powell committee, was 
formed by the Chief Justice Willlam 
Rehnquist In J'une of lPSa. The Powell 
committee was charged with inquiring 
Into the '"necessity and dlsira.billty of 
lecfslation directed toward avoiding 
delay and the l&c.k of finallty" fn cap. 
Ital caseJS In which the prisoner had or 
had not been offered counsel Pursu-
ant to the Chief Justice's request, the 
Powell comm.Jttee has made ita recom-
mendations and bas proposed a legisla-
tive remedy to the problem of habeas 
corpua review fn ca.pit.al cases. I& la 
these recommendations I introduce 
toda.Y-
This N&tlon Is facin&" a cr1sls In lta 
criminal Justice system. Federal 
babeu corpus and collateral attack 
procedures are In dire need of reform. 
Thia la evidenced by the glut of habeas 
· petftJons In the Federal system. The 
wee increases tn the number of 
habeu corpus ffllngs, many of which 
are frivolous and used as a delaying 
tactic. require that leglslation be en-
acted to address this problem. 
Habeas petitions have grov.'D by vast 
numbens in recent years. Last year. 
Federal district courts received an tn-
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credible 9.880 habeas peUtfons. The 
problem of these numerous filings Js 
compounded by the extraordinary 
delay 1n habeaa corpus fllings. The 
result Is a crim1nal Just.ioe aystem 
which la overburdened with piecemeal 
and repeUUous llti&aUon and years of 
delay between aentencing and a final 
Jud1c1al resolution of the cr1m1nal 
matter. 
-Mr. President. oo August 3 of th!& 
yea.r I took the noor and made a state-
ment regarding the need for habeas 
c.orpus reform. ID that statement I dis-
cussed a particular case whJch exem-
pllnea the problem of habea5 corpus 
abuse. ID February of 1979. Ronald 
Wommer went on an 8-hour crime 
spree in South Carollna. By the time 
be was finlshed. tour people were mur-
dered. Woomer. who has never dlsput-
. ed h1s aunt. was c.onvicted of murder 
and sentenced to death that summer. 
He was first sentenced on .July 18. 
1979-over 10 years ago-to die in the 
electric chair. He Is still on South 
C&roUna'a death row. The Woomer 
case Is a prime example of the ob6truo-
tfon of Justice and Inordinate delay 
surround.in&" these habeas corpus 
cases. 
On the first day of th.ls Congr~ I 
Introduced legisl.a.tlon, as I have since 
the 97th Congress, whlch would appro-
priately address this problem. My bill. 
S. 88, Is a much broader bW than the 
leglsl.atlon I am Introducing today as it 
applles to &11 cr1m.inal cases. not Just 
capital offenses. 
Pursuant to law. Senator Bmm in-
troduced legislation which embodies a 
modified version of the Powell recom-
mendations. Yet, since the Powell 
committee spent a si.gnificant Ume for-
mulating it.a recororneodaUons &Dd the 
Chief Justice has expressed a belief 
that the need for strong habeaa 
reform Is urgently needed, I believe 
there should be a Senate vehicle 
which fully embodies the .Powell com-
mittee recommendations. As the .Jud!-
c1a.ry Committee prepares to hold 
hea.rtnas on habeas corpus reform. I 
loot forward to worldne with Senator 
BIDElf on S. 88 and the bills we intro-
duce today 1n an effort to fonnula.te 
the best leg!slaUve aolutfon. · 
Mr. President. lt la appropriate that 
the Powell committee reoommen&t.-
tlons be before the Senate for consld-
era.Uon. This legislation I am introduo-
lna today proposes new atatutory pro-
cedures for Federal babeu corpus 
review of capital sentences. . The 
Powell committee proposal ls aimed at 
achfevlne' the following goat Capital 
cues ahould be subject to one com-
plete and fair cour&e of collateral 
review in the State and Federal 
system, free from the tJme of impend-
ln& execution. and with the assistance 
of c.ompetent counael for the defend-
ant. Once th.ls appropriate. fair review 
Is completed. the · criminal process 
should be brought to a conclusion. 
Thts proposal allows a State to brfns 
capital litigation by !ta . prisoners 
within the new statute by prov1d.1Dc 
competent counsel for Jnmates on 
-State collateral -review. Participation 
tn the new prooedurea Js optional with 
the Stat.es. Th.ls lea:tslat!on also pro-
vides for a 6-month -period wtthfn 
which a Federal habeas petition must 
be filed. This &-month period begins to 
nm on the appointment of counsel for 
the prisoner and ii tolled during the 
pendeney of all State court proceed-
lnp. In addition. thla •eci•J•Uon pro-
vides for an automatic aay of execu-
tion. which ii to remain tn place unW 
Federal habeu proceedlnp are com-
pleted. Th1B provision emmes that 
habeas c1afms not be considered by a 
court under the time pressure of an 
1mpending execution. · 
In mmmary, th.ls propoal ba1anees 
the need for ftnal1tJ tn death penalty 
cases with the requirement that a de-
fendant have a fair examination of his 
claims. Therefore. U the conviction 
and sentence are found to be appropri-
ate, Judicial proceedlnp wtll be at an 
end, absent any exceptional develop. 
menta In the defendants ease. 
In closing, we cannot continue to 
delay action on legislation to correct 
the growing problem In habeas COll)US 
cases. Criminal ·cases must be brought 
to a close. Endless consideration of 
ls&les that have no merit tn cr1m1na1 
cases and are med only for purposes of 
delay must be ellminated from our Ju• 
dielal system. The prtnclples of Justice, 
upon which our cr1m1nal system ts 
based, demands that we t.u e action to 
address the habeas problem. 
For these reasons I UJTe my col-
leagues to ca.ref-ally consider this 
measure. 
Mr. President, I ask unanfmous con- I 
sent that the full text of the blli and a 
copy of the Powell comm.Jttee report 
be printed In the Ri:coJU> immediately 
following my rema.rta. 
There being no obJectfon. the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed fn t.1ile 
RECORD, as follows: to\1111,1,.1- 'rRo rt~L 
aJ...,/hrc,. S.1700 - ==-
Be U en.acted by IN SeM.u au Hau« Qf 
Rcpruentaii,u Qf the UAUcd Stata 0/ Affln• 
Ccc in Congreu cw~ 
SPICIAL BABl:&I OOJlPVS ftloc:DalS Df 
CAPITAL e&aD 
<a> TiUe 28. United States Code. ts amend-
ed by Insert.Ina t.be followtns new chapUr 
lmmedl&tely followina chapter 153: 
.. CHAPTER lM-SPECIAL BA.BEAS 
OORPUS PROCEDURES IN CAPITAL 
CASES 
.. Sec. 
"2251. Prlsonen Jn Stat.e custody subject to 
c:apltaJ eentence; appointment 
of counael; requirement of rule 
of court or sttute.; procedures 
for appointment.. 
'"225'7. Mandatorr stay of execuUon; dura• 
tton; limit. on stays of execu-
tion; successive petitions. 
'"2258. PWnc of habeas corpus pet!Uon: tfme 
requirement&; tonm. rulea. 
'"2259. Evldentl&I')' bearlnp; 1COpe of Peder-
al review; dJstrlct court ldjudl-
cat.lcm. 
'"22&0. eertmca.te of probable cause 1n&ppU-
c:able. 
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112m Prlnaen ta State cu1tocl7 aubject to cap-
Ital MMeaN; appointment or coanHI; require-
. -nt el nle .t court or ltatute; procedure. ror 
· appoint-' 
"<a> ThJs chapter shall apply to cases aria-
~ under eec:Uon 2254 of this title broU1ht 
by prtsonen In State custody who are sub-
ject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only 
If subsectJom <b> and <c> are satisfied. 
"<b> TbJa chapter la applicable if a State 
establlsbf:11 by rule of lta court of last resort 
or by statuu a mechanism for the appoint-
ment. compenaat.ton, and payment of rea-
aonable lftlpUon expensea of competent 
counsel In St.au post-convicUon proceedinp 
broUiht bJ lndi&ent prlaonen whose capital 
convict!om and sentences have been upheld 
on direct appesI to the court of 1ut resort 
In the State to have otherwise become final 
for State law purposes. The rule of court or 
statute must provide standards of compe-
tency for the appointment of such counsel. 
"<c> ADY u,ecbaolsrn for the appointment, 
compensation, and reimbursement of coun-
eel as pl"O\'lded In subsection <b> must offer 
counsel to all State prtsonen under capital 
sentence and must provide for the entry of 
an order by a court of record-
"<U appolntlnc one or more counsel to 
represent the prisoner upon a find.Ina that 
the prtaoner-
"<A> II lndicent and has accepted the 
offer: or 
"(B) II unable competenUy to decide 
whether to accept or reject the offer; 
"<2> flndlna. after a hea.rinc, if necessary, 
that the prisoner has rejected the offer of 
counsel and made the decision with an un-
derstandlni of Its legal con.sequences; or 
"<3> ~ the appointment of counsel 
upon a flndlna that the prisoner Is not lndi-
aenL 
.. <d> No counsel appointed pursuant to 
aubsect.Jom <b> and <c> to represtot a State 
"<A> the time for flltnr a petition for certi-
orari hu expired and no petition bu been 
filed; 
"<B> a timely petition· for certiorari wu 
filed and the Supreme Court denied the pe-
tition; or 
"<C> a timely petition for certiorari wu 
filed and upon ~nalderatlon of the cue, the 
Supreme Court d1si,o&ed of It In a manner 
that left the capital sentence undisturbed; 
or 
---.. <S> before a court of competent Jurladlc-
tJon, a State prisoner under capital sentence 
1n.ivea the rtaht to pursue babeaa corpus 
rerie,r under Section 2254 of thJ& title, In 
the presence of counsel and after havlns 
been advl&ed of the consequences of maklna 
thewalver. 
.. <c> U one of the conditions In subsection 
(b> bu occurred, no Pederal court thereaf-
ter ahall have the authority to enter a stay 
of execution or rrant relief In a capital cue 
unleaa- . . 
"<Uthe basis for the st.a)' and request for 
relief la a claim not previously presented In 
the State or Federal courts; 
.. <2> the failure to raise the clalm-
.. <A> was the result of State action In vio-
lation of the Conatltutlon or lawa of the 
United State&; 
"<B> was the result of a recornltion by the 
Supreme Court of a new Federal rlaht that 
la retroactively applicable; or 
.. <C> la due to the fact that the claim la 
based on fact.a that could not have been dis-
covered through the exercise of reasonable dlllgence In time to prevent the claim for 
State or Federal post-conviction review; and 
"<3> the facts underlying the claim would 
be sufficient, If proven. to undermine the 
court'& confidence In the Jury's determina-
tion of aullt on the offense or offenses for 
which the death penalt)' WU Imposed. 
prlaoner under capital sentence &ball have .., %258. Yalinr of habeu eorpas petitloa; ti- re-
prerioualJ represented the prisoner nt trial cwraneata; tolliq Niel 
or on direct aPQeal In the case for which the .. <a> Any petition for habeaa corpus relief 
appointment Js made unlesa the prisoner under section 2254 of this title must be filed 
and counsel expressly request continued In the appropriate district court not later 
representation. · than 180 days after the fllJ.nf In the appro-
<e> The lneffectlvenea or Incompetence prlate State court of record of an order 
of counsel durtnc State or Federal collateral issued In compliance with aectlon 2256cc) of 
post-conviction proceedings In a capital case thla title. The time requJrements est&b-
ahall not be a cround fqr relief In a proceed- llshed by tbJs section shall be tolled-
Ina arlslnr under this chapter or section "(U from the date that a petition forcer-
2254 of Um tttle.. This subsection shall not tlorvi I& filed In the Supreme Court until 
preclude &be appointment of different coun- the date of final disposltlon of the petition 
sel at &DJ phase of State or Federal post- 1f • State prisoner aeeu review of a capital 
con,1ctJoo Prncwdlnp sentence that has been affirmed on direct 
•12%51. • a'lda&ory 1ta1 or a:entlon: duration; appeal by the court of lut resort of the 
Umita • lta.TI of aeaitJon; nCCH1ITe ,etl· State or has otherwi&e become fJD&l for 
doM State~wpurpoaea; 
.. <a> UPoD the entry In the appropriate "<2> subject to subsection <b>, durlos any 
State Court of record of an order pursuant period In which a State prisoner under cap-
to section 2256<c> of thta UUe, a warrant or ital sentence has a properly filed request for 
order aettfnc an execution date for a State ~nvicUon review pen~ before a 
prisoner aba1l be stayed upon application of St.ate court of competent jurladictJon; and 
any court that would have Jurladictlon over "<J> durlns an additional period ~ to 
any Proceedino filed pursuant to section aceed ,o dQa. U counsel for the St.ate pzv. 
2254 of th1a title. The application must cmer-
rectte t.b&t the State bu Invoked the pc,si. "<A> DlOftS for an extension of time In the 
convicUon review procedures of thla chapter Federal dlatrlct court that would have Jwv-
and that the scheduled execution la subject diction over the cue uPOn the flllnl of • 
to stay. habeas corpus petition under aectlon 2254 of 
"(b) A at&)' of execution granted pursuant thJ& UUe; and 
to subsectfon <•> shall expire U- "<B> mat.ea a ahowtn. of rood cause for 
.. <1> a State prisoner falls to file a habeas counsel's Inability to file the habeu corpua 
corpus petition under section 2254 of this petition wlth!n the 180-day period estab-
tlUe within the time required In section llahed by thla sect.Ion. 
2258 of t.hla UUe; or . ..<b><l> The time requirement establlahNf 
1 "<2> upon completion of district court and by sub&ectlon <a> ahall be contlnuoU&ly 
court ol appeals re,1ew under section 2254 tolled under p&ragn,pb <2> of that subsec-
of thi& Utle. the petition for relief la denied tlon from the date the State prisoner tnJtlal-
and- ly filea for post-conviction review until the 
"<A> the time for filing a petition for certl- date of final disposition of the case by the 
orarl bu expired and no petition ha.s been highest court of the State 10 lonr u all 
filed. the petition for refllef la denied and- State filing rules are timely meL 
"(2) Tolltna ahall not occur under subsec-
tion <a><2> durtnr the pendency of a petition 
for certiorari before the Supreme Court fol-
lov.1nr State post-conviction review. 
-e UH. ET&dentlary hearinp; 1COpe or Federal 
ftYiew; cliltdct eourt acijucllcatlon 
"<a> When a State prisoner under a cap-
Ital sentence files a petition for habeas 
corpus relief to which thla chapter applies. 
the district court shall-
.. < U determine the wfflcleney of the evt-
dentlar1 record for habeu corpus review 
bued on the cla1ms actually preaented and 
Utlpted In the State courts, unless the pris-
oner ahon that the failure to raise or devel-
oP a claim In the State courta-
.. <A> wu the result of State action In vio-
lation of the Constitution or law of the 
Unlted Stat.ea; 
· "<B> was the result of a reootrnltlon bJ the 
Supreme Court of a new Pederal rlrht that 
la tttroactlvely applicable; or 
"<C> ta due to the fact that the claim ta 
baaed on facts that could not have been dis-
covered throUih the execlae of reasonable 
diligence In time to present the claim for 
State post-conviction review; and 
"<2> conduct any requested evldentlary 
bearing necessary to complete the record 
for habeas corpus review. 
"(b) Upon the development of a complete 
evfdenttary record. the district court ahall 
rule on the merlta of the c1a1ma properl1 
before IL 
•1 Z%'4. Cert.llkate ol probable came blappllcule 
-nie requirement of a certificate of prob-
able cause In order to appeal from the dis-
trict court to the court of appeals does not 
applJ to habeas corpus cases subject to this 
chapter except when a aecond or successlve 
petition la filed.". 
Svnaa: Cot11tT or Tm UMITED STAn:s, 
Wcuhtngton, DC. September ZZ. 1119. 
Bon.JOSEPH R. Bmu, Ja.. 
Ch4tTffl4,i. Sen4U Jiulictarw Commtttu. 
U.S. Sffla.te., Wcuhtngton, DC. 
Dua ML CKADULUr. I forward herewith 
the report and proposal received by the Ju-
dicial Conference of the Unlted States on 
September 20, 1989, from lta Ad Boe Com-
mittee on Federal Habeas Corpus In Capital 
Cues. The Ad Boe Committee, chaired by 
Justice Lewis F. Powell. Jr., baa riven care-
ful consJderation to thJ& subject over the 
past year. 
In receMoa tbJa report, the Judicl&l Con-
ference determined to dlscharre Justice 
Powell'• committee, to make the report pub-
licly avallable, and to defer any further con-
sideration of the report unW Its next meet-
tnr. &cbeduled for l4arcb 13, 1990. I &ball 
advise you at that time u to any additional 
action the Conference mlrht take with re-
spect to the reporL 
Siocerl7. 
Wn.t.IAX II. RDiliQt7IST. 
(~~ mx,rt and proposal from the ~ 
-;JucTlciirConfefebce of the United States 
JMl....h<!!L CQmm1t.t.ee OD Federal BabeaaC.,,i,,t. 
~~Jtal Cues, AUi, 23, 19891 ~
AD Boe ColO(ITTD 01' FEDERAL ILUIUI 
Coart1a IJf CAPITAL CUES ColOUTTD 
luPon ~ · 
L DffllOJ>t7CTI01' 
Studies of public optnJon establish that 
an overwhelmina m,Jorlty of our cltluna 
favors the death penalty for certain mur-
den. The Supreme Court has made dear 
that the evolvlnr standards of decencJ em-
bodied In the Ei&hth Amendment permit 
Imposition of this punlshlment for aome of-
fenders. Of course, both the Court and IOcl-
ety have recornJzed that, because It la lrre-
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fttalble.. death la a unique punWunenL Thia The ellistln& 1151,em also fosters piecemeal often apr;,olntment of quallfled CO\UlSel only 
. reallzaUoII demands ateauard,a to ensure L'ld repetftfve UtJptlon ol c1&1m&. Because when au execution ii Imminent. But at this 
that capital punishment la admlnlstered ree Judlcata Is Inapplicable to federal habeas sta,e, aerious eonatlt.ut.lonal dalml may 
'Wfih the utmost rellahn.lty aod fairnea. procwdlnp, ma.ny capital litJp.nta return to have been waived. The belated entry of a 
But our present l)'ltem of multi-layered federal court. with aecon~r even third lawyer, under aevere Ume pressure, does not. 
atate and federal appeal and collateral aod fourth-petitions for relief. Current do enoueh to ensure f&imeu. In awn, Lbe 
review hu led to pfeeemeal and repetftloua rules rovernlna abuae of the writ and 1uc- Committee belie\·es that provlalon of compe-
Utfptlon. and Je&l'S of delay between sen- cealve peUUom h&ve not aerved to prevent tent counael for pr11onera under capital aen-
&enc:tna and a Judld&l reaoluUon u to these endlesa fillnp. Another example of tence Lbrouahout both ltate and federal col-
whether Lbe aentence wu perm.1aalble under piecemeal litJpUon la the fact that current lateral review II crucial to emur1na fairness 
the law. The resulUnc lack of finaUty un- rules allow at least three peUtiom for cert!- and protectlnr Lbe CIODltltutfonal rfihta of 
dermmea public coof1dence In our cr1m1nal orarl to the United Stat.el Supreme Court- capital UU,ant&. 
JusUoe ~ Of murse, any IYStem of after d1rffl review, after It.ate collateral c. Lut-Jti,ud~  
review entalll a01De clel&y. n ii not 1uacest- proceedlnp, and atter federal coll&teral pro- Anoth ..u-. ..... ,__ ..- f th 
ed that the de1a:, needed for re\'few or con-· cee&np. er ...... ~ou u...,. u-~ o e current 
.UtutJonal clalma la Inappropriate. But Pew would arirae that the cun-ent state of 1ystem ta that Utlptlon of constitutional 
much of the deJaJ Inherent In the pre9ent deaJth penalt7 admfn1stration la saUdac- dalml often comes cmlJ when prompted by 
QBtem ta not. needed for falmesa. Addlna to tor7. TMre are now approxtm&tely 2,200 tile ,eWnc of an excutlon date. Judicial re-
the problem la &be fact that prtsonera often convtcted murderer1 on death row awa.ltfnc aources are expended u the pr1aoner must 
cannot obtain qua11fied counael unW uecu- execution. Yet llnoe the supreme Court'• aeet • ltQ' of execution bl order to present 
Uon SI bnmlnent. The reault.lq Jut.minute 1m Furman declaton onl7 ue exeeuttona hta clalmL Juatlee ID&J' be ID«J"Y'ed by con-
rulhed Utl,atJon dlslerves Inmates. and a.pa . have taken plaoe. The ahortest of these Ju· ductinr Judicial proceedlnp In capital cues 
the resources of our Judlclar7. dlclal proceedlnp required two yean and under the pressure of an bn.pendlnc excu-
To addresa tlleSe problems. ChJef Justice nine months to complete. The lo~eat oov- tlon. In 10me cues Jut.minute habeu corps 
WUlJam B. RehnQulat formed thll Commit- ered a period of H )'Nl'I and ldx months. petltlona h&ve resulted from the 
tee In June 1988.. ms cb&rce to wi wu to In• The l~ of the averace prooeedJ.ne wu unavallabWt1 of coumel at any earlier time. 
quire Into -&he necessity and deslrablllty of elaht yeara and two montha. Tbe CommJt• But In other cases attomeyg appear to have 
Jeclslatfon dlrected toward avoid.Inc delay tee does not believe etcbt yean are required tntentlon2lly delayed flllnr until ttme pres-
.and the 1act or flnallt.y" In capital cues In for the appropriate habeas review of state aures were aevere. In most cases, successlve 
which the prtaoner bad or bad been offered crlmlna1 proceedlnp. petitions are meritlcss, and we believe many 
counsel. The ChJef Justice apr;,olnted u The Committee•• anal)'Sls of cases from are ffled at the eleventh hour aeet1J:ia noth-
membera of this CClmmittee Chief Judee Alabama, Florida. Oeorsta. M1ssmtpp1, and Inf more than delay. 
Clark of the Plfth Ctrcult. ChJef Jud&e Texu sbowa that 80% of Lbe Ume apent In The forecolnr typea of abuses h&ve no 
Roney of the Eleventh Clrcult. Dlstrict collateral litigation In death penalty cues place In a rational IJltem of Justice. The 
Judee Bodces of Florida and District Judge occura outside of state collateral proceed- meritl of capital cases should be reviewed 
Sanders ol Texaa. Tbe States In the ruth Inga. A table abowin& the averace Ume pert. carefully and deliberately, and not under 
And Eleventh C!rcuits h&ve by far the oda and ratl01 In death penalty ca.sea In time preasure. Thta should be true both 
greatest number5 or prisoners IR.lbJect to these States ls attached to this reporL durln& atate and federal collateral review. 
capital irentences, and each of Lbeee Judges The relatfvel)' small number ol uecu- But onoe this review bu occurred. absent 
baa bad exten£fft expertence with federal tlona, as well u the deli.y In cases where an extraon1.lnary clrcumst.ance1 there should 
review of capital cues. The chairman ol Lbe execution b.a occurred, makes dear that be no further last-minute Utlp.tlon. 
Committee, retired &soclate Just.lce Lewla the present system of collateral re\1ew aper. · Ill. THE COIOIITTEE PROPOSAL P. Powell. Jr .. aerved as Circuit Juatioe for ates to frustrate the law of 37 States. 1 The 
the Eleventh CSrcult while atttlni on the collateral review p~ tends to be erratic 
8upreme Court. Professor Albert M. Pear• and trequentl)' ta rer rdtlous. The Jona sepa-
lOD of the Un1ftftlt7 of Georgia School of n.tlon of sentence--~ ~ 0 :;recut1ve often ham· 
Law, .who hu uPeZ1ence represent.Ina de- pera Justice '"'ithout lrl tprovlnc the quality 
fendantl In capttal cues, waa the Reporter of adJudlcatlon.• Tim Committee believes 
for the Committee. Wllllam R. Burch1ll, Jr., that any aerious refoirA proposal must ad· 
General Coumel of the Admlnlstratlve dress Lbe problema of delay and repetitive 
Office of the U.S. Courts, aerved u Beere- llt.lpt.ion. 
tar)'. B. The Need for Counul 
The Committee met llfx Umes and consld- A second serious problem with the curnnt 
ered with care &be problema assoc:iated with system la Lbe presslnr need for quallfied 
co1latera1 review of capital sentences. We In• counsel to represent lnmatea In collateral 
vited written cc,mmenta from a broad ai>ec· review. Aa the supreme Court recently reaf-
trum of lnwuted part.1ea and Ol"Pn1m- firmed In Murray v. Oi&n'atano, provisfon of 
lions. and received a number of hell>ful counsel for c:r1m1na1 defendant.a ta constttu-
presentatfons. 'nM?ae Included the vtewa of t1onall)' required on1y for tr1a1 and direct 
st.ate and federal prosecutors croupe urclnc appellate review. Because, u a practical 
abolltJon of the death penalty, state uecu- matter, the foc:ua of review 1n capital casca 
IJTea and ~ and criminal defense often abf!ta to collateral proceedlnp. the 
and public defender orp.mzaUona. The re- lack of adequate - counsel creates aevere 
sponaea contrlbuted to our flnd1Dis. which problem&. This situation ta not lftely to be 
follow, and to &be formulaUon ol the lec1s1A- remendled by the new provisions of the 
tJon we P1'0PQle. . AntJ-Drus Abuse Act of 1988 that reqU1re 
n. mmmca apr;,olntment of counsel In capital federal 
.L Vn~ Delc11 a114 ReJ,ditima habeas corpus proceedlnp. 
The Committee ldentWed aerfous prob- C&pltal lnmatea &lmOllt unllorml)' are fndl• 
1ema with the present aystem of collateral cent. aod often Dllterate or wieducated. 
review. These many be broadly ch&racter• C&pltal habeu litigation may be dlfflcult 
lzed under the bead!nc of UDDecessar)' delay and complex. Prtaoners act1na J12'0 ,e rarel7 
and repetJtlon. Tbe Jack of coordination t,e. present PJ"OlllPU7 or properly exhaust thefr 
tween the federal and state 1ep1 1ystema constitutional challenaa In the atate forum. 
often reeultl In lneffldent and wmecessary Thta resultl In delayed or Ineffective federal 
lteP8 In the course of lltlcatlon. Prisoners. collateral procedure&. The end 1"elult ta 
for example, often apend slilUficant time 
movtn, back and forth between the federal 
and state 1ystems In the proceaa of exbauat-
lnr ltate remedies. Frequent litlptlon 0\'er 
motlom for lt&1s ol execution la another ex-
ample of an unnecessary step In the process. 
Under current Pl'OCedurea, a prisoner hu no 
Incentive to move the collateral re\'iew proc-
eu forward untll an execution date fl ,et, 
and at this Point additional litigation over a 
request for a stQ or execution ls Inevitable. 
• ~ l&w a1ao proYldes for capital punimment 
In c:ert.aln cues. See P.L. 1~90. 102 St&L tJ8'1 
<Anti-Dru& Abuae Act of 1988) (murdffl commlu.c-d 
In connectJon wtt.h D&rOOUca oUemea>. 
• Contnl7 to what may be usumect. the Conatftu-
tlon doea not provide for federal babeu corpua 
reTlew of state court cledslona. TM wrlt of habeu 
corpua available to state pr18onen k not that mm-
tJoned ID the Oollltltutkm. It bu el'Olved from a 
statute ell&Ct.ed by ~ 1D lN'1, DOW codWed 
at 28 U.S. I 22M. 
In response to the problems described 
above., the Committee proposes aew ltatut.o-
ry procedurea for federal habeaa corpus 
review or capital 1eDtencea · where counael 
bu been provided. Separate procedures for 
capital cases are appropriate In llaht of the 
special problems of capital lltiaatlon. The 
incentives faclnr the capital litigant are 
unique. The Inmate under captlal aentence., 
whose rullt frequenUy Is never In question, 
has every lnoentlve to delay the proceedln'3 
that must take plaoe before that aentence ta 
carried out. Such an Inmate ta avol~ the 
punishment prescribed by the law of the 
State. In contrast. prisoners aervlnr an ordi-
nary term of 1ean h&ve every Incentive to 
brlnc their clalma to resolution u aoon u 
PoUlble In order to caln relief. And they are 
aervlnr Lbelr aentencea wblle Utlptlon tall~ 
place. 
The Committee•, proposal ls aimed at 
ach1e,1n1 thJa roal: Capital ca.sea ahould be 
1ubJed to one complete and fair course of 
collateral review In the ltate and federal 
•Y•tem. free from the Ume pressure of Im• 
pendlnf execution, and with the assistance 
of competent coumel for the defendant. 
When this review bu concluded, Utlaatlon 
1houldend. • 
The apeclfic operation of our propo&ed 
lecfslatlon • II deacrlbed In notes followlnc 
each r..atutory aectlon. Some 1eneral com-
ments are appropriate here. The proposal 
allows a State·to brtna capital Utleatlon by 
Its prisoners within Lbe new 1tatute by pro-
vidlna competent counsel for lnmatea on 
state collateral re\iew. Participation In the 
proposal la thwi optional with the States. 
Bee~ It II optional. the pror;,osal 1hould 
• Our proposal would add a new Subchapt.er B 
deallnc with Capital Cues. Sectlona 22'1-225a of 
Subc-bapter A Will not be chan&ed. We refer to 
t.bae chanaea 11.mply u a propc)Md ·-.iatute" or u 
a "proposal." 
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cause mln1maJ tntrustlon on state prerop- capital Utiptlon-pertodic Inactivity and upon a findinl that the prisoner Is not lndl-
Uvea. But for St.ates that are concerned with last-minute frenzied activity, achedu.llna and renL 
del&J In capital UUptlon, It -11 hoped that reachedullnc of execution dates-which di- Cd> No counsel appointed pursuant to su'b-
. · . the procedural mechanisml we recommend mlnished public confidence In the cr1m1na1 aectlom Cb) and <c> to represent a state pril-
wtll fumlah an Incentive to provide the Justice system. ID aum, adoption of this pro- oner under capital aentence shall have pre-
counsel that are needed for falmea. posal W'Ul si&nJflcantly enhance falmess ID viously represented the prisoner at trial or 
The statute provides for a aix-month death penalty Utiption. on direct appeal In the cue for which the 
period Tfthln which the federal habeu petl- ltl'IOLUT or D&ATB PPALTT LITIGATIOX ff&· appointment II made unless the prisoner 
Uon must be flied. The fWnl period belim TUTJCI IIASl:D ox 10 CASl:I ROM PLOIUDA, and counsel expressly request continued 
to run only on the appointment of counsel TUU. .ALALUU ID&SISIIPPI AJfJ) cmoaGIA representation. 
for the prlsooer, or a refusal of the offer of _. " .. m.c to: • MOfllJM <e> The Ineffectiveness or Incompetence of 
counsel The twnc period alao 11 tolled 1lffll9e _, counsel du.rlna state or federal collateral 
dw1.Dc the pendeney of all state court pro- -- Convict.Ion -------- 11 post-conviction proceedlnp In a capital cue 
ceedin&L In view of the provision of counaeL End of state direct appeal 40 &hall not be a around for relief In a proceed-
the tollina provtalona, and the fact that the Direct certloriart review by U.S. lnl arislnc under aectfon 2254 of this su'b-
exhauatlon requirement mandates that the Bupreme Court______ 41 chapter. This Umitatlon &hall not preclude 
prlloDer'a federal petition pre.ent the a.me ExecutJoo IOI the appointment of different counsel at any 
cl&lma contained ID the state petition, the Valid 1mtence to: phue of state or federal post-conviction 
atx-month period ensures adequate time for End of ltate direct appeals._ 2'1 proceedlnp . 
the development and presentation of clafma. CerUorarf denied on direct review - M Comment: subsection <a> defines the 
A fUrther extemfon of time la available for Execuuon_________ n acope of what would be new subchapter B. 
cases where rood cause la shown. Althoqh Total time: whJch establishes rules and procedures that 
the time period may seem abort ID view of State collateral-·----- t app}y aolely to section 2254 cues tnvolvin, 
the fact that no time limit whatsoever exists Federal collateral_______ 18 prfsonen under capital aentence. The aim of 
at present, It should be noted In comparison All collateral_______ 4'1 this subchapter Is to provide a mechanism 
that six montbl Is far lon,er than the time = for the post-conviction Utlp.tlon of capital 
provided for appeals ID the state and federal Percentage ratloa: cases that will enhance procedural safe-
aystema. or for aeetJna cerUorari review In Sentence to cert. on direct/sen- cuarm for the prisoner and yet II less time 
the Supreme Court. tence to execution.._ ____ . 38 consumtns and less cumbersome from the 
Importantly, the statute provides for an Down time• sentence to execution. H viewpotnt of the Jurisdiction seeking to en-
automatic stay of execution, which ls tQ State collateral/sentence to execu- force Its death penalty. There Is no Intent to 
remain In place until federal habeas pro- Uon --·---- -- 10 alter the substantive acope of federal habeu 
~dlnp are completed, or until the prison- Federal collateral/sentence to ex- corpus review under aection 225'-
er has failed to flle a petition wit.bin the al- cutfOD_,_________ 40 Subchapter B offers an alternative to the 
lotted Ume. This automatic stay ensures Total collateral/sentence to execu- present process of post-conviction review ID 
that clalma need not be evaluated under the tion _____ -·--- SO capital cases. If It Is applicable, It would ID 
tlme pressure of scheduled execution. It State collateral/total collateral- 20 all but the most unusual of capital cases 
should substant1ally ~llrnlnate the rush Utt- ~eral collateral/total collateral... 80 11m1t each prisoner to & single opportunity 
cation over stay motions that Is troublintr • Time when oo proc:eedinp are pmc11na ID any for federal habeas corpus review under sec-
for both Utlp.nts and the Judiciary. ooun. tlon 2254. This 11m1tatlon would advance the 
Federal habeas proceedinp under the pro- STAT'DTORT Pl!oPOSAL--CBAPn:ll 153. Huus stat.e Interest In the flnallty of criminal con-
posal will encompus onl)' claims that have Colt.PU& victions and capital aentences. But to avail 
been exhauat.ed ID state courL With the Svl>cha:,ter .L Ge7leral Protn.ri01U fa ltM!lf of subchapter B's more structured 
coumd provided by the statute, there rede.ti a.ti(m habeas corpus review procedures, a State 
should be DO excuse for failure to nJse ~ gn J wo,Ild m.ve to establish a system for the ap-
clatma ID ataie court._ The mtute depart& (Sections 2241-2255 would not bf! polntroent and compensation of competent 
from current exhaustion Pl'Ctice by allow- chanied.J counsel throughout all staaes of state post 
Ing for Immediate presentation . of new Svl>chapter B. Capital Ctuu: Special comi<1ion review. The purpose of this 
claims In federal court In extraordinary cir- Procedure, {ne,,o) mechanism Is to assure that collateral 
cumstances. In the event the entire coun- Section ZZ56. P1'uo'MTI in ,tau cwtcdr review will be fair, thoroueh, and the prod-
aeled state and federal collateral process 111.b;ect to capital ~tence: appointment Qf uct of capable and committed advocaey. 
concludes without relief belni rranted. the counul; requtrement Qf rule Q/ covrl or ,ta.t- Wbile aubchapter B attempts to strike a re-
statute lnclude8 new m"'Cbanisrns to P~ t£U; proceduru for appointment.- alistic balance betv:een the values of Judicial 
mote flnallty. Subs~uent and successive <a> This aubchapter shall &PPIY to cases efficiency and procedural fairness ID the 
federal habeu petitions ~ no longer be artstn, under section 2254 broueht by prfs.. context of a federal system, It does not 
the basis of a stay of execution or rrant of oners ID state custody who are aubject to a Impose a solution on the States. Each State 
relief absent e:rtnordlnary circumstances capital sentence. It shall app}y only If the must assess the utility of subchapter B for 
and a colorable lhowin& of factual Inn~ provisions of aubsections Cb> and cc> are at- itself. Unless a State takes the affinn&tive 
ceoce. lafied. steps required In sections 22S6<b> and <c>. its 
rv. CO!,.CL_V_s~ (bl This subchapter Is applicable If a State Utlptlon of capital cases under section 2254 
nle fundamenta!""" reciwrement of a crlmi- establishes by rule of It& court. of last resort wtll be coverned by the statutory and court 
nal justice system la fa!J-neg_ ID habeas or by statute &_mechanism for the appoint- rules that presently app}y to all federal 
corpus proceedlngg fairness requires that a ment, compensation and payment o! reason- habeu corpus cases. 
defendant be prm-Jded a sear-chine and Im- able Utt.atlon expenses of competent coun- Central to efficacy of thJa scheme Is the 
partial examln&tfon of his claims. Falmea ael ID state post-<:e>nvlctlon proceed.lnp development of standards covernl.,c the 
I 
also requires that If a defendant's claims are broucht by Indigent prlsonen whose capital competency of counsel chosen to aer\'e ID 
!.- fouod to be devoid of merit after auch convictions and sentence. have been upheld thJa apedalir.ed and dem&ndlnc area of Utl-
~ ex~tlon. 80Clety Is rtchtfully entitled to on direct appeal to the court of last resort cation. ThJa mechanism la to be established 
) bave-Uie penalty prescribed by law carried In the State or have otherwise become final by state statute or by rule of the state court 
out without unreasonable delaJ. for state law purposes. The rule of court er of Jut resorL The Committee believes that 
Every capital defendant la now enttUed to statute muat provide standards of compe- It II more consistent with the federal-ct.ate 
competent coo.met at state trail and ap~ tenc:, tor the appointment of such cou.nael. baJanoe to ctve the States wide latitude to 
and, under recent co~esslonal enactment, <c> Any mecbamsm for the appointment. atabllsh a mechanism that complies with 
In federal habeas corpus proceedlnp. The compensation and relmbunement of coun- subsection <b>. The final Judgment as to the 
CommJttee'a propoul aeeu to fill a gap that ael as provided ID subsection Cb> must offer adequaney of any system for the appoint-
now exist.a by encoun.gtn, the appointment counsel to all state prisoners under capital ment of counsel under subsection <b>, ho,v-
of competent counsel also 1D state habeas or sentence and must provide for the entry of ever, rests ultimately with the federal Judi-
collateral prooeedings. The propoul further an order by a court of record: Cl> appolntfDc clary. If prisoners under capital sentence ID 
assures that upon completion of state proc- one or more counsel to represent the prison- a particular State doubt that a State·• 
cedlnp a defendant will have one opportu- er upon a finding that the prisoner ia Ind.I- mechanism for appointlna coimsel compe>rts 
nlty to have bis claims reviewed carefully by· 1ent and accepted the offer or Is unable 11.'ith subsection <b>, the adequacy of the 
the federal courts. Thereafter. If no lnflrmJ. competently to decide whether to accept or 1:vstem-as opposed to the competency or 
ty In the convtctton has been round, Judicial nJect the offer; <2> flndlnc, after a heartns particular counsel-<:an be settled throu,h 
proceedlnp will be at an end, absent excep- If necessary, that the prisoner rejected the Utlptlon. 
tlonal new development&. offer of counsel and made the decision with U the requirements of 1ub6ectlon Cb) are 
The Committee believes that Its proposal an understanding of It.a lepl consequences; satisfied. the state mechanism must offer 
will co far to rectify the current chaos In or <S> denylns the appointment of coumel .counsel to all state prisoners under caplLEl 
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sentence. In addition, It must provtd (b) and <c>. U at any Ume dwinc at&t.e a xec:uUon In capital c:uee at &DJ' time fol• 
u,e entry of an appropriate Judicial o er federal pos~vicUon review It appeana lowlna the appolnt.ment. of coumel PW"SU&Dt. 
based on the st.ate prisoner·, response to the that appointed counael 1a unable to di. to aecUon 22Se<c>. U an aec:uUon d&te bu 
offer of coun,eL Judlcf.&l . control of thla ch&rse bJa obllpUona In a timely and com- been Kt, the priloner can obt.a!n a ~ u a 
process ta necessary to establish a clear pet.ent mannu, the remedy la for the court mat.ta of rlabt limply by mak1na appllca• 
point In time to determine the appllcabillty to appoint a replacement., and to permit tlon to any federal court that would have 
of aectlons 225'f and 2268. It II also neoes- post.conviction review to co forward. Jurudktion over the cue In a prooeedfn& 
ary to usure that a full record exists show- Section ZZ57. Mandato~ 1ta11 Q/ uecu- brou,ht under aectJon 2254.. In practice. 
lnr which state prboners have appointed &,a; d1tnitioft,• Hmtu on ,tar, Q/ aeeutfon; howner, even tbil step II not likely to be 
c:ounael and which do not. ~ve pditknu.- neceaary. U a State tatea the atepa re• 
Under aubsec:Uon <c>, all lndlg-ent state <a> Upon the ·entry In the appropriate quired In eectloD 2268 to brine lta capital 
prisoner-. under capital aentence would be state court of record ol an order punuant to UttaaUon under thll aubchapter, there wm 
enUUed to counsel In at&te post-conviction leCt.lon 2256<c>, a warn.nt or order aetUnc be no reuon to aet an exec:utton date untD 
proceed.lnea u a matter of risht. U an tndl- ·an execution date for a state pruoner ahall the completJon of state and federal post. 
cent prilooer la not competent to decide be stayed upon appllcat.loo to &DJ' court that conriction renew. At that Juncture, the fe-d-
whether to a.ccept or decllne the State's would have Jurisdiction ovu any proceed- era1 court.a would have no authority to stay 
offer, the Sta.t.e must appoint counsel In any lu,s tiled pursuant to section UM. The ~ execuUona except under the ftl'7 Umtted 
evenL u a pnaoner Is not lndla'eDt. which plication must recite that the State hu ID· drcumst&lloe8 ldenttfled In aeetlon 2257Ce>. 
would be the rare case, he would not be en- voted the poat-convictlon review procedures Subeectlon <b> establlsbea the duration of 
Ut.Jed to the appointment of counsel even If of t.hJI aubchapter and that the acheduled a ataJ of execution laued 1lDder thls sub-
be accepted the State•• offer. Pln&lly, In execution ls subject to atay. chapter In effect, It proridea that a~ of 
90me fDst&noes.. a prtsonu might reject the Cb> A stay of execution sranted pursuant ex~ mued under sublectlon ca> will 
offer of counaeL This rejectlon would to subsection <a> shall expire 11: remain In effect u Jonr u state and federal 
become effective and blndln« only after a ·<U A st&te prisoner falls to me a habcaa post.conviction review 1n a capital case Is 
JudJcla1 Inquiry Into the pnsoner'a under- corpus petition under section 2254 within betn. actively pursued by the state prisoner. 
ltandlna or the lea-al consequences o( his de- the time requ!red In aectfon 2258; or The relationship between subsection 
C151on. <2> Upon completion of district court and · 
SUbaect.toD <d> eat&bllshes a rule req~ court of appeals revtew under aectlon 2254 <b><U and section 2258 llli particularly lmpor-
the apgolntment of new counsel at the state the petition (or relief ls denied and <A> the tant. Under SUbsectlon <b><U, a stay of exe-
p:,st.<:onvk:Uon pbue of capital litigation. time for fUl.nc a petition for certiorari has cut.Ion rern&lrul In force u lone u the state 
The primary reason for the rule ls that expired and no peUtlon has been filed; <B> a prisoner files a section 2254 petition In fed-
durlnc the paa.-convtctlon review, lneffec- · timely petition for certiorari wu ftled and eral court within the 18(ktay period set 
tive assistance of trW and appellate counsel the Supreme Court denied the petition; or forth In aectlon 2258. It II Important to em-
ls frequently a major wue. It would be un- <C> a timely petition for certiorari '111,-..S filed ph&Slr.e here that the object of the 180 days 
realist.le to expect a capital defendant's trial and upon consideration of the case, the Su- pertod established In section 2258-wh!ch In-
or appellate counsel to raise a 1r~orous chal- preme Court disposed of ft In a manner that eludes the rilht to apply for a 60-day exten-
J.en&-e to his own effectiveness. A secondary left the capital sentence Wldisturbed; or slon-11 not to produce default. Rather It ls 
reuon la that trial and appellate counsel In <3> Before a court of competent Jurisdlc- one of a aeries of provisions In tbls 5Ubchap-
dca:.h penalty cases serve under ereat pres- tlon, In the presence of counsel and after ter designed to stimulate the_ orderly and 
aure and often work them.selves to the point having been advtsed of the consequences or expeditious consideration on the mertts of 
cf emotional and physical exhaustion. They hl.s decision, a state prisoner under capital all federal Issues arislnc In capital cases. 
are unde.rr..anda.bly less r.ble to undertake a sentence waives the right to pursue habeas If a state prisoner files a petition under 
fresh and dispassionate cooside:ation of tbe corpus review under section 2254.. section 2254 within the time period set forth 
t:sues r&lsed or possibly overlooked at trial <c> U one of the conditions in subsection In section 2258, subsecUon <bX2> ext.ends 
L'Xi on direct appeal. The appointment of Cb) has occurred, no federal court thereafter the rllht to a stay of execution to mclude 
new counsel at the state habeas phase will ahall have the authority to enter a stay of the entire period that the case ts ~
do u m uch as can be done to overcome execution or rrant relief In a capital case before the district court, the court of ap-
tbtse dilficwUes. The Committee, however, unless: peals, and the Supreme Cowi, U a petltJon 
did not believe the rule should be absolute. (1) the basis for the stay and request for for oertlorarl ls filed. The rllht to a 5"Y 
In some ca...-.es, the prisoner under capital l'felief ls a claim not previously presented ln would expire atter the opponunity for Su-
sentence m&Y h1ve such trust and confl- the state or federal court.,; preme Court review has passed or ~..er the 
d.mce In his trial or appellate counsel that (2) the failure to raJse the claim 1s <A> the Suprmie Court h&s considered a petition for 
he v;ould desire the att-Omey<lient relation- result of state action In violation ot the ttrtlorarl and has denied the petition or df&. 
ahip to conti.Due durl~ ~te post<onvtc- Constitution or laws of the Unit.eel States; posed of the ca.se without overturning the 
tfon review. Subsection (dl would permJt., <B> the result of the Supreme Court reeog- caplt&I sentence. The CommJttee assumes 
though not require, continued represent&- nit.Ion of a new federal rlaht that la retroac- L'iat In capital cases the st&te prisoner will 
tion Uthe prisoner and his cou.-isel expres.s- tively applicable; or <C> b&sed on a factual '111,'aJlt to P'!.lrSUe every opportunlty for feder-
tv ma..te a request to the appolnt.1n( author- predicate th.at could not have been diacov- al ~nvtcUon review open to him. In· 
lty established by the State. ued through the exercise of rea.sons.ble dill- eluding Supreme Court rmew. But once 
Subsection <e> pronc!e. t.hAt the lne!!ec- 1ence In time to pres~nt the cla.l.m for state this re\1ew process come.a to its conclus!on 
tl-;eness or ~tence of counsel during or :ederal ~D\1cUon review; &Dd ,·!th a reversal of the capital sentence, It ls 
state or federal post<anvtctlon review In a <3> The facts underlying the cl&!m would the Commlttee'a belief that federal review 
Q.Pltal cue la not a irround for relief ln sec- be sufilcient., U prov.en. to undermine the ahould end. 
C.:ia 2254 proceedings. This r.Jle refl.!<:ts set- court's confidence In the Jury'• determlna- In aubsectlon (bX3>, the authority of a 
tied constitutiocil doctrine which 11.m.Jts ln- tlon of euilt on the offense or off~ for federal court to stay the execution of a state 
effect.Ive assistance of counsel challenges to wh.!ch the death penalty was Imposed. prisoner expires U thue ls a waiver of the 
those c:rimln.al procttdiJl&s to which the Comment: This aubch.apter resu on the rl&ht to pursue habeas corpus review under 
6ixth Amendment rteht to counsel attaches. L'ilUJDPtJon that every state prisoner under aection 2254. To ellmlnate doubt about the 
M1trra.'11 Y. Gianzt4no, 109 S. Ct. 2768 <1989>. c:apft&l sentence ahould have one opportunf- validity of the waiver, aublectlon <b><3> re-
.Fennsi,lMnta Y. Fu&Zey, 481 U.S. 551 <l9ffl. t.)' for full st&te and federal post,.conv1ctlon qulrea th.at the prisoner announce the decl-
T?le CommJt.t.ee recogn!zes that the compe- review before belnc aubject to execution. Al- alon before a court of competent Jurlsdic-
tmce of counsel d~ an lrtaies of state thou.eh this appean to have been the prac> Uon and In the preaenoe of bJa counseL It 
and federal post,<onvtctlon revtew 15 of the Uce In capital CMea alnce l'lmlMul v. Geor- alao requires the ~which can be state 
utmost Importance In c:aplt&l cases. Bowev• gill, 408 U.S. 238 <1972>, ft bu never been or federal-to advtae the prlaooer of the 
er, u far as federal review ln a Proceedinc formally recognfz.ed u such. Man7 atat.e consequenoea of the waiver decislon. 
11Dder aectlon %254 ls concerned, lt believe. p:-llonera under capital sentence have at.rua- .After the occurrence of one of the condl-
that the focua ahould be on the perform- 1ted to secure a stay of uec:utJon--often Uona resultln1 In the expiration of the rt,ht 
ance of a capital defendaDt's trial a.n.d appel- ai&lnst the vtcoroua opposttJon of the to a mandatoQ' ata:, of execution under aub-
lau collllSel. The provtslC'n of COW15el under State-before av&lllnc themaelvea of even aectton <b><2), federal review In capital cues 
the nc-.r atatute therefore does not Involve one chance to pursue state and federal post- pursuant to section 22M la extremely Umlt-
tbe crea.tfon of any potential claim of lne(- conviction revtew. Stay of execution Utica• ed. Subsection <e> would thereafter permit a 
fecttve assistance of counsel In collateral tion often has been aubject to tlcht dead- stay or execution and the erant of relief In a 
review. The effectiveness of state and feder- lines. and places unreaUstlc demanda oo capital cue only U: <Uthe claim bu never 
al post.conv1ction counsel ts a matter that Jud&ea, lawyera, and the prisoner. . been ra.!sed In atat.e or federal court prevl-
can and must be dealt '111,1th In the appoint- If applicable, section 2257 would el1mlnate ously; (2) there II a n!Jd excuse for not dl&-
ment process. Only one who h.a.s the clear stay of execuUon llt.la'atlon during a atat.e covertnc and raJslnc the cl&tm dwinc the 
abWty and willingness to handle caplt&l prisoner's flrat request for post.convtcUon · prtaoner'• tnft.lal opportunity for st.ate and 
cases ahould be appolnud under subsections relief. It provtdea for & mandatory stay of federal post..convtcUon review; and <3> the 
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facta IIDdert,tn, the cl&1m raise a serious 225'1. But ft ls clear that there mu.st be 10me 
&>ubt about the prisoner'• rullt of the of• aub&tltute mechanism t.o came understand• 
feme or offmsea for which the death penal• ably reluctant at.ate prisoners to aeek post. · 
· t1 wu lmpClled. conviction review when IIUch action may 
diction over the •ectJon 2254 petition when 
ultimately fOed. 
Section ZZSI. E1'Mlfflttarr MCJnng,,· •co~ 
of federal ,nuv,; diltrlct court adJudfca• 
tum.-
<•> Whenever a state prisoner under a cap-
Ital •entence files a petition for habeas 
oorpua relief to which th1a 11Ubchapter ap-
plies, the district court shall: 
U> determine the aufflciency of the evi-
dentta.ry record for habeu oorpua review 
bued on the cl.alma actually presented and 
UtJrated In the state courts except when the 
prison~ can ahow that the failure to nlae 
or develop a claim tn the at.ate courts la <A> 
the result of at.ate action In violation of the 
.Comt.ttutlon or Ian of the United stat.ea: 
<B> the result of the SUpreme Court reco,-
nltlon of a new federal richt that la retroac-
tively applfcable; or <C> baaed on a factual 
predJcate that could not have been dlacov-
.ered throurh the exercise of reasonable dW-
cence In time to present the claim for state 
post-conviction review; and 
The Uurd of these conditions fs clearly remove the only obstacle prevent.Inc the 
the IDOlt lmpartant. In the CommJttee'a State from carrylna out the death sentence. 
Yiew, U theft II any doubt about the aen- The entrJ of an order under aectfon 
tencina phue of a capital cue, It should be 2256<c) fl auch a substitute. It be1ina the 
ni5ed dur1Da a at.ate prisoner·• lnJt.iAl at- runn1ni of the filina period In capital Utlra• 
tempt to obtain PoSt-<:onvlctlon review. tJon. Unlesa the state prisoner actively lltJ• 
Often factual rullt ia not seriously In dla- ratea his cue after his conviction and cap-
pute. Both the priaoner and h1a counsel ---ital aentence have become final on direct 
have ner7 Incentive to ask whether all rele- appeal, he risks loslnl the richt to file a aec-
n.nt lnformaton tn mitigation of punish- Uon 2™ petition In federal court. Thua, the 
ment wu ~ted and whether the aen- 180 daJ nun. requirement 1erves the at.ate 
teDdn& phase of the trial was otherwise Interest tn promot.tnc ffna1Jt7 In capital 
CODduded ID a constJtutlonall7 fair manner. cues. At the same time, thil subchapter 
Qlftn &be clear Incentive to . do thla. the ae"es to advaDce that Interest only U the 
CommJUee does not believe that the federal State provides prisoners under capital aen-
eourta aboaJd have to cons!der a second pe- tence with the meana-eompetent counsel at 
won tmdel' aectton 2™ which challenges state expense-to u.,ert their lepl rilhta In 
only &be am&.enclnc phase In • capital case. state PoSt-c:onvictlon proceedlnp. Aa 
Aa su_t.ectloa <c> reflect.a. the only approprl- stressed earlier, the Interaction of aectlom 
ate exception Ill when the new cla.1m roes to 2258 225'1 and 2258 ii designed not to 
the w.de:tlylna aullt or Innocence of the prod~ce flnallt7 through procedural default 
state prtsooer under capital sentence. 
Sectioe ns,. Filing of ha.bear coTJ)u., peti- but rather through a structured proceaa of 
tio,a; ttae nqu!mnents; tolling nuu.-Any post-conviction llU,atlon that brlniB all Po-
peUUon fs habeas corpus relief under seo- tentlall7 merltorloua cla.1ma to the attention 
uon 2254 lllUlt be filed 1n the appropriate of the state and fedei:,J courts before the 
district court within 180 days from the Imposition of the death penalt7 becomes le-
twnr ID the appropriate state court of p.lly permissible. 
<2> conduct UlJ' requested evidentta.ry 
hearlnr neoeasary to complete the record 
· for habeas corpua review. 
record ol an order issued in compliance with There are aeveral lmpartant tolllnr rules 
eecUon mace>. The time requirements es- In. 1eetlon 2258. With one exception the 
tabllshed b7 this section shall be tolled: filing period does not run after the flling of 
<a> Pram the date that a petition for certJ- a section 2256<c> order as lonr u a capital 
orari ta filed 1n the Supreme Court until the case ls pending for consideration before a 
date of final disposition of the petition If a court of competent Jurisdiction. The palic7 
state prtsooer seeks review of a capital sen- underlying section 2258 Is to encourage liU-
tence that bas been affirmed on direct cants to lnJtl&te the post-conviction review 
appeal bJ the court of last resort of the process and to keep It movtnr from stage to 
State or baa otherwise become final for stage. I! delay In the litigation procesa Is 
state la• purposes. due to slow Judicial consideration of death 
Cb> Dmtnc any period In which a state penalty litigation. that time obviously 
prfaoner under capital sentence haa a prop, should not be and la not counted In comput-
eJb filed request for post.conviction re'iiew lnr the 180 day period under section 2258. 
pendfnr before a at.ate court of competent Under section 2258(&), the 180 da7 period 
jw1sdicUoa; U all state filing rules are met Ls tolled when a at.ate prisoner files a petJ. 
tn a UmdJ manner, this period shall run tlon for certiorari In the Supreme Court 
contlnuous17 from the date that the state after afflrmance of hfs capital sentence on 
prisoner Initially files for post~nvtctlon direct appeal to the state court of last 
retjew until final disposition of the case by resort. It Is extremel7 Important to rec:or-
the h1cbest court of the St.ate; provided. nlze, u section 2258<b> makea clear, that 
however, the tolllng rule established by this there la no comparable tolllnr rule to permit 
aubsectloo does not apply during the pend- the fWnc of certiorari petitions after state 
ency of a petition for certion.rl before the post-oomictlon review. The Committee be-
Supreme Court followlni such atate pos~ Ueves that multiple oppartimJtlea for Su-
c:onvictJ0n renew. preme Court review are not es.sent.1Al to fafr. 
<c> Dartnc an additional period not to ness In the consideration of capital cases. In 
exceed IO days, If counsel for the st.ate prls- th1a veln. It would Point out that of the 1oe 
oner: <l> mcwea for an extension of time In capital cast'S In which the Supreme Court 
the federal district court that would have has ,ranted certiorari atnce 19'12, onl1 2 
proper Jarlsdfctlon over the case upan the came to the Court from state PoSt-c:onvic-
fllinl of a habeas corpus petition under aec- tlon review. Elimination of th1a step does 
Uon 2254 and <2> makes a showuir of food not result in disadvantage to the state prla-
cauae I« counsel's lnabWt7 to file the oner, since all Issues raJsed In state post-con-
babeu corpus petition within the 180 da,y vtcUon review can be carried forward In a 
period estabtished b7 th1a section. section 2254 petition and ultlmatel7 pre-
Comment Section 2258 · requires a state tented to the Supreme Court. . 
prisoner ander capital sentence to file a ,e,o. The flllnc period It also tolled under sec-
tlon 2254 petition within 180 daya from the Uon 2256{b) durinc &DJ' perfod that a capital 
entr7 ol an order under section 2256<c). In cue It pen~ for post-conviction review 
almost all cues, th1a will be an order ap- before a state court of competent JurtacUc-
Polntlnr counsel to lnJttate state post-con- Uon. After all state post-conviction review 
viction review. But even If a state prisoner ia baa been completed, lnclu~ review b7 the 
not entftled to the appaintment of counsel court of wt resort. the 180 da,y period 
11r aimply reJecta the State's officer of ap- be,tns to nm again U the capital sentence la 
Point.mm&. the 180 day period applies to all undisturbed. The next step for the state 
capital cases U the State la subject to thJs prisoner la to file a section 2254 petition In 
subcbapCer. federal d.lstrlct court. U counsel for the 
In death penalty Jurisdictions, the sole In• state prisoner properl7 discharges h1a re-
cent!ve for a prisoner tnltlate post-convic- sponslbWtJea, default under the 180 day rule 
Uon reTleT; la either the schedullnr of an will not occur. 
execution date or the threat to schedule In the event that counsel experiences 
one. 'lbe disadvantares to thfs method of some difficulty In flllnr a section 2254 peU-
admlnJstertnc capital Utlptlon persuaded tlon on time, subsection <c> authorizes a 80 
the Committee to recommend the mandato- da7 extension upan a showtnr of rood cause 
17 staJ ol aecutlon provisions 1n section In the federal district that would have Juris-
<b> UPon the development of a complete 
evidentiary record, the district court aball 
rule on the merits of the claims properlJ 
before It. · 
Comment: Subsection <a> defines the 
acope of federal review In capital cases to 
which this aubchapter applies. It authorizes 
the district court to consider only those fed-
eral cla1ms actuallJ raised and litl(ated In 
the state court.a. U the section 2254 petition 
present.a no new clalma, the district court 
will proceed to rule on the merits of the 
claims properly before it u lonr u the state 
evidentJ&rJ record and findings of fact are 
adequate. U the7 are deficient In an, re-
spect reco(Dized under section 2™<d>, the 
district court must complete the evldentlal"J' 
record before addresslnc the issues on the 
merit& To thil extent. subsection <a> does 
not depart from exlstlnr law and practice. 
I! a petitioner asserts a claim not previ-
ously presented to the state court.a, the dis-
trict court can consider the claim onIJ If one 
of the three exceptions to the ,eneral rule 
listed In subsection <aKl> ii applicable. In 
that cue, the district court must conduct an 
evtdentiary hearlnr necessar, to a full and 
fair consideration of the claim and In ac-
cordance with subsection <b> adjudicate it 
on the menu alonr with all other Issues 
presented In the section 2254 petition. 
Aa far u new or "unexhausted" clalma are 
concerned, section 2259 represents a chanre 
In the exhaustion doctrine u articulated in 
Bou v. Lvmtv, 455 u. S. 609 <1982>. Section 
2259 bars 11Uch cl.alma from oonslderatlon 
unless one of the 11UbaectJon <aKl> exoep-
Uona ii applicable. Tbe prisoner cannot 
return to at.ate court to exhaust even U he 
would lllte to do 10. On the other hand. If a 
aubsectlon <aXU exception ii applicable, the 
district oourt la directed to conduct an evf. 
dentJarJ, bearlrig and to rule on the new 
cJalm without first exhausttnr state reme-
dlell u Rose •· Lvmf~ now requires. Becau,e 
of the eldstenoe of state procedural default 
rulea, exhaustion ii futile In the rreat ma-
Jorlty of cases. It serves the state Interest of 
comlt7 in theory, but In practice It results In 
delay and undermines the state Interest In 
the finality of tta criminal convictions. The 
Committee believes that the St.ates would 
prefer to see post-conviction UUptlon co 
forward In capital cases. even If that ental.la 
a minor subordination of their lntereat In 
comity u It la expressed In the exhaustion 
doctrine. 
Sect!on Z260. Cert{ffcau Qf probable CCl1'1e 
inapplfcabu.-The requirement of a certlfi• 
cate of probable cause In order to appeal 
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from &be diNict court to the court of ap- ood. espedally among teenagers; Involved tn setting the direction of 
peals does not. applY &o babeu corpua cuea wing ceographJc mobillty of farnl- family resource and support pro 
aubJoct to the provilSom of t.bfa subchapter II ; and splralllng poverty among chll- and wort as partners with pr, . · :=,_ when & aecond or aucceastve petlUon dre , particularly 1n female-headed staff. 
Comment: The prem11e of thf.a 1Ubchat-ter hou holds. Several State government a.gentles-
. ts that a at.ate priloner under capital &en· Th result of these changes often Is Including my home State of 
tence 1a ent.tUed to one oPt>Ortunity for state bolati and frustration within f.amt. land's Department of H~ Re-
and federal post<onvk:tlon revt~w before lies, p them at riak of & range of aources-have recognJzed the potential 
belna •ubJect to uecut1on. Cons1stent with &Oclal p blema. Traditional aoclal In- of family resource and support pro-
thia premJ•e. tM O>rnmfUe4e believes that 1n stituUo both public and private, IT'&DlS for assisting paren~an early 
a aectfon 2254 proceedln&, & state prisoner have al.ow to respond to the point, thereby avolA'"'" f crises 
should J>e allowed to appeal tram the dis- ... 1...... 1n f•-n .. 1U to th eeds ~ 
tr1ct court to the court of appeals u a ~es ~ e, e n and problems which 6 te agencies 
matter of richL Wtt.b one exception, •ectfon within fMWLlllPI, and to their potential- would later have to lll1.l'l1"A!n 
12eo ~Urn!n•te• the eertlflcau of probable 1Y costly and ong-tenn repercussions. These family suppo centers are 
cause requirement tn cue• to which this For the part. the delivery of prevention oriented p 1n programs 
aubch;&Pter II applJcable. 'lbe ex~tlon IOdal aervfcea famillea In the United that serve )'oung ts and their 
•~· when a 8eCOOd or succeatve petition Sta.tea contlnu to operate on a casu- children from birth age three All of 
II med. Ew:n If IUCb • petition t• authonzed alty-based. cns1&\drfven 1ystem. Re- th te ... -et •--- ..,.._,.;ts .. _ 
IIDder the prcmafom of •ectlon 2257<c), the ,rim:au,, de ted to treu- e cen rs .... 15 ~ ...-- u-c;• 
rtcbt to appeal 1n t11at 1n11tance wtll be 1ov- sources are P vo cause they, and elr children. are 
erned bJ aec:tlon 2253 nther than •ectlon Ing existing, we fined problems most vulnerable the negattve conse-
2HO. rather than bull the capacity of quences of ear chlldbearlng. The 
__ famillea to avoid p lems or to deal centers' overri objective Is to In-
By Ms. MIKUIBKI: effectively with th at an early terrupt the cle of poverty among 
. 1'161. A blll to establish a national stage. young paren and their children by 
,tf:r for Information and technical Virtually no supportl services are preventing ditlonal pregnancies, en-
relattnc to all types of available to children or nts In the f:l resource and support prolT'&DlS, critical years before a d enters cou.ragtng, and-whenever possible-
and or other pl1Jl)06es; to the Com- school, even though ~:eaircn and ex- en&.bltng em to complete their edu-
mi on Labor and Human Re- perlence indicate strongly at much cation. ulre Job skills, and Increase 
of a child's important physl , social, their P ntlng competencies and con-
IF.t.lULT ~er ACr 
M1KULSKI. Mr. President, I am 
to Introduce today a sig-
lll aimed at Informing the 
Nation. d the world. about the good 
things be done for American !&mf. 
lies by erfcan famflles. Mr. Presi-
dent.. we tnow too well the statls-
tlca about ow the American family 
has cha.naed the last few decades. 
Ha.--dly a k coes by without the 
media loet:ISl!lig on how families are 
chandnc In ur country. But we 
rarely hear abd t how our familles are 
successfully ting to the changes 
besetting them =eir communities. wen. 1n fact f es have been In 
the forefront of developing services 
and programs to ~e~_p \hemselves and 
other familles to ~eviate the stress 
and Isolation they ott.en face. Pamilies 
In communities all licross the country 
h&ve tn~]J' me together to 
create community parent educa-
tion and support se These pro-
erams constitute what u come to be 
commonly referred to the "family 
resource and supportH m vement. 
It Is the family reso and support 
movement which I am he to tell you 
about today. More lmpo tly, I am. 
today lntroduc1n& a blll ed at ~et-
tin& the word out around e country 
about thla movement. I • uld not.e 
here that I am especlaI}y pl that 
tam.Wea and communJty d State 
leaders tn my home State of aryland 
are In the vanguard 1n this xclting 
movement. 
Let'• step bact for a momen first, 
and look at why such a moveme t has 
developed 1n this country. The ami-
llea In our co\Dltry are 
These changes Include the contlnUlJIY 
Increasing numbers of mothers work-
Inc outside the home; changes 
family structure brought about by q•· 
vorce. remarrl8ie. and single paren 
and Intellectual development rs 1n fide~ To achieve the center's objec-
these early years. This Is the od 1n tives, articlpants and staff plan a 
which positive support to par ts tn com ation of structured and un-
the form of parenting education. d at~tured activities. At the core of all 
development Information. peer up- thf1 services la a focus on enhancing 
port, and links to other comm ty c 11d development. 
services can Increase pa.rent.s' co 1- Mr. President. there Is no better ln-
dence and competence tn their Job estment we could make with our na-
being parents. Their children In ttonal resources. In order to assure the 
benefit from Improved child reartn development of efiect111e family re-
practices and a more secure and i,· urce and support programs wiUun 
turtng home environment. ommunities WII.Ilting to tJevelop such 
In response to this unmet need or p grams, the bill I e.r.a introducing 
supportive services. famllies in~u- to ay would create a national center 
ruties aero&',. the country have rp.- wh primary goal Is to promote the 
nized family resource and sup pro- esta llshment of model family re-
ua.ms to help themselves. Th,tse pro- and support programs around 
it1lJilS a.re significa.nUy and d~libera.te- untry. The national center 
ly different from traditional aoclal v.ould romote the development of 
service programs. Rather. t}!a.n focus- family r urce and support programs 
L"lg on a 11mlted and caref)'_~ circum- In two k y ways. First, the national 
scribed £J'OUP of famlllei; who are 1n center wo d establish a cleartnghou..c:e 
the midst of severe pro,blems, family to systemf Identify, collect and 
resource and support ptograms reach disseminate ormation on all types 
out to all familles tnie community, of family urce and support pro-
with the coal of.hel Ing them tune- crams around the country. I want to 
tion better so u to e ance their qual- point out here hat a seemingly small 
tty of life and a~vold r lessen problems but essential f Ion of this clearing-
which might devel later. house la to Info Individual parents 
Family reso and support pro- either of exJstinc am1ly resource and 
arams exist In a e pf aettinp. In• support programs thin their commu-
cluding comm#tJ centers. achools. nltiea or to provide t.Y'1ltnh,o and tech· 
the workpl~ or wherever It ta con- nlcal assistance to 1n setting up 
ven!mt for ftmWJ1::a to meet. In some such a program 1n th community If 
cues. trad1 na1 IOclal aervlce aaen- one does not already e 
des-ehDd centers, community The second import.an task of the 
mental h agencies, Head Start national center Is to Iden ffy different 
pro or health clfn1c:s-h&ve types of model family r urce and 
added f resource and support support programs. The p ose of this 
compo nts to their exJst!ng proil'8,ID. t&sk la to work with the odel pro-
resource and support pro- gram administrators to deve p traln-
alao differ fundamentally from Ina and technical assistance aterials 
onal aocl&1 aervlce programs 1n and semJna.ra for use by other 
th~ Interaction with participants. nitlea In . settinl up such mod 
e services they offer begin with and &n,mS. 
b.tiild on a famDy'1 strengths. seeldne Finally, this bill would also man' 
empower families to meet their own the conduct of evaluations of the 
eeda. Aa a result. pa.rents are closely ous types of family resource and 
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WASHING1DN , D .C. 20544 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
October 17, 1989 
'i ~ OCT i98~ 
WILLIAM R. B URCHILL, JR. 
GENERAL COUNSEL 
t Oocr 19ag 
I am providing for your information excerpts from the Congressional Record of 
yesterday relevant to the progress of the Ad Hoc Committee report. 
As you will observe, Senator Biden introduced his own variation of the Ad Hoc 
Committee's proposal as S. 1757. Senator Thurmond then proceeded to introduce our 
proposal as S. 1760, and he also inserted into the Record the full text of your 
Committee's report. I am copying the other members of the Ad Hoc Committee with 
this correspondence in order that we shall all share the same information as this process 
goes forward. With kindest personal regards, 
Enclosure 
cc: Honorable Charles Clark 
Honorable Wm. Terrell Hodges 
Honorable Paul H. Roney 
Honorable Barefoot Sanders 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
FIFTY YEARS OF SERVICE 
Sincerely, 
TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
1939 - 1989 
-
• l~ PATTON, BOGGS & BLOW 2550 M STREET , N.W . 
WASHINGTON , D.C . 20037 
(202) 457-6000 
Octobe r 18, 1989 
Justice Powell 
United States Supreme Court 
1 First Street,N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
My dear Justice Powell: 
ITT TELEX, 440324 
TRT TELEX, 197780 
TELEC0PIER, 457-6315 
~ OCT 1989 ~ -
WRITER"S DIRECT DIAL }J 
(202) 457-6020 
I have long thought that the "cruel and unusual" nature of 
the death penalty as enforced in the United States is in the 
extraordinary time in which the condemned must contemplate his 
execution. Although I have served as defense counsel in only one 
case carrying the death sentence (Green v United States, 355 U.S. 
184), it strikes me that each day following sentencing must be a 
horror. For this reason, your committee's proposal should have 
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TAKING IB~U~![~ 
Justice Powell's Predicament 
Like most Americans. Lewis Powell Jr. had never given 
much thought to the death penalty . 
Then, in 1972. he joined the Supreme Court . Since then 
Justice Powell, who retired in June 1987 at the age of79. 
has thought about it quite a bit. 
He has adhered to his view that nothing in the 
Constitution bars governments from putting vicious 
murderers to death . But he has pondered-what happens after 
all the appeals have been litigated and the·stays of execution 
have run out and the prisoner's head has been shaved . 
"ljust can ' t imagine having the job of pulling the switch 
on someone in the electric chair. " Justice Powell said in an 
interview last week in his Supreme Court office . 
He also has come. to believe, contrary to his initial 
assumption, that " capital punishment has not deterred 
murders." They have continued at a "shocking" 20,000-a-
year pace, he notes, since he helped reinsta!e the death 
penalty in 1976. 
"It ' s perfectly clear that if I were in the legislature now, 
in view of the extended litigation and the ineffectiveness of 
the way the system operates. I would vote against the death 
penalty;: Justice Powell concludes . " l would be inclined to 
vote against it in any event. We are the only Western 
democracy that still retains the death sentence . ... We 
have a system that isn ' t working, and I doubt very much 
whether you could ever by law create a system that would 
work at the present stage of our civilization . " 
He adds that he has · •moral concerns as well as legal." 
Asked to elaborate, he pauses, groping for the right words, 
and says quietly, • 'The taking of human life is something 
that I'd rather leave to whomever one thinks of as God." 
These reflections are of particular interest in light of the 
recent release , by a Judicial Conference committee Justice 
Powell chaired at the request of Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist, of proposed fedcr.ri legislation to make 
eath-penalty litigation more fair, orderly-and final. 
The Powell committee's proposal would allow states 
willing to provide death-row prisoners with lawyers to place 
time limits on their post-conviction appeals and limit them 
to a single set of habeas appeals through state and federal 
.courts. ending the repetitive appeals that are now common. 
Many opponents of the death penalty immediately 
denounced the proposal as " a rush to the gallows, " in the 
words of the American Civil Liberties Union. 
Rejecting this assessment. Justice Powell says that the 
objective is to give each prisoner sentenced to death " one 
opportunity. with competent counsel. to have a thorough 
review all the way to the United States Supreme Court. " 
He predicts that death-penalty litigation would still take 
years to work its way through the courts . But he says , "It 
should be more expeditious than what we have presently.· ' 
Would not more expedition mean more executions--
more pulls on that switch? Why did Justice Powell spend 
much of his 82nd year devising ways to operate more 
efficiently a system he would rather see shut down? 
"I think that as long as the death penalty is retained as a 
law that it should be enforced,'' Justice Powell explains. 
"There are many laws with which I disagree but as a judge I 
would vote to carry out. " 
Vexed by the repetitive. 11th-hour appeals and stay 
applications filed by lawyers desperate to stave off 
imminent executions of prisoners who have spent years on 
death row, he wants a more orderly process. And he finds it 
unseemly that, with 2,200 people on death row, only 118 
({ 
have been executed since 1976. with an average-of more \l 
than eight years from sentence to execution. 
All this, the justice believes , undermines public respect 
for the judicial system: ·•It is operating in a way that the 
public-doesn ' t understand a!!d the lawyers can ' t explain . ·· 
Such reasoning will hardly satisfy those who fintt-the 
death penally not just morally trnublesome bui moraiiy 
abominable and who find Powell ' s concerns trivial when 
measured against the stakes for death-row defendants . 
The last thing they want is a fair, efficient process for 
culling out the minority of murderers so vicious that they 
qualify for execution under current laws . 
Even in the highly unlikely event that such a process 
could be devised. ardent opponents of the death penalty 
prefer the procedural bog that is the status quo . 
Although about 300 defendant~ are sentenced to death 
each vear . there were onlv 25 executions in 1987. 11 in · 
1988 : and 14 so far this y~ar. 
While;: the Powell committee seeks to 11ive condemned 
prisoners . almost all of whom are indige.rn. competent 
lawyers (which many now lack ) for state habeas rev iew and 
automatic stays o f execution . it seeks to thwart the delaying 
'"' 
tactics that have kept many alive . Those whose sentences 
still stand after one full set of appeals through state and 
federal courts would be on a fast track to the death chamber. 
The Powell proposal represents a good-faith effort to 
bring some rationality to the review process , but it is flawed 
by some troubling gaps. 
Trial-Level Injustice 
\l>{ith a mandate from the chief justice to address only 
post-conviction review . the committee did not touch on the 
most glaring injustice: the gross deficiency of the 
undercompensated, inexperienced trial lawyers appointed 
by the states. In Mississippi, for example , fees for 
court-appointed defense lawyers in capital cases are capped 
at an absurdly low $1,000, providing them strong incentives 
not to do the kind of thorough job that can make the 
difference between life and death . 
The Supreme Court has been slack in enforcing states ' 
constitutional obligations to provide indigeni defendants 
with effective assistance of counsel. Gross errors by defense 
• lawyers at death-penalty trials are commonplace . Some are 
I'- caught on appeal; others are not. And the many defendants 
whose trial lawyers are not very good but deemed good 
enough by the courts are out of luck . 
Thus. the current chaotic system of habeas review has 
one thing to recommend it; Prisoners who may have been 
condemned because of ineffective trial representation can 
stave off execution with repetitive habeas appeals and 
delaying tactics . Congress shouldn't deny them these 
weapons without guaranteeing them good trial lawyers . 
In addition. the Powell proposal represents more a wish 
than a guarantee that the lawyers for post-conviction review 
would be any better than those at the trial level have been . 
Also troubling is that the proposal would apply only to 
states that provide lawyers to death-row inmates in order to 
get the benefit of the restrictions on federal habeas review . 
If this is a good bargain for states. can it be good for 
death-row inmates too? 
Professor Albert Pearson of the University of Georgia 
School of Law says it can be . He served as reporter for the 
Powell committee , has represented capital defendants, and 
shares Justice Powell's doubts about the death penalty . 
Pearson says that opponents of the death penalty who 
have assailed his committee ' s proposal are naive if they 
assume they will be better off without it. The alternative . he 
notes , may be that the Supreme Court on its own will 
translate its evident impatience with death-penalty delays 
into drastic new restrictions on habeas review-as it has 
started doing already-with no .:ountervailing requirement 
t_hat states give death-row prisoners lawyers for state 
post-cm,vic tion review . (The Court ru ied in iune that the 
Constitution imposes no such requirement.) 
An American Bar Association task force has also been 
studying the death-penalty process and plans to issue a 
report next month, which may suggest solutions for some ol 
the problems with the Powell committee·s proposals . 
While members o f Congress ponder these reports. they 
should also give some thought to the broader points Justice 
Powell made last week : The death penalty serves no useful 
purpose . It will serve no useful purpose no matter how 
much the review process is tinkered with . It is morall y 
troublesome . if not worse. And it ought to be abo lished. 
Stuart Tudor Jr . i.l" u senior ,vriter " ·irh American Lm n ·er 
,'vtediu L. P. ·and The American Lawyer ma',(u:i11e. · ·raki;1g 







October 23, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee 
Dear Al: 
It will be good to have you with me when I appear 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee on November 8. I have 
asked Hew to join us. 
In thinking about likely questions, the following 
come to mind. We are certain to be asked about "40% of cap-
ital cases being reversed". I have never known the origin 
of that figure or what it means. It would be helpful, as-
suming the accuracy of the 40%, to know where the reversals 
occurred, e.g., state or federal courts, and if federal 
courts whether DC, CA or Supreme Court reversed. 
As for Supreme Court cases, it also would be 
helpful to know how many of these reversals occurred on 
the first trip through the system, including first federal 
habeas. 
My guess is that some bright staff member will make 
a list of cases in which I wrote the opinion of the Supreme 
Court in capital cases, in which we reversed a state court. 
I recall, for example, Booth v. Maryland and Eddings v. 
Oklahoma. 
If you are here on the afternoon of November 7, it 
might be desirable for us to talk a bit. 
Sincerely, 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
School of Law 
University of Georgia 
Athens, Georgia 30602 
lfp/ ss 
cc: R. Hewitt Pate, III, Esquire 
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2 aocr 1ssa 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
U.S. Supreme Court 
1 First Street 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
On Wednesday, November 8, 1989, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee will hold a hearing on habeas corpus reform in 
capital cases. The hearing will begin at 10:00 a.m. in Room 
226 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. I am writing to 
request that you testify at this hearing. 
The hearing will focus on past and current legislative 
proposals to reform federal court procedures for reviewing 
sentences imposed in state criminal trials. In light of your 
role as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Corpus in Capital Cases, your testimony would be of great 
interest to the committee. 
In order for you to prepare adequately, I would like to 
suggest some specific topics that I hope to cover in the 
hearing. Of course, other Senators may raise additional 
issues, but I would like to discuss the following: 
1) The recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal 
Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases; 
2) S.1757, S.1760, and S.88, which would amend Title 28, 
United States Code, to provide special habeas corpus 
procedures in capital cases (copies are enclosed). 
Committee rules allow your entire written testimony to be 
placed in the hearing record but require you to submit 70 
copies of your testimony to the committee, Room 224 Dirksen 
Senate Office Building, at least 48 hours before the hearing. 
I will ask you to make an opening statement that summarizes 
your written testimony, and then we will begin with questions. 
/ ~ -
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
October 23, 1989 
Page Two 
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I want to thank you in advance for testifying. If you 
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The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
U.S. Supreme Court 
1 First Street 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
On Wednesday, November 8, 1989, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee will hold a hearing on habeas corpus reform in 
capital cases. The hearing will begin at 10:00 a.m. in Room 
226 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. I am writing to 
request that you testify at this hearing. 
The hearing will focus on past and current legislative 
proposals to reform federal court procedures for reviewing 
sentences imposed in state criminal trials. In light of your 
role as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Corpus in Capital Cases, your testimony would be of great 
interest to the committee. 
In order for you to prepare adequately, I would like to 
suggest some specific topics that I hope to cover in the 
hearing. Of course, other Senators may raise additional 
issues, but I would like to discuss the following: 
1) The recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal 
Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases; 
2) S.1757, S.1760, and S.88, which would amend Title 28, 
United States Code, to provide special habeas corpus 
procedures in capital cases (copies are enclosed). 
Committee rules allow your entire written testimony to be 
placed in the hearing record but require you to submit 70 
copies of your testimony to the committee, Room 224 Dirksen 
Senate Office Building, at least 48 hours before the hearing. 
I will ask you to make an opening statement that summarizes 
your written testimony, and then we will begin with questions. 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
October 23, 1989 
Page Two 
I want to thank you in advance for testifying. If you 






1ST SESSION S.1760 
To amend Title 28, United States Code, to provide special habeas corpus 
procedures in capital cases. 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
OCTOBER 16 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 18), 1989 
II 
Mr. THURMOND introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 
to the Committee on the Judiciary 
A BILL 
To amend Title 28, United States Code, to provide special 
habeas corpus procedures in capital cases. 
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
3 SPECIAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES IN CAPITAL 
4 CASES 
5 (a) Title 28, United States Code, is amended by insert-
6 ing the following new chapter immediately following chapter 
7 153: 
8 "CHAPTER 154-SPECIAL HABEAS CORPUS 
9 PROCEDURES IN CAPITAL CASES 
"Sec. 
2 
"2256. Prisoners in State custody subject to capital sentence; appointment of coun- 1 tence sel; requirement of rule of court or statute; procedures for appoint-
ment. 
2 "2257. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on stays of execution; succes- recor 
sive petitions. 
"2258. Filing of habe.:.~ corpus petition; time requirements; tolling rules. 3 
"2259. Evidentiary hearings; scope of Federal review; district court adjudication. 
"2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable. 4 
1 "§ 2256. Prisoners in State custody subject to capital sen- 5 
2 tence; appointment of counsel; requirement 6 
3 of rule of court or statute; procedures for ap- 7 
4 pointment 8 
5 "(a) This chapter shall apply to cases arising under sec- 9 
6 tion 2254 of this title brought by prisoners in State custody 10 
7 who are subject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if 11 
8 subsections (b) and (c) are satisfied. 12 
9 "(b) This chapter is applicable if a State establishes by 13 
10 rule of its court of last resort or by statute a mechanism for 14 
11 the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable 15 
12 litigation expenses of competent counsel in State post-convic- 16 and 
13 tion proceedings brought by indigent prisoners whose capital 17 shal 
14 convictions and sentences have been upheld on direct appeal 18 dire 
15 to the court of last resort in the State to have otherwise 19 unli 
16 become final for State law purposes. The rule of court or 20 rep 
17 statute must provide standards of competency for the ap- 21 
18 pointment of such counsel. 22 dur 
19 "(c) Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation, 23 mg 
20 and reimbursement of counsel as provided in subsection (b) 24 pro 
21 must offer counsel to all State prisoners under capital sen- 25 titl 








1 tence and must provide for the entry of an order by a court of 
2 record-
3 "(1) appointing one or more counsel to represent 
4 the prisoner upon a finding that the prisoner-
5 "(A) is indigent and has accepted the offer; 
6 or 
7 "(B) is unable competently to decide whether 
8 to accept or reject the offer; 
9 "(2) finding, after a hearing, if necessary, that the 
10 prisoner has rejected the offer of counsel and made the 
11 decision with an understanding of its legal conse-
12 quences; or 
13 "(3) denying the appointment of counsel upon a 
14 finding that the prisoner is not indigent. 
15 "(d) No counsel appointed pursuant to subsections (b) 
16 and (c) to represent a State prisoner under capital sentence 
17 shall have previously represented the prisoner at trial or on 
18 direct appeal in the case for which the appointment is made 
19 unless the prisoner and counsel expressly request continued 
20 representation. 
21 "(e) The ineffectiveness I or incompetence of counsel 
22 during State or Federal collateral post-conviction proceed-
23 ings in a capital case shall not be a ground for relief in a 
24 proceeding arising under this chapter or section 2254 of this 
25 title. This subsection shall not preclude the appointment of 
es 11so 1s 
4 
1 different counsel at any phase of State or Federal post-con- 1 
2 viction proceedings. 2 
3 "§ 2257. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on 3 
4 stays of execution; successive petitions 4 
5 "(a) Upon the entry in the appropriate State court of 5 
6 record of an order pursuant to section 2256(c) of this title, a 6 
7 warrant or order setting an execution date for a State prison- 7 
8 er shall be stayed upon application to any court that would 8 
9 have jurisdiction over any proceedings filed pursuant to sec- 9 
10 tion 2254 of this title. The application must recite that the 10 
11 State has invoked the post-conviction review procedures of 11 
12 this chapter and that the scheduled execution is subject to 12 curre1 
13 stay. 13 to en 
14 "(b) A stay of execution granted pursuant to subsection 14 unles, 
15 (a) shall expire if- 15 
16 "(1) a State prisoner fails to file a habeas corpus 16 
17 petition under section 2254 of this title within the time 17 
18 required in section 2258 of this title; or 18 
19 "(2) upon completion of district court and court of 19 
20 appeals review under section 2254 of this title, the pe- 20 
21 tition for relief is denied and- 21 
22 "(A) the time for filing a petition for certio- 22 
23 rari has expired and no petition has been filed; 23 
24 "(B) a timely petition for certiorari was filed 24 
25 and the Supreme Court denied the petition; or 
es 11so is es 1 
eral post-con-
lon; limits on 
titions 
State court of 
of this title, a 
~ State prison-
Lrt that would 
.rsuant to sec-
:ecite that the 
procedures of 
L is subject to 
~ to subsection 
habeas corpus 
vi.thin the time 
"t and court of 
s title, the pe-
ion for certio-
been filed; 














"(C) a timely petition for certiorari was filed 
and upon consideration of the case, the Supreme 
Court disposed of it in a manner that left the cap-
ital sentence undisturbed; or 
"(3) before a court of competent jurisdiction, a 
State prisoner under capital sentence waives the right 
to pursue habeas corpus review under section 2254 of 
this title, in the presence of counsel and after having 
been advised of the consequences of making the 
waiver. 
"(c) If one of the conditions in subsection (b) has oc-
12 curred, no Federal court thereafter shall have the authority 












"(1) the basis for the stay and request for relief is 
a claim not previously presented in the State or Feder-
al courts; 
es 1760 1s 
"(2) the failure to raise the claim-
"(A) was the result of State action in viola-
tion of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States; 
"(B) was the result of a recognition by the 
Supreme Court of a new Federal right that is ret-











"(C) is due to the fact that the claim is based 
on facts that could not have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence in 
time to present the claim for State or Federal 
post-conviction review; and 
"(3) the facts underlying the claim would be suffi-
cient, if proven, to undermine the court's confidence in 
the jury's determination of guilt on the offense or of-
fenses for which the death penalty was imposed. 
10 "§ 2258. Filing of habeas corpus petition; time require-
11 
12 
ments; tolling rules 
"(a) Any petition for habeas corpus relief under section 
13 2254 of this title must be filed in the appropriate district 
14 court not later than 180 days after the filing in the appropri-
15 ate State court of record of an order issued in compliance 
16 with section 2256(c) of this title. The time requirements es-
1 7 tablished by this section shall be tolled-
18 "(1) from the date that a petition for certiorari is 
19 filed in the Supreme Court until the date of final dispo-
20 sition of the petition if a State prisoner seeks review of 
21 a capital sentence that has been affirmed on direct 
22 appeal by the court of last resort of the State or has 
23 otherwise become final for State law purposes; 
24 "(2) subject to subsection (b), during any period in 
25 which a State prisoner under capital sentence has a 



















































properly filed request for post-conviction review pend-
ing before a State court of competent jurisdiction; and 
"(3) during an additional period not to exceed 60 
days, if counsel for the State prisoner- ' 
"(A) moves for an extension of time in the 
Federal district court that would have jurisdiction 
over the case upon the filing of a habeas corpus 
petition under section 2254 of this title; and 
• "(B) makes a showing of good cause for 
counsel's inability to file the habeas corpus peti-
tion within the 180-day period established by this 
section. 
13 "(b)(l) The time requirement established by subsection 
14 (a) shall be continuously tolled under paragraph (2) of that 
15 subsection from the date the State prisoner initially files for 
16 post-conviction review until the date of final disposition of the 
1 7 case by the highest court of the State so long as all State 
18 filing rules are timely met. 
19 "(2) Tolling shall not occur under subsection (a)(2) 
20 during the pendency of a petition for certiorari before the 
21 Supreme Court following State post-conviction review. 
es 11so rs 
8 
1 "§ 2259. Evidentiary hearings; scope of Federal review; 
2 district court adjudication 
3 "(a) When a State prisoner under a capital sentence 
4 files a petition for habeas corpus relief to which this chapter 
5 applies, the district court shall-
6 "(1) determine the sufficiency of the evidentiary 
7 record for habeas corpus review based on the claims 
8 actually presented and litigated in the State courts, 
9 unless the prisoner shows that the failure to raise or 
10 develop a claim in the State courts-
11 "(A) was the result of State action in viola-
12 tion of the Constitution or laws of the United 
13 States; 
14 "(B) was the result of a recognition by the 
15 Supreme Court of a new Federal right that is ret-
16 roactively applicable; or 
17 "(C) is due to the fact that the claim is based 
18 on facts that could not have been discovered 
19 through the exercise of reasonable diligence in 
20 time to present the claim for State post-conviction 
21 review; and 
22 "(2) conduct any requested evidentiary hearing 
23 necessary to complete the record for habeas corpus 
24 reVIew. 
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1 "(b) Upon the development of a complete evidentiary 
2 record, the district court shall rule on the merits of the claims 
3 properly before it. 
4 "§ 2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable 
5 "The requirement of a certificate of probable cause in 
6 order to appeal from the district court to the court of appeals 
7 does not apply to habeas corpus cases subject to this chapter 
8 except when a second or successive petition is filed.". 
0 
es 1160 1s 
101ST CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION ·s.ss 
II 
To reform procedures for collateral review of criminal judgments, and for other 
purposes. 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
JANUARY 25 (legislative day, JANUARY 3), 1989 
Mr. THURMOND (for himself, Mr. HATCH, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. HELMS, Mr. 
WILSON, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. DEOONCINI, Mr. SIMPSON, and Mr. 
DOMENIC!) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 
to the Committee on the Judiciary 
A BILL 
To reform procedures for collateral review of criminal 
judgments, and for other purposes. 
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
3 That this Act may be cited as the "Reform of Federal Inter-
4 vention in State Proceedings Act of 1989". 
5 SEC. 2. Section 2244 of title 28, United States Code, is 
6 amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sub-
7 sections: 
8 "(d) When a person in custody pursuant to the judgment 
9 of a State court fails to raise a claim in State proceedings at 
2 
1 the time or in the manner required by State rules of proce-
2 dure, the claim shall not be entertained in an application for a 
3 writ of habeas corpus unless actual prejudice resulted to the 













"(1) the failure to raise the claim properly or to 
have it heard in State proceedings was the result of 
State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 
the United States; 
"(2) the Federal right asserted was newly recog-
nized by the Supreme Court subsequent to the proce-
dural default and is retroactively applicable; or 
"(3) the factual predicate of the claim could not 
have been discovered through the exercise of reasona-
ble diligence prior to the procedural default. 
"(e) A one-year period of limitation shall apply to an 
17 application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 
18 pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation 
19 period shall run from the latest of the following times: 






"(2) the time at which the impediment to filing an 
application created by State action in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, 
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where the applicant was prevented from filing by such 
State action; 
"(3) the time at which the Federal right asserted 
was initially recognized· by the Supreme Court, where 
the right has been newly recognized by the Court and 
is retroactively applicable; or 
"(4) the time at which the factual predicate of the 
claim or claims presented could have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence.". 
SEC. 3. Section 2253 of title 28, United States Code, is 
11 amended to read as follows: 
12 "§ 2253. Appeal 
13 ''In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under 
14 section 2255 of this title before a circuit or district judge, the 
15 final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court 
16 of appeals for the circuit where the proceeding is had. 
1 7 "There shall be no right of appeal from such an order in 
18 a proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to remove, to 
19 another district or place for commitment or trial, a person 
20 charged with a criminal offense against the United States, 
21 or to test the validity of his detention pending removal 
22 proceedings. 
23 "An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals 
24 from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding where the 
25 detention complained of arises out of process issued by a 
S 88 IS 
4 
1 State court, or from the final order in a proceeding under 
2 section 2255 of this title, unless a circuit justice or judge 
3 issues a certificate of probable cause.". 
4 SEC. 4. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 1s 





"HABEAS CORPUS AND § 2 2 5 5 PROCEEDINGS 
"(a) Application for an Original Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
9 An application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be made to 
10 the appropriate district court. If application is made to a cir-
11 cuit judge, the application will ordinarily be transferred to the 
12 appropriate district court. If an application is made to or 
13 transferred to the district court and denied, renewal of the 
14 application before a circuit judge is not favored; the proper 
15 remedy is by appeal to the court of appeals from the order of 
16 the district court denying the writ. 
17 "(b) Necessity of Certificate of Probable Cause for 
18 Appeal. In a habeas corpus proceeding in which the deten-
19 tion complained of arises out of process issued by a State 
20 court, and in a motion proceeding pursuant to section 2255 of 
21 title 28, United States Code, an appeal by the applicant or 
22 movant may not proceed unless a circuit judge issues a certif-
23 icate of probable cause. If a request for a certificate of proba-
24 ble cause is addressed to the court of appeals, it shall be 
25 deemed addressed to the judges thereof and shall be consid-
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1 ered by a circuit judge or judges as the court deems appropri-
2 ate. If no express request for a certificate is filed, the notice 
3 of appeal shall be deemed to constitute a request addressed to 
4 the judges of the court of appeals. If an appeal is taken by a 
5 State or the government or its representative, a certificate of 
6 probable cause is not required.". 
7 SEC. 5. Section 2254 of title 28, United States Code, is 
8 amended by redesignating subsections "(e)" and "(0" as 




(a) by amending subsection (b) to read as follows: 
"(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf 
13 of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
14 court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant 
15 has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the 
16 State, or that there is either an absence of available State 
1 7 corrective process or the existence of circumstances render-
18 ing such process ineffective to protect the rights of the appli-
19 cant. An application may be denied on the merits notwith-
20 standing the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies 
21 available in the courts of the States."; 
22 (b) by redesignating subsection "(d)" as subsection 
23 "(e)", and amending it to read as follows: 
24 "(e) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a 
25 writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 
S 88 IS 
6 
1 judgment of a State court, a full and fair determination of a 1 
2 factual issue made in the case by a State court shall be pre- 2 
3 sumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of 3 
4 rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evi- 4 
5 dence."; and 5 
6 (c) by adding a new subsection (d) reading as 6 
7 follows: 7 
8 "(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf 8 und, 
9 of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 9 late1 
10 court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that has 10 
11 been fully and fairly adjudicated in State proceedings.". 11 
12 SEC. 6. Section 2255 of title 28, United States Code, is 12 
13 amended by deleting the second paragraph and the penulti- 13 
14 mate paragraph thereof, and by adding at the end thereof the 14 
15 following new paragraphs: 15 
16 "When a person fails to raise a claim at the time or in 16 
17 the manner required by Federal rules of procedure, the claim 17 
18 shall not be entertained in a motion under this section unless 18 
19 actual prejudice resulted to the movant from the alleged 19 
20 denial of the right asserted and- 20 
21 "(1) the failure to raise the claim properly, or to 21 
22 have it heard, was the result of governmental action in 22 
23 violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 23 t 
24 States; 
S 88 IS S 88 J 
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"(2) the right asserted was newly recognized by 
the Supreme Court subsequent to the procedural de-
fault and is retroactively applicable; or 
"(3) the factual predicate of the claim could not 
5 have been discovered through the exercise of reasona-
6 ble diligence prior to the procedural default. 
7 "A two-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion 
8 under this section. The limitation period shall run from the 
9 latest of the following times: 
10 "(1) the time at which the judgment of conviction 




"(2) the time at which the impediment to making 
a motion created by governmental action in violation of 
the Constitution or laws of the United States is re-





a motion by such governmental action; 
"(3) the time at which the right asserted was ini-
tially recognized by the Supreme Court, where the 
right has been newly recognized by the Court and is 




"(4) the time at which the factual predicate of the 
claim or claims presented could have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence.". 
0 
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101ST CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION S.1757 
To amend title 28, United States Code, to provide special habeas corpus 
procedures in capital cases. 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
OCTOBER 16 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 18), 1989 
II 
Mr. BrnEN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
Committee on the Judiciary 
A BILL 
To amend title 28, United States Code, to provide special 
habeas corpus procedures in capital cases. 
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 lives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
4 This Act may be cited as the "Habeas Corpus Reform 
5 Act of 1989''. 
6 SEC. 2. SPECIAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES IN CAPITAL 
7 CASE& 
8 Title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
9 the following new chapter immediately following chapter 
10 153: 
2 
1 "CHAPTER 154-SPECIAL HABEAS CORPUS 
2 PROCEDURES IN CAPITAL CASES 
"Sec. 
"2256. Prisoners in State custody subject to capital sentence; appointment of coun-
sel; requirement of rule of court or statute; procedures for appoint-
ment. 
"2257. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on stays of execution; succes-
sive petitions. 
"2258. Filing of habeas corpus petition; time requirements; tolling rules. 
"2259. Evidentiary hearings; scope of Federal review; district court adjudication. 
"2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable. 
"2261. Counsel in capital cases; trial and post-conviction; standards. 
"2262. Law controlling in Federal habeas corpus proceedings; retroactivity. 
3 "§ 2256. Prisoners in State custody subject to capital sen-
4 tence; appointment of counsel; requirement 
5 of rule of court or statute; procedures for ap-
6 pointment 
7 "(a) This chapter shall apply to cases arising under sec-
8 tion 2254 of this title brought by prisoners in State custody 
9 who are subject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if 
10 subsections (b) and (c) are satisfied. 
11 "(b) This chapter is applicable if a State establishes by 
12 rule of its court of last resort or by statute a mechanism for 
13 the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable 
14 fees and litigation expenses of competent counsel consistent 
15 with section 2261 of this title. 
16 "(c)(l) Upon receipt of notice that counsel has been ap-
1 7 pointed to represent a prisoner under sentence of death after 
18 the prisoner's conviction and sentence have been upheld on 
19 direct review in a State court of last resort and in the Su-
20 preme Court of the United States if application is made to 


























)RPUS 1 that court, the State court of last resort shall enter an order 
s 2 confirming the appointment and shall direct its clerk to for-
nent of coun- I 
3 ward the record of the case to the attorney appointed. 
, for appoint-
I 4 "(2) Upon receipt of notice that counsel has been offered 
1tion; succes-
' 5 to, but declined by, such a prisoner, the State court of last 
adjudication. I 6 re·sort shall direct an appropriate court or judge to hold a 
7 hearing, at which the prisoner and the attorney offered to the 
,ity. I 
ital sen- l 
8 prisoner shall be present, to determine whether the prisoner 
9 is competent to decide whether to accept or reject the ap-
tirement I 
; for ap- I 
10 pointment of counsel and whether, if competent, the prisoner 
11 knowingly and intelligently waives the appointment of coun-
I 
12 sel. The court or judge shall report its determinations to the 
.der sec-
13 State court of last resort, which shall review the determina-
custody 
· only if 
14 tions for error. If the State court of last resort concludes that 
15 the prisoner is incompetent and does not waive counsel, the 
shes by r 
16 court shall enter an order confirming the appointment of the 
ism for I 
17 attorney assigned to the prisoner by the appointing authority 
18 and shall direct the clerk to forward the record to the attor-
mnable 
tsistent I 19 ney appointed. If the court concludes that the prisoner is 
20 competent and waives counsel, the court shall enter an order 
21 that counsel need not be appointed and shall direct the clerk 
1en ap-
b. after ~ 22 to forward the record to the prisoner; provided that nothing 
:1 
23 in this section requires the appointment of counsel to a pris-
eld on 
24 oner who is not indigent. 
te Su-
tde to 
es 1151 IS 
4 
1 "(d) No counsel appointed pursuant to subsections (b) 1 
2 and (c) to represent a State prisoner in State collateral pro- 2 
3 ceedings shall have previously represented the prisoner at 3 
4 trial or on direct appeal in the case for which the appoint- 4 
5 ment is made unless the prisoner and counsel expressly re- 5 
6 quest continued representation. 6 
7 "(e) The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel ap- 7 
8 pointed under this chapter during State or Federal collateral 8 
9 post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in 9 
10 a proceeding arising under this chapter or section 2254 of 10 
11 this title. This limitation shall not preclude the appointment 11 
12 of different counsel at any phase of State or Federal post- 12 
13 conviction proceedings. 13 
14 "§ 2257. Mandatory stay of execution; duration; limits on 14 
15 stays of execution; successive petitions 15 
16 "(a) Upon the entry in the State court of last resort of 16 
17 an order pursuant to section 2256(c) of this title, a warrant or 17 
18 order setting an execution date for a State prisoner shall be 18 
19 stayed upon application to any court that would have juris- 19 
20 diction over any proceedings filed pursuant to section 2254 of 20 
21 this title. The application must recite that the State has in- 21 Cl 
22 voked the post-conviction review procedures of this chapter 22 tc 
23 and that the scheduled execution is subject to stay. 23 Ul 
24 "(b) A stay of execution granted pursuant to subsection 24 
25 (a) shall expire if- 25 
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"(1) a State prisoner fails to file a habeas corpus 
petition under section 2254 of this title within the time 
required in section 2258 of this title; or 
"(2) upon completion of district court and court of 
appeals review under section 2254 of this title the peti-
tion for relief is denied and-
" (A) the time for filing a petition for certio-
rari has expired and no petition has been filed; 
"(B) a timely petition for certiorari was filed 
and the Supreme Court denied the petition; or 
"(C) a timely petition for certiorari was filed 
and upon consideration of the case, the Supreme 
Court disposed of it in a manner that left the cap-
ital sentence undisturbed; or 
"(3) before a court of competent jurisdiction, in 
the presence of counsel and after having been advised 
of the consequences of his decision, a State prisoner 
under capital sentence waives the right to pursue 
habeas 'corpus review under section 2254 of this title. 
20 "(c) If one of the conditions in subsection (b) has oc-
21 curred, no Federal court thereafter shall have the authority 




"(1) the basis for the stay and request for relief is 
a claim not previously presented by the prisoner in the 


















State or Federal courts, and the failure to raise the 
claim is-
"(A) the result of State action in violation of 
the Constitution or laws of the United States; 
"(B) the result of the Supreme Court recog-
nition of a new Federal right that is retroactively 
applicable; or 
"(C) based on a factual predicate that could 
not have been discovered through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence; or 
"(2) the facts underlying the claim would be suffi-
cient, if proven, to undermine the court's confidence in 
the jury's determination of guilt on the offense or of-
fenses for which the death penalty was imposed; or 
"(3) a stay and consideration of the requested 
relief are necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 
1 7 "§ 2258. Filing of habeas corpus petition; time require-
18 ments; tolling rules 
19 "Any petition for habeas corpus relief under section 
20 2254 of this title must be filed in the appropriate district 
21 court not later than 365 days after the date of filing in the 
22 State court of last resort of an order issued in compliance 
23 with section 2256(c) of this title. The time requirements es-
24 tablished by this section shall be tolled-



































to raise the 




























"(1) from the date that a petition for certiorari is 
filed in the Supreme Court until the date of final dispo-
sition of the petition if a State prisoner seeks review of 
a capital sentence that has been affirmed on direct 
appeal by the court of last resort of the State or has 
otherwise become final for State law purposes; 
"(2) during any period in which a State prisoner 
under capital sentence has a properly filed request for 
post-conviction review pending before a State court of 















in a timely manner, this period shall run continuously 
from the date that the State prisoner initially files for 
post-conviction review until final disposition of the case 
by the State court of last resort, and further until final 
disposition of the matter by the Supreme Court of the 
United States, if a timely petition for review is filed; 
and 
"(3) during an additional period not to exceed 90 
days, if counsel for the State prisoner-
es 11s1 1s 
"(A) moves for an extension of time in the 
United States district court that would have 
proper jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of 
a habeas corpus petition under section 2254 of 






"(B) makes a showing of good cause for 
counsel's inability to file the habeas corpus peti-
tion within the 365-day period established by this 
section. 
5 "§ 2259. Evidentiary hearings; scope of Federal review; 
6 district court adjudication 
7 "(a) Whenever a State prisoner under a capital sentence 
8 files a petition for habeas corpus relief to which this chapter 
9 applies, the district court shall-
10 "(1) determine the sufficiency of the evidentiary 
11 record for habeas corpus review; and 
12 "(2) conduct any requested evidentiary hearing 
13 necessary to complete the record for habeas corpus 
14 reV1ew. 
15 "(b) Upon the development of a complete evidentiary 
16 record, the district court shall rule on the merits of the claims 
17 properly before it. 
18 "(c)(l) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a district 






"(A) the prisoner previously failed to raise the 
claim in State court at the time and in the manner pre-
scribed by State law; 
"(B) the State courts, for that reason, refused or 
would refuse to entertain the claim; and 
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"(C) such refusal would constitute an adequate 
and independent State law ground that would foreclose 
direct review of the State court judgment in the United 
States Supreme Court. 
"(2) A district court shall consider a claim under this 
. 6 section if the prisoner shows that the failure to raise the 
7 claim in a State court was due to the ignorance or neglect of 
8 the prisoner or counsel or if the failure to consider such a 
9 claim would result in a miscarriage of justice. 
10 "§ 2260. Certificate of probable cause inapplicable 
11 "The requirement of a certificate of probable cause in 
12 order to appeal from the district court to the court of appeals 
13 does not apply to habeas corpus cases subject to this chapter 
14 except when a second or successive petition is filed. 
15 "§ 2261. Counsel in capital cases; trial and post-convic-
16 tion; standards 
17 "(a) A mechanism for the provision of counsel services 
- 18 to indigents sufficient to invoke the provisions of this chapter 
19 under section 2256(b) of this title shall provide for counsel to 
20 indigents charged with offenses for which capital punishment 
21 is sought, to indigents who have been sentenced to death and 
22 who seek appellate or collateral review in State court, and to 
23 indigents who have been sentenced to death and who seek 
24 certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court. 
es 1157 1s 
10 
1 "(b)(l) In the case of an appointment made before trial, 1 Upon 
2 at least one attorney appointed under this chapter must have 2 
not p 
3 been admitted to practice in the court in which the prosecu- 3 thori2 
4 tion is to be tried for not less than 5 years, and must have 4 
pro t1 
5 had not less than 3 years' experience in the trial of felony 5 
6 prosecutions in that court. 6 gene: 
7 "(2) In the case of an appointment made after trial, at 7 of la' 
8 least one attorney appointed under this chapter must have 8 be p 
9 been admitted to practice in the court of last resort of the 9 
the f 
10 State for not less than 5 years, and must have had not less 10 
othe 
11 than 3 years' experience in the handling of appeals in that 11 tion 
12 State courts in felony cases. 12 be r 
13 "(3) Notwithstanding this subsection, a court, for good 13 sub~ 
14 cause, may appoint another attorney whose background, 14 
"§ 2 
15 knowledge, or experience would otherwise enable the attor- 15 
16 ney to properly represent the defendant, with due consider- 16 
17 ation of the seriousness of the possible penalty and the unique 17 erni 
18 and complex nature of the litigation. 18 bee 
19 "(c) Upon a finding in ex parte proceedings that investi- 19 la" 
20 gative, expert or other services are reasonably necessary for 20 
ser 
21 the representation of the defendant, whether in connection 21 by 
22 with issues relating to guilt or issues relating to sentence, the 22 ist
1 
23 court shall authorize the defendant's attorney to obtain such 23 th« 
24 services on behalf of the defendant and shall order the pay-
25 ment of fees and expenses therefor, under subsection (d). 
e8 1757 IS 
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1 Upon finding that timely procurement of such services could 
2 not practicably await prior authorization, the court may au-
3 thorize the provision of and payment of such services nunc 
4 pro tune. 
5 "(d) Notwithstanding the rates and maximum limits 
6 generally applicable to criminal cases and any other provision 
7 of law to the contrary, the court shall fix the compensation to 
8 be paid to an attorney appointed under this subsection and 
9 the fees and expenses to be paid for investigative, expert, and 
10 other reasonably necessary services authorized under subsec-
11 tion (c), at such rates or amounts as the court determines to 
12 be reasonably necessary to carry out the requirements of this 
13 subsection. 
14 "§ 2262. Law controlling in Federal habeas corpus pro-
15 ceedings; retroactivity 
16 "In cases subject to this chapter, all claims shall be gov-
17 erned by the law as it was when the petitioner's sentence 
18 became final, supplemented by any interim change in the 
19 law, if the court determines, in light of the purpose to be 
20 served by the change, the extent of reliance on previous law 
21 by law enforcement authorities, and the effect on the admin-
22 istration of justice, that it would be just to give the prisoner 
23 the benefit of the interim change in the law.". 
0 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR. 
RETIRED October 24, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus 
Dear Chief: 
I enclose a copy of Senator Biden's letter to me of 
October 23, with copies of bills now pending in the Senate. 
Ronald Klain, Chief Counsel to the Judicial Commit-
tee, called me last week and said the Committee would wel-
come the opportunity to have me appear before it on November 
8. I am getting more than a little bit tired of federal 
habeas but, of course, I will testify. 
A preliminary look at S. 1757 (Biden's bill) makes 
it clear that we cannot support it. I am asking Al Pearson 
to prepare drafts of a statement I ~hould make before the 
Committee. I assume it should be along the lines of the 
statement I made to the Judicial Conference but with elabo-
rations on important points. I know that Al, as well as I, 
would welcome any suggestions you care to make. 
I am sending copies of this letter, and of the Bi-
den letter and Senate bills to the members of the Ad Hoc 
Committee for their information. 




cc: Members of the Committee 
Professor Albert M. PeaLson 
- -
October 24, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus 
Dear Chief: 
I enclose a copy of Senator Biden's letter to me of 
October 23, with copies of bills now pending in the Senate. 
Ronald Klain, Chief Counsel to the Judicial Commit-
tee, called me last week and said the Committee would wel-
come the opportunity to have me appear before it on November 
8. I am getting more than a little bit tired of federal 
habeas but, of course, I will testify. 
A preliminary look at s. 1757 (Biden's bill) makes 
it clear that we cannot support it. I am asking Al Pearson 
to prepare drafts of a statement I should make before the 
Committee. I assume it should be along the lines of the 
statement I made to the Judicial Conference but with elabo-
ratians on important points. I know that Al, as well as I, 
would welcome any suggestions you care to make. 
I am sending copies of this letter, and of the Bi-
den letter and Senate bills to the members of the Ad Hoc 
Committee for their information. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ ss 
Sincerely, 
cc: Members of the Committee 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
RETI RED 
Juprtutt <!Iourt 4tf tltt 'Jnitth ~ta.tt• 
'Jlul{mghm. ~. <!J. 2llffe'!, 
October 24, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
MEMORANDUM TO MEMBERS: 
I enclose a copy of Senator Biden's letter of the 
23rd inviting me to testify at 10:00 a.m., on November 8, in 
support of our recommendation, and copies of proposed bills 
by Senators Biden and Thurmond. Al Pearson and Hew Pate 
will be with me. 
Of course, I would be happy if all or any of you 
also conveniently could be with me. I would welcome your 
comments on the changes proposed by Senator Biden. They 
differ in a number of respects from ours. 
It is now evident that the Chief Justice gave us a 
difficult assignment, and one not easy to bring to a conclu-





cc: . Professor Albert - M. Pear~on 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 
R. Hewitt Pate, III, Esquire 
- -
October 24, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
MEMORANDUM TO MEMBERS: 
I enclose a copy of Senator Biden's letter of the 
23rd inviting me to testify at 10:00 a.m., on November 8, in 
support of our recommendation, and copies of proposed bills 
by Senators Biden and Thurmond. Al Pearson and Hew Pate 
will be with me. 
Of course, I would be happy if all or any of you 
also conveniently could be with me. I would welcome your 
comments on the changes proposed by Senator Biden. They 
differ in a number of respects from ours. 
It is now evident that the Chief Justice gave us a 
difficult assignment, and one not easy to bring to a conclu-




cc: Professor Albert M. Pearson 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 
R. Hewitt Pate, III, Esquire 
- 4t 2 'iOCT 'b.:i 
CHAMBERS OF 
WILBUR D . OWENS , JR. 
CHIEF JUDGE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
POST OFFICE BOX 65 
MACON, GEORGIA 31202 
October 25, 1989 
Honorable Gerald Bard Tjoflat 
Chief United States Circuit Judge 
Post Office Box 960 
Jacksonville, Florida 32201 
Honorable Sam c. Pointer, Jr. 
Chief United States District Judge 
882 Hugo Black U. s. Courthouse 
Birmingham, Alabama 35203 
Re: Report of Powell Committee Concerning 
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus Cases 
Dear Jerry and Sam: 
/IA 
Y=-
AREA CODE 912 
752 -3491 
FM;,: 8 I 2-752<.3.CS5 
Having carefully read the just-received report of the 
Powell Committee, my only comment is that it is superb and 
my only recommendation is that the Judicial Conference 
promptly transmit the same to Congress and urge them to enact 
the same as soon as possible. 
My very best regards. 
Sincerely, 
zl~ 
United States Judge 
cc: Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
j9 Z, t L S -f ~~&--'V ( /i-u.l ) 
· e tr--6 ~ . ~ ~ ~ a..1-~,12 ~vi-- 7 e t:_ 1-fl 
~k~~ 
p-..d., J.f,n__ ~ ~ ~ 
~ ~-re;_J 
~t}bw' 
:J. av J ~ ~ c.... ~ C:. <f-
MEMORAN~UM ~d. ~(~ 
~ /~ V- j_~- f) 17" 
TO: Justice Powell October 28, 1989 
FROM: Hew 
RE: Senator Biden's Habeas Proposal 
Introduction 
- .,..,{ _; ~ f-
~ c;.v-• - ---
----- A,vvv 
'l 
Senator Bi den "has recently introduced 1 eg i sY a ti on, Bi 11 
s. 1757, that purports to be based on your 
( S. 1760, introduced by Senator Thurmon 
oposed statute 
with "minor" al-
terations. These alterations are ma;ro r, and passage of no ]7,,.,c...L ~ 
legislation at all would to passage of the /v'l-V 
Biden Bill. I think that it i vital you make this clear in cA~~ 
'f/tA-7 0,, t'f1..t 1~ ( 0,-510-k ~ 
your testimony. Your propo al is - ~ased on a "quid pro quo." ~-
~ The B~l appears a'med at making the "quid pro quo" so 
~~unfavorable to the S)tates that they will have no incentive 
~,;f,-,{o opt for the n7 statute. The Biden Bill has t\rn effect r t---"-"'2£,~ f removing anyp ance of finalit~ doublinq the limitations 
period, an~ verruling Supreme Court cases on procedural 
default and retroactivity. A point by point discussion fol-
---,, 
lows. 
1. Qualifications and Payment of Counsel 
Your proposal ~ States fut ~~t --.i, ~ n to pro-
~ de qualified counsel in state collateral proceedings. 
i.J"-- h, would leave to the States the initial responsibility to set 
~ dards of competence and compensation . 
.;,, ..,,..1- (vj.,~ 





- - 2 - -
The Biden Bill expands these provisions, setting specific 
standards for appointment and unlimited compensation. 
. /JL~ - ?'<.~4-- ~kk 
a. Standards for Appointment :,L,.,  ~   ~4 
Unlike your 
¥h~ .J-.devise standards 
,st~~ 
proposal, which would allow the States to 
and procedures for the appointment of coun-
~ sel, the Biden Bill sets forth a uniform~ standard 
I that the States ~ me~ Post-conviction lawyers must 
have been admitted to practice in the state court of last 
resort for at least five years, -- and have at least three /} ''-ye a rs experience in felony appeals. -------------------------~ appointment of an attorney who does The statute allows for not meet these qualifi-
£-1~~} cations if the attorney has special "background, knowledge, 
or experience." 
I{ ' \ 
b. Trial Counsel 
The Biden Bill would also to provide 
counsel who meet specified criteria for trial in all capital 
; 
cases. The trial attorney must have been admitted to prac-
5~Jf tice in the t~ial court for at least five years, and have at 
~ least three years experience in trying felonies. The stat-
~ ute allows for appointment of an attorney who does not meet 
vyt,.,-
~ r-~ 
&--1.,,tYi ' , 
fj~ 
AiP-
these qualifications if . the attorney has special "back-
ground, knowledge, or experience." 
c. Level of Compensation 
The Biden Bill also includes a provision for compensa-
tion, but it does not set a schedule of fee rates. Rather, 
it commands that "Notwithstanding the rates and maximum lim-





















- ,L a, ~ 4- ~.Ly' 
- 3 - d' -.1.~ " ...-: . .,/ -~ ~ u C ~ v..rJA.-,V) 
I ~ A-f ;j.4-v S- y-r 
I S ./-~ ...!-~ 3 yv-s 
provision of law to the contrary," upe court shall set fees ""-""'•-u--, -~ -.I\---.. ~ -,,~  
and expenses at whatever level is to "carry out ,.;.,___, ~ 
---- -- ~
the requirements of the subsection." Biden §2261. This 
""--. ' .. ~ 
section leaves the amount of compensation to the discretion 
of the appointing judge. Importantly, it preempts all state 
law limits on the amount of fees, leaving the size of the 
'lf db' 1·. h ~~~ potentia ee awar su Ject to no imi t w atever.  -j,  
d. Investigative and Expert Services ~I-~~) 
The Biden Bill requires that expert and investigative 
 
services be provided to the defendant upon a finding in an 
~
ex parte hearing that such services would be reasonably nee-
essary. As with compensation of counsel, the Biden Bill 
places no limits on the amount that a state may be required 
to spend for these services, as long as a court finds them 
to be reasonably necessary. Biden §2261(c). 
Analysis: Senator Biden may have admirable goals, but ~ 
 
the attempt to impose such expensive requirements of counsel .Lf-~ 
on the States may make the statute unattractive to them. If S/--~ , 
the States see the statute as too expensive, 
~ "h-u /-
they will not t-L-LJ?._ ~ --- ---. use it and it will accomplish nothing. 
__________, 
The idea of stand-
ards for the appointment of counsel may in fact be a good 
one. But as Judge Clark argued, there is a great federalism ~ 
value in allowing the States to take the first crack at de- /4/--;;;z;_,__ 
veloping standards. 
~ 
In sum, the standards for appointment -1-e J,4-,--t---
- ~ 
a re an area where you might express some qualified support /- 1 . , 
I • • l2..., AA,t.z,t~ 
for the Biden proposal despite the fact that the Committee 
reached a different con~lusion. The requirement for counsel 
I 
/~ . ~A,1.,,f ~ 
l'St:..~~~..6-~ 
d--i- la ~. 
- - 4 - -
/ 11-~k. 
at trial is another area where you might exprfSS approval of 
Biden's goal of improving the quality of counsel. But 
changing the state law governing appointme mt of counsel at 
trial is highly in t rusive. This is an ar~a where the Biden 
Bill may be so unattractive to the States ' that they will not ------
opt in. - - / r-/ 
The Biden Bill' s {tunding provisions are ~ iggest 
problem in this section. They make the am~ that States 
must pay for defense counsel unlimited. / Most States now 
place strict limits on the amount that may be spent by ap-
pointed criminal defense counsel, and the Biden Bill's fund-
h ~1-e.. ing provision may entail a huge e xpense for the States. T e 
investigative and expert services provision 
~~ 
only adds to Irv' S~ 
this high expense. Moreover, th e Bi d e n Bill sets absolutely ~ P2-0 
no standards for the amount of compensation -- it will vary ~~ 
from case to case depending solely 
trial judge. The provision thus 
on the discretion of the ~~; 
ensures that defendants ~ 
-
wi 11 not be treated equally. I think 
~~ I strong~ oppose this ' ~unding provis~ o';i . 
. ~. ~L:- proposed statute a dead letter. v- ------ ~~~ ~
tha t you should ~ 
~
It will make the 
~ 2. Waiver of Counsel 
f>_Jl:r 
~ 
Your proposal provides that the appointing court must 
make findings of competency and knowing waiver where the 
defendant declines an offer of counsel. Powell §2256 ( c). 
The Biden Bill expands on this, r equiring that the appoint------~~--..... 
ing court conduct a hearing. More important, the Biden Bill 
requires immediate review of the decision allowing waiver of 
- - 5 - -
counsel by the State's court of last 
§2256(c). 
resort. Biden 
Analysis: This provision clarifies the procedure to be 
followed in determining competence to waive counsel. But it 
imposes an additional layer of appellate review, and there-
?hi-
~-
fore more delay. Moreover, this federal statute would dis-
place state law governing appellate review of the competenc~L 
d . . 1th h th' . . ·1 . ;fan!'-'~ ec1s1on. A oug 1s prov1s1on seems unnecessar1 y 1n-~ L-.ri..~ 
trusive on the States, I do not recommend you spend much 
energy criticizing it. There are more important problems 
with the Biden Bill that should receive top priority. 
~+ 
3. Successive Petitions1-- "Miscarriage of Justice" 
~ ~ I~ Your proposal would allow subsequent peti tions 1 ~Ci) u:- . ~- 5 





tional state action~ ew retroactive law, oµ;newly discov-
ered if the claims go to factual innocence of the 
crime itself. Powell §2257(c). The Biden Bill alters your :fi~~
5 
approach entirely. First, new claims that could not have ~J 
been raised due to unconstitutional state action, new retro- ~..v-e,. 
active law, or newly discovered facts come in regardless of ~ 
(I ' ' "'>'-<-f~ 
Note the difference bewtween a "successive" petititon ~ a-......., 
and a 1~"subsequent" '· petition. A successive petition raises LA"---- • 7: ,,..,,/ 
claims that have already been adjudicated in an earlier ha- -~~v 
beas proceeding. A ' subsequent peti ti n- raises new claims. ~--
A subsequent petition may e ar red as an "abuse of the --~ 
writ" under Rule 9(b) if the petitioner should have raised 
the new claims in the first petition. See generally 
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986) (opinion of 
Powe 11 , J . ) . 
,g ~ 
~ 
~-3 - 6 - -
whether they involve factual innocence. 
\ \ 
involve ~ actual innocence come in regardless of whether they 
..::_ 
involve any new facts or law. This means that successive 
petitions come in so long as they involve factual innocence, 
even though they have al ready been adjudicated. Finally, 
the Biden Bill adds on a new provision, allowing subsequent 
or successive peti ~ ions any time they are needed to prevent ---------- -
·'a miscarriage of justice ~ Biden §2257(c). 
-----
-...___- .._,,., 
Analysis: This change is intended to gut the finality 
mechanism of your proposal. The major goal of Bi den's 
changes is to allow challenges 
guilt of the crime. As we have discussed, 
~ nt ·- petitions to claims of~ta f°innocence 
,Je ~~ ~- ---
~~ light of the fact that prisoners will have had 
is fair 
counsel to 
•?; ·· present challenges to the sentence at trial and on their 
/1,J ~ rst habeas petition. In view of the w~ evi -
~ ~ k dence that see, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 
~
~ ,._,~ 09 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 
~ - j_,~ V ~ "(\ 
 ( 1982) ,A cfeferiaants ca11 easily "discover" new evidence after 
the first habeas proceeding, or have new testimony fabricat-
ed by paid experts. Affording additional opportunities to 
challenge the sentencing hearing alone also comes at a great 
cost to the State, and to the families of the murdered vie-
tims. Because the Court has required that the evidence al-
lowed at sentencing be unlimited, the sentencing hearing 
involves placing almost the entire record before another 
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~~I- & 
fendant has not bothered -- despite the assistance 
sel -- to raise the claim the first time around is not fair 
or necessary to prevent injustice. 
The Biden Bill would allow successive petitions on the 
basis that the claim raised relates to factual innocence. 
Be aware that this test is similar to the one you proposed 
~~ plurality of the Court in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. r ~-836 (1986). But your Kuhlmann test was to apply to all ha-
~ ~ ,.,>-8:as petitions, not just capital petitions where the pros-
~ JAect for delay is greatest. Also in capital cases delay by 
~ finition frustrates implementation of the penalty. And 
,1,-t., ~ mann had nothing to do with a "quid pro quo" involving 
~ counsel and automatic stays of execution. 
~~ 
~ f'a,,/ The {,~iscarriage of justice ~ ~ dard of the Biden Bill 
~~s vague and open-ended, and unless it is subsequently lim-
~ ited by the Supreme Court it could provide a wide-open door 
~ ~ uccessive petitions in every case. The "miscarriage of ~ f-o 
~ t, r ,;,<--justice" language appears to come from discussions of proce- /UU.--2.._~ 
~µ-, hrural default (not subsequent petitions) in Harris v. Reed, ~~1,Ju 
u ~ . ' f¥{ ]:;..d 
~ L.~ S. Ct. 1038 (1989) and Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 478 r 
~ -~~ 
~ y' (1986). The meaning of the term is not clear, but the Court '-'-
~I. ~ 
~ ill soon hear a case on the issue. Selvage v. Lynaugh, No. · 
87-7600 (no argument date set). 
In sum, these changes alter the balance of the "quid 
~ 
pro quo" offered to the States. If they can expect the cur- J--... 
~~
rent waive of meritless subsequent petitions to continue, ~ 
why should they opt in to the new statute? ..:5~k 
CJ qi-'' ~ 
~! 
5-=1-tL/.t,J.J 
- - 8 - - ~/~ 
4. Limitations Period -- One Year 
As we expected, the Biden Bill lengthens the limita-
tions period from six months to one year. It also allows a \ 
90-day extension for good cause instead of a 60-day exten-
sion. 
Analysis: There is not much to add here except to say 
that 6 months is longer than provided for any appeal in our ..._____________.__________ ~~
legal system. No more than 6 months is needed for fairness. 
_________,_ 




Your proposal would not toll the limitations period u...-c..L_/....,.(__, 
while the petitioner seeks cert in the United States Supreme SE__~ 
~~ 
Court from state collateral proceedings. Powell §2258(b). 
The Biden Bill would. Biden §2258(b). 
~~ 
Analysis: As the Committee report stated, only two of ? 
the over 100 modern capital cases decided by the Court came _________, 
from state habeas. And the Supreme Court can always address 
any claims on review of the federal habeas proceeding. The 
Bi den change produces needless delay. But this is not a _ 
.· -~ 
major point, and I would not spend much time on it. 
5. Procedural Default and Exhaustion 
Under your proposal, the federal habeas court will hear 
only claims that were raised in the state proceeding. Your 
proposal does allow a federal habeas court to immediately 
hear claims not presented in state court where the failure 
to develop a claim in the state courts was due to unconsti-
tutional state action, the recognition of a retroactively 
applicable new federal right, or new facts that could not 
- - 9 - -
have been discovered previously. But for claims that do not 
fall within these categories, the prisoner cannot return to 
state court for exhaustion in the hope of raising the claims 
in a subsequent federal petition. Powell §2259. Your pro-
posal thus changes the current law with respect to exhaus-
tion, which does not allow a federal habeas court to hear 
claims not presented to the state courts in any circum-
stances, but allows a prisoner to exhaust the claims and 





Your proposal does not alter the present rules concern- J ~ 
procedurally defaulted claims. Under Wainwright v. M--O ~ ing 
L-v't./ 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), a claim that is procedurally ~ 
barred under state law will not be heard on federal habeas ~~' 
unless the prisoner shows "cause and prejudice" as defined ~ 
in cases such as Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 
Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984). 
107 (1982) and "~L 
The Biden Bill changes §2259 in an effort to alter the 
law of procedural default in favor of prisoners. [Oddly, 
the Biden change does not address exhaustion at all. Per-
haps the staffer who drafted the change did not understand 
the difference between the two.] Under the Biden Bill, the 
federal court "may" refuse to consider a claim that has been 
procedurally defaulted in state court. But the federal 
court "shall" hear the claim regardless of the default if 
the prisoner shows that "the failure to raise the claim in a 




- - 10 - -
oner or counsel or if the failure to consider such a claim 
would result in a miscarriage of justice." See Biden 
§2259(c). As discussed above, the "miscarriage of jutice" 
language is drawn from recent procedural default cases, but 
has not been defined. 
Analysis: Again, the Biden change substantially disfa-
vors the States, giving them a further disincentive to use 
the new statute. The Biden change would appear to resurrect 
ll 
_____, 
the "knowing bypass" rule of ~ v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 ___________, 
(1963). Under~' a procedurally defaulted claim will be 
heard in federal court unless it can be shown the prisoner 
knew of the claim and deliberately chose not to present it. 
The Biden Bill achieves the same result by making "ignorance 
or neglect" a basis for avoiding the State's procedural de-
fault rule. For the reasons stated in the Wainwri.9.ht v. 
Sykes opinion that you joined, resurrection of the ~ v. 
Noia standard would be a disaster in terms of finality and 
judicial efficiency. ------ This change would leave a State that opts into the "reform" statute worse off than it is under 
current law. Again, Biden's change makes the statute worth-
~
<-> 
less from the State's point of view. 
6. Retroactivity -- Repealing Teague 
As you know, the Court last term a ~ ted Justice _ Har--lan's approach to retroactivity. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 
1060 ( 1989). Under this approach, new constitutional rules -will not (with narrow exceptions) be applied on federal ha-
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the new rule was adopted. As you said in Solem v. 
13µ 7 
/ ~ I-. 
Stumes, ~~ :;.,, ~ 
465 U.S. 638, 653 ( 1984) (Powell, J., concurring in judg-.____ 
ment), "Review on habeas to determine that the conviction 
rests upon correct application of the law _iE effect at the 
--·-- --
time of conviction is all that is required to 'forc[e] trial ---------------
and appellate courts to toe the constitutional mark.'" 
In Penry v. Lynaugh, supra, 
plies to capital cases. 
the Court held that Teague ap-
The Biden Bill gratuitously adds a new §2262 that would 
repeal Teague in capital cases. Under §2262, habeas peti-
~ -----
tioners will get the advantage of new rules if the court 
finds "in light of the purpose to be served by the change, 
the extent of reliance on previous law by law enforcement 
authorities, and the effect on the administration of jus-
tice, that it would be just to give the prisoner the benefit 
of the interim change in the law." 
Analysis: Section 2262 would essentially restore the 
retroactivity analysis of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 
(1965). I will not recount all the reasons that you have 




rule. The main point is that habeas ------------should not ·bec•fome al-/~ 
"time machine" by which the prisoner constantly brings the -legality of his sentence "up to date" by challenging it on 
the basis of new law made long after his conviction became 
final. Moreover, there is no reason for a statutory change 
in the retroacti vi ty rule. Courts have long administered 
retroactivity analysis and have a far better knowledge of 
- - 12 - -
what works and what doesn't. The Biden change needlessly 
overrules a new decision that is important to the States. 
Capital cases are the most important area for application of 
Teague, as prisoners attempt to frustrate execution of the 
sentence every year by obtaining "holds" for Supreme Court 
cases that may establish new rules. Again, this makes the 
proposed statute less attractive to the States, and more 
likely to remain on the books unused. 
Conclusion 
Ron Klain, Biden's Chief Counsel, tells me that Biden's 
changes will look "minor" compared to those the ACLU and ABA -----have in mind. But that is no reason to support these 
changes. The danger here is that Congress will pass a di-
luted "Biden Bill," and then pat itself on the back for hav-
ing reformed capital habeas. There will not be sufficient 
political pressure to do anything more for years to come. 
But the , Biden Bill will be unattractive to the States, and 
will bring no change to the present situation. In fact, a ----------------------------~ -
State that opted in to the Biden statute would find itself 
---- ---
in a worse situation than exists today. I urge that you 
tactfully convey the message to Senator Biden that his 
changes will "kill the goose that lays the golden egg" by 
taking away all benefit for the States. It would be far 'Ka-~ 
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Here is a memo on the Biden Bill. I have enclosed a 
copy of the Congressional Record that includes the text of 
the Biden Bill, the text of your Bill and the Committee Re-
port, and a table comparing the two Bills. Your Bill has 
~ ~ ' 
been introduced by Sena tor Thurmond. I have marked the 
parts of the Biden Bill that differ from yours in yellow. 
I will give you a suggested draft of testimony soon, 
presenting some of the points made in my memo in a gentler 
style. I will see Senator Thurmond's Chief Counsel, Terry 
Wooten, on Monday. He has asked whether you could come by 
and visit with Senator Thurmond about half an hour before 7 
your 
a. m. ) . 
Judiciary Committee testimony (approximately 9:20 ~UL 
3 ~ ~ T~-v-v /::~ r 
1,,1) q .. r/cf 1-0(.,a . 1.--i-, ~ - ~~;---
~ J/~~•s ~ ,a,,-i- ~ 
,,,.,~ ~ ~~4 I 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Justice Powell 
Hew 
October 30, 1989 
FROM: 
RE: Senator Biden's Habeas Proposal 
Introduction 
Senator Biden has recently introduced legislation, Bill 
S. 1757, that purports to be based on your proposed statute 
(S. 1760, introduced by Senator Thurmond) with "minor" al-
terations. These alterations are major, and passage of no 
legislation at all would be preferable to passage of the 
Biden Bill. I think that it is vital you make this clear in 
your testimony. Your proposal is based on a "quid pro quo." 
The Biden Bill appears aimed at making the "quid pro quo" so 
unfavorable to the States that they will have no incentive 
to opt for the new statute. The Biden Bill has the effect 
of removing any chance of finality, doubling the limitations 
period, and overruling Supreme Court cases on procedural 
default and retroactivity. A point by point discussion fol-
lows. 
1. Qualifications and Payment of Counsel 
Your proposal requires States that would opt in to pro-
vide qualified counsel in state collateral proceedings. It 
would leave to the States the initial responsibility to set 
standards of competence and compensation. Powell §2256. 
- - 2 - -
The Biden Bill expands these provisions, setting specific 
standards for appointment and unlimited compensation. 
a. Standards for Appointment 
Unlike your proposal, which would allow the States to 
devise standards and procedures for the appointment of coun-
sel, the Biden Bill sets forth a uniform federal standard 
that the States must meet. Post-conviction lawyers must 
have been admitted to practice in the state court of last 
resort for at least five years, and have at least three 
years experience in felony appeals. The statute allows for 
appointment of an attorney who does not meet these qualifi-
cations if the attorney has special "background, knowledge, 
or experience." 
b. Trial Counsel 
The Biden Bill would also require states to provide 
counsel who meet specified criteria for trial in all capital 
cases. The trial attorney must have been admitted to prac-
tice in the trial court for at least five years, and have at 
least three years experience in trying felonies. The stat-
ute allows for appointment of an attorney who does not meet 
these qualifications if the attorney has special "back-
ground, knowledge, or experience." 
c. Level of Compensation 
The Biden Bill also includes a provision for compensa-
tion, but it does not set a schedule of fee rates. Rather, 
it commands that "Notwithstanding the rates and maximum lim-
its generally applicable to criminal cases and any other 
- - 3 - -
provision of law to the contrary," the court shall set fees 
and expenses at whatever level is necessary to "carry out 
the requirements of the subsection." Bi den §2261. This 
section leaves the amount of compensation to the discretion 
of the appointing judge. Importantly, it preempts all state 
law limits on the amount of fees, leaving the size of the 
potential fee award subject to no limit whatever. 
d. Investigative and Expert Services 
The Biden Bill requires that expert and investigative 
services be provided to the defendant upon a finding in an 
ex parte hearing that such services would be reasonably nec-
essary. As with compensation of counsel, the Biden Bill 
places no limits on the amount that a state may be required 
to spend for these services, as long as a court finds them 
to be reasonably necessary. Biden §2261(c). 
Analysis: Senator Biden may have admirable goals, but 
the attempt to impose such expensive requirements of counsel 
on the States may make the statute unattractive to them. If 
the States see the statute as too expensive, they will not 
use it and it will accomplish nothing. The idea of stand-
ards for the appointment of counsel may in fact be a good 
one. But as Judge Clark argued, there is a great federalism 
value in allowing the States to take the first crack at de-
veloping standards. In sum, the standards for appointment 
a re an area where you might express some qualified support 
fo r the Bi den proposal despite the fact that the Committee 
r eached a different conclusion. The requi r ement fo r counsel 
- - 4 - -
at trial is another area where you might express approval of 
Biden's goal of improving the quality of counsel. But 
changing the state law governing appointment of counsel at 
trial is highly intrusive. This is an area where the Biden 
Bill may be so unattractive to the States that they will not 
opt in. 
The Biden Bill's funding provisions are the biggest 
problem in this section. They make the amount that States 
must pay for defense counsel unlimited. Most States now 
place strict limits on the amount that may be spent by ap-
pointed criminal defense counsel, and the Biden Bill's fund-
ing provision may entail a huge expense for the States. The 
investigative and expert services provision only adds to 
this high expense. Moreover, the Biden Bill sets absolutely 
no standards for the amount of compensation -- it will vary 
from case to case depending solely on the discretion of the 
trial judge. The provision thus ensures that defendants 
will not be treated equally. I think that you should 
strongly oppose this funding provision. It will make the 
proposed statute a dead letter. 
2. Waiver of Counsel 
Your proposal provides that the appointing court must 
make findings of competency and knowing waiver where the 
defendant declines an offer of counsel. Powell §2256 ( c). 
The Biden Bill expands on this, requiring that the appoint-
ing court conduct a hearing. More important, the Biden Bill 
requires immediate review of the decision allowing waiver of 
- - 5 - -
counsel by the State's court of last resort. 
§2256(c). 
Biden 
Analysis: This provision clarifies the procedure to be 
followed in determining competence to waive counsel. But it 
imposes an additional layer of appellate review, and there-
fore more delay. Moreover, this federal statute would dis-
place state law governing appellate review of the competency 
decision. Although this provision seems unnecessarily in-
trusi ve on the States, I do not recommend you spend much 
energy criticizing it. There are more important problems 
with the Biden Bill that should receive top priority. 
3. Successive Petitions -- "Miscarriage of Justice" 
Your proposal would allow subsequent petitions1 for 
claims that could not have been raised due to unconsti tu-
tional state action, new retroactive law, or newly discov-
ered facts, if the claims go to factual innocence of the 
crime itself. Powell §2257(c). The Biden Bill alters your 
approach entirely. First, new claims that could not have 
been raised due _ to unconstitutional state action, new retro-
active law, or newly discovered facts come in regardless of 
1Note the difference bewtween a "successive" petititon 
and a "subsequent" petition. A successive petition raises 
claims that have already been adjudicated in an earlier ha-
beas proceeding. A subsequent petition raises new claims. 
A subsequent petition may be bar red as an "abuse of the 
writ" under Rule 9(b) if the petitioner should have raised 
the new claims in the first petition. See generally 
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986) (opinion of 
Powell, J.). 
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whether they involve factual innocence. Second, claims that 
involve factual innocence come in regardless of whether they 
involve any new facts or law. This means that successive 
petitions come in so long as they involve factual innocence, 
even though they have al ready been adjudicated. Finally, 
the Biden Bill adds on a new provision, allowing subsequent 
or successive petitions any time they are needed to prevent 
"a miscarriage of justice." Biden §2257(c). 
Analysis: This change is intended to gut the finality 
mechanism of your proposal. The major goal of Biden's 
changes is to allow challenges to the sentence as well as to 
guilt of the crime. As we have discussed, limiting subse-
quent petitions to claims of factual innocence is fair in 
light of the fact that prisoners will have had counsel to 
present challenges to the sentence at trial and on their 
first habeas petition. In view of the wide range of evi-
dence that can be mitigating, see, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 
109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 
(1982), defendants can easily "discover'' new evidence after 
the first habeas proceeding, or have new testimony fabricat-
ed by paid experts. Affording additional opportunities to 
challenge the sentencing hearing alone also comes at a great 
cost to the State, and to the families of the murdered vic-
tims. Because the Court has required that the evidence al-
lowed at sentencing be unlimited, the sentencing hearing 
involves placing almost the entire record before another 
jury. To impose this heavy burden in a case where the de-
- - 7 - -
fendant has not bothered -- despite the assistance of coun-
sel -- to raise the claim the first time around is not fair 
or necessary to prevent injustice. 
The Biden Bill would allow successive petitions on the 
basis that the claim raised relates to factual innocence. 
Be aware that this test is similar to the one you proposed 
for a plurality of the Court in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 
836 (1986). But your Kuhlmann test was to apply to all ha-
beas petitions, not just capital petitions where the pros-
pect for delay is greatest. Also in capital cases delay by 
definition frustrates implementation of the penalty. And 
Kuhlmann had nothing to do with a "quid pro quo" involving 
counsel and automatic stays of execution. 
The "miscarriage of justice" standard of the Biden Bill 
is vague and open-ended, and unless it is subsequently lim-
ited by the Supreme Court it could provide a wide-open door 
for successive petitions in every case. The "miscarriage of 
justice" language appears to come from discussions of proce-
dural default (not subsequent petitions) in Harris v. Reed, 
109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989) and Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 478 
(1986). The meaning of the term is not clear, but the Court 
will soon hear a case on the issue. Selvage v. Lynaugh, No. 
87-7600 (no argument date set). 
In sum, these changes alter the balance of the "quid 
pro quo" offered to the States. If they can expect the cur-
rent waive of meritless subsequent petitions to continue, 
why should they opt in to the new statute? 
- - 8 - -
4. Limitations Period -- One Year 
As we expected, the Biden Bill lengthens the limita-
tions period from six months to one year. It also allows a 
90-day extension for good cause instead of a 60-day exten-
sion. 
Analysis: There is not much to add here except to say 
that 6 months is longer than provided for any appeal in our 
legal system. No more than 6 months is needed for fairness. 
a. Cert Petitions from State Habeas 
Your proposal would not toll the limitations period 
while the petitioner seeks cert in the United States Supreme 
Court from state collateral proceedings. 
The Biden Bill would. Biden §2258(b). 
Powell §2258 ( b). 
Analysis: As the Committee report stated, only two of 
the over 100 modern capital cases decided by the Court came 
from state habeas. And the Supreme Court can always address 
any claims on review of the federal habeas proceeding. The 
Bi den change produces needless delay. But this is not a 
major point, and I would not spend much time on it . 
5. Procedural Default and Exhaustion 
Under your proposal, the federal habeas court will hear 
only claims that were raised in the state proceeding. Your 
proposal does allow a federal habeas court to immediately 
hear claims not presented in state court where the failure 
to develop a claim in the state courts was due to unconsti-
tutional state action, the recognition of a retroactively 
applicable new federal right, or new facts that could not 
- - 9 - -
have been discovered previously. But for claims that do not 
fall within these categories, the prisoner cannot return to 
state court for exhaustion in the hope of raising the claims 
in a subsequent federal petition. Powell §2259. Your pro-
posal thus changes the current law with respect to exhaus-
tion, which does not allow a federal habeas court to hear 
claims not presented to the state courts 
stances, but allows a prisoner to exhaust 
in any circum-
the claims and 
then return to federal court. 
(1982). 
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 
Your proposal does not alter the present rules concern-
ing procedurally defaulted claims. Under Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), a claim that is procedurally 
barred under state law will not be heard on federal habeas 
unless the prisoner shows "cause and prejudice" as defined 
in cases such as Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) and 
Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984). 
The Biden Bill changes §2259 in an effort to alter the 
law of procedural default in favor of prisoners. [Oddly, 
the Biden change does not address exhaustion at all. Per-
haps the staffer who drafted the change did not understand 
the difference between the two.] Under the Biden Bill, the 
federal court "may" refuse to consider a claim that has been 
procedurally defaulted in state court. But the federal 
court "shall" hear the claim regardless of the default if 
the prisoner shows that "the failure to raise the claim in a 
State court was due to the ignorance or neglect of the pris-
- - 10 - -
oner or counsel or if the failure to consider such a claim 
would result in a miscarriage of justice." See Biden 
§2259(c). As discussed above, the "miscarriage of jutice" 
language is drawn from recent procedural default cases, but 
has not been defined. 
Analysis: Again, the Biden change substantially disfa-
vors the States, giving them a further disincentive to use 
the new statute. The Biden change would appear to resurrect 
the "knowing bypass" rule of ~ v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 
( 1963). Under ~, a procedurally defaulted claim will be 
heard in federal court unless it can be shown the prisoner 
knew of the claim and deliberately chose not to present it. 
The Biden Bill achieves the same result by making "ignorance 
or neglect" a basis for avoiding the State's procedural de-
fault rule. For the reasons stated in the Wainwright v. 
Sykes opinion that you joined, resurrection of the ~ v. 
Noia standard would be a disaster in terms of finality and 
judicial efficiency. This change would leave a State that 
opts into the "reform" statute worse off than it is under 
current law. Again, Biden's change makes the statute worth-
less from the State's point of view. 
6. Retroactivity -- Repealing Teague 
As you know, the Court last term adopted Justice Har-
lan's approach to retroactivity. Teague v. Lane, 109 s. Ct. 
1060 (1989). Under this approach, new constitutional rules 
will not (with narrow exceptions) be applied on federal ha-
beas where the petitioner's conviction became final before 
-
the new rule was adopted. 
465 U.S. 638, 653 (1984) 
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As you said in Solem v. Stumes, 
(Powell, J., concurring in judg-
ment), "Review on habeas to determine that the conviction 
rests upon correct application of the law in effect at the 
time of conviction is all that is required to 'forc[e] trial 
and appellate courts . . . to toe the constitutional mark.'" 
In Penry v. Lynaugh, supra, the Court held that Teague ap-
plies to capital cases. 
The Biden Bill gratuitously adds a new §2262 that would 
repeal Teague in capital cases. 
tioners will get the advantage 
Under §2262, habeas peti-
of new rules if the court 
finds "in light of the purpose to be served by the change, 
the extent of reliance on previous law by law enforcement 
authorities, and the effect on the administration of jus-
tice, that it would be just to give the prisoner the benefit 
of the interim change in the law." 
Analysis: Section 2262 would essentially restore the 
retroactivity analysis of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 
( 1965). I will not recount all the reasons that you have 
previously given for the superiority of Justice Harlan's 
rule. The main point is that habeas should not become a 
"time machine" by which the prisoner constantly brings the 
legality of his sentence "up to date" by challenging it on 
the basis of new law made long after his conviction became 
final. Moreover, there is no reason for a statutory change 
in the retroactivity rule. Courts have long administered 
retroactivity analysis and have a far better knowledge of 
- - 12 - -
what works and what doesn't. The Biden change needlessly 
overrules a new decision that is important to the States. 
Capital cases are the most important area for application of 
Teague, as prisoners attempt to frustrate execution of the 
sentence every year by obtaining "holds" for Supreme Court 
cases that may establish new rules. 
proposed statute less attractive to 
likely to remain on the books unused. 
Conclusion 
Again, this makes the 
the States, and more 
Ron Klain, Biden's Chief Counsel, tells me that Biden's 
changes will look "minor" compared to those the ACLU and ABA 
have in mind. But that is no reason to support these 
changes. The danger here is that Congress will pass a di-
luted "Biden Bill," and then pat itself on the back for hav-
ing reformed capital habeas. There will not be sufficient 
political pressure to do anything more for years to come. 
But the Biden Bill will be unattractive to the States, and 
will bring no change to the present situation. In fact, a 
State that opted in to the Biden statute would find itself 
in a worse situation than exists today. I urge that you 
tactfully convey the message to Senator Biden that his 
changes will "kill the goose that lays the golden egg" by 
taking away all benefit for the States. It would be far 
better to pass nothing than to pass the Biden Bill. 
R.H.P. 
- -
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 
L. STANLE Y CHAUVIN, JR. 
AMERICAN B AR CENTER 
750 N . LAKE SHORE DRIVE 
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 606 11 
T E LEPHONE: 312 / 988- 5109 
A SA / NET: A BA005 
0 2 NOV 1989 
Honorable Lewis Powell 
Justice (Retired) 
October 30, 1989 
Supreme Court of the United States 
One First Street, NE 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
~~ 
PLEASE REPLY TO: 
PO. Box 1748 
L OU ISVILLE, KENTUCKY 40201 
TELEPHONE : 502/ 585-4131 
It was great seeing you last week and I thank you for tak ing 
the time out of your busy schedule to visit with me . I 
appreciate the effort you have made on behalf of the Ad Hoc 
Committee of the Judicial Conference, and the filing o f your 
excellent report. We at the American Bar Association value y our 
counsel and friendsh i p plus your leadership over the years. As I 
indicated to you, we hope the Judiciary Committee will include i n 
its bill a set of guidelines for the appointment of counsel at 
the time of the trial. Maybe with more competent counsel during 
the trial, the continuing habeas corpus crisis can be reduce d. 
My wife, C'Allen, joins me in sending our best to you and 
Mrs. Powell. 
Thanks again. 
Kindest personal regards. 
LSC/lbk 
urs, 
L. St Jr. 
- -
October 30, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
MEMO TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS: 
You have a copy of the Congressional Record that 
contains the Biden bill (see Bill Burchill's letter of Octo-
ber 17). I now send you by express mail Hew Pate's memoran-
dum of October 28 in which he analyzes the Biden proposal in 
some detail. 
As I have been out of my office since Thursday I 
have not had an opportunity to review Hew's memo careful1y. 
On the basis of a first reading, I am inclined to agree with 
Hew that the states and the courts would be better off with 
the status quo than under what Senator Biden proposes. 
The Biden provisions with respect to the qualifica-
tions of counsel in many cases would be impossible to meet. 
I doubt that any member of the Supreme Court, except Justice 
Marshall, possesses the qualifications Biden proposes for 
counsel representing a capital defendant on state collateral 
review. As I read his proposal, such counsel, in addition 
to having been admitted to practice for "at least five 
years", must have had "at least three years experience in 
felony appeals". I would fall far short of meeting these 
standards, as would a high percentage of the bar. The pro-
vision for unlimited funding could also be a major objection 
for the states. 
I am in some doubt as to my testimony on November 
8. I have thought it would be appropriate for me, on behalf 
of our Committee, to make a summary statement. Of course, 
there will be questions. A longer written statement could 
be filed. I may well be asked my view of the Biden bill, 
and I suppose I should respond as briefly as I can. 
Normally a Supreme Court Justice does not testify at 
all, much less about pending legislation. I therefore am 
not happy about my present situation. 
I am sending a copy of this letter to the Chief 
Justice and am anxious to have his advice as well as yours. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
cc: The Chief Justice 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 
R. Hewitt Pate, Esquire 
-
October 31, 1989 
Dear Wilbur: 
How very thoughtful of you to 
~rite about the report of the Powell Com-
mittee. I hope a majority of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee agrees with you. 
As ever, 
Hon. Wilbur D. Owens, Jr. 
United States District Court 
Middle District of Georgia 
P. 0. Box 65 






Ad Hoc Committee - Testimony before Judiciary Committee 
MEMO TO HEW: 
In addition to the draft statement that you are 
preparing and that I know will be excellent, I would welcome 
help from you or Mike on some miscellaneous points including 
the following: 
1. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 requires ap-
pointment of counsel in capital federal habeas cases. The 
Act also provides standards. How do these compare with Sen-
ator Biden's rather strict standards in his proposed bill? 
2. See page 6 of the Report of the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee. Our statute provides a six-months' period within which 
federal habeas petitions must be filed. This period begins 
to run only on the appointment of counsel for state collat-
eral review. The six-months period is "tolled'' - and this 
is important - during the pendency of state collateral re-
view. Our report then states: 
"In view of the provision for counsel, the 
tolling provisions, and the fact that the 
exhaustion requirement mandates that the 
prisoner's federal petition present the same 
claims contained in the state petition, the 
six-months' period insures adequate time for 
the presentation of claims." 
How does this compare with the Biden bill? 
- -
As I do not have clearly in mind the "exhaustion 
requirement", and how it operates in a capital case, a memo 
would be helpful. 
I should mention in my testimony (having in mind 
that Biden would provide a one-year time period) that six 
months is longer than the time provided for appeals in both 
state and federal systems. 
3. I should keep in mind, and emphasize that our 
statute - in addition to providing for a six months period 
within which to file a federal habeas petition - also pro-
vides for an automatic stay of execution. The stay would 
remain in effect until all federal habeas proceedings are 
completed, or until the prisoner fails to file a habeas pe-
tition within the six-months period. 
The merit of these provisions is that they would 
largely eliminate the last minute filing of stay motions. I 
am probably more familiar with these than any Justice on the 
Court. 
4. On p. 7 of our statement, we say: 
"Federal habeas proceedings under our propos-
al will encompass only claims that have been 
exhausted in state court. We note that when 
counsel is provided, as would be required by 
our statute, there should be no excuse for 
failure to raise claims in state court." 
There are exceptions, permitting unexhausted claims 
in certain extraordinary circumstances. (I'd like some ex-
2 • 
- -
amples of what might constitute extraordinary circum-
stances.) 
Our discussion concludes with the statement that 
subsequent and successive habeas petitions no longer would 
be the basis for a stay of execution in the absence of "ex-
traordinary circumstances" and a colorable showing of factu-
al innocence. (Report, p. 7). 
* * * 
I should include in my statement to the Judiciary 
Committee all, or at least the substance, of the conclusion 
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November 1, 1989 
Honorable Lewis F. 
Associate Justice, 
u.s. supreme court 





Dear Justice Powell: 
This is a hurried response to your October 30 Memo and to Hew Pate's 
attached memorandum re the Biden bill. 
First, as to the Biden provisions for competency of counsel. These 
are the same standards now set by federal statute (Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act Amendments of"'l988, 21 u.s.c. § 848(q), (4) through (10)), for 
counsel appointed in the federal court in death penalty cases. 
While I agree that our approach is better and more pragmatic, viz., 
the states to set standards of competency, I do not believe that we 
should criticize the Biden approach tor setting rmpossihlv h1gh 
s tandarcls • ~ _,_____,_, -~
I agree that hearing and appellate review where defendant declines 
counsel, as proposed by Chairman Biden, is unnecessary; and I also 
agree that it is not worth much comment, if any. r 
I turn next to Hew's comments regarding "successive petitions 
'miscarriage ot justice 111 • Pate Memorandum at s~a. I agree ~ 
generally with Hew's comments that the Biden proposal would certainly {/ 
dilute the t nality mechanism. However,-1 am not as disturEed a-s-he 
is ou he use o f e ase "miscarriage of justice". Although 
the phrase is ·vague, it will have · appeal to many. 
I agree with Hew's comments regarding the one-year limitation period. r-
Jt ,.._ 
I also agree with his comments regarding ~rocedural default and 
il ~tion~\ However, I question whether the proposed standard of 
"igno~e or neglect" equates with "knowing l:>ypass". I think our 
approach should be that the states are unlikely to adopt "ignorance v 
or neglect" for the obvious reason tha 1 wea ens rocedural default 
r~ 
t l 
1 . -F nally, the Biden app~ 
Perhaps the best approach would be to 
recant and is still being fleshed out 
i tic. 
point out that ........ ==-- is tairly 
by the court. 
I suspect that the comments which Hew attributes to Biden•s Chief 
Counsel -- that Biden•s changes are minor compared to those which 
will be recommended by the ACLU and ABA -- are correct. (I found out 
this morning that the Chiet Counsel has a copy of the ABA Report. I 
have asked the ABA to send Bill Burchill a .copy of the Report today.) 
that somewhere between the Biden bill and our bill a 
_______ .-- _ ... -~ can be tound; I am not prepared to define what that is 
L -- ink the door to compromise should be expressly left 
open. 
Of course, I would rather have our bi ll in the torm proposed but that 
is not usually the nature ot the legislative process. 
I hope these comments will be helpful and I certainly wish you every 
success in your November 8 appearance. 
sincerely, 
cc: Honorable Charles Clark 
Honorable Paul H. Roney 
Honorable William Terrell Hodges 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
Mr. William R. Burchill, Jr. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
- -
j,nprtntt <!I~ of tqt ~b- j,taftg 
'Jf ag Jr:nght~ ~. <!}. 2llffe'!-~ 
0 lNOV 1989 
November 1, 1989 
Re: Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus 
Dear Lewis: 
I have read your memorandum of October 30, and 
thoroughly approve of what you say in it. I agree with you 
that both the states and the federal courts will be better 
off with the status quo than with the Biden proposal, and I 
would not hesitate to make that view known to the Judiciary 
Committee. 
I realize, in retrospect, that it turns out that you 
took on a great deal more than you thought you were taking 
on when you agreed to serve as the chairman of this 
committee. But you have done an outstanding job, and I'm 
sure you will do an outstanding job testifying before the 
Judiciary Committee -- even if you would rather "this cup 














November 7, 1989 
Arrangements for Testimony 
As a reminder, here are the arrangements for the Judi-
ciary Committee testimony as they now stand: 
1. Tuesday at 4:00 p.m., meeting with Judge Clark, 
Judge Roney, and Al Pearson. 
2. Wednesday, 9:50 a.m., meet with Senators prior to 
hearing in room adjoining the hearing room, Dirksen 234. 
3. Wednesday, 10:00 a.m., hearing in Dirksen 226. Ap-
proximately 15 min. statement and 30 mins. of questions from 
Senators. 
R.H.P . 
. ~ . ' 
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November 9, 1989 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Supreme Court of the United States 




Dear Justice Powell: 
-
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LY M AN G FRIED M AN 
• NOT A.O M ITTED IN DC 
I am yawning this morning from lack of sleep and you are 
responsible. 
When I was watching the late news on t.v. last evening, 
I happened to switch to C-Span and discovered that it was 
carrying your appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
regarding the habeas corpus/death penalty legislation. I 
dutifully watched the broadcast until it ended at about 1:00 a.m. 
I found the proceedings very interesting and your 
testimony was extremely effective. I congratulate you on a job 
well done. Undoubtedly, a bill will eventually be passed to 
address this problem, and as Senator Biden indicated, your work 
and your Committee's report will have been the major impetus for 
legislative action. 
I only regret 
an opportunity as your 
JJB:kn 
that, unlike Hewi tt Pate, I was not given 
law clerk to testify before Cong r ess. 
Jr. 
- -
November 9, 1989 
Federal Habeas Corpus 
Dear Chief: 
As the subject of habeas corpus reform will be on 
your March agenda for the Judicial Conference, I enclose 
copies of statements submitted to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee on November 8 by Judges Oakes and Holloway. 
As you would expect, Judge Lay also filed a state-
ment that was some 25 pages long that does not merit read-
ing. 
My guess is that these same arguments will be ad-
vanced at your March meeting. Judges Clark, Roney and 
Higginbotham had excellent statements that were filed with 
the Senate Committee yesterday. I am sure they would be 
helpful in March if you requested their assistance. 
If you have questions, I will be happy to come to 
your Chambers at any time convenient. 







November 9, 1989 
First, I want to thank you warmly 
for the gracious way in which you welcomed 
me at the Senate hearing yesterday. Also, 
your questions were pertinent and quite 
helpful. 
I have not had an opportunity to 
study your bill carefully. Our objectives 
seem generally similar, and I hope that in 
the usual process of legislative compromise 
significant improvements can be agreed 
upon. Senator Biden, and other members of 
your Committee, now seem to recognize the 
need for major reform of the present limit-
less habeas corpus review, particularly in 
capital cases. 
I think you know my warm feeling 
for South Carolina, its traditional cul-
ture, and the quality of South Carolinians. 
I also have admired you personally and your 
great service to our country. 
My wife Jo is in the same "wom-
en's" club with your beautiful and charming 
Nancy. We send special wishes to both of 
you. 
As ever, 
Hon. Strom Thurmond 
217 Russell Senate Office Building 




November 9, 1989 
PERSONAL 
Dear Senator Biden: 
This is a brief note to thank you 
for being so gracious to me yesterday when 
I testified before your Judiciary Commit-
tee. In my view, there is no more impor-
tant Committee of the Senate than Judicia-
ry, and I was impressed by the way you pre-
sided. 
Like many Americans, 
concerned about your illness. 
lieved and pleased to see how 
looked. 
I have been 
I was re-
fit you 
As I stated, your Senate Bill 1757 
and the proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee 
have much in common. I hope that our views 
can be harmonized sufficiently to produce 
major reform in federal habeas corpus that 
is overdue. 
I send best wishes. 
Sincerely, 
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 
Chairman 
Senate Judiciary Committee 
221 Russell Senate Office Building 




November 9, 1989 
Dear Charles and Paul: 
A brief note to say that I regret-
ted leaving the Judiciary Committee hearing 
without being present for your testimony. 
I was beginning to feel more than a little 
bit tired, and thought it best for me not 
to remain. 
I am sure you both did well. I 
repeat, as I have said before, that one of 
the most satisfying experiences of my pro-
fessional life has been the opportunity the 
Ad Hoc Committee gave me to know both of 
you better. Of course, I knew and admired 
you during my years as Circuit Justice. 
The difference is friendship. 
I hardly need say that Jo would 
join me in sending affectionate best wishes 
to both of you and to your Emily and Sally. 
Do let us know when you are in 
Washington. 
As ever, 
Hon. Charles Clark 




November 9, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear Chief: 
Larry Averill was present at the hearing before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, and I assume that you have a 
report from him. 
I enclose a copy of the statement I filed with the 
Committee. My oral statement was somewhat more personal, 
but with the same emphasis. Chairman Biden and members of 
the Judiciary Committee (at various times a majority of the 
Committee was present) received me graciously, and the ques-
tions were not hostile. I testified for 2-1 / 2 hours. 
Judges Clark and Roney followed me. I felt too 
tired to remain to hear their testimony, but we had reviewed 
it together on Tuesday afternoon. As you would expect, 
Judges Holloway, Lay and Oakes were present to testify 
against us. 
As probably you know, Senator Biden has introduced 
s. 1757 that is similar in some respects to our proposal, 
but is more generous in allowing repetitive review under 
certain specified circumstances. My guess is that there 
will be legislation, but not until after the Judicial Con-
ference meets in March. One or more of the Senators ex-
pressed an interest in what the Judicial Conference will 
decide at that time. 
Your Ad Hoc Committee has been discharged once. I 
am sure you will understand when I express the hope that we 
now have a more effective discharge. 




cc: Members of the Committee 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 
- -
November 9 , 1989 
Dear Stan : 
Thank you for your letter of Octobe r 30 . lt was a 
pleasure to have vou visit me here at tne Couct . 
As we both hav1: hnrl the privileqe of servi.ng i\S 
President of the AIT\erican 13ar Association , I had l-loped for 
some time to have the opportunity to visit with you . 
On wednesc1ay of this week , the Ju<iiciary <:ommlttee 
of the Senate neld a hearinq on the Ad ~oc Committee ' s rec-
ommenoation for chanqes in fedPral nabeas . Perhaps you ~now 
that Senator Biden also has introduced leqi~lation on this 
~ubject . 
I have not seen the ARA proposal, hut have been 
told that its primary focus is on making federal habeas rP-
lief even more ea~lly availablP than at presAnt . rn ~y view 
this wou.h, hnrulv s~rve the c<11JrHJ of -justice . 
We expect to be with you at the Chicago meP.tlng . 
Meanwhile , I sen<l best wishes . 
Sincer~lv, 
Hon . L. Stanley Chauvin , Jr . 
President 
American Sar Association 
P . O. Box 1748 
Louisvill~ , Kentuckv 40201 
lfp/ss 
be: The Chief Justice 
-
November 10, 1989 
Dear Pat: 
I have now had an opportunity to 
read more carefully the statement you pre-
pared for the Senate Judiciary Committee 
hearing on November 8. It is an excellent 
statement, beautifully written, and - at 
least for me - quite persuasive. 
I am grateful to you for making 
the trip to Washington to support the rec-
ommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee on Fed-
eral Habeas appointed by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist. 
My high opinion of you dates back, 
as I have said before, to the time I was 
visiting Dallas and you met me at the air-
port. 
With warm best wishes. 
Sincerely, 
Hon. Patrick E. Higginbotham 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit 
15E23 U.S. Courthouse 
1100 Commerce Street 
Dallas, Texas 75242 
lfp/ ss 
-
November 13, 1989 
Dear John: 
I hope you will forgive me for 
keeping you awake until 1:00 a.m. But I do 
appreciate your writing. 
I had not testified before a Sen-
ate Committee since my confirmation hearing 
in the fall of 1971. The Chairman, Joe 
Biden, was fair and even generous. There 
is reason to believe that the recommenda-
tion of our Committee will be a positive 
influence for long overdue reform of habeas 
corpus procedure. 
It is always good to hear from 
you. At some convenient time, Sally and I 
would enjoy seeing your young ladies - per-
haps I should say your four. 
As ever, 
~- i rl. 
John J. Buckley, Jr., Esquire 
Williams & Connolly 
839 Seventeenth Street 
Washington, D. C. 20006 
lfp/ss 













November 13, 1989 
Andrew McBride, SOC's clerk who is now at the Justice 
Dept., informs me that Biden will attempt to bring his bill, 
S. 1757, to the Senate floor Tuesday morning. So much for 
Biden's (false) protest that more time was needed for study, 
and his aide's (false) statement to me that nothing would 
happen until February. But this is Washington. 
l.,_ ~tn,,.---




- ~ ~ lainly 
think it is vital for you to make clear that Bi-
1757 is not your habeas reform proposal. Biden 
• 
Ekpi- 'advance 
intends to tie himself to your good name in order to 
his own agenda, and he should not be allowed to do 
so. The Biden Bill makes things wor se for the States than 
they are now. No State will ever use the Biden system. 
Biden also intends to int r oduce legislation that will 
overrule your McKleskey opinion. Ev e r y capital case would 
be reviewed against a national data bank of racial statis-
tics. A prosecutor could only seek the death penalty 
against a minority defendant if his quota of prosecutions 
against minority defendants had not been used up. This is 
not justice, but trial by numbers without regard to individ-
ual facts . 
R.H.P. 
- -
lfp/ss 11/13/89 HEWM SALLY-POW 
Testimony before the Judiciary Committee on 
Federal Habeas 
MEMO TO HEW: 
There were some minor factual errors in the origi-
nal draft of the statement I read at the beginning of the 
hearing before the Judiciary Committee. We corrected these 
in the copy I read. 
The error I recall was in saying that there could 
be at least 11 opportunities for Judiciary Review. 
lieve the proper number is eight or nine. 
I be-
If this or any other errors - exist in the state-
ment we filed with the Committee, the Clerk of the Committee 
would permit us to make corrections. 
* * * * 
I take this opportunity, Hew, to say again that 
your thoughtful assistance - evidenced in so many ways - was 
indispensable to my service on the Ad Hoc Committee and most 
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November 13, 1989 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
U.S. Supreme Court 
1 First Street 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
I want to thank you once again for taking the time to 
testify before the Judiciary Committee on November 8, 1989, 
regarding the reform of federal habeas corpus procedures. 
Enclosed please find questions that I and other Senators 
did not have an opportunity to ask at the hearing. Your 
written responses to these questions will be included in the 
hearing record. · 
Some of these questions address the same subject or 
different aspects of the same subject. In such instances, 
please feel free to give a narrative response to several 
questions at once rather than responding to each question 
individually, if that would facilitate giving a cogent and 
complete answer. 
If possible, answers should be filed with the committee by 
December 15, 1989. 
, lo 
·I' Ques tions from Senator Dennis DeConcini 
QUESTIONS FOR JUSTICE POWELL 
STANDARDS FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
YOUR PROPOSED BILL CONTAINS NO "STANDARDS GOVERNING THE 
COMPETENCY OF COUNSEL." INSTEAD, YOU SAY THAT THE STATES 
SHOULD BE GIVEN "WIDE LATITUDE" TO ESTABLISH STANDARDS OF 
COMPETENCE THAT MEET THIS REQUIREMENT. 
Q. HOW CAN CONGRESS DETERMINE THAT THE TRADE-OFF SET FORTH 
IN THIS PLAN ADEQUATELY PROTECTS THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 
SENTENCED TO DEATH IF WE DON'T KNOW HOW A CENTRAL ELEMENT 
OF THE SCHEME -- THE STANDARDS OF COMPETENCY -- WILL BE 
IMPLEMENTED BY THE STATES? 
THE BILL I INTRODUCED SETS FORTH STANDARDS OF COMPETENCY 
FOR COUNSEL APPOINTED TO REPRESENT AN INDIGENT DEFENDANT AT 
TRIAL, ON DIRECT APPEAL, ON REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT, AND ON 
STATE COLLATERAL REVIEW. NEITHER THE POWELL COMMITTEE'S BILL 
NOR MINE INCLUDES STANDARDS FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL ON 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW BECAUSE CONGRESS. ENACTED STANDARDS 
GOVERNING THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN THOSE CASES LAST YEAR. 
Q. GIVEN THAT STANDARDS FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN 
FEDERAL HABEAS CASES ALREADY EXIST, WOULDN'T IT MAKE SENSE 
TO HAVE THE SAME STANDARDS APPLY THROUGHOUT THE 
PROCEEDINGS AT THE STATE LEVEL? 
Q. IF THE STATES WERE FREE TO SET THEIR OWN STANDARDS AS 
PROVIDED IN THE POWELL COMMITTEE BILL, AND THOSE STANDARDS 
TURNED OUT TO BE LESS RIGOROUS THAN THE FEDERAL STANDARDS 
THAT ARE ALREADY LAW, WOULDN'T THAT MEAN THAT IN SOME 
CASES COUNSEL REPRESENTING THE DEFENDANT ON STATE 
COLLATERAL REVIEW WOULD HAVE TO BE REPLACED BEFORE FEDERAL 
HABEAS REVIEW COULD BEGIN? 
Q. WOULDN'T THIS BE THE CAUSE OF THE KIND OF DELAY THAT 
YOUR PROPOSAL SEEKS TO AVOID? 
YOUR REPORT STATES THAT "THE ADEQUACY OF ANY SYSTEM FOR 
THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL ... RESTS ULTIMATELY WITH THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY." YOU SUGGEST, IN OTHER WORDS, THAT STATE 
PRISONERS WHO FEEL THAT THE STANDARDS OF COMPETENCE ESTABLISHED 
BY THEIR STATE ARE INADEQUATE CAN LITIGATE THAT QUESTION IN 
FEDERAL COURT. 
Q. DOESN'T THAT MEAN THAT BEFORE THE SCHEME ENVISIONED BY 
THIS BILL CAN BE IMPLEMENTED, THE FEDERAL COURTS WOULD 
HAVE TO LITIGATE THE STANDARDS OF COMPETENCE ESTABLISHED 
BY EVERY STATE? 
·, Senator Dennis DeConcini 
Q. IF EACH STATE ESTABLISHED DIFFERENT STANDARDS, THAT 
WOULD MEAN 50 SEPARATE LAWSUITS WOULD HAVE TO MOVE THROUGH 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY BEFORE THIS PLAN WOULD BE FULLY IN 
EFFECT. WOULDN'T THAT JUST CONTINUE THE KIND OF 
UNNECESSARY DELAY THAT THIS BILL IS INTENDED TO AVOID? 
Q. IF WE ADOPTED A UNIFORM FEDERAL STANDARD, ON THE OTHER 
HAND, WOULDN'T THE REFORM PLAN YOU RECOMMEND TAKE EFFECT 
IMMEDIATELY? 
(? Senator Dennis DeConiini 
SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS 
JUSTICE POWELL, YOUR COMMITTEE REPORT RECOMMENDS THAT A 
STATE PRISONER BE ALLOWED TO PRESENT A SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE 
HABEAS CORPUS PETITION IN ONLY ONE CIRCUMSTANCE -- WHERE THE 
CLAIM RAISES AN ISSUE AS TO THE UNDERLYING GUILT OR INNOCENCE 
OF THE PRISONER. 
AT THE HEARING I SUGGESTED THAT THERE MAY BE CIRCUMSTANCES 
THAT MIGHT JUSTIFY A SECOND REVIEW OF SENTENCING ISSUES. FOR 
EXAMPLE, I SUGGESTED THAT A PRISONER MIGHT BE PREVENTED FROM 
RAISING AN ISSUE BECAUSE OF ILLEGAL STATE ACTION -- SUCH AS 
WHERE THE STATE HAD CONCEALED THE FACT THAT PERJURED TESTIMONY 
HAD BEEN USED AT THE SENTENCING HEARING. 
Q. IF THE PRISONER DIDN'T LEARN ABOUT THIS UNTIL AFTER THE 
FIRST HABEAS REVIEW WAS COMPLETE, SHOULDN'T HE BE ALLOWED 
TO RAISE IT IN A SUCCESSIVE PETITION? 
Q. DOESN'T YOUR REPORT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUCH THINGS DO 
HAPPEN WHEN IT PERMITS THE FEDERAL COURT, IN THE CASE OF 
THE FIRST PETITION, TO REVIEW A CLAIM NOT PREVIOUSLY 
PRESENTED IN PRECISELY THESE CIRCUMSTANCES? 
Q. WHY SHOULD A PRISONER BE ALLOWED TO RAISED SUCH A CLAIM 
IF HE FINDS OUT ABOUT IT BEFORE FILING HIS FIRST PETITION, 
BUT NOT IF HE DOESN'T FIND OUT ABOUT IT UNTIL AFTERWARDS? 
Q. YOU STATED IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION THAT THE TRIAL 
JUDGE WOULD "FIND A WAY" TO AVOID A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE 
IN SUCH A CASE. HOW WOULD THE JUDGE DO THAT? 
SUPPOSE, AFTER THE FIRST HABEAS REVIEW IS COMPLETE, THE 
SUPREME COURT HOLDS, IN ANOTHER CASE, THAT SOME ASPECT OF THE 
PRISONER'S SENTENCING HEARING WAS IMPROPER. FOR EXAMPLE, THE 
COURT MIGHT HOLD THAT A CERTAIN JURY INSTRUCTION IS ILLEGAL. 
Q. IF THAT SAME JURY INSTRUCTION HAD BEEN GIVEN IN THE 
PRISONER'S CASE, SHOULDN'T THE PRISONER HAVE AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE THAT ISSUE IN A HABEAS PETITION? 
Q. WOULD IT BE RIGHT TO EXECUTE A MAN WHOSE SENTENCE --
ACCORDING TO THE SUPREME COURT -- WAS ILLEGAL, JUST 





FOR ALL WITNESSES 
2) Concerns have been expressed regarding the limits 
placed on the availability of federal writs on successive 
applications. Specifically, Judge Lay has suggested that the 
language of S. 1757 allowing "manifest injustice " as a ground 
for successive petitioning be included in legislation 
addressing habeas reform. 
My question is this: Wouldn ' t the use of broad and vague 
language such as "manifest injustice " allow for excessive 
petitioning? If the goal of habeas reform is to limit the 
excessive use of the petitioning process, would inclusion of 
this language fly in the face of reform? 
3) The Powell proposal provides for a 180-day limit for 
filing of a federal habeas petition, and permits an extension 
up to 240 days upon the showing of good cause. In your opinion 
is 240 days an adequate amount of time for filing? If not, is 
365 days? What period of time would be adequate for filing a 




Questions from Senator Dennis DeConcini 
QUESTIONS FOR PANEL I 
1) S. 1760 REQUIRES THE APPOINTMENT OF COMPETENT COUNSEL. 
I AM CONVINCED THAT IN ORDER TO ENSURE FAIRNESS THROUGHOUT THE 
PROCEEDING, COMPETENT COUNSEL IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. BUT I 
WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING YOUR OPINION OF THE CRITERIA 
THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. ARE THERE SOME MINIMUM STANDARDS BY 
WHICH APPOINTMENT OF COMPETENT COUNSEL COULD BE GUARANTEED? 
WHAT MIGHT THOSE STANDARDS BE? 
WHAT IF COUNSEL IS RETAINED, BUT PROVES INCOMPETENT? DOES 
THIS NOT IMPLY THAT ADEQUATE REVIEW HAS EFFECTIVELY BEEN 
DENIED? 
SECTION 2256(E) OF S. 1760 ALLOWS FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF 
DIFFERENT COUNSEL IN THE EVENT THAT PREVIOUS COUNSEL IS 
INEFFECTIVE. WITH REGARD TO THE PROPOSED STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS, WOULD THE NEW COUNSEL BE BOUND BY THE 6 MONTH 
FILING PERIOD? 
2) S. 1757 (SEC. 2261) REQUIRES THE APPOINTMENT OF 
COMPETENT COUNSEL, AND DIRECTS THAT SUCH COUNSEL HAVE BEEN 
ADMITTED TO PRACTICE IN THE STATE COURT OF LAST RESORT FOR NOT 
LESS THAN 5 YEARS, AND MUST HAVE AT LEAST 3 YEARS OF APPELLATE 
EXPERIENCE IN FELONY CASES. I AM CONCERNED THAT OUR 
EXPECTATIONS AS TO THE EXPERIENCE OF ATTORNEYS IN APPELLATE 
CAPITAL PROCEEDINGS BE REASONABLE. 
IN YOUR VIEW, ARE THESE STANDARDS REASONABLE? 
DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF 
ATTORNEYS AVAILABLE WHO HAVE SEVERAL YEARS EXPERIENCE WITH THIS 
TYPE OF CASE AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL? 
3) WHILE I AGREE THAT CURRENT HABEUS CORPUS PROCEDURE 
REQUIRES REFORM, WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT 
PEOPLE'S LIVES ARE AT STAKE. THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE 
REPORT SUGGESTS THAT THE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN CURRENT HABEUS 
CORPUS PROCEDURE ARE 1) PIECEMEAL AND REPETITIOUS LITIGATION, 
AND 2) YEARS OF DELAY BETWEEN SENTENCING AND JUDICIAL 
RESOLUTION AS TO WHETHER THE SENTENCE WAS PERMISSIBLE. 
I SUPPORT THE NEED FOR EXPEDITING HABEUS CORPUS APPEALS. 
BUT I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT SAFEGUARDS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE 
FAIR AND PROPER REVIEW. WITHOUT CASTING ANY ASPERSIONS, I 
WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR COMMENTS ON THE REQUIREMENT OF ONE 
THOROUGH REVIEW. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT, ASSUMING COMPETENT 
COUNSEL, ONE REVIEW IS SUFFICENT TO ASSURE THAT THE SENTENCING 








LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES 
<llnitrd ~tatrs ~rnatr 
WASHINGTON, DC 20510 
November 14, 1989 
Justice Le wis F. Powell, Jr. 
Supre me Court of the United States 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
11 7 NO\J 198~ 
.,._.. 
c/ 
Your kind note of November 9, 1989, has been received. 
< 
Again, I want to thank you for appearing as a witness on the 
habeas corpus matter, and your testimony was outstanding and will 
be a great help to us when we act upon this bill. 
We appreciate your tak ing the time to come here and testify, and 
if we can get favorable act ion on t he habeas corpus legislation , 
the work we have done and the hearings we have held1will all be 
justified. 
With kindest regards a nd best wishes to you and your lovely wife, 




.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR. 
RETI RED 
~nprnnt Qlomt of t4, ~~ ~hdt# --as~ J. QJ. 2.llffe'l, 
November 16, 1989 
Dear Senator Biden: 
Thank you for your letter of November 13, delivered 
to me this afternoon. 
I will be happy to reply to the questions you sub-
mitted, and will do so before December 15, the date you sug-
gested. 
Sincerely, 
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 
Chairman 
Senate Judiciary Committee 
t~o~ 
221 Russell Senate Office Building 
Washington, D. C. 20510 
lfp/ss 
cc: Professor Albert M. Pearson 
- -
November 16, 1989 
Dear Senator Biden: 
Thank you for your letter of November 13, delivered 
to me this afternoon . 
I will be happy to raply to the questions you sub-
mitted, and will do so before December 15 , the date you sug-
gested . 
Hon . Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 
Chairman 
Sincerely, 
Senate Judiciary Committee 
221 Russell Senate Office Building 
Washington , o. c . 20510 
lfp/ss 
cc: Professor Albert M. P~arson 
November 16, 1989 
Dear Al: 
I enclose a copy of Senator Biden's letter and 
questions, and would appreciate your suggesting appropriate 
answers. There seems to be . a considerable overlap in the 
questions. 
Mrs. Powell and I plan to leave Washington the 
weekend of December 15, and to spend the Christmas holidays 
in our Richmond home. It would therefore be helpful if I 
could have your suggested answers by Monday, December 4. 
We are having a hard time putting the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee to rest. 
Sincerely, 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
School of Law 
University of Georgia 
Athens, Georgia 30602 
lfp/ss / 
cc: R. Hewitt Page, Esquire 
(_ .1-: (f 
- -
November 16, 1989 
Dear Al: 
I enclose a copy of Senator Biden's letter and 
questions, and would appreciate your suggesting appropriate 
answers. There seems to be a considerable overlap in the 
questions. 
Mrs. Powell and I plan to leave Washington the 
weekend of December 15, and to spend the Christmas holidays 
in our Richmond home. It would therefore be helpful if I 
could have your suggested answers by Monday, December 4. 
We are having a hard time putting the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee to rest. 
Sincerely, 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
School of Law 
University of Georgia 
Athens, Georgia 30602 
lfp/ ss 
-1' 
cc: R. Hewitt Pafe, Esquire 
- -~iteb jhrles ~istrid C1lnurt 
CHAMBERS 01" 
JUDGE BAREFOOT SANDERS 
November 17, 1989 
NORTHERN DISTRICT O F TEXAS 
1100 COMMERCE STREET 
DALLAS, TEXAS 715242 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
As sociate J ustjGe , Retir.ed 
U.S. Supreme Court 
1 First st., NE 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Re: Ad Hoc committee on Federal H 
Dear Justice Powell: 
2 lNOV 198i, 
_9-. 
Thank you for sending me a copy of your November 9 letter to the 
Chief Justice. 
At your convenience please send me a copy of the statement which you 
filed with the Senate Judiciary Committee. I would like to have it 
available when we commence to prepare for discussion at the Judicial 
Conference in March. 
I will say once again that it has been a privilege to work with you 
on this project. 
Sincerely, 
y ./ 




ADMINIST RATIVE O FIC~ OF THE 
* /.k-c_ 
2 2NO\J 198$ ~ 
~ -
'd), F ~ '-7 A., 
UNITED STATES COURTS 
L RALPH MECHAM 
DIRECTOR 
JAMES E. MACKLIN. JR 
DEPUTY DIRECTOR 
'"Ov . c;\..v 
WASHINGlDN, D .C. 20544 
WILLIAM R BURCHILL, JR 
GENERAL COUNSEL 
November 21, 1989 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
We have extracted from the Congressional Record of Senate proceedings on this past 
Sunday, November 19, the enclosed excerpt announcing a unanimous consent agreement to 
defer consideration of capital habeas corpus and other drug-related legislation until February. 
This agreement modifies the previous schedule adopted in September, under which the 
Senate would have considered this legislative package prior to adjournment of this year's 
session. In view of ~acceleration of congressional adjournment to this week and the 
consequent press of otfi business to be handled on an expedited basis, the plan now is to 
cons_J9ert~e "tiatives related to criminal issues following the return of Congress 
February 7, 1990. 
~ou had not already seen this, I know it will be of interest to you and to the 
other members who served on the Ad Hoc Committee. With kindest personal regards, 
Enclosure 
cc: Honorable Charles Clark 
Honorable Paul H. Roney 
Honorable Wm. Terrell Hodges 
Honorable Barefoot Sanders 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 




TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
1939 - 1989 
.. 
:ONGRESSIONAL RECORD 
Noverrber 19, 1989 -• UNANIMOUS-CONsJ AGREEMENT Mr. NITCHEL1.. Mr. Preddent, ~n 
September '215 of thls -year, 'the Sem.te 
reachf!d a -conu,rehensive agreement 
on bow ti\ conSM'ler l~islation deallllg 
wUh the contrQI of drugs and with the 
11.sue -Of <Jrlme and «unioal $&UCUol3s 
and prooedurel;. The funding portion 
of that proPODI -was sent 'to ttle Presi-
dent u ,-rt <Of the Transportgtlon ap-
lffl>priatlfflls 'bill; the several commit-
tees" legislative 'Initiatives as well as 
certain of the legislative J.nlUatlves of 
the Pre5ldent's ,drug proposal, have 
been passed by both Houses and are 
now in oonierence. In addition. the 
Bouse is considering the Senate's 
~ <m '& bill oontain1ng f!e\l'Cffll ad· 
anUdrug prQJ)OSa}s. 
'nle remaining portion of the B.il"ee-
ment reached .on Septew bee 2S provld-
~ that the majority leader, after con-
.ultation with the Republican ieader, 
~uld determine a method tor the 
consideration of a bill or a motion to 
1)rooeed to such bill dea!ing ,ritb the 
death penalty, habeas corpus reforms, 
excltl51ona.ry rule. Justice Department 
reor&an1za.1lon. lnternational money 
l&underm&. and the &vail&bWty of fire-
arms !oc ,purchase; and that t.htis ~1: 
cle or motion to proceed to .such vehi-
cle shall <>000r no later 'than alne die 1 
adjournment. 
Mr. President.. 1 had been preparing 
to proceed to this leg1slation on 
lwnday. 'l\Aesday, .and Wednesday of 
this .c,omioe week. Senat.oc Bmt:N has 
told me that .be J.s prepared to manage 
the legisl&tion .-nd 'has a bill that in-
oorporates the elements of the agree-
ment ready to introduce. However. the 
Republican leader .asked me &t the end 
.of last week Jf. &iven the .tJme oon-
.1traints that we lacln& WI all &t this 
point and the need to~ .ooBOeDtrat-
ed attenUon tio this topic, I wc,uld 
mind ~elring '&CUon -on this teglma-
tion 'Until just prior to tbe Pebnm.ry 
recess. Mr. ~ent. 1 'have no prob-
lem. ~ to the .Republican lead-
~ e>rePGll&l; l .aavedleok,d ,rjth Ben-
.ator .BmEK, and he lpcttcaa,d that if 
Uie Joint leadernhtp 'W1shecl to 1Sefer 
aetlon 1Ufftll Pebruar7, be "WOU1d aceede 
to the request. l would an the Repub-
lican leader 1f I have stated the situa-
tion as ibe uoderstands lt u well? 
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President_ the ma-
Jority aeader' Js ~ I tlave ois-
cused this with &naten on this aide 
C1f the a1s1e and with officials m the 
admlnistratfon, 1Ll1d tho 11,gree that it 
would be preferable to defer .act1on on 
this lmport.ant l~t.Lon Wltll .F'ebnl-
ary. I believe that it needs mol'C lo-
oosed .attentk>n than time permtu at 
tbis 1>0int. beoaase, :u md1oated by t.he 
~onty 1ea.der, we 1l!"e under rather 
avere 'time constni.ints. 
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Presldent, 
therefore, I now ask unarwmnus .oeo-
sent that the maJority Jeader, after 
oonsultation with 1.be Republican 
ieader, :ma7 move to pioceed to 'the-
conslderation of legislation tnom'J)oni.t-
1ng the 'Six elements listed above at 
any t.iIIre beginning Wednesday • .Feb-
ruary "1, reg~ of .the pe.ndency of 
other .lecislation, &Dd .notwithstanding 
the JH'<M8ions of ntle XXII. 
The P'R.EEIDilVO OF'FlCER. With-
out objecUon, It 1a 60 «dered. 
- -
November 22, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear Barefoot: 
As requested, I enclose copies of the statemff~f00450;025 
S0s 
filed in advance with the Senate Judiciary Committee, as 
required by its rules, and the statement I presented orall 
y. 
Members of the Committee were courteous, and asked 
a number of questions - favorable and unfavorable. I testi-
fied for 2-1/2 hours. 
I will certainly miss seeing you regularly. What-
ever ultimately happens to the Report of our Committee, I 
think it represents a constructive and fair alternative to 
the present chaotic system that - in my view - no thoughtful 
person can approve. I repeat that I admired your contribu-
tion to the work of our Committee. 
I hope we keep in touch and send very best wishes 
for Thanksgiving. 
Sincerely, 
Hon. Barefoot Sanders 
United States District Court 
Northern District of Texas 
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ADM1N1J RAT1vEo Fie~ oF THE 
UNIT~if STATES' COURTS 
JAMES E . MACKLIN, JR. 
DEPUTY DIREClOR 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
'rov . s\:-> 
WASHINGlDN. D.C. 20544 
November 27, 1989 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
WILLIAM R. BURCHILL. JR. 
GENERAL COUNSEL 
Consistent with Hew Pate's request, this office has duplicated the enclosed 
transcript of the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing of November 8 on habeas corpus 
reform. 
I am enclosing herewith for you a copy of the transcript, and by copy of this 
correspondence, I am also transmitting it to each member of the former Ad Hoc 
Committee. 
I have shipped ten additional copies directly to Hew. With kindest personal 
regards, 
Enclosure 
cc: Honorable Charles Clark 
Honorable Paul H. Roney 
Honorable Wm. Terrell Hodges 
Honorable Barefoot Sanders 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
Mr. R. Hewitt Pate 
FIFTY YEARS OF SERVICE 
Sincerely, 
TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
1939-1989 
,f __ .. .. ~ ~-- ~. ~ ,,.,__.$ ~ . :~:.:~. • .. : .. ~L-:·::.::.•:~·;i_::::~'-•'i•_. , 
FROM=LAW SCHOOL -UGA - TO: - DEC 11, 1989 2:05PM P.02 
(1ID ____ ,,,, __ _ aJ ~ 
The University of Georgia 
School of Law 
December 11, 1989 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell 
Associate Justice, Retired 
United states Supreme Court 
Washington, DC 20543 
Re: Response to Biden Committee's 
Follow-up Questions 
Dear Justice Powell, 
Enclosed is a draft of the proposed answers to the questions 
formulated to you by Senator Biden and other members of the 
Judiciary Committee. I am sorry for the delay in getting this 
material to you, but I had trials last week and could not get a 
stretch of time to complete my work.,, I_ 7m clear for the balance 
of this week and can assist you and~ in editing and otherwise 










Professor of Law 
~ ~ k 







' • • · 
:· ... : - .... ·-.. ,'!,,';;·. _- ·" 
FROM:LAW SCHOOL -UGA - TO: 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Lewis F. Powell 
From: Al Pearson 
Re: Proposed Responses to Senate 
Judiciary Followup Questions 
l. Standards for Competency of Counsel 
· . ::e: ·": _;_;,;; ·:E 1 Il~;gy~;;tl.'<· 
DEC 11, 1989 2:05PM P.03 
)J-~~ 
Dece~ber 11. 1989 
Several factors ~ent into the Committee's consideration of 
this issue. First, there is no constitutional right to counsel 
during either state or federal post-conviction review. Whether or 
not this is wise, it is a factor that will influence the 
willingness of the states to support habeas corpus reform. Second, 
if habeas corpus reform in capital cases is to be achieved, 
su bstan t isl support at the state 1 evel would seem to be both 
desirable end politically neceeeary. Third, considerable weight was 
accorded to the fact that, subject to federal review, responsbility 
for providing competent counsel at the critical stages of criminal 
ceses has always resided at the state level. 
In the Committee's viev, the crucial issue is how to get the 
state's to undertake an obligation that they do not presently have 
to perform: provide counsel in state habeas proceedings. By 
allowing states the choice of either remaining under the present 
system--~which many find undesirable---or opting in to the scheme 
proposed by our Committee (S. 1760), there is an important element 
of flexibility. For the states seeking greater finality in capital 
cases, their burden will be to propose 8 mechanism for providing 
competent habeas counsel which they can sustain financially and can 
staff fully. If a scheme doesn't measure up, federal court review 
I 
I 
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FROM:LAW SCHOOL -UGA - TO: - DEC 11, 1989 2:06PM P.04 
wi 11 make clear what more a a ts te must do to meet the legal 
requirements of section 2256. In the Committee's view, this process 
should produce within a reasonable period of time the necessary 
legal benchmarks for other states to follow if they wish to opt in 
to the special habeas scheme for capital cases. 
But far more important, the Commit tee's scheme em bod 1es an 
incentive structure that is likely to stimulate the interest of 
states willing to conaider seriously change in the way capital 
habeas litigation is conducted. Unless there is a good reason for 
the states to opt in to the Committee's proposal, they will take 
their chances wi~h the status quo which means taking the chance 
that the courts will eventually clarify the habeas corpus finality 
rules in ways that are appropriately attuned to the states' 
perception of their own interests. The issue of state habeas 
counsel in capital cases will remain where it was left in Murray 
v, Giarrantano. 
To allow the states to take the initiative in 12.roposing 
representational schemes for state habeas proceedings may seem to 
be a legislative abdication on a central issue. But I would suggest 
that the process contemplated by the Committee's proposal---which 
involves ultimate judicial oversight---would work well. Not only 
would it attract state interest, it would reveal how seriously that 
interest is to be taken. A federal court would have before it 
detailed information that will not be readily available to 
2 
~ 
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FROM:LAW SCHOOL -UGA TO: DEC 11, 1989 2:06PM P.05 
Congress, including data about the number of attorneys in a state 
willing to undertake capital defense representation, those skilled 
enough to do it in some capacity, where such attorneys live and 
practice in the state and what it would take financially to make 
it feasible to get these attorneys involved in capital defense 
work. It is probably unfair to state legislatures and courts to 
suggest that they might try to opt in under section 2256 by 
proposing a representational scheme without objective criteria for 
determining the competency of counsel. It is probably equally 
unfair to federal courts to suggest that they would not inquire 
seriously about the need for at least soMe objective criteria by 
which to make a threshhold judgment about attorney competency. 
In any event, after hearing testimony from al1 interested 
parties and consideration of local fectors unique to a particular 
state, a federal court under the Committee's proposal could say 
authoritatively whether a state's proposal is reasonably calculated 
to insure the appointment of competent counsel in state habeas 
proceedings. Until now, this type of judgment has elmost 
universally been the kind of fact specific determination that 
courts do far better than legislatures, We should not forget that 
federal courts are constantly asked to award attorney's fees under 
statutory provisions which set no specific guidelines, Nor should 
we forget that the competency of defense counsel is one of the most 
common questions that federal courts face in post-conviction 
11 t iga tion. Standard e of attorney competency, of course. have 
3 
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developed entirely on a case-by - case basis. Litigation under the 
Committee's proposal no doubt would be the cause of some delay, but 
largely such delay would occur on a one time basia. The value of 
the litigation pTocess would lie in the refinement of atate 
proposals to promote compliance with section 2256. 
If a state acts in response to the incentive structure 
contemplated by the Committee, the status quo will change at least 
in that state and perhaps in others. Capital defendants will obtain 
representation which they now have no right to demand. Objective 
standards for promoting competent representation may vary at · least 
initially from state to state, but that should not militate against 
the Committee's proposal as long as the federal judiciary is 
authorized to review each scheme to assure that it is reasonably 
calculated to produce competent counsel in capital cases at the 
state habeas phase. 
The notion of uniform national stHndards of competency has a 
s u r face a pp ea 1 bu t i t i a a " t op d o "'n '' so 1 u t 1 on that act u a 11 y 
obacures the many detailed considerations that are crucial to the 
development of an effective system of hab~as representation in 
capital cases. An examination of the standards for counsel in S. 
1757 illustrates why. Section 2261 of S. 1757 requires 3 years of 
"experience" in the handling of felony trials. It doesn't specify 
what that experience includes, such as the number of cases tried 
to verdict, whether the attorney must have served as lead counsel 
4 
' .. 
, : • ~ • _. '• • _'•, T~::-.::•:\:>.:•~• i:;}irf-, -~ > -_~,- ::_, __ -.--~ -_ -~-: ·e\~r1'\~:~?-- -~;~~1-,~~~L~:~-~i{~S-~~i:.~t~~· 
FROM:LAW SCHOOL -UGA TO: DEC 11, 1989 2:07PM P.07 
or whether the trials inv~lved felonies of a serious and complex 
nature. A similar "experience" requirement is applicable to the 
handling of appeals. 
Even if all attorneys who have less than the necessary 3 years 
experience are presumptively incomptent to handle capital cases. 
the converse is not true. All attorneys with at least 3 years 
felony trial experience cannot be judged preaum£tively competent 
as a class, Thus. under section 2261 the experience rules would 
function in an operational sense ae little more than threshhold 
screening tools in the attorney appointment procedure. To promote 
attorney competency in capital cases, many details would have to 
be filled in and presumably S. 1757 leaves those details---which 
would be decisive to the efficacy of a statewide representational 
scheme---to be worked out at the state level. Viewed in this light, 
the notion of uniformity expressed in S, 1757 is extremely limited. 
In another sense, these "experience" provisions ~ould be 
counterproductive even if they served only as screening devices. 
In addition to the 3 year trial and appellate "experience" 
requirements. section 2261 also requires that the attorney must 
have acquired that experience in the trial and appellate court in 
which the capital case is to be heard. Section 2261 also requires 
that each attorney subject to appointment must have been admitted 
to practice in those specific courts for 5 years prior to 
5 
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appointment. Inate8d of viewing esch state as a genera1 talent pool 
from which to attract attorneys to handle capital cases, section 
2261 seems to require each state to subdivide itself into numerous 
local talent pools. What does time of admission to practice before 
a particular court have to do with capability to represent a 
capital defendant? Why does felony trial experience have to be 
essenti8lly "local" experience? Under section 2261, an attorney 
with extensive federal criminsl trial experience could not be 
appointed unless he or she possessed the requisite etate trial 
experience in the relevant trial court. Similarly, an attorney in 
Virginia who acquired his criminal experience in Richmond could not 
defend a capital case in Nox-folk unless he ox- she met section 
2261's local admission and local experience rules. It plainly is 
not easy to find attorneys willing and able to make the 
extraordinary commitment needed to serve es lead counsel or even 
to pax-tic i pate in a capable case. But sect ion 2261 ref lee ts an 
outmoded view of attorney mobi 1 i ty that wi 11 make the task of 
finding capital defense counsel even harder than it already is. 
Whether attorney competency standards are mandatory or 
voluntary, the states will be loath to accept them unless the 
standards are reasonable in light of local conditions. In view of 
these consid-0rationa, the Committee believes that its approach will 
encourage the development of statewide representational schemes to 
which the proposing states would be genuinely committed end it 
further believes that these schemes would be effect 1 ve, 
particulorly in light of their feder~l reviewability. The absence 
6 
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of so-called unifox-m federal standards of competency is not a 
shortcoming in the Committee's proposal. Such standards will evolve 
as states attempt to opt in. The states will not have a free hand 
to pay lipservice to the ideal of effective assistance of coinsel 
and yet. at the same time, secure the benefits of increas~d 
finality in capital cases. The federal judiciary has faithfully 
protected constitional righte---including most particularly the 
right to counsel - --since Brown v. Allen was handed down and it can 
be expected to continue to do its duty under the habeas corpus 
statute if it is reformed as the Committee proposes in S. 1760. If 
the states are allowed some flexibility in taking the initiative. 
the end result in the Committee's view would be a material, 
generally beneficial and lasting change in the way capital casea 
are litigated in this country. 
In answer to some of the roore specific questions concerning 
the Committee's recommendations. the standards for judging 
competency of counsel should be compatible throughout state and 
federal habeas corpus proceedings. But as indicated earlier, the 
competency standards in section 2261 of S. 1757 are neither uniform 
nor particularly exacting and they authorize virtually open ended 
departure when an attorney meeting those standards is unavailable. 
The same is true of the attorney competency standards in 21 USC$ 
848(q)(7). Considerable discretion is placed in the hands of the 
trial judge in both instances. The Committee. however, believes 
that this is inevitable. There is no W8Y to make any seriouA 
7 
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advances in this erea without substantial delegation of 
responsibility under general standards. 
In my view, the attorney who represents a capital defendant 
at the state phase ought to continue to handle the case once it 
reaches federal court unless there is clear reason to believe thftt 
the case hae been mishandled. At that juncture, performance in the 
context of the specific case ought to override adherence to more 
generalized standards of competency. The object of this proposal 
is to find lawyers who will put forth intelligent, informed and 
aggressive efforts on behalf .of capital defendants. If that 
performance is present, blind adherence to supposedly more 
demanding federal standards of competency would be a disservice to 
the client and would discourage future lawyers from heeding the 
call to provide a perhaps unpleasant but desperately needed service 
to the criminally condemned. 
As far as the litigation process is concerned. it would be 
inevitable even either under S. 1757 ors. 1760. The suggeet:f.on 
that a uniform federal competency standard would produce immediate 
reform is not plausible. There are simply too many issues to be 
worked out through general legislation. The enhancement of fairness 
and finality in capital cases requires a collaborative effort on 
the part of the states and the federal government. While it vould 
take time for a judicial consensus to develop concerning the 
adequucy of atate representational schC!mes • the delay involved 
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would occur on a one time basis for each state. Presumably, each 
state would be in the beat position to judge whether this one time 
delay would be worthwhile in light of the benefits to be derived. 
The real issue is not how to design a scheme that provides 
competent representation for capital defendants. It is whether the 
states which have the death penalty see it as in their interest to 
undertake to devise one. In the Committee's view, the incentive 
structure incorporated into S. 1760 is calculated to stimulate 
state interest in thia issue and it contemplates immediate judicial 
review as the best mechanism to test the good faith and 
reasonableness of the states seeking to opt in. 
2. Successive Petitions 
The object of the Committee's proposal is to encourage habeas 
counsel to inquire aggressively into ell legal and factual issues 
concerning the capital sentencing procedure. The vast majority of 
death penalty cases do not focus on guilt-innocence, but rather are 
concerned with the avoidance of the death penalty. After a verdict 
of guilty, a jury in a capital case can impose the death penalty 
only if it finds beyond a reasonable doubt that certain aggravating 
circumstances were present. If the jury cannot reach unanimity on 
that issue or if a aingle juror finds mitigating circumstances to 
be overriding, then life imprisonment is the sentence by default. 
An understanding of this makes the state intereat in 
9 
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sentencing finality clearer. It is just as burdensome to retry a 
capital case completely as it is to have a new trial limited only 
to sentence. A second jury in a capital case must still hear all 
the evidence relevant to sentence before it decides whether to 
impose the death penalty. From the state's perspective, challenges 
to the sentence really do not rest on the argument that the first 
jury would have decided the death penalty issue differently. 
Instead. they rest on the premise that a second and differently 
composed jury might have one member who is unwilling to impose the 
death penalty. If a conviction in a capital case 1s reversed, the 
state almost always retries the case. If the reversal is limited 
to the death sentence, the state is not as invariably inclined to 
go through a x-esentencing trial because the possibility of ft 
default verdict is such an unpredictable factor. 
Under S. 1760, second or successive petitions are permissible 
in cases where there is doubt about the guilt-innocence 
determination because there is necessarily doubt about the 
imposition of the death penalty. Where there is no question in a 
capital case about guilt, S. 1760 limits a capital defendant to one 
opportunity for federal habeas review on the validity of sentence. 
Of course, it is highly significant that this ~ould be a counseled 
opportunity. An experienced criminal attorney kno~s the types of 
issues that can be raised in post-conviction proceedings in 
addition to those raised at t ria 1 and on direct appeal. The 
identity of the state's witnesses and their testimony at the 
10 
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sentencing hearing would be a matter of record. Under S. 1760, 
habeas counsel ia expected to undertake the necessary steps to 
investigate all such anticipatable issues, including BradJ 
violations and the possibility of perjured testimony, and do it in 
connection ~1th the first petition. Discovery procedures are 
available at the federal level to assist in this process and should 
be liberally avai18ble. 
!£ 1 after ell the efforts of habeas counsel, perjured 
testimony or a Br~dy violation is not discovered, S. 1760 would 
remit the capital defendant to state court for a remedy at that 
point. If the clei~ has substance and raises questions about the 
propriety of the sentencing procedure I there is no reason to 
believe that a state court judge would hesitate to act in a clear 
case. The fact that federal habeas review of sentencing would come 
to an end at some point does not mean that a capital defendant hes 
no forum at all for late emerging theories of relief. 
3. Retroectivity 
Under S. 1760 1 the Supreme Court would take its most serious 
look at a death penalty case after all state and federal post-
conviction review has been concluded. If it determines that one of 
its decisions ought to be retroactively applied, it will have the 
opportunity to do so at that point. After the Supreme Court has 
taken its final look at a capital case and has upheld the 
11 
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conviction and sentence, the death penalty will probably be carried 
out within weeks. If a capital defense attorney thinks that another 
case pending before the Supreme Court for decision might have an 
impact on his client's case, he is obligated to advise the Court 
of that fact so that action on his client's certiorari petition can 
be withheld until a decision on the potentially controlling case 
is handed down. Apart from these circumstances, retroactivity 
issues won't be a problem under S. 1760. 
4. Manifest Injustice Standard 
If that language is the only limit on second or successive 
petitions, there is no limit on such petitions. Adoption of that 
standard would in essence mean that all previoua judicial efforts 
to review the case count for virtually nothing if a later judge's 
conception of justice differs from that of his predecessors. 
5. Adequacy of 180 Day Filing Requirement 
If an attorney accepts appointment in a cap1 tal csse, the 
state would have reason to expect the case to be his or her top 
priority. Since Furman, many death penalty cases have been 
litigated at the habeas phase under far greater initial time 
constraints than the 180 day period proposed under S. 1760. This 
happens because the stBte hes set an execution date after the 
conviction 5nd sentence hove been upheld on direct appeal. One of 
12 
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the advantages of S. 1760, in the Committee's vielt', is that it 
would eliminate the time and energy that sometimes has to be put 
into securing stays of execution. 
But apart from that, is 180 days otherwise adequate to prepare 
a state habeas corpus petition which will in turn become the basis 
for the federal habeas corpus petition? The Committee believes that 
this time period is reasonable since new counsel would already have 
a full trial transcript to work from plus the benefit of all briefs 
and motions prepared by predecessor counsel. Frequently, trial 
counsel will assist habeas counsel in making them familiar with the 
case as it is their ethical obligation to do. Four months would be 
a sufficient amount of time to evaluate the records and file 8 
state habeas petition which would atop the 180 day time period from 
running any longer. Bear in mind here that if investigation 
thereafter turns up any new issues, counsel for the capital 
defendant could seek leave to amend the petition to add those 
i9sues, a request th8t ought to be granted as a matter of course 
prior to any state evidentiary hearing and thereftfter upon a 
showing of cause 88 long 88 the habeas trial court still retains 
jurisdiction over the case. 
The point of the 180 day filing requirement ia to place some 
deadline pressure on capital defense attorneys to formulate a 
habeas petition in a prompt manner. Otherwise, in a capital case, 
there is literally no incentive to file a habeas corpus petition 
13 
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until it becomes absolutely necessary. If a cspital defense 
counsel works diligently from the day of appointment, he or she 
will get the state habeas petition filed with time to spare. 
The 180 day clock stops upon the filing of the state habeas 
petition and remains stopped throughout state habeas litigation. 
It begins to run again only after the state high court hes rendered 
a final judgment in the case which usually comes after the denial 
of a motion for rehearing in the event of a judgment adverse to the 
capital defendant. If there is continuity of representation es S. 
1760 contemplates, the jump from state to federal court should not 
require much additional time. The better practice would be to have 
all federal habeas pleadings pre-drafted and finalized during the 
time -when a motion for rehearing is pending before the state 
supreme court. If the motion for rehearing is denied, the federal 
habeas petition could then be filed on the same day of this denial 
~1th no additional running of time, This is a worst case scenario 
premised on the filing of a state habeas on the 180th day. The 
other option would be to seek a 60 day extension of time to file 
the federal habeas petition. If unusual problems arise in advance 
of the filing of either a state or federal hebeas petition, 
competent counsel have ways to avoid default. But the expectation 
is that they will get the job done within the time prescribed and 
the Committee sees the task as manageable. 
6. Objective Criteria £or Appointment of Counsel 
14 
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Probably the most important determinants of effectiYe 
representation in capital cases (at the trial. appellate and habeas 
phases) are the extent of previous jury trial experience, 
demonstrsted knowledge and research ability in the field of 
criminal law based on both motion practice and appellate experience 
and finally the maturity and temperament of the indiYidual 
attorney. Bright line rules don't work in this area and may in fact 
be counterproductive. As is well known, many young, highly 
motivated but objectively inexperienced attorneys have gotten 
excellent results in death penalty cases in every jurisdiction. 
Competency standards serve a purpose, but we must keep in mind that 
each state needs to expand the pool of attorneys who are willing 
to represent capital defendants. If competency standards are so 
high that only a very few attorneys can qualify for appointment, 
the states will not find it very attractive to opt in under S. 1757 
or some variation of it. 
The criteria for appointment of counsel in S. 1757, as 
indicated earlier, don't have the relevant objective content to be 
assessed as either too high or too low. They can't even serve as 
nieaningful guidelines to the states. This is why S. 1757 would 
allow the states to take the initiative to set attorney competency 
standards that are geared at least in part to local conditions. 
Permit the federal courts thereafter to review these plans before 
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under s. 1757. The aim should be to develop a pool of legal t&lent 
in each state that is ava:f.lable for habeas representation in 
capital cases. If a uniform national standard of attorney 
competency is mandated as a condition of opting in. few states. if 
any, will do so. 
As far as retained counsel is concerned. the most plausible 
time for replacement would be when the case arrives in federal 
court. But it could very well be done earlier. In my view, the 
state mechanism for appointment of counsel ought to have someone 
assigned to monitor the progress of all attorneys---whether 
appointed or retained---working under the 180 day filing 
requirement. If no progress is shown after three or four months. 
the state on its own motion ought to take the initiative to seek 
a replacement even in cases where counsel is retained. If a state 
appoints a replacement within the 180 day period. the time period 
ought to start again for the replacement counsel. Otherwise, if a 
replacement is made after the case resches federal court. the 180 
day filing period is no longer applicable. The federal judge can 
give the new attorney however much time he or she needs to prepare 
to carry the case forward from that point. 
7. Is One Federal Review Sufficient? 
Given the focus on continuously counseled representation 
throughout all post-conviction ~evie~. the scheme proposed in S. 
16 
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1760 would be far superior to the chaotic system now in place. 
Piecemeal litigation is to some degree the result of several 
different teams of attorneys working at different phases of a death 
penalty case. Continuity of representation will eliminate piecemeal 
litigBtion due to changes in counsel and it will also promote 
fairness to the capital defendant, Finally, the issue in capital 
cases is not delay per se; it is the lack of structure for the 
capit8l litigation process and the lack of clear agreement when the 
federal role in this process comes to an end. Now the courts are 
grappling with this issue on a case-by-case basis, s. 1760 is an 
attempt to produce a balanced solution to the present deadlock. It 
offers major enhancements in terma of fairness to the capital 
defendant and requires in return a clarification of the rules of 
finality. It leaves the substantive scope of habeas corpus review 
intact. 
If this proposal doesn't succeed politically, the states will 
continue to try to develop the case law in ways that further limit 
federal habeas corpus review. Thie strategy has been relatively 
successful in recent years. If the states achieve through the 
litigation process what they would like in terms of finality, they 
will have no incentive to compromise along the lines suggested in 
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_,,Z_ (601) 353-0911 
This letter from an Alabama lawyer makes the best 
argument I can conceive of for our committee report 
procedures. The lawyer is completely frustrated by rushed, 
last-minute proceedings in the two death penalty cases where 
he was appointed to represent the habeas petitioner. His 
dilemma pleads for the imposition of rules for an orderly 
development of habeas issues by competent counsel with 
execution stayed. I am trying to develop the support needed 
to get our proposal, or one with substantially similar 
operative provisons, adopted by the Conference. Any 
suggestions would be greatly appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
cc: Chief Judge William H. Rehnquist 
- -
Letter to the Editor 
Like other states, Alabama faces an 
acute problem in obtaining counsel 
for the deiense of capital cases. The 
following thought-provoking com-
mentary was contained in a letter 
sent to the Action Group on Post-
Conviction Capital Representation. 
Member~ Action Group on Post-
Conviction Capital Representation 
Board oi Directors. Alabama Capita l 
Resource Center. Inc. 
RE : Civil Trial Lawyer~ 
in Death Penalty Cases 
As vou might have read in the news-
paper, mv client Michael Lindsey was ex-
ecuted on May 26. That, along with the 
execution of my client Wayne Ritter in 
1987 (the last man executed in Alabama). 
put~ me in the unique and unenviable 
role oi having represented, at the time oi 
execution, 50 percent of all the people 
executed in Alabama in the last 23 years, 
a ract I do not plan to list in Martindale-
Hubbell . Considering my personal hi~-
tory.1 it 1s remarkable. 
After a Memorial Day weekend of rest, 
fishing and skiing, I am moving on in my 
lire, never to take another death penalty 
ca~e even ii they disbar me for my refusal 
(there are 105 on death row there, I think, 
and one or two more from Mobile alone 
are convicted every week, it seems, but 
there ,He lot~ more lawvers than that). 
Like those ,-vho served both in WWII and 
Korea . : figure I've done my duty, and the 
ne,t \\ dr can be iought by somebod,· 
ebt . 
Betore I movf' on in m" l11P. lhougr. 
I mve 1t to tnosP 105 or more civil ma , 
lawver~ wno will oe araneo in tn e nex; 
two vears or so. to do wnat i cm to pa), 
on mv les~ons tu someoodv. so their ro1t-
wil! be e,v;:er . • 1nrl tor that limi ted our-
pose I send this letter. I couldn't think o; 
anvbodv to send it to other than the bar s 
Task Force on Post-Conviction Capita l 
Representation . and the board members 
and executive director oi the Alabama 
Capital Representation Resource Center. 
Inc.. the organ that Albert Brewer and th~ 
task iorce kicked into liie to work on thi , 
stui1 
Here are my lessons: 
1. Appointing civil trial lawyers in 
death penalty cases is a bad mistake-I 
have believed this all along. and I believe 
it more strongly now than ever. Those oi 
you who have been on this project irom 
the start know that I have never made a 
secret of it. Lest you think I have kept my 
mouth shut when I should not have, I 
should add that in the last two months 
I have filed motions and mandamus peti-
tions and appeals in five difierent courts 
(three different ones in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit alone) based on federal and state 
statutes which I believed (and still be-
lieve, though the judges don't) to requm· 
the appointment of lawvers with threP 
years' (federal) or iive year~· (state) 
criminal experience. 
My strong opinion is that the publi c 
needs to hire some death penalty public. 
detenders. Ii they burn out , then replace 
them; or pay them enough to keep them. 
Obviously, this is not likelv in the short 
ru n, at least until 105 or more middie-
aged civil trial lawyers get galvanized b, 
the experience I have had. at which po1rn 
the politic~ or it m,11 ch,rnge. Tht:.' re:-.r or 
thi s letter proceeds on the r1•~umpt1on 
tlldi orCll:1,HI ( l \ ll trl,!. l,l\\ \ ;:'f- \\ ill <.01,· 
t 1 r:u ·-~ tc: Di-- 2~n•;:r.:r-: :n ar- :"1 ! !1 f1P~--: f~ !! •. 
hanea, ca-• ·· 
2. Your opponC'nf-\nur orporl!'rit wi! : 
be Ed Carne~ or th 1::· Attornev Gt>ner,11 ·, 
oi11cc. He 1~ wry, \·erv briµht . ht· ha~ a 
narrow special tv. anrl he know~ it cold . 
He could beJt anvbocl\' in the countn 
on th, ~ )ub1ect the i~ al~o. in mv experi-
ence. ent1re1, 1aIr and eth1cal1. On vour 
11rst solo f11gnr vou wil l not meet a Ger-
man tarmnano . vou \.viii meet the Red 
Baron. Good iuu, 
3. What your opponent knows that 
you do not know-There are rour app li-
cable bodies oi law that vour opponent 
and the iederal judges know periecth 
and you do not know at all. and vou will 
never know as well as your judges or 
your opponent. They are (1/ general sub-
stantive criminal law and criminal pro-
cedure needed ior the non-death issue~ 
(Bradv. Mas siah, Sandstrom. etc.), (2) the 
operation and constitutional overlay oi 
the Alabama death penalty statute, (3) the 
rules oi " procedural default" and the 
wavs to get around it and to stop lawver~ 
irom getting around it, and (4) the doc-
trines oi "abuse oi the writ." 
To some extent m the "original habea," 
case vou will have time to do adequate 
research to trv to catch up. but vour lad 
of depth will clearl v hurt at oral argu-
ment in the Eleventh Circui t. 
Where your ignorance will clearly hurl 
vou is in "the subsequent habeas ca se," 
d I scussed next. 
4. The "Subsequent Habeas Case'.!.. 
You and all civil trial lc1wyers will say, " I 
plan to give it mv hPst shot at first, anci 
not file those last-minute appeal s likP 
those Godless commie civil righb lav.--
yers." Sure. so d id I. 
What hc1ppens is that aiter you have 
filed and litigated your first habeas cor-
pus ca se. there will be ~ome new de-
velopment in the law m the ~upreme 
court or in some other nrcurt whi ch. on 
the merit~. would entitlt> vou to reliPi. 
You mc?v leJrn Jbout :r on vou:-- O\\·n . er 
more l1i-.eiv ~ump "ut>atn Dt'n ,11!\ P'-Prri . 
wil l t0II ynu about It m.11 he the ,, eek iw-
-
!u f~ i!! • ... P~eCUli o r·. •(J \ ' ! )~ ; rlld'- !J · 
un luC~ \' like I Web , and ~ P l .. ll)t)Ollllt'U IU-
1:-JC· ri r, i time arrc~ tn (: r:r~r nJDt'J ,. an c! 
onlv the week berore tn e execution I. M\ 
expn1ence 1~ thJt a second hahe.:is case 
I~ s1rnµ:\ a normed anrl expectable part 
oi the proces~ ror a good lawver. Just a, 
a spring ba5s iisherman who does not get 
hi~ 1ure caught in tne stumps and bushe~ 
is no: casting in the right piace~. so too 
the habeas lawver who does not get in-
volved in a subsequent haheas case ma\· 
not be serving as effectivelv as oossibl e. 
A subsequent habeas case twith an 
outstanding execution warrant and datei 
1s to a 11rst habeas case as "Space Moun-
ta in'· is to riding to church with your 
father. In both my cases it involved tak-
ing a brand new issue-cold and with a~ 
solutelv no time for preparation-from 
the district court through the court oi ap-
peals to the U.S. Supreme Court in less 
than three and a half days, the days im-
mediately preceding the execution. Spic-
ing up the process are the unexpected 
calls from the AP, UPI. the local press and 
the television and radio stations, the 
ACLU. Amnesty International in London, 
women in Maine who want to make sure 
you really believe your client is innocent 
and that you are working hard enough 
and-the most iun yet-funeral homes. 
Here is where your lack of depth will 
kill you, on the doctrines of "procedural 
bar," "successive habeas" and "abuse of 
the writ;' the common battlefields of suc-
cessive habeas. In addition. since you 
will be going cold on a new case involv-
ing an unfamiliar area, your lack of depth 
will hurt. 
You will spend all oi your available 
time physically moving papers to and 
from increasingly high court s, one each 
day (if you are lucky). You will be bat-
tling with unfamiliar precepts, and every-
body else involved-the judges and your 
opponent-will know the rules cold . 
At the end, the court will enter an 
order saying that your failure to have 
either known about or even to have antic-
ipated that new development in the un-
fam iliar area oi death penalty law makes 
your fiiini! the case "an abuse of the writ." 
Thereiore vou iose. and vour client dies. 
That dav. u~uall\ \\·ithin hour;. 
! n. 
-
-'\ 1 lt' d '- t tndr 1, wnar nJDl)Pnl'C: ffi 11 1• 
in ootn cases. and 1t wili l1ke1v happen 
tu n,u .... : ui \.\ .. h. .. . 
4. What can be done to help civil trial 
lawyers in death penaltv cases-lust 
trom seemg what I needed. I have a pret-
ty good idea what can be done to help 
ovil trial lawver.; in death penalty habeas 
corpus case~. 
a. Review of record to spot issues-
The first thing that is needed is a review 
oi the record bv somebodv who know~ 
what he/she is doing, simply to spot the 
issues. What was not raised in state court 
by the tria l or appellate lawyer oiten 1s 
even more important than what was 
raised . and onlv an experienced death 
penalty hand can spot that. Anybody 
who thinks a middle-aged civil trial law-
yer can do that is just wrong. 
Somebody (not me) needs to provide 
an experienced death penalty hand at 
the outset to read the whole record and 
to spot and list the issues to be followed 
up by the civil trial lawyer. 
As far as I know, nobody is doing that. 
b. Newsletter-Expecting middle-aged 
civil trial lawyers to be able to keep up 
with death penalty developments is a 
serious mistake. Somebody (not me) 
needs to compile and send a newsletter 
every two weeks or month to point out 
hot new death cases and hot new death 
' My practice is entirely civil. I never 
volunteered for such cases. When ap-
pointed, I politely resisted appointment. 
I do not consider it the duty of civil trial 
lawyers in big firms to handle such cases, 
any more than it is the personal duty of 
metropolitan dermatologists to fill the 
gap of obstetrics in rural counties (both 
are public problems requ iring public 
solutions). Almost alone among "death 
penalty lawyers: ' I don't even care much 
whether we have the death penalty or not 
(I generally iavor it because mad dogs 
1,qw~. Thi, h tni- nnl\ Wrl\ tn nP l ll '1\ , 'I' ; 
the ··abuse or me \H1t " trJ o. 11 nooom 
w1I1 unaertaKe such a tash. . dt a min1mu,; , 
somebodv ought to suggest that the lav--
ver ~ iirm subscribe ior one vear to the 
Criminal La,v Reporter, or whatever else 
pa sses in the trade as a newsletter. 
Even better. but more labor intensive. 
would be tor somebody to maintain a 
current listing of the issues in each pend-
ing death case, with bullet memos to al l 
lawyers involved in a panicuiar issue. 
c. Abuse of the writ advice-Some-
body needs to tell the appointed lawyer 
that there is a high (though unauan-
tiiiableJ probability that he/she will be in-
volved in a subsequent habeas case on 
short notice based on some new de-
velopment, and that a high priority dur-
ing the original habeas phase should be 
mastering the "abuse of the writ" and 
"successive habeas" and procedural bar 
issues and, particularly, every loophole 
and exception and ground in them . 
This cannot be learned in the last min-
ute. when every second counts just to get 
the paperwork on the last Federal Express 
plane to Atlanta, or the last fax to the 
supreme court clerk's office.2 
Good luck to you if you are next. I am 
not. 
Very truly yours, 
David A. Bagwell, 
Mobile, Alabama 
ought to die, but I have occasional 
qualms that Jesus might not agree with 
that. and I am supposed to consider 
every now and then what he might do 
and try to do roughly the same). 
2 Just to let you know the rush, I actual-
ly faxed a handwritten note (a "sup-
plemental brief" I guess) to the U.S. 
Supreme Court while my stay motion 
was pending at 5:30 CDT (6:30 EDT) with 
an execution set that evening. The mo-
tion to stay was denied one minute later. 
There is no time for research then . • 
,n-:_ 
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December 14, 1989 
Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases 
Senator Biden: 
I have enclosed a response to the several questions 
from Senators transmitted with your letter of November 13, 
1989. As you will see, the response adopts the "narrative" 
form you suggested in addressing overlapping questions. 
Professor Pearson assisted me in the preparation of 
this response. Accordingly, he will not send any separate 
material in his own name. 
Sincerely, 
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 
Committee on the Judiciary 
Ruseell Senate Office Building 
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UNITED STATES SENATE 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS ON 
HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES 
LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
December 14, 1989 
1. Standards for Competency of Counsel 
Several factors went into the Committee's consider-
ation of this issue. First~ there is no constitutional 
right to counsel during either state or federal post-
conviction review. This is a factor that will influence the 
willingness of the States to support habeas corpus reform. 
Second, if habeas corpus reform in capital cases is to be 
achieved, substantial support at the state level will be 
necessary. Third, considerable weight was accorded to the 
fact that, subject to federal review, responsibility for 
providing competent counsel at the critical stages of crimi-
nal cases has always resided at the state level. 
The Committee's proposal has the important ele-
ment of flexibility. It allows the States the choice of 
remaining under the present system of multiple reviews with-
out regard to innocence, or of adopting the proposal of our 
Committee (S. 1760). For the States seeking greater finali-
ty in capital cases, their burden will be to propose a mech-
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anism for providing competent habeas counsel which they can 
sustain financially and can staff fully. The adequacy of a 
State's provisions will remain subject to federal court re-
view. In the Committee's view, this process should produce 
within a reasonable period of time the necessary precedents 
for other States to follow if they wish to choose the spe-
cial habeas scheme for capital cases. 
If a State acts in response to the incentive 
structure contemplated by the Committee, the status quo will 
change at least in that State and perhaps in others. Capi-
tal defendants will obtain representation which they now 
have no right to demand. Objective standards for promoting 
competent representation may vary at least initially from 
State to State, but that should not militate against the 
Committee's proposal as long as the federal judiciary is 
authorized to review each scheme to assure that it is rea-
sonably calculated to produce competent counsel in capital 
cases at the state habeas phase. Litigation over the ade-
quacy of the state system could produce initial delay, but 
this would be a one-time delay, well-justified by the gains 
in efficiency and fairness in the system as a whole. 
Uniform national standards of competency of counsel 
could obscure the many detailed considerations that are cru-
cial to the development of an effective system of state ha-
beas representation in capital cases. An examination of the 
standards for counsel in S. 1757 provides an illustration. 
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Section 2261 of S. 1757 requires 3 years of "experience" in 
the handling of felony trials. But it does not specify what 
that experience includes. A similar "experience" require-
ment is applicable to the handling of appeals. To promote 
attorney competency in capital cases, many details would 
have to be filled in. Presumably s. 1757 leaves those de-
tails - which would be decisive to the efficacy of a state-
wide representational scheme - to be worked out at the state 
level. Viewed in this light, the notion of uniformity ex-
pressed ins. 1757 is extremely limited. 
These "experience" provisions also could be coun-
terproductive. In addition to the 3 year trial and appel-
late "experience" requirements, section 2261 also requires 
that the attorney must have acquired that experience in the 
trial and appellate court in which the capital case is to be 
heard. Section 2261 also requires that each attorney sub-
ject to appointment must have been admitted to practice in 
those specific courts for 5 years prior to appointment. 
Under section 2261, even an attorney with extensive federal 
criminal trial experience could not be appointed unless he 
or she possessed the requisite state trial experience in the 
relevant local court. It is not easy to find attorneys 
willing and able to make the extraordinary commitment needed 
to serve as lead counsel or even to participate in a capital 
case. Section 2261 would make the task of finding capital 
defense counsel more difficult than it is at this time. 
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Whether attorney competency standards are mandatory 
or voluntary, the States will be unlikely to accept them 
unless the standards are reasonable in light of local condi-
tions. This includes the need for reasonable flexibility as 
to the amount of compensation for counsel. The absence of 
so-called uniform federal standards of competency is not a 
shortcoming in the Committee's proposal. If the States are 
allowed some flexibility in taking the initiative, the end 
result should be a material and beneficial change in the way 
capital cases are litigated in this country. 
In answer to some of the more specific questions 
concerning the Committee's recommendations, the standards 
for judging competency of counsel should be compatible 
throughout state and federal habeas corpus proceedings. But 
as indicated earlier, the competency standards in section 
2261 of s. 1757 are neither uniform nor particularly exact-
ing and they authorize virtually open ended departure when a 
attorney meeting those standards is unavailable. The same 
is true of the attorney competency standards in 21 USC 
§848(q)(7). Considerable discretion is placed in the hands 
of the trial judge in both instances. The Committee, howev-
er, believes that this is inevitable. There is no way to 
make any serious advances in this area without substantial 
delegation of responsibility under general standards. 
In my view, the attorney who represents a capital 
defendant at the state phase ought to continue to handle the 
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case once it reaches federal court unless there is clear 
reason to believe that the case has been mishandled. At 
that juncture, performance in the context of the specific 
case ought to override adherence to more generalized stand-
ards of competency. The object of this proposal is to find 
lawyers who will put forth intelligent, informed and aggres-
sive efforts on behalf of capital defendants. If that per-
formance is present, blind adherence to supposedly more de-
manding federal standards of competency would be a disser-
vice to the client and would discourage future lawyers from 
heeding the call to provide a needed service. 
2. Successive Petitions 
The object of the Committee's proposal is to en-
courage habeas counsel to inquire into all legal and factual 
issues concerning the capital sentencing procedure. The 
vast majority of death penalty cases do not focus on guilt-
innocence, but rather are concerned with the avoidance of 
the death penalty. After a verdict of guilty, a jury in a 
capital case can impose the death penalty only if it finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that certain aggravating circum-
stances were present. If the jury cannot reach unanimity on 
that issue or if a single juror finds mitigating circum-
stances to be overriding, then life imprisonment is the sen-
tence. 
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An understanding of this makes the state interest 
in sentencing finality clearer. It is hardly more burden-
some to retry a capital case completely than it is to have a 
new trial limited only to sentence. A second jury in a cap-
ital case must still hear all the evidence relevant to sen-
tence before it decides whether to impose the death penalty. 
From the State's perspective, challenges to the sentence 
really do not rest on the argument that the first jury would 
have decided the death penalty issue differently. Instead, 
they rest on the premise that a second and differently com-
posed jury might have one member who is unwilling to impose 
the death penalty. 
Under S. 1760, second or successive petitions are 
permissible in cases where there is doubt about the guilt-
innocence determination. Where there is no question in a 
capital case about guilt, S. 1760 limits a capital defendant 
to one opportunity for federal habeas review on the validity 
of sentence. Of course, it is significant that this would 
be a counseled opportunity. An experienced criminal attor-
ney knows the types of issues that can be raised in post-
conviction proceedings in addition to those raised at trial 
and on direct appeal. The identity of the State's witnesses 
and their testimony at the sentencing hearing would be a 
matter of record. Under S. 1760, habeas counsel is expected 
to undertake the necessary steps to investigate all such 
anticipatable issues, including Brady violations and the 
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possibility of perjured testimony, and do it in connection 
with the first petition. Discovery procedures are available 
at the federal level to assist in this process and should be 
liberally available. 
If perjured testimony or a Brady violation is not 
discovered by habeas counsel, S. 1760 would remit the capi-
tal defendant to state court for a remedy at that point. If 
the claim has substance and raises questions about the pro-
priety of the sentencing procedure, there is no reason to 
believe that a state court judge would hesitate to act. The 
fact that federal habeas review of sentencing would come to 
an end at some point does not mean that a capital defendant 
has no forum at all for late emerging theories of relief. 
Provision of a loophole in the federal successive 
petition rule for alleged Brady violations or perjured tes-
timony, moreover, would invite abuse through last-minute 
filings. The Committee's research indicates that such facts 
rarely exist. But they are easily alleged. The claim may 
require time to investigate even where it appears to be 
without merit, affording an opportunity to seek a stay of 
execution and further delay. Moreover, the successive peti-
tion provisions of s. 1757 are not limited to situations 
involving Brady violations or perjured testimony. Rather, 
S. 1757 provides a broad exception for any challenge to the 
sentence. This provision will destroy the enhanced finality 
that makes reform attractive to the States. If the Congress 
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decides that any exception for successive petitions beyond 
factual innocence is appropriate, it should be narrowly con-
fined to situations involving Brady violations or perjury. 
3. Retroactivity 
s. 1757 incorporates a section that would amend by 
legislation the Supreme Court's rules with respect to retro-
activity. The provision specifically overrules recent 
cases, including Teague v. Lane, 109 s. Ct. 1060 (1989). 
Retroactivity has traditionally been an area subject to~-
dicial administration, not specific legislative rules. This 
is appropriate due to the Court's greater expertise in the 
area. Moreover, the current law of retroactivity ensures 
that a prisoner's conviction and sentence will be proper 
under the law in effect at the time of trial, but does not 
allow challenges on the basis of law not even on the books 
at the time of the initial trial. The provision of s. 1757 
reverses this rule, making it far less attractive to the 
States. This disincentive for state participation would 
impede reform. 
4. Adequacy of 180 Day Filing Requirement 
If an attorney accepts appointment in a capital 
case, the State would have reason to expect the case to be 
his or her top priority. Since Furman, many death penalty 
cases have been litigated at the habeas phase under far 
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greater initial time constraints than the 180 day period 
proposed under s. 1760. This happens because the State has 
set an execution date after the conviction and sentence have 
been upheld on direct appeal. One of the advantages of S. 
1760, in the Committee's view, is that it would eliminate 
the time and energy that sometimes has to be put into secur-
ing stays of execution. 
The Committee believes that the 180-day time period 
is reasonable since new counsel would already have the bene-
fit of a full trial transcript plus all briefs and motions 
prepared by predecessor cou~sel. Frequently, trial counsel 
will assist habeas counsel in making them familiar with the 
case. Four months should be a more than adequate amount of 
time to evaluate the records and file a state habeas peti-
tion which would stop the 180 day time period from running 
any longer. If investigation reveals new issues, counsel 
for the capital defendant could seek leave to amend the pe-
tition to add those issues. The point of the 180 day filing 
requirement is to prompt capital defense attorneys to formu-
late a habeas petition. Otherwise, in a capital case, there 
is literally no incentive to file a habeas corpus petition 
until it becomes absolutely necessary. If a capital defense 
counsel works diligently from the day of appointment, he or 
she will get the state habeas petition filed with time to 
spare. 
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Under the Committee's proposal, the 180 day clock 
stops upon the filing of the state habeas petition and re-
mains stopped throughout state habeas litigation. It begins 
to run again only after the state high court has rendered a 
final judgment in the case which usually comes after the 
denial of a motion for rehearing in the event of a judgment 
adverse to the capital defendant. If there is continuity of 
representation as S. 1760 contemplates, the move from state 
to federal court should not require additional time. The 
better practice would be to have all federal habeas plead-
ings pre-drafted during the . time a motion for rehearing is 
pending before the state supreme court. If the motion for 
rehearing is denied, the federal habeas petition could then 
be filed on the same day of this denial with no additional 
running of time. If unusual problems arise in advance of 
the filing of either a state or federal habeas petition, the 
Committee proposal provides for a 60-day extension of time 
in which to file. 
5. Is One Federal Review Sufficient? 
Given the focus on continuously counseled represen-
tation throughout all post-conviction review, the scheme 
proposed in S. 1760 would be far superior to the chaotic 
system now in place. Piecemeal litigation is to some degree 
the result of several different teams of attorneys working 
at different phases of a death penalty case. Continuity of 
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representation will eliminate piecemeal litigation due to 
changes in counsel and it will also promote fairness to the 
capital defendant. Finally, the issue in capital cases is 
not delay per se; it is the lack of structure for the capi-
tal litigation process and the lack of clear agreement on 
when the federal role in this process comes to an end. Now 
the courts are grappling with this issue on a case-by-case 
basis. S. 1760 is an attempt to produce a balanced solution 
to the present deadlock. It offers major enhancements in 
terms of fairness to the capital defendant and requires in 
return a clarification of the rules of finality. 
~ 
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( 205) 432 - 6843 
(205) 433 - 3821 
Very shortly the Senate Judiciary Committee will no doubt 
be considering the question of the competence of appointed 
counsel in death penalty habeas litigation, either in the 
hearing on the Powell committee report, or in oversight with 
respect to counsel appointments under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1988, specifically 21 u.s.c. § 848(q) (5) (providing for 
standards on appointive counsel in death penalty cases). 
I write to suggest that (1) there needs to be established 
a death penalty habeas corpus public defender in each state, by 
somebody, the establishment of which will take either federal 
money or federal coercion, either direct or indirect, (2) such 
an office would not likely cost the government any more than it 
is currently paying, since the elimination of the old statutory 
maximum hourly rates and maximum case limits (by the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988) will drive up lawyer costs anyway, and (3) 
the present system of "pick-up appointed lawyers", whether 
middle-aged civil trial lawyers or criminal trial lawyers or 
both in some ersatz combination, is simply not working. Worse 
yet, I don't think the federal judges know it is not working. 
In court, when you were in practice, you established an 
expert's background before his opinion would be accepted. My 
background on this question includes ( 1) I am a middled-aged 
civil trial lawyer and know something about what middle-aged 
civil trial lawyers know and don't know, (2) as of this spring, 
I had represented in their habeas corpus death penalty cases 
(which were "only two") (by federal court appointment) at the 
time of their execution half of all the people executed in 
/) 
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Alabama in the last 23 years, (3) the Federal Judicial Center 
about seven years ago asked me to make, and I made, a three-
hour videotape training film on the handling of, among other 
things, habeas corpus cases, (4) I served on the Alabama State 
Bar Task Force on the Crisis in Capital Representation, and (5) 
I served on the board of the Alabama Capital Resources Defense 
Center, the corporation established by the State Bar to provide 
assistance to appointed death penalty lawyers. I know 
something about this problem. 
A little background may be in order. 
From about 1968 to about 1982, the actuality of the death 
penalty -- actual executions -- was essentially on the back 
burner, with the big constitutional law questions being 
litigated up to and including the Supreme Court. In those days 
these cases were handled by expert civil rights lawyers who 
knew what they were doing, and a very few of them could handle 
the big test cases. In Alabama, that was mostly the Southern 
Poverty Law Center (principally John Carroll). 
Beginning in about 1984 or 1985 or 1986 or thereabouts, 
the civil rights lawyer specialists got out of the field for 
one reason or another. For one thing the number of cases 
overwhelmed them, as we moved past the test cases. For another 
thing they got tired of it and burned out and moved on to other 
jobs. For another thing they got -- with some justification--
sick and tired of hearing the lawyers and the judges and the 
politicians and the people decry the handling of death penalty 
litigation by those lawyers, and they basically left the field, 
saying to the rest of us "okay, you handle the problem 
yourselves", and we are now stuck with it. 
For the most part the legislatures have not provided any 
solution, accurately reading the people as wanting to do 
nothing to stop or slow down death penalty cases, ( such as 
providing _lawyers) but wanting instead to speed them up. 
That left the federal judges with a large group of death 
penalty habeas corpus cases of a relatively routine nature, 
often second or even third habeas cases, with no lawyers. The 
judges, under the circumstances, did the best they could. 
The judges were faced with no good solutions. If they 
appoint experienced criminal lawyers, cases like this -- which 
tend to take six weeks completely out of law practice in great 
gaps and with little or no warning -- would wreck the practice 
of small single practitioner criminal lawyers. Furthermore, 
those lawyers -- while they know criminal law pretty well--
typically don't know the rules pertaining to specialty habeas 
• 
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corpus litigation, such as "abuse of the writ", "procedural 
default", "deliberate bypass", and the like. And, those 
lawyers tend to lack the staff, the resources, and the skills 
to mount effective habeas corpus attacks, the legal skill most 
nearly approximated by corporate takeover litigation. 
The federal courts in the Deep South, and probably over 
the entire nation, decided to start appointing middle-aged 
civil trial lawyers in these cases, sometimes with some 
success. (The appointment of a large firm civil trial lawyer 
also wrecks his practice, since big firms are basically just a 
big collection of small firms and individual lawyers, but not 
many judges understand that.) Occasionally the appointment of 
a middle-aged civil trial lawyer -- who could provide manpower 
and machinery skills, such as research computers and FAX 
machines and the like -- was combined with the appointment of a 
criminal law "mentor" or advisor. To some extent that 
minimized the problem, but neither the civil lawyer nor the 
criminal lawyer would be generally familiar with the real 
specialty areas of habeas corpus litigation, namely, 
"procedural default", "abuse of the writ", and "deliberate 
bypass", areas in which state Attorneys General are experts 
and areas in which the members of the federal judiciary are 
experts. The net effect is that the habeas petitioner's 
lawyer, being largely ignorant of about half the applicable 
substantive and procedural law, is usually monumentally 
outgunned. I would call it shooting fish in a tub. 
The current system simply does not work nearly as well as 
it should. Take my word for it. I have been on both ends of 
it; I have seen it from the judicial perspective, and maybe 
more than anybody else in our state at least, from the habeas 
petitioner's prospective. In that regard, I enclose a copy of 
a letter which I sent to the other members of the State Bar 
Task Force and the other directors of our Capital Resources 
Center, explaining in a little more detail and maybe more 
graphically how and why the current system does not work. 
The only solution I see is a death penalty habeas public 
defender, someone whose expertise in all the applicable areas 
of habeas corpus could at least equal that of the state 
Attorneys General. 
I really don't think it would cost much if any more than 
the current system. In that vein, I doubt that many people 
realize yet just how expensive the current system actually is, 
starting this year. Under the current system, by reason of the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, middle-aged civil trial lawyers 
like me who are appointed in these cases are paid current 
market rates, which may be tens of thousands of dollars. I 
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suspect that the full effect of this is only now starting to be 
felt. If you add in all of the money being spent on all of 
those appointed lawyers -- much of it for repetitive education 
on the basics of habeas -- you already have the federal money 
in the system to pay for a federal habeas corpus death penalty 
public defender. 
I say the system needs it badly. 
If nothing else, I would respectively suggest that the 
committee, in what I understand to be its oversight function, 
take a look at the current administrative operation of the 
federal courts in appointing non-criminal lawyers pursuant to 
their interpretation of 21 u.s.c. § 848(q) (5), a statute which 
according to my understanding shows that the Congress intended 
experienced criminal lawyers in federal courts to represent 
people under sentence of death. If that was the intent of 
Congress, it has not been followed by the Eleventh Circuit, at 
least. See In re Lindsey. 875 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1989). 
This is a tough problem. Good luck on it. 
DAB/lbr 
Enclosure 
cc: Hon. William H. Rehnquist 
Hon. Lewis Powell 




Letter to the Editor 
Like other states, Alabama faces an 
acute problem in obtaining counsel 
for the defense of capital cases. The 
following thought-provoking com-
mentary was contained in a letter 
sent to the Action Group on Post-
Conviction Capital Representation. 
Members, Action Group on Post-
Conviction Capital Representation 
Board of Directors, Alabama Capital 
Resource Center, Inc. 
RE : Civil Trial Lawyers 
in Death Penalty Cases 
As you might have read in the news-
paper, my client Michael Lindsey was ex-
ecuted on May 26. That, along with the 
execution of my client Wayne Ritter in 
1987 (the last man executed in Alabama), 
puts me in the unique and unenviable 
role of having represented, at the time of 
execution, 50 percent of all the people 
executed in Alabama in the last 23 years, 
a fact I do not plan to list in Martindale-
Hubbel l. Considering my personal his-
tory,1 it is remarkable. 
After a Memorial Day weekend of rest, 
fishing and ski ing, I am moving on in my 
life, never to take another death penalty 
case even if they disbar me for my refusal 
(there are 105 on death ra,,v there, I think, 
and one or two more from Mobile alone 
are convicted every week, it seems, but 
there are lots more lawyers than that) . 
Like those who served both in WWII and 
Korea, I figure I've done my duty, and the 
next war can be fought by somebody 
else. 
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Before I move on in my life, though, 
I owe it to those 105 or more civil trial 
lawyers who will be drafted in the next 
two years or so, to do what I can to pass 
on my lessons to somebody, so their role 
will be easier, and for that limited pur-
pose I send this letter. I couldn't think of 
anybody to send it to other than the bar's 
Task Force on Post-Conviction Capital 
Representation, and the board members 
and executive director of the Alabama 
Capital Representation Resource Center, 
Inc., the organ that Albert Brewer and the 
task force kicked into life to work on this 
stuff. 
Here are my lessons: 
1. Appointing civil trial lawyers in 
death penalty cases is a bad mistake-I 
have believed this all along, and I believe 
it more strongly now than ever. Those of 
you who have been on this project from 
the start know that I have never made a 
secret of it. Lest you think I have kept my 
mouth shut when I should not have, I 
should add that in the last two months 
I have filed motions and mandamus peti-
tions and appeals in five different courts 
(three different ones in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit alone) based on federal and state 
statutes which I believed (and still be-
lieve, though the judges don't) to require 
the appointment of lawyers with three 
years' (federal) or five years' (state) 
criminal experience. 
My strong opinion is that the public 
needs to hire some death penalty public 
defenders. If they burn out, then replace 
them, or pay them enough to keep them. 
Obviously, this is not likely in the short 
run, at least until 105 or more middle-
aged civil trial lawyers get galvanized by 
the experience I have had, at which point 
the politics of it may change. The rest of 
this letter proceeds on the assumption 
that ordinary civil trial lawyer-. will con-
tinue to be appointed in death penalty 
habeas cases. 
2. Your opponent-Your opponent will 
be Ed Carnes of the Attorney General 's 
office. He is very, very bright, he has a 
narrow specialty, and he knows it cold. 
He could beat anybody in the country 
on this subject (he is also, in my experi-
ence, entirely fair and ethical ). On your 
first solo flight you will not meet a Ger-
man farmhand, you will meet the Red 
Baron. Good luck. 
3. What your opponent knows that 
you do not know-There are four appli-
cable bodies of law that your opponent 
and the federal judges know perfectly 
and you do not know at all , and you will 
never know as well as your judges or 
your opponent. They are (1) general sub-
stantive criminal law and criminal pro-
cedure needed for the non-death issues 
(Brady, Massiah, Sandstrom, etc.), (2) the 
operation and constitutional overlay of 
the Alabama death penalty statute, (3) the 
rules of "procedural default" and the 
ways to get around it and to stop lawyers 
from getting around it, and (4) the doc-
trines of "abuse of the writ." 
To some extent in the "original habeas" 
case you will have time to do adequate 
research to try to catch up, but your lack 
of depth will clearly hurt at oral argu-
ment in the Eleventh Circuit. 
Where your ignorance will clearly hurt 
you is in "the subsequent habeas case," 
discussed next. 
4. The "Subsequent Habeas Case'!... 
You and all civil trial lawyers will say, " I 
plan to give it my best shot at first, and 
not file those last-minute appeals like 
those Godless commie civi I rights law-
yers." Sure, so did I. 
What happens is that after you have 
filed and litigated your first habeas cor-
pus case, there wi II be some new de-
velopment in the law in the supreme 
court or in some other circuit which, on 
the merits, would entitle you to relief. 
You may learn about it on your own, or 
more likely some "death penalty expert" 
wi ll tell you about it maybe the week be-
November 1989 
fore the execution . (Or, you may be 
unlucky like I was, and get appointed (or 
the first time after the first habeas, and 
only the week before the execution). My 
experience is that a second habeas rase 
is simply a normal and expectable part 
of the process for a good lawyer. Just as 
a spring bass fisherman who does not get 
his lure caught in the stumps and bushes 
is not casting in the right places, so too 
the habeas lawyer who does not get in-
volved in a subsequent habeas case may 
not be serving as effectively as possible. 
A subsequent habeas case (with an 
outstanding execution warrant and date) 
is to a first habeas case as "Space Moun-
tain" is to riding to church with your 
father. In both my cases it involved tak-
ing a brand new issue-cold and with al:r 
solutely no time for preparation-from 
the district court through the court of ap-
peals to the U.S. Supreme Court in less 
than three and a half days, the days im-
mediately preceding the execution. Spic-
ing up the process are the unexpected 
calls from the AP, UPI, the local press and 
the television and radio stations, the 
ACLU, Amnesty International in London, 
women in Maine who want to make sure 
you really believe your client is innocent 
and that you are working hard enough 
and-the most fun yet-funeral homes. 
Here is where your lack of depth will 
kill you, on the doctrines of "procedural 
bar;' "successive habeas" and "abuse of 
the writ;' the common battlefields of suc-
cessive habeas. In addition , since you 
will be going cold on a new case involv-
ing an unfamiliar area, your lack of depth 
will hurt. 
You will spend all of your available 
time physically moving papers to and 
from increasingly high courts, one each 
day (if you are lucky). You will be bat-
tling with unfamiliar precepts, and every-
body else involved-the judges and your 
opponent-will know the rules cold. 
At the end, the court will enter an 
order saying that your failure to have 
either known about or even to have antic-
ipated that new development in the un-
familiar area of death penalty law makes 
your filing the case "an abuse of the writ:' 
Therefore you lose, and your client dies. 
That day, usually within hours. 
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At least, that is what happened to me 
in both cases, and it will likely happen 
to most of you . 
4. What can be done to help civil trial 
lawyers in death penalty cases-Just 
from seeing what I needed, I have a pret-
ty good idea what can be done to help 
civil trial lawyers in death penalty habeas 
corpus cases. 
a. Review of record to spot issues-
The first thing that is needed is a review 
of the record by somebody who knows 
what he/she is doing, simply to spot the 
issues. What was not raised in state court 
by the trial or appellate lawyer often is 
even more important than what was 
raised, and only an experienced death 
penalty hand can spot that. Anybody 
who th inks a middle-aged civil trial law-
yer can do that is just wrong. 
Somebody (not me) needs to provide 
an experienced death penalty hand at 
the outset to read the whole record and 
to spot and list the issues to be followed 
up by the civil trial lawyer. 
As far as I know, nobody is doing that. 
b. Newsletter-Expecting middle-aged 
civil trial lawyers to be able to keep up 
with death penalty developments is a 
serious mistake. Somebody (not me) 
needs to compile and send a newsletter 
every two weeks or month to point out 
hot new death cases and hot new death 
1 My practice is entirely civil. I never 
volunteered for such cases. When ap-
pointed, I politely resisted appointment. 
I do not consider it the duty of civil trial 
lawyers in big firms to handle such cases, 
any more than it is the personal duty of 
metropolitan dermatologists to fill the 
gap of obstetrics in rural counties (both 
are public problems requiring public 
solutions). Almost alone among "death 
penalty lawyers," I don't even care much 
whether we have the death penalty or not 
(I generally favor it because mad dogs 
issues. This is the only way to help avoid 
the "abuse of the writ" trap. If nobody 
will undertake such a task, at a minimum 
somebody ought to suggest that the law-
yer's iirm subscribe for one year to the 
Criminal Law Reporter, or whatever else 
passes in the trade as a newsletter. 
Even better, but more labor intensive, 
would be for somebody to maintain a 
current listing of the issues in each pend-
ing death case, with bullet memos to all 
lawyers involved in a particular issue. 
c. Abuse of the writ advice-Some-
body needs to tell the appointed lawyer 
that there is a high (though unquan-
tifiable) probability that he/she will be in-
volved in a subsequent habeas case on 
short notice based on some new de-
velopment, and that a high priority dur-
ing the original habeas phase should be 
mastering the "abuse of the writ" and 
"successive habeas" and procedural bar 
issues and, particularly, every loophole 
and exception and ground in them . 
This cannot be learned in the last min-
ute, when every second counts just to get 
the paperwork on the last Federal Express 
plane to Atlanta, or the last fax to the 
supreme court clerk's office.2 
Good luck to you if you are next. I am 
not. 
Very truly yours, 
David A. Bagwell, 
Mobile, Alabama 
ought to die, but I have occasional 
qualms that Jesus might not agree with 
that, and I am supposed to consider 
every now and then what he might do 
and try to do roughly the same) . 
2 Just to let you know the rush, I actual-
ly faxed a handwritten note (a "sup-
plemental brief" I guess) to the U.S. 
Supreme Court while my stay motion 
was pending at 5:30 CDT (6:30 EDT) with 
an execution set that evening. The mo-
tion to stay was denied one minute later. 
There is no time for research then . • 
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December 18, 1989 
Dear Mr. Shearer: 
Thank you for your letter of De-
cember 10. I am impressed by your under-
standing of the recommendation of the Ad 
Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in 
Capital Cases. 
I testified in support of our rec-
ommendations before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. I think there is a fairly good 
chance of major improvements in the present 
law. 
Sincerely, 
C. Russell H. Shearer, Esquire 
4000 Heather Drive 




December 19, 1989 
Dear Charles, 
Thank you for your memorandum of December 11 enclosing 
the article about the abuse of habeas corpus in death cases. The 
author of the article, David Bagwell, sums up the present situation 
rather well in his final couple of paragraphs. I very much 
appreciate the effort you are making to obtain Congressional 
support of the proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee. I have been 
pleased by the absence - at least to date - of any criticism of our 
proposal except by those who oppose the death penalty. 
Jo and I returned to our Richmond home this weekend to 
be here for Christmas. The weather - snow and sub-freezing tempera-
tures - is most unwelcome. 
Always with affection for you and Emily. 
Honorable Charles Clark 
Chief Judge, United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fi f th Circuit 
P. o. Box 2219 
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Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
December 20, 1989 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
2 7D£c l 
WILLIAM R. BURCHILL, JR. 
GENERAL COUNSEL 
I thought that you and the members of the former Ad Hoc Committee would be 
interested in seeing the relevant excerpts from the draft report of the Judicial 
Conference's Federal Courts Study Committee regarding habeas corpus issues. I am 
enclosing the same herewith. 
I should emphasize that this report remains in draft form, but it has now been 
released for public comment and reaction. As you may be aware, the report is due to 
be formally adopted and submitted in April to the Judicial Conference, the President, 
and Congress, following a sche ule of nine public hearings on the report which will be 
held in January 1990. 
With kindest regards and very best wishes for the Holiday season, 
Sincerely, 
Enclosure 
cc: Honorable Charles Clark 
Honorable Wm. Terrell Hodges 
Honorable Paul H. Roney 
Honorable Barefoot Sanders 







The purpose of these tentative recommendations is to 
stimulate debate and comment prior to final resolution 
of Committee recommendations. As such, this tentative 
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December 22, 1989 
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HABEAS CORPUS REFORM 
• Congress should make no change regarding the stan-
dards for hearing the successive habeas corpus peti-
tions of state prisoners under 28 o.s.c. S 2244. 
The present rules governing the hearing of succes-
sive petitions were established by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Sanders v. United States.60/ Under Sanders controlling weight 
may be given to the deniarof a prior habeas corpus applica-
tion only if (1) the same ground was presented and decided 
adversely to the petitioner, (2) the prior decision was on the 
merits, and (3) "the ends of justice" would not be served by 
reaching the merits of the subsequent application.61/ When 
grounds could have been but were not raised in an earlier 
petition, the merits must be reached unless the petitioner has 
deliberately abused the writ or motion remedy.62/ 
These rules have been controversial from their in-
ception. Some think that the "lax" standards espoused in 
Sanders resulted in a flood of successive petitions that need-
lessly undermined the states' interests in the finality of 
convictions. Early efforts to convince Congress to overrule 
Sanders failed, and instead the Court's result was codi-
fied.63/ A later effort to overrule Sanders by rule was simi-
larlyrepudiated.64/ Efforts from within the Court have 
failed to obtain amajority.65/ 
The Committee believes that no change is needed in 
this area. Many prisoners file more than one petition, but 
the chief source of these successive petitions -- changes in 
law that give rise to new claims or strengthen or revive old 
!QI 313 U.S. l (1963). 
fill Id. at 15. 
62/ Id. at 17-18. 
63/ 28 o.s.c. 5 2244: Larry w. Yackle, Postconviction 
Remedies S 154 at 560 (1981). 
64/ See Rule Governing S 2254 Cases in the United States 
filstrict Court 9(b) (1976). 
65/ Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986). 
- - 60 - -ones -- was recently eliminated by the Supreme Court's hold- / 
ings in Teague v. Lane!§_/ and Penry v. Lynaugh.67/ ) 
Of greater importance is the fact that the federal ~f-1.).C> 
courts appear to have little difficulty disposing of those 
successive petitions that do come before them. The absence in. 
the reports of decisions applying the Sanders criteria sug-
gests (and anecdotal evidence confirms) that successive peti-
tions are usually disposed of summarily and without reported 
opinion. In fact, the rules governing successive petitions 
appear to be applied-in practice as if they incorporated a res 
judicata principle, so that successive .petitions are turned ~-y~ 
aside routinely without significant expenditure of judicial 
effort. At the same time, the broad formulation in terms of 
"abuse of the writ" and "the ends of justice" provides judges 
with sufficient flexibility to reach the merits in those cases 
that do appear to warrant further examination. 
• Congress should make no change in the law respecting 
fact-finding procedures in habeas corpus cases. 
The Committee also examined proposals that would 
have restricted further the power of district courts to hold 
evidentiary hearings. Here, too, we recommend no change. 
There are very few habeas corpus cases in which such hearings 
are held -- indeed, the rate of hearings is lower than for 
other classes of civil litigation. We believe existing stan-
dards are sufficiently strict. 
In Townsend v. Sain,68/ the Supreme Court estab-
lished when evidentiary hearings must be held to make indepen-
dent findings of fact in habeas corpus cases. Soon thereaf-
ter, Congress amended 28 o.s.c. S 2254 and established new 
guidelines for when state court findings should be presumed 
correct. Considerable dissension over the law in this area 
has erupted: the chief impetus for reform seems to be the 
belief that federal courts should not waste valuable time 
reassessing something that has already been done in the state 
courts. Thus, advocates of reform have proposed restricting 
the availability of federal evidentiary hearings to those few 
cases in which the state court hearing was not "full and 
fair." Other reformers propose abolishing federal fact-
finding altogether and making habeas corpus review a purely 
appellate procedure. 
§!/ 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). 
67/ 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989). 
68/ 372 o.s. 293 (1963). 
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essary at this time. Evidentiary hearings are held in very 
few habeas corpus cases. In both 1987 and 1988, only 1.1\ of 
the petitions filed were terminated after a trial.69/ One 
reason so few hearings are held is that, in practice, most 
judges grant a hearing only if the state court proceedings 
were not full and fair. As a result, habeas corpus cases are 
less likely than other civil cases to go to trial. The data 
suggest that this is a direct result of the 1966 amendments. 
Accordingly, we see little need for congressional intervention 
at this time. 
• Congress should enact legislation regulating when a 
prisoner can -base a habeas corpus petition on legal 
decisions rendered after his or her conviction be-
came final. This legislation should provide that 
the federal courts entertain a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus only if it presents a claim that 
was either controlled or •clearly foreshadowed• by 
existing Supreme Court precedent. The district 
court should have discretion to address the merits 
of the claim if that is necessary to determine 
whether a proper claim is presented. In addition, 
the legislation should recognize exceptions to this 
principle if the petitioner's claim is (1) that 
certain conduct or a certain kind of punishment is 
beyond the power of the criminal law to proscribe: 
(2) that the absence of a particular procedure sub-
stantially increases the likelihood of an erroneous 
verdict: or (3) the kind of claim that is not feas-
ible to raise in an appeal from the judgment under 
which the applicant is in custody. 
The question of retroactivity70/ has been a particu-
larly sensitive issue in habeas corpus aebate: if the state 
provides a trial that protected a defendant's constitutional 
rights as then understood, but a federal court later decides 
that the Constitution requires new or different procedures, 
should the state be required to release the prisoner and hold 
69/ Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative 
Orfice, 1987-88. 
70/ Last Term, in Teague v. Lane, 109 s. Ct. 1060 (1989), the 
Supreme Court held that a prisoner cannot seek habeas corpus 
relief based on changes in law occurring after his or her 
conviction. But the Court defined "new law" in extremely 
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a second trial that complies with the new law? The Supreme 
Court addressed this issue last Term in two important cases, 
Teague v. Lane71/ and Penry v. Lynaugh.72/ Although the Court 
was split in both cases, the plurality agreed that "new con-
stitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable 
to those cases which have become final before the new rules 
are announced."ll./ 
Furthermore, a majority appears to agree that a rule 
is Nnew" if it was not "dictated by prior precedent" -- even 
if the rule was already followed in every state.74/ A "new 
rule," in other words,_ is ·any rule that has not oeen expressly 
ratified by the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner's 
conviction becomes final. The Court also held that retroac-
tivity is a threshold inquiry that must be addressed before 
the court considers the merits. 
Finally, the Court recognized two exceptions to this 
general prohibition: a petitioner may base a claim on "new 
law" if the claim is (l) that certain conduct or a certain 
kind of punishment is beyond the power of the criminal law to 
proscribe, or (2) that the absence of a particular procedure 
substantially diminishes the likelihood- of an accurate ver-
dict.75/ 
Teague and Penry have dramatically changed the law 
of habeas corpus. One might perhaps argue that Congress 
should leave the courts to flesh out these issues before con-
sidering legislation. But Congress successfully codified 
several then-recent Supreme Court decisions in 1966: con-
gressional action in this context will be equally helpful. 
Teague and Penry are based on the premise that the 
interests of the prisoner are at their weakest, and those of 
the state at their strongest, when the state court correctly 
applied law that has since been changed. In those cases, 
habeas corpus does not deter state courts from ignoring feder-
al constitutional rights, since the failure to predict a 
change cannot realistically be deterred. The state court has 
71/ 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). 
72/ 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989). 
73/ 109 s. Ct. at 1075, O'Connor, J. (plurality opinion), 
1080, Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J. 
74/ 109 s. Ct. at 1070, O'Connor, J. (plurality opinion): 109 
S:- Ct. 2944. 
75/ 109 s. Ct. at 1075-77 (plurality opinion). 
- - 63 - -done all that can fairly be asked of it by properly applying 
the law as it stood during the trial and appeal. 
The desirability of limiting habeas corpus to claims 
based on law existing at the time a conviction becomes final 
depends on how one distinguishes between "misreading existing 
law" and "making new law." These categories blend together, 
yet this blurred line determines the scope of the state 
courts' duty to faithfully interpret and enforce the Constitu-
tion. There will often be sufficient uncertainty about the 
implications of particular Supreme Court decisions to insulate 
some state interpretations from federal habeas corpus review 
under Teague and Penry. Enough ambiguity will remain to insu-
late some state decisions from federal habeas corpus review. 
Therefore, we suggest that Congress direct federal 
courts to hear a habeas corpus petition only if it presents a 
clai~ that was either controlled or "clearly foreshadowed" by 
existing Supreme Court precedent. This standard should re-
quire state courts to attend to caselaw developments without 
penalizing them for failing to be prescient. At the same 
time, we believe that this standard will not be too difficult 
to administer. Its precise contours will require further 
development through adjudication. 
Second, it will often be difficult to separate the 
retroactivity issue from the merits. In addition, because the 
pleadings in habeas corpus cases are usually prepared by the 
inmate, they often require considerable interpretation by the 
reviewing court: issues that have been formulated cleanly when 
the case reaches the Supreme Court were seldom so in the lower 
courts. Therefore, we recommend that the decision whether to 
address the merits be left to the court's discretion. 
Exercising of this discretion should depend on whether the 
merits can be separated from the retroactivity question. 
Finally, we agree with the two exceptions recognized 
in Teague and Penry, but we believe that Congress should cre-
ate a third exception as well. Some claims are unlikely to be 
raised on direct appeal (e.g., ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claims and claims that turn ~n facts that are discovered 
after appeal, such as Brady claims). After Teague and Penry, 
however, such claims can no longer be raised in habeas corpus 
proceedings if they argue for a change in the·law. An excep-
tion to the rule of retroactivity is thus needed here for the 
same reason the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to 
the mootness doctrine for claims that are "capable of repeti-
tion yet evading review:" 
